People v. Tsarnas CA1/2

Filed 4/24/23 P. v. Tsarnas CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A163770
v.
JEFFRY LEE TSARNAS, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR1900173)
Defendant and Appellant.
In November of 2018, defendant Jeffry Tsarnas hit a pedestrian with
his car on a bridge and drove on without stopping. The victim suffered
multiple fractures to her foot and ankle. Tsarnas was convicted by a jury of
leaving the scene of an accident causing permanent, serious injury and placed
on two years’ probation. Tsarnas appeals, making three arguments: (1) that
substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding that the victim’s
injury was permanent; (2) that a juror who was also a nurse committed
misconduct by offering her opinion that the injury was permanent during
deliberations; and (3) that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring
during closing argument to a photo of the victim’s injured foot that had not
been admitted into evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On November 27, 2018, around 5:30 to 5:40 p.m. on a “dark and foggy”
night, pedestrian Marie Kelley was on the Fernbridge near Ferndale when
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she was struck from behind by a four-door sedan, which one witness
estimated to be travelling about 60 mph. When the sedan hit Kelley, she
“went flying into the side of the railing like a rag doll.” The sedan did not
stop or attempt to slow down. After the incident, Kelley crawled toward the
end of the bridge while yelling for help. Kelley was taken to the hospital with
a broken foot and ankle, including fractures of her ankle and the third,
fourth, and fifth metatarsal bones in her mid-foot.
On December 26, 2019, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed an
information charging Tsarnas with failing to perform a legal duty following a
vehicle accident that caused permanent, serious injury (Veh. Code, § 20001,
subds. (a), (b)(2)) with the special allegation that he personally inflicted great
bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court later granted
defense counsel’s unopposed motion to dismiss the great bodily injury
allegation.
Trial took place over five days in March of 2021. The jury was
instructed on both the charged offense and the lesser-included offense of
failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused injury .
(See Veh. Code, § 20001, subds. (a), (b)(2); Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (d)
[defining “ ‘permanent, serious injury’ ” as “the loss or permanent impairment
of function of a bodily member or organ”].)
On April 1, the jury found Tsarnas guilty as charged. The trial court
later denied Tsarnas’s motion for a new trial, suspended the imposition of
sentence, and placed Tsarnas on two years’ probation.
Tsarnas appealed.
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DISCUSSION
Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding of
Permanent, Serious Injury
As noted, Tsarnas was convicted under Vehicle Code, section 20001,
subdivision (b)(2), which provides for enhanced penalties where the accident
“results in death or permanent, serious injury.” Vehicle Code section 20001,
subdivision (d) defines “ ‘permanent, serious injury’ ” as “the loss or
permanent impairment of function of a bodily member or organ.” And the
jury was instructed that “a permanent, serious injury is one that
permanently impairs the function or causes the loss of any organ or body
part.” (CALCRIM No. 2140.)
Tsarnas first argues that substantial evidence does not support the
jury’s finding that Kelley suffered “permanent, serious injury” within the
meaning of Vehicle Code, section 20001, subdivision (d).
“In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We presume
every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably
deduced from the evidence. . . . If the circumstances reasonably justify the
trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding. . . . “A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor
reevaluates a witness’s credibility.” ’ (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47,
60, citations omitted.) We must affirm if ‘ “ ‘any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’
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(People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1081, italics omitted.)” (People v.
Chavez (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 159, 165–166 (Chavez).)
We conclude the evidence supports the finding that Kelley suffered a
“permanent, serious injury,” which evidence includes the following:
Kelley testified that the incident left her “pretty messed up,” and that
“I’ll have permanent damage for the rest of my life.” And, she continued, the
incident “just mangled my foot and my ankle. So I had actually had a cage on
the outside. It was so—it was so bad that they couldn’t—they couldn’t cast it.
They actually had to put pins in and I had to carry my foot for a couple
months.” At the time of trial, Kelley had already undergone two surgeries,
and had “more to come too.” When asked whether she had further surgeries
scheduled, she responded: “Not scheduled. I have just—go figure. I’m a
cancer survivor. I had just had a seven-pound tumor removed from me just a
couple months ago, so I really, that’s been kind of like the last has been my
priority. After all that was settled in I have every intention of going back to
orthopedic and getting further work done on my foot, yes.” Kelley also
testified that she “should be doing physical therapy after the surgery,” and
would be “picking [that] up pretty soon.”
