County of San Diego v. Com. on State Mandates

Filed 5/16/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, D079742
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-
00009631-CU-WM-CTL)
COMMISSION ON STATE
MANDATES,
Defendant and Respondent;
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Affirmed.
Office of County Counsel, Thomas Deak, and Walter de Lorrell III; Best
Best & Krieger, Rebecca Andrews, and Weiland Chiang for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Juliana F. Gmur, Senior Commission Counsel, and Camille Shelton,
Chief Legal Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney
General, Benjamin M. Glickman and Seth E. Goldstein, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
I
INTRODUCTION
Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution generally
requires the State to reimburse local governments when the Legislature
imposes a mandate on the local governments to carry out new programs or
higher levels of service. Relying on this constitutional provision, the County
of San Diego filed a test claim with the Commission on State Mandates
seeking reimbursement from the State for costs the County incurs to prepare
for, and attend, criminal proceedings known as Franklin proceedings.1
Broadly speaking, Franklin proceedings afford youth offenders serving
lengthy prison sentences an opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-
related factors that may be relevant when the youth offenders become eligible
for parole many years in the future.
The Commission denied the County’s test claim. It found the costs at
issue were not reimbursable because the laws on which the County based its
test claim—Penal Code sections 3041, 3046, 3051, and 4801, as added and
amended by Statutes 2013, chapter 312, Statutes 2015, chapter 471, and
Statutes 2017, chapter 684 (collectively, the Test Claim Statutes)—do not
expressly require counties to participate in Franklin proceedings.
Alternatively, the Commission found the County was not entitled to
reimbursement because the Test Claim Statutes fell within an exception to
the mandatory reimbursement requirement, which applies when a law
1 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).
2
changes the penalty for a crime. (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (g).) The County
sought judicial review, but the trial court denied relief for the same reasons
articulated by the Commission in its decision denying the test claim.
Like the Commission and the trial court, we conclude the County is not
entitled to mandatory reimbursement from the State because the Test Claim
Statutes—the laws giving rise to the County’s reimbursement claim—change
the penalties for crimes. In our view, these laws change the penalties for
crimes because they make the vast majority of youth offenders in the State
eligible to receive a youth offender parole hearing and, as a result, many
youth offenders are released from prison years or even decades earlier than
they would have been if they had served out their original sentences. Given
our determination that the Test Claim Statutes change the penalties for
crimes, and thus fall within the statutory exception to the mandatory
reimbursement requirement, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the
Test Claim Statutes impose a mandate on counties to carry out a new
program or a higher level of service.
The judgment is affirmed.
II
BACKGROUND
1. Constitutional Subvention Provisions
In 1978, voters in our State approved an initiative measure adding
Article XIII A to the California Constitution. (Prop. 13, as approved by
voters, Primary Elec. (June 6, 1978).) The measure “imposes a limit on the
power of state and local governments to adopt and levy taxes.” (County of
Fresno v. State of Cal. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 482, 486 (Fresno); see Dept. of
Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727, 735 (Kern)
3
[“Article XIII A (adopted by the voters in 1978 as Proposition 13), limits the
taxing authority of state and local government.”].)
The following year, California voters approved an initiative measure
adding Article XIII B to the California Constitution. (Prop. 4, as approved by
voters, Special Statewide Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979).) This measure “place[d]
limitations on the ability of both state and local governments to appropriate
funds for expenditures.” (Fresno, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 486; see Kern, supra,
30 Cal.4th at p. 735 [“Article XIII B (adopted by the voters in 1979 as
Proposition 4) limits the spending authority of state and local government.”].)
Article XIII A and Article XIII B “ ‘work in tandem, together restricting
California governments’ power both to levy and to spend for public
purposes.’ ” (County of San Diego v. State of Cal. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 81
(San Diego).) “Their goals are ‘to protect residents from excessive taxation
and government spending.’ ” (Ibid.)
Section 6 of Article XIII B (hereafter, section 6) is the constitutional
provision of relevance to the current proceeding. As a general matter, and
subject to specified exceptions, section 6 provides, “Whenever the Legislature
or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any
local government, the State shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse
that local government for the costs of the program or increased level of
service.”2 (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. (a).) Section 6 “preclude[s] the
state from shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental
functions to local agencies, which are ‘ill equipped’ to assume increased
financial responsibilities because of the taxing and spending limitations that
articles XIII A and XIII B impose.” (San Diego, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 81.)
