Robertson v. Larkspur Courts CA1/1

Filed 5/2/23 Robertson v. Larkspur Courts CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
J. MARTIN ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A166818
v.
LARKSPUR COURTS et al., (Marin County
Super. Ct. No. CIV-1504551)
Defendants and Respondents.
This is our fourth opinion in this litigation, which has been pending for
over seven years. Rather than resolving the merits of this appeal, however,
we dismiss it under the disentitlement doctrine. That doctrine permits us to
“dismiss an appeal where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower
court’s orders or engaged in obstructive tactics,” a standard amply met here.
(Gwartz v. Weilert (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 750, 757–758 (Gwartz).)
After discovering mold in his apartment, plaintiff J. Martin Robertson
sued several entities, including respondents.1 Robertson and respondents
entered a stipulation for settlement, and judgment was entered to enforce the
Respondents, all of whom were involved in the management of
1
Robertson’s apartment complex, are Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America, Riverstone Residential Group, LLC, Greystar RS CA,
Inc., and Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC. The other four named
defendants never appeared in the litigation.
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stipulation’s terms. In 2018, we affirmed the judgment, which awarded
Robertson $28,000, required the parties to accept a mutual release, and
required Robertson to sign a dismissal of the action with prejudice.
(Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (May 22, 2018, A152226) [nonpub. opn.]
(Robertson I).) We also affirmed the trial court’s order awarding sanctions to
respondents, and we awarded respondents their appellate costs. (Ibid.) Two
further appeals ensued, the latter of which also resulted in an award of
appellate costs to respondents. (Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (Jun. 19, 2019,
A154206) [nonpub. opn.] (Robertson II); Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (Oct. 5,
2021, A160942) [nonpub. opn.] (Robertson III).)
Respondents paid Robertson the $28,000 they owed him, but he refused
to comply with his obligations under the judgment to enter a mutual release
and dismiss the lawsuit. He refused to comply with these obligations even
though respondents offered not to pursue the sanctions award and both
orders awarding appellate costs, no parts of which have ever been paid. In
response, the trial court entered an order deeming respondents’ proposed
release signed by all the parties and dismissing the case with prejudice.
Robertson now appeals from that order, claiming that (1) the trial court
lacked authority to deem the release signed; (2) the release was inconsistent
with the judgment; and (3) dismissal of the case deprived him of his rights.2
We agree with respondents, however, that the disentitlement doctrine
applies, and we therefore grant their motion to dismiss the appeal.
2Robertson filed a request for judicial notice of 29 “matters,” all of
which are federal materials that do not require a request for judicial notice
and/or are irrelevant to the remaining issues in this case. Thus, we deny the
request in full.
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I.
BACKGROUND
A. Robertson’s Previous Appeals
We begin by summarizing the case’s facts and history through our
October 2021 decision in Robertson III. Robertson, who is a lawyer, filed this
suit in December 2015 alleging that respondents and other entities
inappropriately responded to the discovery of mold in his Larkspur
apartment. Robertson and respondents reached a settlement and signed an
agreement under which Robertson agreed to dismiss his claims in exchange
for $28,000. In May 2017, the trial court entered judgment to effectuate the
settlement’s terms. Robertson unsuccessfully moved to vacate the judgment,
and the court awarded $1,280 in sanctions to respondents, concluding that
the motion to vacate was frivolous. The following May, we affirmed the
judgment and sanctions order in Robertson I. We also awarded respondents
their costs on appeal, which they then sought in the amount of $463.20.
Meanwhile, both before and after the judgment was entered,
respondents tried to pay the $28,000 to Robertson, but he refused to provide
his social security number and other personal information (social security
information), which respondents believed their insurer needed to comply with
Medicare reporting requirements. In February 2018, while Robertson I was
pending, the trial court granted respondents’ motion to enforce the judgment
and ordered Robertson to provide the social security information.
Robertson appealed that order, initiating Robertson II. In our
June 2019 opinion, we vacated the order on the basis the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter it while Robertson I was pending. In doing so, we did not
reach the merits of Robertson’s claim that the court erred by ordering him to
disclose the social security information.
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On remand, Robertson filed motions seeking postjudgment attorney
fees, postjudgment costs, and interest on the judgment, and respondents filed
a second motion to enforce the judgment. While those motions were pending,
respondents’ insurer paid Robertson the $28,000 despite his failure to provide
the social security information. In August 2020, the trial court denied
Robertson’s motions and granted respondents’ motion to enforce the
judgment. The court ordered the parties to “jointly lodge a signed mutual
release[,] if they agree on [one,] or . . . each separately lodge a proposed
mutual release if they do not agree on [one].” It also ordered Robertson “to
sign a standard form Dismissal of Prejudice of this action.”