The jury also heard the testimony of Dr. Jabari Reeves, the emergency
doctor who treated Kelley the night of the incident. He testified that Kelley
suffered fractures of her ankle and the third, fourth, and fifth metatarsal
bones of her mid-foot.
In Chavez, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th 159, the Court of Appeal considered a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that
the victim had suffered a “permanent, serious injury” within the meaning of
Vehicle Code, section 20001, subdivision (d). The victim, Torres, testified—
nine months after the incident—that he had had two surgeries on his left
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tibia and fibula, the first of which placed a metal plate and screws in his leg.
(Chavez, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) Torres “showed his injuries to the
jury and noted that he still had an open wound. For the first few months
after the accident, his pain level was 10 on a scale of 1 to 10. At the time of
trial, his pain level by the end of each day was always four or five. In the
months following the accident he underwent painful physical therapy to
regain his ability to walk, stand, sit, and climb stairs. He still needed
physical therapy, but had to stop after three months due to the COVID-19
pandemic. As a result of his injuries it was difficult to walk, sit, and sleep
and he could no longer run. He also had balance problems and had been
unable to return to his construction job.” (Ibid.)
Torres’s treating orthopedic surgeon also testified and offered an expert
opinion that “the injury had ‘fail[ed] to heal in a sufficient amount of time.’ ”
(Chavez, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) For such injuries, “ ‘it’s not
uncommon’ ” for a patient to require “ ‘between about four and seven
surgeries and sometimes more.’ ” (Ibid.) The doctor “was ‘not sure’ if Torres
would need additional surgeries and ‘hop[ed]’ he would not, but was ‘prepared
to further escalate the type of surgery [Torres] would need.’ ” (Id. at p. 164.)
“The doctor went on to opine it was ‘likely’ that Torres’s injured leg would
‘[n]ever heal in a way that it will be as good as it was prior to the accident[,]’
and would ‘probably not’ ‘ever heal in a way that it will be as good as the non-
injured leg.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Chavez court concluded: “Here, the jury was presented with
evidence that the broken bones in Torres’s leg still had not healed nine
months after the accident and that his injuries impacted his ability to walk,
balance, and sleep. Moreover, Dr. Tilan opined that the function of Torres’s
leg was permanently impaired. This evidence is sufficient to support the
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jury’s finding” that the injury was permanent. (Chavez, supra,
69 Cal.App.5th at p. 168.) By analogy to the law of mayhem, which requires
an injury that is “more than ‘ “slight [or] temporary,” ’ i.e., permanent,”
Chavez also noted that “[t]he long duration of an injury, such as a broken
ankle that has not fully healed after more than six months, may support an
inference that the injury is permanent and that the defendant is thus guilty
of mayhem. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 168.)
Tsarnas contrasts the evidence of permanent injury in this case from
that in Chavez, noting that there was no expert testimony about the
permanence of Kelley’s injuries and that Kelley did not herself testify about
her current level of pain or the impact of her injury on her daily living or
employment.
We conclude that, viewing “the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment,” substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
Kelley’s injuries were permanent. (Chavez, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
Kelley testified that the incident had “messed up” and “mangled” her foot, an
injury “so bad” that doctors could not place it in a cast and instead had to
surround it with a cage. She had already had two surgeries, and at the time
of trial—some 2 years and 4 months after the incident—still needed further
surgery as well as physical therapy. (Cf. Chavez, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p.
168 [injury lasting more than six months supports inference of permanent
damage].) Her doctor testified that her foot and ankle were fractured in four
different places. Although no expert opinion was offered regarding the
permanence of her injury, Tsarnas cites no authority for the proposition that
expert testimony was required. Kelley herself testified that she would “have
permanent damage for the rest of my life,” and the jury was permitted to
credit this testimony. (See Evid. Code, § 411 [“the direct evidence of one
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witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact”]; People
v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296 [“The uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically
impossible or inherently improbable”].) From the serious nature of the
injury, the fact that Kelley had and would require multiple surgeries, the
length of time since the incident, and Kelley’s own testimony, the jury could
permissibly infer that she had suffered “permanent, serious injury” within
the meaning of Vehicle Code, section 20001, subdivision (d).