2 “ ‘Subvention’ generally means a grant of financial aid or assistance, or
a subsidy.” (Hayes v. Commission on State Mandates (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th
1564, 1577.)
4
“ ‘Essentially, the constitutional rule of state subvention provides that
the state is required to pay for any new governmental programs, or for higher
levels of service under existing programs, that it imposes upon local
governmental agencies. [Citation.] This does not mean that the state is
required to reimburse local agencies for any incidental cost that may result
from the enactment of a state law; rather, the subvention requirement is
restricted to governmental services which the local agency is required by
state law to provide to its residents. [Citation.] The subvention requirement
is intended to prevent the state from transferring the costs of government
from itself to local agencies. [Citation.] Reimbursement is required when the
state “freely chooses to impose on local agencies any peculiarly ‘governmental’
cost which they were not previously required to absorb.” ’ ” (County of Los
Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 898, 906–
907.)
As noted, section 6 enumerates a handful of exceptions to its rule
requiring reimbursement for legislative mandates. It permits, but does not
require, reimbursement “for the following mandates: [¶] (1) Legislative
mandates requested by the local agency affected. [¶] (2) Legislation defining a
new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime. [¶] (3) Legislative
mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations
initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975. [¶]
(4) Legislative mandates contained in statutes within the scope of paragraph
(7) of subdivision (b) of Section 3 of Article I [of the California Constitution].”
(Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, the State is not
required to reimburse local governments when a legislative mandate defines
a new crime or changes the definition of a crime, among other circumstances.
5
2. Statutory Subvention Framework
“In 1984, the Legislature created a statutory procedure for determining
whether a statute imposes state-mandated costs on a local agency within the
meaning of section 6. (Gov. Code, § 17500 et seq.)” (San Diego, supra, 15
Cal.4th at p. 81.) The statutory scheme generally compels the State to
“reimburse each local agency and school district for all ‘costs mandated by the
state,’ ” (Gov. Code, § 17561, subd. (a)), and it defines “[c]osts mandated by
the state,” as “any increased costs which a local agency or school district is
required to incur … as a result of any statute … which mandates a new
program or higher level of service of an existing program within the meaning
of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution,” (id., § 17514).
One provision contained within the statutory scheme, Government
Code section 17556, “outlines six circumstances where duties imposed by
statute on local governments are not deemed ‘costs mandated by the state.’ ”
(County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates (2018) 6 Cal.5th 196,
207.) One such circumstance exists when a “statute create[s] a new crime or
infraction, eliminate[s] a crime or infraction, or change[s] the penalty for a
crime or infraction, but only for that portion of the statute relating directly to
the enforcement of the crime or infraction.” (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (g).)
The Commission is “charged with the responsibility of hearing and
deciding, subject to judicial review by an administrative writ of mandate,
claims for reimbursement made by local governments or school districts.
(Gov. Code, § 17551.)” (San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on
State Mandates (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859, 872 (SDUSD).) An initial
reimbursement claim filed by a local government or school district is known
as a test claim. (Gov. Code, § 17521.) “The test claim process allows the
claimant and other interested parties to present written evidence and
6
testimony at a public hearing. [Citations.] Based on that evidence, the
Commission must decide whether the challenged statute or executive order
mandates a new program or increased level of service.” (Coast Community
College Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2022) 13 Cal.5th 800, 808
(CCCD).) “The Commission’s adjudication of the test claim ‘governs all
subsequent claims based on the same statute.’ ” (Department of Finance v.
Commission on State Mandates (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 546, 553, fn. 4; see also
SDUSD, at p. 872, fn. 10 [“a ‘test claim is like a class action—the
Commission’s decision applies to all [local governments and] school districts
in the state’ ”].)
“In making [its] determination, the Commission is required to address
a series of questions. First, it must decide whether the legal provision for
which subvention is sought compels the local agency to act or merely invites
voluntary action. If the provision compels action, the Commission must next
decide whether the compelled activity requires the agency to provide ‘a new
program or higher level of service.’ [Citation.] Finally, if the Commission
finds a statute or executive action mandates a new program or higher level of
service, it must consider if any of the enumerated exceptions to
reimbursement apply.” (CCCD, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 808.)
