People v. Vallery CA2/6

Filed 4/21/23 P. v. Vallery CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B321475
(Super. Ct. No. BA175507)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
YKI JAMALL VALLERY,
Defendant and Appellant.
The separation of powers doctrine is enshrined in our
Constitution. It states: “The powers of state government are
legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the
exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except
as permitted by this Constitution.” (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)
Here, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended that a criminal sentence be
recalled based on the defendant’s “exceptional conduct while
incarcerated.” While such conduct is commendable, the trial
court was not required to resentence the defendant to a specific
term. The power to sentence, accomplished through the informed
exercise of discretion, belongs solely to judges.
Yki Jamall Vallery appeals from the trial court’s order
recalling his sentence of 75 years to life in state prison and
resentencing him to 25 years to life. (See Pen. Code,1 § 1172.1.2)
He contends the court: (1) disregarded the statutory presumption
in favor of resentencing, and (2) did not state its reasons for
rejecting the resentencing recommendation from the CDCR,
which (3) deprived him of the ability to contest those reasons. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2004, a jury convicted Vallery of first degree murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)) and attempted premeditated
murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)). The jury also found true
allegations that Vallery committed his crimes for the benefit of a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that he
personally used a firearm, discharged a firearm, and discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death while committing
them (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). The trial court sentenced him
to 75 years to life in state prison. We affirmed the judgment on
appeal. (See People v. Vallery (Feb. 14, 2006, B180800) 2006 WL
330101 [nonpub. opn.].)
Sixteen years later, CDCR recommended that the trial
court recall Vallery’s sentence and resentence him pursuant to
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Section 1172.1 was added as section 1170.03 by Assembly
Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 3.1.)
It was subsequently renumbered without substantive change.
(See Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2022, ch.
58, § 9.) We use the statute’s current designation throughout this
opinion.
2
section 1172.1 because he had demonstrated “exceptional conduct
while incarcerated.” This conduct included multiple laudatory
commendations and self-help activities but only a single,
nonviolent rules violation. CDCR did not recommend that the
court impose any specific sentence.
Vallery supplemented CDCR’s recommendation with his
own resentencing request, asking the trial court to impose a term
of 13 years four months. Specifically, Vallery requested that the
court vacate his murder conviction and sentence him to 11 years
for the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)),
strike the jury’s finding that his attempted murder was
premeditated and sentence him to two years four months on that
conviction (see § 664, subd. (a)), and strike the gang and firearm
enhancements. Prosecutors agreed with Vallery that his
sentence should be recalled, but argued that the court should
resentence him to a term of 18 years four months: six years on
the manslaughter, two years four months on the attempted
murder, and 10 years on a firearm enhancement.
The trial court recalled Vallery’s sentence and held a
resentencing hearing. At that hearing Vallery accepted
responsibility for his crimes and expressed remorse. He also
highlighted the positive changes he had made while in prison.
The trial court granted the parties’ requests to dismiss the
gang and firearm enhancements attached to Vallery’s original
sentence, but otherwise rejected their sentencing
recommendations. It instead imposed a sentence of 25 years to
life in state prison on Vallery’s murder conviction and a
consecutive life term on his attempted murder. The court
explained that it did not sentence Vallery on manslaughter
instead of murder because the jury was instructed on both
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offenses but opted to convict him of murder. The court said that
it imposed a consecutive sentence on the attempted murder
because Vallery committed violent crimes against separate
individuals: “One person . . . saw his brother die, and then
became paralyzed himself. It is not in the interest of justice to
release this man right now.”
Vallery subsequently moved the trial court to reconsider its
sentencing decision, alleging the court failed to apply the
statutory presumption in favor of resentencing and that it did not
state its reasons for denying resentencing. The court denied the
reconsideration motion:
“[Vallery] mistakenly avers that the court denied
[his] motion in toto. That is incorrect. The court
carefully considered the dictates of section [1172.1]
and granted the motion in part. The court is fully
aware of what is required under section [1172.1] and
gave due consideration to all pleadings and attached
exhibits.”
DISCUSSION
If a defendant has been committed to state prison, a trial
court has the discretion to recall their sentence and resentence
them upon receiving a recommendation from CDCR. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).) Upon receiving such a recommendation, the court
must provide notice to the defendant, appoint counsel, and set a
status conference. (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(1).) When deciding
whether to resentence the defendant, the court must “apply any
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).) It must also “consider if the
defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma . . . and whether [that trauma was] a contributing factor
4
in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).) It may
additionally consider whether postconviction factors “have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (Ibid.)
Resentencing “shall not be denied . . . without a hearing
where the parties have an opportunity to address the basis for
the intended denial or rejection.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(8).)
Additionally, when CDCR requests resentencing, there is a
“presumption favoring recall and resentencing . . . [that] may
only be overcome if a [trial] court finds [that] the defendant is an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1172.1, subd.
(b)(2); see also People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035,
1040 [noting that section 1172.1 evinces the Legislature’s intent
that trial courts should generally accept CDCR’s
recommendations].) After applying this presumption, the court
must “state on the record the reasons for its decision to grant or
deny recall and resentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(6).) We review
that decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Frazier (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 858, 863-864.)
There was no abuse of discretion here. Vallery first
contends the trial court disregarded section 1172.1’s presumption
in favor of resentencing because it did not find that he presented
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. But the court
recalled Vallery’s sentence and resentenced him. It thus
necessarily applied the statutory presumption and concluded that
it had not been overcome. (Cf. People v. Braggs (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 809, 819-820 [section 1172.1 includes a presumption
for recall and resentencing a defendant, not a presumption of
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resentencing the defendant to a particular term].) Vallery’s first
contention lacks factual support.
Vallery next contends the trial court failed to state its
reasons for denying resentencing, which denied him the ability to
contest those reasons. The record again belies this contention.
The court did resentence Vallery. It explained why it did so on
its own terms rather than adopting his recommendation or that
of prosecutors: Because it agreed with the jury’s finding that
Vallery committed murder instead of manslaughter, because
Vallery’s crimes were violent, and because he committed those
crimes against multiple individuals. And Vallery had the
opportunity to contest those reasons, both at the resentencing
hearing and in his motion for reconsideration. Section 1172.1
requires no more.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order recalling Vallery’s original sentence
and resentencing him, entered April 20, 2022, is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. YEGAN, J.
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Ronald S. Coen, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic, Loyola Law
School, Marisa Harris and Christopher Hawthorne for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.