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the
Motion for a New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct
Additional Background
On September 1, 2021, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1181 on the grounds of juror and
prosecutorial misconduct. With respect to juror misconduct, the motion
alleged that Juror No. 2, who was a registered nurse, “told the other jurors in
her professional opinion because the injury was to a lower limb it was likely a
permanent injury” and that “[a] subsequent juror confirmed this information
and indicated she would have voted differently had that ‘expert’ opinion in
the jury room not have been rendered.”
On September 2, defense counsel requested a two-week continuance.
Defense counsel indicated that Juror No. 2 “initially agreed to sign the
declaration that was read to her over the phone [but] has subsequently asked
us not to contact her,” and requested a continuance so that Juror No. 2 could
be subpoenaed to appear.
A hearing on the motion was held on September 22, at which Juror
No. 2 testified. When asked whether she “discuss[ed] with the jurors [her]
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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thoughts about weight bearing injuries,” she answered, “I pointed out that
her injury is on a weight bearing limb which any person would deduce.” She
did not “indicate to the other jurors what an injury to a weight bearing limb
would require as far as treatment.” And when asked whether she gave her
opinion to other jurors about whether the injury would be permanent, she
responded that “we discussed that the injured had mentioned that she had
not gone to her follow-up care appointments, and she had not—and that she
would require follow-up surgeries. . . . Based on that is how we came to the
conclusion that this might be ongoing if she continued to not follow-up with
her post op care.” Juror No. 2 added that “[w]hat I said was that the recovery
is different than if she had broken her clavicle or a rib, that she obviously is
going to need follow up” and that “I don’t recall saying as an RN these are the
things that I know.” When asked whether she told the defense investigator
that she had told other jurors that a weight-bearing injury would require
additional surgeries, she responded: “That was based on what the injured
had told us . . . that she was going to need more surgeries. I don’t profess to
know about all orthopedic injuries and need for follow up.”
The court set a further hearing for October 18th.
On September 22, defense counsel filed a brief declaration from Juror
No. 8, indicating that “[a]s a part of the jury deliberations a fellow jur[or]
offered their opinion on whether or not the injury was life altering or
permanent,” that that “fellow juror was a nurse by profession,” that she
“shared that in her work experience the injury would most likely be a
permanent injury,” and “[t]he information I received from that jur[or]
influenced my decision in deciding on the nature of the injury.”
A further hearing was held on October 13, at which Juror No. 8
testified. She testified that she considered Juror No. 2’s opinion “as well as
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the rest of the testimony” in reaching a decision in the case. She answered
“Yes” when asked if Juror No. 2 “express[ed] statements that in her
experience the injury would be a permanent injury,” that she understood that
experience to be Juror No. 2’s “medical experience as a nurse,” and when
asked whether she took “that into account in reaching your verdict,”
answered “I believe so.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion for a
new trial, concluding that “[a]s far as the testimony regarding Juror Number
2’s purported expertise with injuries as well as her statement in the jury
room about it being a permanent injury, the Court will find on that issue that
the—even assuming that that is what transpired, that it was not enough to
constitute juror misconduct” because “the juror we heard from today
indicated that she at least did not rely exclusively on the Juror Number 2’s
opinion, but instead formed her conclusion based on what was presented at
trial as well,” including testimony from the treating physician and the victim
herself.
Applicable Law
A motion for a new trial may be granted on the ground of juror
misconduct. (§ 1181, subds. 2, 3, 4.) “The trial court is vested with broad
discretion to act upon a motion for new trial. (See People v. Ault (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1250, 1260.) When the motion is based upon juror misconduct, the
reviewing court should accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence, but must
exercise its independent judgment to determine whether any misconduct was
prejudicial. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 192; see also People v.
Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1263–1265.)” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th
731, 809.)
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In People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614 (San Nicolas), our
Supreme Court gave the following explanation of the applicable law
regarding improper juror expertise:
“ ‘ “It is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her educational or
employment background, to express an opinion on a technical subject, so long
as the opinion is based on the evidence at trial. Jurors’ views of the evidence,
moreover, are necessarily informed by their life experiences, including their
education and professional work. A juror, however, should not discuss an
opinion explicitly based on specialized information obtained from outside
sources. Such injection of external information in the form of a juror’s own
claim to expertise or specialized knowledge of an issue is misconduct.” ’
(People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1265 (Steele), quoting In re Malone
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 963.) [¶] . . . [¶]
“ ‘A juror may not express opinions based on asserted personal
expertise that is different from or contrary to the law as the trial court stated
it or to the evidence, but if we allow jurors with specialized knowledge to sit
on a jury, and we do, we must allow those jurors to use their experience in
evaluating and interpreting that evidence. Moreover, during the give and
take of deliberations, it is virtually impossible to divorce completely one’s
background from one’s analysis of the evidence. We cannot demand that
jurors, especially lay jurors not versed in the subtle distinctions that
attorneys draw, never refer to their background during deliberations. . . .’