For purposes of section 6, a “program” refers to: (1) a program that
carries out the governmental function of providing services to the public; or
(2) a law which, to implement state policy, imposes unique requirements on
local governments and does not apply generally to all residents and entities
in the state. (SDUSD, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 874.) A “higher level of
service” refers to “ ‘state mandated increases in the services provided by local
agencies in existing ‘programs.’ ” (Ibid.) “[S]imply because a state law or
order may increase the costs borne by local government in providing services,
7
this does not necessarily establish that the law or order constitutes an
increased or higher level of the resulting ‘service to the public’ under article
XIII B, section 6, and Government Code section 17514.” (Id. at p. 877.)
3. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Beginning in the mid-2000’s, the U.S. Supreme Court and the
California Supreme Court issued a series of bedrock decisions collectively
standing for the proposition that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of certain of our nation’s
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders, without at least some
consideration being given to the distinctive characteristics of youth that
render juvenile offenders less culpable, as a class, than adult offenders.3
The first of these decisions was Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551,
in which the U.S. Supreme Court proscribed the death penalty for defendants
who committed their crimes when they were older than 15 but younger than
18.4 In prohibiting the death penalty for such defendants, the Roper court
recognized three differences between juveniles and adults, which precluded
juveniles from being “classified among the worst offenders.” (Id. at p. 569.)
First, “ ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions.” (Ibid.) Second, “juveniles are more
3 The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment
states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.)
4 A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court previously held that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids the death
sentence for any defendant who was under the age of 16 at the time of his or
her offense. (Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 815.)
8
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure.” (Ibid.) And third, “the character of a juvenile is not
as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are
more transitory, less fixed.” (Id. at p. 570.) Given these differences, the
Roper court concluded the penological goals of the death penalty—retribution
and deterrence—applied with lesser force to juvenile offenders compared to
adult offenders. (Id. at pp. 571–572.) In the words of the Roper court, the
differences between adults and juveniles are simply “too marked and well
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty
despite insufficient culpability.” (Id. at pp. 572–573.)
A few years later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Graham v. Florida
(2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham), which prohibited sentences of life in prison
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juveniles convicted of
nonhomicide crimes. Like the Roper court, the Graham court reiterated that
“juveniles have lessened culpability” and, therefore, “they are less deserving
of the most severe punishments.” (Graham, at p. 68.) The Graham court also
opined on the seriousness of an LWOP sentence, describing it as “ ‘the second
most severe penalty permitted by law.’ ” (Id. at p. 69.) It “deprives the
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.” (Id. at
pp. 69–70.) Further, an LWOP sentence is “an especially harsh punishment
for a juvenile,” since a juvenile offender “will on average serve more years
and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” (Id. at
p. 70.) Given the distinctive characteristics of youth, as well as the severity
of LWOP, the court concluded the penological justifications for LWOP were
insufficient for Eighth Amendment purposes in cases involving juvenile
perpetrators of nonhomicide crimes. (Id. at pp. 71–75.) The court clarified
that a state need not “guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender
9
convicted of a nonhomicide crime.” (Id. at p. 75.) But it must provide “some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the
means and mechanisms for compliance.” (Ibid.)
Not long after the U.S. Supreme Court issued the Graham decision, it
determined that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders also run
afoul of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, even when the offenders
have perpetrated homicide crimes. (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460(Miller).) As the Miller court explained, mandatory LWOP penalty schemes
“prevent the sentencer from taking account of [the] central considerations” of
youth. (Id. at p. 474.) “By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a
juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—
these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s
harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.”
(Ibid.) According to Miller, “[t]hat contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s)
foundational principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on
juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.” (Ibid.)
Finally, in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, the California
Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Graham to cases where a juvenile
convicted of a nonhomicide crime is sentenced to prison for a term of years
that is equivalent to an LWOP sentence. The Caballero court reasoned,
“Consistent with the high court’s holding in Graham, … sentencing a juvenile
offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility
date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Although proper authorities may later determine that youths
should remain incarcerated for their natural lives, the state may not deprive
10
them at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their
rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society in the future.” (Id. at p. 268.)
4. Youth Offender Parole Hearings
In response to these watershed Eighth Amendment decisions, the
California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.),
which added Penal Code section 3051 and amended Penal Code sections
3041, 3046, and 4801, effective January 1, 2014. Section 1 of the bill states,
“The purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that
provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a
juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he
or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance with the
decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero (2012) 55
Cal.4th 262 and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Graham
v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, and Miller v. Alabama (2012) 183 L.Ed.2d 407.