Robertson again appealed, claiming that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider respondents’ second motion to enforce the judgment
and that it erred by denying him postjudgment attorney fees, costs, and
interest. In October 2021, we issued our Robertson III opinion affirming the
court’s rulings. In doing so, we explicitly rejected Robertson’s challenge to
the court’s findings that (1) respondents made an “unconditional tender” of
the $28,000 settlement payment, despite their request for the social security
information before making it; and (2) respondents’ delay in paying was due to
his “vexatious and obstructionist conduct.”
B. The Proceedings Leading to This Appeal and Respondents’ Motion
to Dismiss
In September 2020, around the time Robertson III was initiated, each
side submitted a proposed mutual release to the trial court. Respondents’
proposed release stated that Robertson and respondents, “along with each of
their respective affiliates, predecessor entities, and successor entities . . . ,
hereby mutually release one another from all claims arising in any way out
of, or related to, [Robertson’s] occupancy of the [Larkspur] apartment.” In an
accompanying case management statement, respondents reported that
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Robertson objected to their proposed release because he wanted (1) “a ‘carve-
out’ ” to permit him to pursue “fees/costs/damages/interest allegedly incurred
during the [post-settlement] time period where the parties were attempting
to negotiate a long-form release agreement” and (2) a term “address[ing] the
so-called ‘non-appearing’ defendants in this matter, including their alleged
relationship to the ‘appearing’ defendants.”
Reflecting these demands, Robertson’s proposed release stated that
Robertson would discharge his claims against respondents “and their
affiliates, subsidiary and predecessor entities except” for five categories of
claims, including postjudgment interest on the settlement amount, costs and
fees incurred litigating the social security information issue, and potential
federal and state claims involving that issue. (Boldface omitted.) His release
also left spaces for describing respondents’ “form of organization” and
affiliates.
In summer 2022, several months after the Robertson III remittitur
issued, respondents filed a case management statement reporting that
Robertson continued to refuse to agree to a mutual release and still “ha[d] not
paid outstanding sanctions and appellate costs.” Respondents also filed
another proposed release that was similar to their previous release.
At the case management conference that September, the trial court set
an order to show cause (OSC) hearing for October 19, 2022, to address why
respondents’ proposed release should not be deemed signed by all the parties.
It allowed the parties to submit their positions on this issue by September 30.
Respondents filed a statement arguing it was appropriate to deem the release
signed, but Robertson did not file anything by the deadline. Instead, on
October 13, he filed three ex parte applications seeking orders (1) requiring
respondents to provide more details about their insurer’s claim to need the
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social security information to comply with Medicare reporting requirements,
even though the insurer had already paid him without obtaining that
information; (2) requiring respondents to provide information about their
form of organization and affiliates so he could ensure a release “of the claims
of all named defendants”; and (3) staying the case to permit him to file a
federal lawsuit “concerning federal questions that [respondents’] and the
[California] courts’ decisions have raised.” (Boldface and italics omitted.)
On October 17, 2022, the date for which Robertson noticed a hearing on
his ex parte applications, the trial court held a hearing and denied all three
applications. Two days later, the court held the OSC hearing on its
scheduled date. After hearing argument by the parties, the court entered an
order “deem[ing] the release as proposed by [respondents] signed by all
parties” and dismissing the case with prejudice. Robertson appealed the
order on December 15.
Before the appellate record was filed, respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. After receiving three
extensions of time on his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Robertson filed
the opposition in conjunction with his opening brief.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Standards
“An appellate court has the inherent power to dismiss an appeal by a
party that refuses to comply with a lower court order.” (Gwartz, supra,
231 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) “Courts cannot function if their orders and
judgments are routinely ignored by litigants or their counsel,” and “litigants
are [not] free to ignore or refuse to comply with subsequent trial court orders”
when their lawful attempts to challenge a court’s rulings are unsuccessful.
(Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 736,
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756.) Rather, “ ‘[a] trial court’s judgment and orders, all of them, are
presumptively valid and must be obeyed and enforced. [Citation.] They are
not to be frustrated by litigants except by legally provided methods.’ ” (Ibid.)
The disentitlement doctrine “is not jurisdictional” but is instead “a
discretionary tool that may be used to dismiss an appeal when the balance of
the equitable concerns makes dismissal an appropriate sanction.” (Gwartz,
supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) It is based on the principle that “ ‘[a] party
to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court
in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal
orders and processes of the courts of this state.’ ” (Stoltenberg v. Ampton
Investments, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1230, quoting MacPherson v.
MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277; see Polanski v. Superior Court (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 507, 538 [party cannot “seek[] relief from the courts while
‘insulating [himself] from the consequences of an unfavorable result’ ”].)
We may dismiss an appeal under the disentitlement doctrine “where
the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower court’s orders or engaged in
obstructive tactics,” even if the appellant has not been formally held in
contempt. (Gwartz, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 757–758.) The doctrine
has been repeatedly applied in cases where the appellant “has frustrated or
obstructed legitimate efforts to enforce a judgment” (id. at p. 758), and it “ ‘is
particularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises out of the very order
. . . the party has disobeyed.’ ” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica,
Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265.) “[T]he merits of the appeal are
irrelevant to the application of the doctrine.” (Ibid.)
B. Dismissal Under the Disentitlement Doctrine Is Justified.
Respondents argue that dismissal under the disentitlement doctrine is
warranted because Robertson has violated multiple court orders. These
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include orders requiring him to dismiss the underlying case with prejudice,
sign a standard mutual release, and pay sanctions and appellate costs.
Respondents also argue that Robertson violated the trial court’s order setting
the OSC hearing by filing ex parte applications after the deadline to submit
position statements and setting the hearing on those applications two days
before the OSC hearing.
We agree with respondents that the equities favor dismissing the
appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. We affirmed the judgment
requiring Robertson to sign a release and dismiss the action with prejudice
almost five years ago. Regardless of whether his position about the social
security information was reasonable, by mid-2020 he received the $28,000
settlement payment without having to provide that information. Even
though respondents thus fulfilled their primary obligation under the
judgment nearly three years ago, Robertson refused to negotiate a mutual
release in good faith or take any other action to help finally bring this
litigation to a close. By now challenging the mutual release that was deemed
signed only because of his intransigence, Robertson is clearly “seeking the
benefits of an appeal while willfully disobeying the trial court’s valid orders
and thereby frustrating [respondents’] legitimate efforts to enforce the
judgment.” (Gwartz, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.)
In arguing otherwise, Robertson reiterates his objections to the mutual
release’s terms and his views on matters that are not at issue in this case.
We decline to address the merits of the appeal, which are irrelevant to
application of the disentitlement doctrine, or his ongoing concerns about the
social security information. He also claims that respondents have unclean
hands because they want to dismiss this appeal “to cover up their ongoing
concealment of material information,” namely the information about
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Medicare reporting requirements that he sought below through one of his
late-filed ex parte applications. Discovery about the social security
information has no conceivable relevance at this point, and we agree with
respondents that Robertson’s attempt to seek it below violated at least the
spirit of the trial court’s order permitting position statements before the OSC
hearing.
Moreover, as Robertson admits, he has never paid the amounts due
under the trial court’s July 2017 sanctions order or this court’s May 2018
award of appellate costs in Robertson I.3 The failure to pay sanctions and
other awards of fees and costs is a common ground for applying the
disentitlement doctrine, and we conclude it supports dismissal here. (See,
e.g., Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th
at p. 757; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 166–167.)
In arguing otherwise, Robertson claims he is not in violation of any
court orders since respondents “offered to waive their rights to collect the
sanctions and costs” and the mutual release deemed signed is “broad enough
to cover releases of [respondents’] claims” for those charges. This position is
specious. First, respondents offered to waive the sanctions and costs, which
were clearly not contemplated under the original stipulation for settlement,
to incentivize Robertson to fulfill his obligations to enter a mutual release
and dismiss the lawsuit. In other words, his refusal to comply with the
judgment was the only reason respondents offered not to seek payment.
Second, in this appeal Robertson seeks to overturn the mutual release, which
3We also awarded respondents their appellate costs in Robertson III,
but they state that they never pursued those costs “in hopes of mitigating
disputes and being done with this case.”
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the trial court deemed signed only after he failed to negotiate in good faith.
He cannot simultaneously contend that the very release he challenges
insulates him from having to comply with other court orders.
In short, Robertson has persistently refused to comply with the
judgment or pay the sanctions and costs he owes respondents. Despite our
entreaty in Robertson I that he work constructively to resolve this case, he
has unreasonably prolonged the litigation while burdening respondents, the
trial court, and us with his voluminous filings and meritless arguments. We
decline to entertain yet another appeal by someone who displays such
disregard for court orders and the legal process.
III.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Respondents are awarded their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
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_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Margulies, J.
_________________________
Banke, J.
Robertson v. Larkspur Courts A166818
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