(Id. at p. 1266.)” (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 649–650.)
Analysis
In San Nicolas, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial
based on juror misconduct where, as here, the defendant alleged that a juror
who was also a nurse improperly asserted her expertise during deliberations,
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in part by “explain[ing] a number of the medical issues relating to blood
pressure and circulation.” (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 643, 648.)
Our Supreme Court affirmed, with this language:
“Similarly, in the present case, the evidence presented in support of
defendant’s motion for a new trial does not show that [the nurse-juror]
offered the jurors any basis for deciding the case other than the evidence and
testimony presented at trial. No declaration suggests that she made any
assertion inconsistent with the properly admitted evidence and testimony.
Indeed, the remarks attributed to her in her declaration are consistent with
the trial testimony of the pathologist, who expounded at length on the
concept of blood flow, circulation, and the meaning of ‘shunting.’ The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that [the nurse’]s explanation of
blood evidence was not misconduct.” (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 650.)
Similarly here, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that there was no juror misconduct. Juror No. 2 was
permitted to use her background, including her medical knowledge, to
evaluate and interpret the evidence. According to her testimony, she based
her conclusion that Kelley’s injury was permanent on the fact it was a
weight-bearing injury, as well as Kelley’s testimony that she would require
further surgeries and had not attended her “follow-up care,” by which she
presumably meant Kelley’s testimony that she would be “getting further
work done on my foot,” “should be doing physical therapy after the surgery,”
and would be “picking [that] up pretty soon.” To the extent this even rises to
the level of Juror No. 2 bringing her medical experience to bear on the
evidence at trial, it was permissible.
11
Moreover, these statements are fully consistent with Juror No. 8’s
testimony that Juror No. 2 “express[ed] statements that in her experience the
injury would be a permanent injury.” Neither juror’s testimony provides any
basis to conclude that Juror No. 2 “offered the jurors any basis for deciding
the case other than the evidence and testimony presented at trial,” gave an
“opinion explicitly based on specialized information obtained from outside
sources,” or offered one “different from or contrary to the law as the trial
court stated it or to the evidence.” (Cf. In re Malone, supra, 12 Cal.4th at
pp. 948, 963–965 [juror misconduct for psychologist to opine on accuracy of
polygraph test based on having “read and discussed professional articles on
the subject in the course of her studies in psychology” including specific
accuracy rates discussed in those articles].) At worst, Juror No. 2 brought
her medical experience to bear in evaluating the evidence before the jury. We
find no abuse its discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that this did not rise
to the level of juror misconduct.
There Was No Prejudicial Prosecutorial Misconduct In
Referring to Photo Exhibit Not in Evidence
Additional Background
During the prosecution’s case-in-chief, People’s Exhibit No. 9 was
marked for identification, described in the minutes as a “color photo of a
swollen and bruised foot elevated on black fabric.” No witness testified about
the photograph, and it was not admitted into evidence. However, during his
rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury “[w]hat’s marked as
People’s 9 is a photograph of Ms. Kelley’s foot that you can take a look at as
well.”2
2Defense counsel’s new trial motion indicates that the prosecutor “held
up” the exhibit during his closing argument. No declaration supporting the
motion appears in the record, and the parties have not pointed us to any
12
During deliberations, the jury made a written request to see “[t]he
photo of Ms. Kelley’s foot.” In discussing the request with counsel, the court
stated “I believe they have that. That should be Exhibit No. 9 in our records.
So what I would respond to them then is just to let them know it’s Exhibit
No. 9 is the photo of the foot.” Counsel agreed with this response, and the
court’s written response stated “that photo is Exhibit number 9. Please let
me know if you do not have the exhibit.” The jury wrote back “We do not
have Exhibit #9. Thank you for sending down.”
In discussing the jury’s response, the trial court indicated that court
staff had reviewed the records and concluded that People’s Exhibit No. 9 was
never entered into evidence. The prosecution then moved to reopen the
evidence for the limited purpose of admitting the exhibit. The court
concluded, based on a review of the transcript, that a foundation had not
been laid for admitting the exhibit and denied the motion. Defense counsel
then proposed an admonition, and the jury was told in writing that “Exhibit
No. 9 was not admitted into evidence and should not be considered by the
jury.”