… It is the intent of the Legislature to create a process by which growth and
maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity
for release established.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)
As originally enacted, Penal Code section 3051 required the Board of
Parole Hearings (hereafter, the Board), a state agency, to conduct parole
hearings known as youth offender parole hearings for most juvenile offenders
who were under the age of 18 when they committed their controlling
offenses.5 (Former Pen. Code, § 3051, subds. (b), (d), added by Stats. 2013,
ch. 312, § 4.) The law required the Board to hold a youth offender parole
hearing during a juvenile offender’s 15th year of incarceration in cases where
the offender was sentenced to a determinate sentence, during a juvenile
5 “ ‘Controlling offense’ means the offense or enhancement for which any
sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.” (Pen. Code,
§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
11
offender’s 20th year of incarceration in cases where the offender was
sentenced to a life term of less than 25 years to life, and during a juvenile
offender’s 25th year of incarceration in cases where the offender was
sentenced to 25 years to life. (Id., subd. (b)(1)–(3).)
In addition to enacting Penal Code section 3051, the bill amended
Penal Code section 4801. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 5.) As amended, Penal Code
section 4801 requires the Board, at a youth offender parole hearing, to “give
great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the
hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased
maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” (Pen. Code,
§ 4801, subd. (c).) Penal Code section 3051, in turn, states in part: “(f)(1) In
assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and risk
assessment instruments, if used by the board, shall be administered by
licensed psychologists employed by the board and shall take into
consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of
adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the individual. [¶] (2) Family members, friends, school
personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from community-based
organizations with knowledge about the individual before the crime or the
individual’s growth and maturity since the time of the crime may submit
statements for review by the board.” (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (f)(1), (2).)
“In 2015, the Legislature expanded [Penal Code] section 3051 to apply
to offenders who committed crimes at the age of 23 or younger. (Former [Pen.
Code,] § 3051, subd. (a)(1), added by Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1.) The
amendment’s author cited ‘[r]ecent scientific evidence on adolescent and
young adult development and neuroscience show[ing] that certain areas of
the brain—particularly those affecting judgment and decision-making—do
12
not fully develop until the early-to mid-20s.’ (Sen. Com. on Public Safety,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 261 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 28, 2015, p. 3.)”
(People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 776–777.)
Then, in 2017, the Legislature further amended Penal Code
section 3051 to apply “to offenders who committed the controlling offense
when 25 years old or younger [citation]. In addition, in the 2017 legislation
raising the threshold age to 25, the Legislature extended youth parole
hearings in the 25th year of incarceration to juveniles sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense committed before the
age of 18.” (People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 282; Stats. 2017,
ch. 684, § 1.5.)
Thus, under current law, and subject to exceptions, “ ‘an offender who
committed a “controlling offense” under the age of 26 is entitled to a “youth
offender parole hearing” during his or her 15th year of incarceration if he [or
she] received a determinate sentence; during his or her 20th year of
incarceration if he or she received a life term of less than 25 years to life; and
during his or her 25th year of incarceration if he or she received a term of 25
years to life. [Citation.] An offender convicted of a controlling offense
committed before the age of 18 for which he or she was sentenced to LWOP is
entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his or her 25th year of
incarceration.’ ” (People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 194.)6
6 A youth offender parole hearing is not required for certain categories of
youth offenders, including youth offenders who are convicted under the Three
Strikes law or the One Strike law (for certain sex offenses), or youth offenders
who are sentenced to LWOP for controlling offenses that are committed after
they turn 18 years old. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (h).)
13
5. Franklin Proceedings
Soon after the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260, our Supreme
Court decided Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, a seminal case addressing the
interplay between the State’s youth offender parole hearing system and
juvenile offenders’ claims of constitutional error under Miller.
In Franklin, the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory term of 50
years to life for a murder he committed at the age of 16. (Franklin, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 269–272.) On appeal, he argued his sentence was the
functional equivalent of a mandatory LWOP sentence, which he claimed was
unconstitutional under Miller. (Franklin, at pp. 272–273.) The Franklin
court determined that the rationale of Miller extended to cases in which a
juvenile offender is subject to a mandatory sentence equivalent to LWOP.
