People v. Stockman CA1/3

Filed 4/11/23 P. v. Stockman CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A164669
v.
JESSE ARTHUR STOCKMAN, (Napa County
Super. Ct. No. 21CR001775)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Jesse Arthur Stockman was charged with various offenses in a six-
count information arising from a violent altercation with his ex-girlfriend,
Jane Doe, during which he broke her nose. He pled no contest to a single
count of corporal injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and admitted a
great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). In exchange for his
plea, he was promised a five-year maximum prison sentence, and he
indicated in his plea form that he understood he was pleading to a violent
felony. The trial court accepted the plea and, on motion of the district
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1, reciting only those facts
necessary to resolve the issues raised.
All undesignated statutory references appearing within are to the
Penal Code.
1
attorney, dismissed all of the remaining counts with a Harvey waiver.2 The
defendant also entered an Arbuckle waiver,3 such that another judge could
sentence him at a later date.
At a sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the trial court to grant
probation, arguing the evidence showed that Jane Doe was the initial
aggressor and that defendant reacted with excessive force. The court
continued the hearing so it could consider the preliminary hearing transcript,
and the court also allowed the parties to file additional briefing, in part,
about whether to strike the great bodily injury enhancement or the
punishment for that enhancement.
At the continued sentencing hearing on November 22, 2021, the
prosecutor noted that the enactment of Senate Bill No. 567 (Senate Bill
567)—which would take effect at the beginning of the new year—would
generally require imposition of the middle term unless the defendant
stipulated to aggravating circumstances, or a jury or the court found such
circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor stated that if
the court were inclined to strike punishment on the great bodily injury
enhancement, then she would ask the court to impose the upper term of four
years for the section 273.5 count. The prosecutor pressed for defendant’s
stipulation to aggravating circumstances out of concern that, absent such a
stipulation, an upper term sentence would be reversed due to Senate Bill 567.
The trial court indicated that if defendant would stipulate to
aggravating factors, it would consider imposing the upper term of four years
for the section 273.5 count and striking the punishment for the great bodily
injury enhancement, rather than sentencing him to five years. Defense
2 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.
3 People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749.
2
counsel stated defendant would surely prefer four years to five and stipulate
to circumstances in aggravation, but defendant interjected “no.” Defendant
then made a short statement, during which he took responsibility for
breaking Jane Doe’s nose, while also saying he did not “want to aggravate
anybody.” The prosecutor then pressed for defendant’s stipulation to all of
the aggravating circumstances found applicable by the probation department,
at which point the court said the prosecutor might as well proceed to
sentencing. After defense counsel indicated he had nothing to add, the court
sentenced defendant to a five-year term: two years for the section 273.5
count, and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement.
Defendant appeals, arguing that remand for resentencing is necessary
because the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion under Senate
Bill 567. The People concede the error, stating that by admitting to the great
bodily injury enhancement, defendant effectively stipulated to at least one
aggravating circumstance (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)4), which could
have justified imposition of the upper term of four years even under Senate
Bill 567. The People further concede that a remand is necessary so that the
trial court can resentence defendant “with a proper understanding of its
power under [Senate Bill] 567.”
We accept the People’s concessions. Under rule 4.421(a)(1),
circumstances in aggravation include: “(1) [when] [t]he crime involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” In this case,
defendant admitted that he “personally inflict[ed] great bodily injury”
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), which permitted the trial court to rely upon the
aggravating circumstance set out in rule 4.421(a)(1).
4 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
3
Moreover, rule 4.420(g) provides that “a fact charged and found as an
enhancement may be used as a reason for imposing a particular term only if
the court has discretion to strike the punishment for the enhancement and
does so. The use of a fact of an enhancement to impose the upper term of
imprisonment is an adequate reason for striking the additional term of
imprisonment, regardless of the effect on the total term.” Furthermore,
Senate Bill 567 did not alter the rule that a single aggravating factor may
justify imposition of the upper term. (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799,
813; People v. Berdoll (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 159, 163.) As such, it appears
the trial court could have struck the punishment for the great bodily injury
enhancement, in order to rely on the aggravating factor set out in
rule 4.421(a)(1) to justify the upper term.
“ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise
of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court
which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have
been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.’ [Citations.] In such circumstances, we have held that the
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly
indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even
if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) Here, because the record reflects that the trial court
was unaware of the scope of its discretion, we will remand the matter for
resentencing.5
5 In light of our conclusion, we need not and so do not consider
defendant’s alternative contention that the trial court abused its discretion in
wrongly believing it needed the prosecutor’s assent as to the number of
4
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed, but the matter is remanded to
the trial court for resentencing in a manner not inconsistent with this
opinion.
FUJISAKI, J.
WE CONCUR:
TUCHER, P.J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
People v. Stockman (A164669)
aggravating circumstances requiring defendant’s stipulation before the upper
term could be imposed. Nor do we consider defendant’s argument that, if his
trial attorney forfeited his appellate issues by failing to object, then he
suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel.
5