As part of his motion for a new trial, Tsarnas argued that the
prosecutor’s reference to Exhibit No. 9 during closing argument constituted
prosecutorial misconduct.
At the October 13 hearing on the new trial motion, Juror No. 8 testified
that she did not recall the prosecutor holding up a photograph during his
closing argument, nor did she recall the jury asking for an exhibit that was
ultimately not provided.
other indication in the record that People’s Exhibit No. 9 was actually shown
to the jury.
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The trial court denied the motion for a new trial on the ground of
prosecutorial misconduct, noting that no objection was made by defense
counsel during closing argument and that an admonition was given to the
jury not to consider the exhibit.
Applicable Law
Section 1181, subdivision (5), provides that a new trial may be granted
when the prosecutor has “been guilty of prejudicial misconduct during the
trial thereof before a jury.”
“A prosecutor’s conduct ‘ “violates the federal Constitution when it
comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it infects the trial with such
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citation.] But
conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally
unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves ‘ “the use
of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court
or the jury. ” ’ ” ’ (People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 418.) Under state
law, ‘bad faith on the prosecutor’s part is not required.’ (People v. Centeno
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666.)” (People v. Zarazua (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 639,
644.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial based on
prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Alvarez
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 213; People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 729.)
“ ‘[A] claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not preserved for appeal if
defendant fails to object and seek an admonition if an objection and jury
admonition would have cured the injury. [Citation.]’ (People v. Crew (2003)
31 Cal.4th 822, 839.” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1010.)
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Analysis
The Attorney General argues that Tsarnas has failed to preserve his
claim for appeal because defense counsel did not object to the prosecution’s
mention of Exhibit No. 9 during closing. Tsarnas argues that if his claim has
been waived, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to
make an objection. Because an objection would have led to an admonition,
and an admonition was in fact given to the jury, we will consider the merits
of Tsarnas’s argument. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161,
fn. 6 [“An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question
that has not been preserved for review by a party”].)
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the prosecutor’s reference to Exhibit No. 9 during closing
argument was not “prejudicial misconduct.” Although “ ‘[s]tatements of facts
not in evidence by the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury
constitute misconduct,’ ” People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 797, that
is not exactly what occurred here. At worst, the jury was briefly shown and
told to consider a photograph of the victim’s foot for which no evidentiary
foundation had been laid. As noted, it is not even clear that the jury was ever
actually shown the exhibit at issue. And even if they were, the photograph of
Kelley’s injured foot did not state any “facts” not in evidence—the defense did
not dispute that Kelley’s foot was injured, and the principal question for the
jury was whether that injury was “permanent” and “serious,” a question to
which the photograph had, at best, limited relevance. As discussed, there
was other, better evidence of the fact that Kelley’s injury was serious and
permanent, including her own testimony and that of the emergency room
doctor who treated her.
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More importantly, the jury was given a curative admonition, that
“Exhibit number 9 was not admitted into evidence, and should not be
considered by the jury.” We “must presume jurors follow instructions and
obey admonitions.” (People v. Hem (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 218, 230; see
People v. Vang (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1129; People v. Zack (1986)
184 Cal.App.3d 409, 416.) And “prosecutorial misconduct is ordinarily
presumed to be cured by a proper admonition.” (People v. Green (1980)
27 Cal.3d 1, 30, abrogated on another ground by People v. Martinez (1999)
20 Cal.4th 225, 234–239.) “It is only in the exceptional case that ‘the
improper subject matter is of such a character that its effect . . . cannot be
removed by the court’s admonitions.’ (People v. Seiterle (1963) 59 Cal.2d 703,
710.)” (People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 924, 935.) This is not such an
exceptional case, and the admonition was sufficient to cure any potential
prejudice. (See People v. McNally (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1429 [no
error in denying motion for mistrial after unredacted version of video
inadvertently played and jury was admonished to disregard it]; People v.
Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 428 [“thorough and forceful” admonition sufficient
to prevent any prejudice from witness’s reference to having taken lie detector
tests].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
Richman, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Stewart, P.J.
_________________________
Markman, J. *
People v. Tsarnas (A163770)
*Superior Court of Alameda County, Judge Michael Markman, sitting as
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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