(Franklin, at p. 276.) Nonetheless, it concluded that the defendant’s
constitutional claim was mooted by Senate Bill No. 260, which the
Legislature passed while the appeal was pending. (Id. at pp. 276–280.) The
court reasoned the new law “superseded [the defendant’s] sentence so that
notwithstanding his original term of 50 years to life, he [was] eligible for a
‘youth offender parole hearing’ during the 25th year of his sentence.” (Id. at
p. 277.) And, at the youth offender parole hearing, the Board was required by
statute to give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth, the
hallmark features of youth, and the defendant’s growth and increased
maturity. (Ibid.) According to the court, the defendant was therefore
“serving a life sentence that include[d] a meaningful opportunity for release
during his 25th year of incarceration,” not a sentence of LWOP or its
functional equivalent. (Id. at pp. 279–280.)
Despite reaching this conclusion, the court determined the defendant
raised “colorable concerns” that the record in his case may be incomplete or
14
lacking mitigation information, which could in turn deprive him of a
meaningful opportunity for release at his eventual youth offender parole
hearing. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 268–269, 282.) It observed that
the youth offender parole system “contemplate[s] that information regarding
the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the
offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the
Board’s consideration,” including statements from family members, friends,
school personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from community-based
organizations. (Id. at pp. 283–284; see Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (f)(2).) But
“[a]ssembling such statements ‘about the individual before the crime’ is
typically a task more easily done at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense
rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may have been
lost or destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated or
passed away.” (Franklin, at pp. 283–284.) Further, any psychological
evaluations and risk assessment instruments used by the Board at a youth
offender parole hearing must “take into consideration ... any subsequent
growth and increased maturity” of the defendant (Pen. Code, § 3051,
subd. (f)(1))—a statutory dictate that “implies the availability of information
about the offender when he was a juvenile.” (Franklin, at p. 284.)
Because it was unclear whether the defendant had an adequate
opportunity to put this type of information on the record at sentencing, the
Franklin court remanded the matter for the trial court to decide whether he
had such an opportunity and, if he did not, to receive submissions from the
parties and testimony, if appropriate. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
The Franklin court determined that the defendant may, at the proceeding,
“place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to
cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender
15
parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any
evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive
maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.”
(Ibid.) According to the Franklin court, the goal of such a proceeding is “to
provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the
juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the
offense so that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation
to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors [citation] in determining
whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a
serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’ [citation].” (Ibid.)
These proceedings are commonly known as Franklin proceedings.7
Three years later, the Supreme Court issued Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th
439, which held that an otherwise-eligible youth offender is entitled to a
Franklin proceeding, even when the youth offender’s judgment is already
final. As the court explained, the text of the Test Claim Statutes “ ‘makes
clear that the Legislature intended youth offender parole hearings to apply
retrospectively, that is, to all eligible youth offenders regardless of the date of
conviction.’ [Citation.] By a parity of reasoning, an evidence preservation
process should apply to all youthful offenders now eligible for such a parole
hearing.” (Id. at p. 450, italics omitted.) Further, the Cook court opined that
the risks Franklin proceedings are intended to mitigate—namely, the loss or
destruction of evidence bearing on youth-related factors—are present
regardless of the finality of the youth offender’s judgment. (Ibid.)
7 A judicial officer presides over a Franklin proceeding and regulates its
conduct, but “is not called upon to make findings of fact or render any final
determination at the proceeding’s conclusion.” (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th
439, 449, fn. 3 (Cook).)
16
6. Procedural Background
In 2018, the County filed a test claim with the Commission seeking
reimbursement from the State for costs incurred by the County when its
district attorneys and public defenders prepare for, and attend, Franklin
proceedings. The County also sought reimbursement for costs it incurs to
transport and house youth offenders for Franklin proceedings. The crux of
the County’s argument was that the Test Claim Statutes mandate a new
program or higher level of service in the form of Franklin proceedings and,
therefore, the costs incurred by the County in connection with Franklin
proceedings are reimbursable under section 6. The County estimated
Franklin proceedings require counties statewide to incur collective costs
totaling between $2,750,000 and $6,375,000 per year.
By a 6–1 vote of its members, the Commission denied the County’s test
claim for two independent reasons. First, it found the “plain language” of the
Test Claim Statutes does “not impose a state-mandated program on local
agencies.” According to the Commission, the Test Claim Statutes impose
duties on the Board, a State agency, but they do not impose activities on local
governments. The Commission emphasized that, although “the courts have
identified procedures to implement the [T]est [C]laim [S]tatutes,” section 6
requires reimbursement only for legislative or agency mandates, and the
Legislature “has not enacted any laws to specify what evidence-gathering
procedures should be afforded to youth offenders.”
Second, as an alternative basis for denying the test claim, the
Commission found the Test Claim Statutes changed the penalties for crimes
and thus satisfied Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g). As noted,
that provision states that costs are not mandated, and reimbursement from
the State is not required, when a “statute create[s] a new crime or infraction,
17
eliminate[s] a crime or infraction, or change[s] the penalty for a crime or
infraction, but only for that portion of the statute relating directly to the
enforcement of the crime or infraction.” (Gov. Code, § 17556, sub. (g).) The
Commission reasoned this exception applied because the Test Claim Statutes
“capp[ed] the number of years the offender may be imprisoned before
becoming eligible for release on parole, and all of the activities alleged in this
case to comply with the [T]est [C]laim [S]tatutes, including the resultant
Franklin proceedings, relate directly to the enforcement of the youthful
offender’s underlying crime.”8
The County petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative
mandate compelling the Commission to set aside its denial of the test claim.
After receiving written submissions from all parties, including the County,
the Commission, and the real parties in interest,9 the trial court denied the
County’s petition. Like the Commission, the court found reimbursement was
unwarranted because the Test Claim Statutes “contain no mandate directed
to any local government.” The court adopted the Commission’s alternative
basis for denying the test claim as well, finding the County was not entitled
8 In briefing filed with the Commission, the parties raised competing
arguments concerning the applicability of Government Code section 17556,
subdivisions (b) and (c). Those statutory provisions state that reimbursement
from the State is not required when a “statute or executive order affirm[s] for
the state a mandate that has been declared existing law or regulation by
action of the courts,” (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (b)), or when a “statute or
executive order imposes a requirement that is mandated by a federal law or
regulation and results in costs mandated by the federal government” (id.,
subd. (c)). The Commission did not reach the issue of whether these
statutory exceptions apply to the Test Claim Statutes.
9 The real parties in interest are the State of California Department of
Finance and Betty T. Yee, in her official capacity as the California State
Controller.
18
to reimbursement because the Test Claim Statutes changed the penalties for
crimes perpetrated by eligible youth offenders.
The County appeals the trial court’s determination.
III
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
“ ‘Courts review a decision of the Commission to determine whether it
is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Ordinarily, when the scope
of review in the trial court is whether the administrative decision is
supported by substantial evidence, the scope of review on appeal is the same.
[Citation.] However, the appellate court independently reviews conclusions
as to the meaning and effect of constitutional and statutory provisions.
[Citation.] The question whether a statute or executive order imposes a
mandate is a question of law.’ ” (CCCD, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 814.)
2. The Test Claim Statutes Change the Penalties for Crimes and Therefore
Fall Within a Statutory Exception to the Reimbursement Requirement
The parties present competing arguments as to whether the Test Claim
Statutes impose mandates on the County and other local governments to
carry out new programs or higher levels of service. If they do impose such
mandates, the local governments may be entitled to reimbursement from the
State for any costs they incurred as a result of the legislative mandates,
unless an exception to the mandatory reimbursement requirement applies.
(Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6; Gov. Code, §§ 17514, 17561, subd. (a).) If they
do not impose such mandates, the affected local governments would not be
entitled to mandatory reimbursement from the State.
The County asserts the Test Claim Statutes mandate Franklin
proceedings because Franklin proceedings “derive[] from” the Test Claim
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Statutes. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459; see id. at p. 449 [“Franklin
authorized postjudgment proceedings to effectuate [the] intent” of the Test
Claim Statutes].) The County claims it is compelled to prepare for, and
attend, Franklin proceedings—and it incurs costs in the process of doing so—
because county-employed public defenders and district attorneys have non-
discretionary constitutional duties to represent their clients in critical stages
of criminal proceedings. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)
By contrast, the Commission and the real parties in interest argue the
Test Claim Statutes do not impose mandates on local governments; rather,
they require the Board, a state agency, to conduct youth offender parole
hearings. The Commission and the real parties in interest maintain that
Franklin proceedings are judicially crafted proceedings, which the
Legislature did not expressly mandate through the Test Claim Statutes or
otherwise. (See Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 [opining that the Legislature
“remains free ... to specify what evidence-gathering procedures should be
afforded to youth offenders”]; see also id. at pp. 460–461 (conc. & dis. opn. of
Kruger, J.) [“we have never held that the specific record-preservation
procedures we ordered in Franklin, including the opportunity to present live
testimony, are required either by the terms of the [Test Claim S]tatutes or by
the constitutional guarantee they are designed to implement”].)
We need not decide whether the Test Claim Statutes impose a mandate
on local governments and, if so, whether the alleged mandate requires local
governments to carry out a new program or a higher level of service—issues
that present thorny questions about the very nature of Franklin proceedings.
Assuming arguendo that the Test Claim Statutes compel local governments
to provide a new program or a higher level of service, we conclude the
Commission and the trial court properly denied the County’s reimbursement
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claim because the Test Claim Statutes fall within the exception to mandatory
reimbursement codified in Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g).
As noted, Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g), provides,
“The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in
[Government Code] Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a local agency
or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds any one of the
following: [¶] The statute created a new crime or infraction, eliminated a
crime or infraction, or changed the penalty for a crime or infraction, but only
for that portion of the statute relating directly to the enforcement of the
crime or infraction.” (See also Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. (a)(2) [no
reimbursement is required for “Legislation defining a new crime or changing
an existing definition of a crime.”].)
The Test Claim Statutes fall within this statutory exception because
they changed the penalties for crimes perpetrated by eligible youth offenders.
Prior to the enactment of the Test Claim Statutes, youth offenders could be
subject to the same lengthy—and often mandatory—prison sentences that
were imposed on adult offenders. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 272
[“Once a juvenile offender is tried and convicted in criminal court, the trial
court may be statutorily obligated to impose a lengthy sentence.”].) The Test
Claim Statutes changed this practice for most youth offenders. Now, as a
direct result of the Test Claim Statutes, most youth offenders are statutorily
eligible for parole at a youth offender parole hearing conducted during the
15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the term of
incarceration included within the youth offender’s original sentence. (Pen.
Code, §§ 3046, subd. (c), 3051, subds. (b), (d), 4801, subd. (c).) In practice,
this parole eligibility ensures that some youth offenders will be released from
21
prison years earlier, and perhaps even decades earlier, than they otherwise
would have been but-for the Test Claim Statutes.
Thus, the Test Claim Statutes, and the youth offender parole hearing
system established thereunder, “superseded the statutorily mandated
sentences of inmates who ... committed their controlling offense” when they
were under the age of 26. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) Stated
differently, the laws “effectively reform[ed] the parole eligibility date of a
[youth] offender’s original sentence so that the longest possible term of
incarceration before parole eligibility is 25 years.” (Id. at p. 281; see People v.
Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 125 [“section 3051 is, in part, a sentencing
statute”]; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 205 [section 3051
“ ‘impacts the length of sentence served.’ ”]; In re Hoze (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th
309, 315 [“For youth offenders granted parole under section 3051, the statute
overrides their original, statutorily mandated sentences.”]; People v. Scott
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1265, 1281 [“section 3051 has abolished de facto life
sentences”].) By guaranteeing parole eligibility for most youth offenders, and
overriding those offenders’ original sentences, the Test Claim Statutes
change the penalties for crimes within the meaning of Government Code
section 17556, subdivision (g).
The County raises four arguments as to why the Test Claim Statutes
do not change the penalties for crimes. First, it asserts the Test Claim
Statutes do not change the penalties for crimes because they do not vacate
youth offenders’ original sentences. It is true the Test Claim Statutes do not
vacate youth offenders’ sentences, nor do they require resentencing
proceedings. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278; People v. White (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238–1239.) But these facts do not mean the Test Claim
Statutes effect no change on the penalties suffered by youth offenders. The
22
Test Claim Statutes “change[] the manner in which the juvenile offender’s
original sentence operates by capping the number of years that he or she may
be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on parole. The Legislature
has effected this change by operation of law, with no additional resentencing
procedure required.” (Franklin, at pp. 278–279, italics added; id. at p. 281
[“by operation of law, [the defendant] is entitled to a parole hearing and
possible release after 25 years of incarceration”].) In short, by changing the
manner in which the original sentences operate, and guaranteeing youth
offenders the chance to obtain release on parole, the Test Claim Statutes—by
operation of law—alter the penalties for the crimes perpetrated by eligible
youth offenders.
Second, the County argues the Test Claim Statutes do not change the
penalties for the crimes perpetrated by eligible youth offenders because those
penalties were changed before the Test Claim Statutes went into effect—by
the Graham, Miller, and Caballero decisions interpreting the Eighth
Amendment. The County is mistaken. To be sure, these important Eighth
Amendment decisions served as the impetus for the Legislature’s enactment
of the Test Claim Statutes. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1; Franklin, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 277.) But they did not change the penalties for any crimes.
Even after the U.S. Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court issued
these Eighth Amendment decisions, youth offenders in California remained
subject to the sentences originally imposed on them, with no automatic
statutory right to parole eligibility. Only after the Test Claim Statutes were
enacted did eligible youth offenders automatically, and by operation of law,
become eligible for parole. It was these legislatively-enacted statutes—not
the Eighth Amendment judicial decisions themselves—that changed the
penalties for the crimes perpetrated by youth offenders in our State.
23
Third, the County contends the Test Claim Statutes do not change the
penalties for crimes because they simply implement so-called “procedural”
and “administrative” changes. This argument is without merit as well. As
discussed above, the Test Claim Statutes guarantee parole eligibility for
qualified youth offenders. Parole is not a mere “procedural” or
“administrative” facet of the criminal justice system. “[P]arole is
punishment.” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 976; see Samson v.
California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 850 [“parolees are on the ‘continuum’ of state-
imposed punishments”]; People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 609
(Nuckles) [parole is generally “acknowledged as a form of punishment”].) In
fact, “parole is a mandatory component of any prison sentence. ‘A sentence
resulting in imprisonment in the state prison ... shall include a period of
parole supervision or postrelease community supervision, unless waived ....’
([Pen. Code,] § 3000, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, a prison sentence ‘contemplates a
period of parole, which in that respect is related to the sentence.’ ” (Nuckles,
at p. 609.) By guaranteeing parole eligibility for all qualified youth offenders,
the Test Claim Statutes altered the substantive punishments, i.e., the
penalties, for the offenses perpetrated by those offenders.
Finally, the County argues reimbursement is required, at minimum, for
costs it incurs to comply with at least one statutory provision composing the
Test Claim Statutes—namely, Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (f). The
County argues that statutory provision does not relate directly to the
enforcement of a crime. As stated above, reimbursement is mandatory when
a statute changes the penalty for a crime, “but only for that portion of the
statute relating directly to the enforcement of the crime or infraction.” (Gov.
Code, § 17556, subd. (g).) Once more, we disagree with the County.
24
Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (f), identifies the evidence that
may be introduced and considered when the Board assesses a parole
candidate’s growth, maturity, and overall parole suitability. (Pen. Code,
§ 3051, subd. (f)(1), (2).) Because it dictates the evidence and information the
Board may, or must, assess when determining a candidate’s parole
suitability, it plays an indispensable role in the youth offender parole hearing
scheme. Indeed, in practice, it very well may be determinative as to whether
a given youth offender will be released on parole. Further, there can be no
dispute that parole flows directly from the parolee’s underlying crime. (See
Nuckles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 609 [“parole is a form of punishment accruing
directly from the underlying conviction”]; ibid. [“Being placed on parole is a
direct consequence of a felony conviction and prison term.”]; see also People v.
VonWahlde (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1194 [parole “is ‘a direct and,
pragmatically, an inexorable penal consequence’ ” of a criminal conviction].)
Because Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (f), plays a pivotal role in the
Board’s parole determination, and parole is a direct consequence of a criminal
conviction, we conclude section 3051, subdivision (f)—like the other statutory
components that make up the Test Claim Statutes—directly relates to the
enforcement of the crimes perpetrated by eligible youth offenders.
In sum, we conclude the Test Claim Statutes change the penalties for
crimes perpetrated by youth offenders who are, thanks to the Test Claim
Statutes, now eligible for a parole hearing in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of
incarceration. Since the Test Claim Statutes change the penalties for crimes,
they fall within the statutory exception to the mandatory reimbursement
requirement codified in Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g).
And, because they are not subject to the mandatory reimbursement
25
requirement, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the
Commission properly denied the County’s test claim.10
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on
appeal.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
DO, J.
10 In its opening brief, the County implies Government Code
section 17556, subdivision (g) is unconstitutional because it is broader than
section 6, subdivision (a)(2), of Article XIII B of the California Constitution,
which creates a reimbursement exception for “[l]egislation defining a new
crime or changing an existing definition of a crime.” However, in its reply
brief, the County expressly disclaims that it is challenging the
constitutionality of Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g). Because
the County makes no argument about the constitutionality of Government
Code section 17556, subdivision (g), we do not address the issue.
26