In re K.A. CA2/2

Filed 5/16/23 In re K.A. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re K.A., a Person Coming B316357
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (c/w B320391)
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. 21CCJP03374A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
E.C. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from findings and orders of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed in part
and dismissed in part.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant E.C.
John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant G.A.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendants and appellants E.C. (mother) and G.A. (father)1
appeal from the juvenile court’s October 27, 2021, jurisdictional
findings and dispositional orders in which their daughter, K.A.
(minor, born Mar. 2014), was declared a dependent of the court
and removed from parental custody. Father also challenges the
court’s finding at the six-month status review hearing on
April 27, 2022, that the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) had provided reasonable
services to him.
On November 15, 2022, during the pendency of this appeal,
the juvenile court ordered minor returned to father’s custody.2
1 We refer to mother and father collectively as the parents.
2 On December 28, 2022, DCFS filed a motion requesting
that we take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s November 15,
2022, minute order. We hereby grant the motion. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
2
DCFS thereafter moved for partial dismissal of father’s appeal as
moot.
We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
dispositional order removing minor from mother’s custody. We
conclude that father’s challenges to the dispositional order
removing minor from his custody and to the juvenile court’s
reasonable services finding are moot in light of minor’s
subsequent return to father. We, therefore, grant DCFS’s motion
for partial dismissal and dismiss father’s appeal concerning these
two issues.
BACKGROUND
Existing Family Law Order
Pursuant to an existing family law order, mother and
father shared joint legal custody. Mother had physical custody of
minor, with father having overnight visits with minor every first
and fourth weekend of the month.
Referral
In June 2021, DCFS received a referral alleging that minor
was visiting her maternal aunt (aunt) in Kentucky when the
child disclosed that, in May 2021, father had touched her vaginal
area under her clothing while they slept in the same bed.
Initial Investigation
In response to the referral, a DCFS social worker contacted
aunt by telephone on June 23, 2021. Aunt explained that minor
and minor’s half-sibling had been in her care in Kentucky since
86, 110 [“While appellate courts rarely consider postjudgment
evidence or evidence developed after the ruling challenged on
appeal, such evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of
determining whether the subsequent development has rendered
an appeal partially or entirely moot”].)
3
June 9, 2021.3 Minor told aunt that “‘Daddy touched me[,]’”
which aunt immediately reported to mother. Mother asked aunt
to take minor “to be checked out.” When examined, minor
“complained about tenderness around her labia” and was
diagnosed with vaginitis.
Aunt reported that mother had recently moved to
New Mexico with her current boyfriend, leaving notarized letters
granting the maternal grandmother (grandmother) legal
guardianship of minor and minor’s half-sibling. Aunt suspected
that mother was using methamphetamine.
Minor returned to grandmother’s home in California on
July 1, 2021,4 where according to grandmother, she and mother
had been living for the past year and a half. Grandmother told
the social worker that both mother and father had used
methamphetamine in the past and that father, who had anger
issues, currently smoked marijuana. Grandmother did not know
if mother was currently using drugs. Mother had left for
New Mexico with her new boyfriend, who had been recently
released from prison.
Minor told the social worker that aunt had taken her to the
doctor “‘because I had an infection and I was hurting.’” Mother
had given her a shower and told father about minor’s pain.
3 Minor’s younger half-sibling is not the subject of these
dependency proceedings.
4 On July 2, 2021, minor’s court-appointed counsel in a
family law matter sought a temporary emergency order that
minor be placed with grandmother pending investigation into the
sexual abuse allegations. The family court ordered that neither
mother nor father visit or communicate with minor until a
hearing later that month.
4
Minor also told father, but he did not buy her medicine. Minor
did not remember how long she had been in pain.
In a subsequent forensic sexual abuse interview, minor said
she had “an ‘infection’” in her vaginal area but that it no longer
hurt. She stated that father had been “touching it ‘down there[]’”
and that he touched her underneath her panties while she slept.
Father “touched her ‘body part’ with his hand and it felt weird.”
The social worker spoke with mother in mid-July 2021.
Mother was in New Mexico and did not have imminent plans to
return to California. Mother stated that she did not have a good
relationship with father, who hated everyone and was violent and
verbally abusive. Mother admitted to using methamphetamine
in the past, but stated that she had been “clean” for two years.
Mother had told father about minor’s infection; he responded
“that it was not his problem because [minor] live[d] with her and
it was her responsibility to attend to her needs.” Mother
acknowledged that aunt could “provide a better life for her
children.” When she was ready, mother planned to petition for
the children’s return to her care.
Father reported to the social worker that he was in “an
endless battle” with mother for custody of minor. He denied ever
touching minor under her clothes. He believed that mother’s
family had made up the allegations to keep minor away from
him. Father had previously complained to mother about minor’s
poor hygiene and head lice. Father admitted to prior substance
abuse; however, he currently only smoked marijuana when he
could afford it.
Dependency Petition
On July 21, 2021, DCFS filed a dependency petition
seeking the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over minor
5
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)5 (failure to protect), based on the parents’
medical neglect of minor, and pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (d) (sexual abuse), based on father’s
sexual abuse of minor and mother’s failure to protect minor from
it.
Detention Hearing
At the July 26, 2021, detention hearing, the juvenile court
found that a prima facie showing had been made that minor was
a person described by section 300. The court detained minor from
the parents, finding that remaining in their home would be
contrary to her welfare. The parents were granted monitored
visitation.
Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
The dependency investigator contacted several family
members in August 2021.
According to aunt, minor arrived at her home in Kentucky
on June 9, 2021. Aunt stated: “‘I had already known in
California . . . that [minor] had infection all around her vaginal
area for a month and a half because [mother] told me. When she
got to my house, it was late. Next day I gave her a bath. She
complained about it (vagina) hurting. But that day I was putting
butt paste for diaper rash to help. She never got treatment for
her infection. She was laying on my bed. When she opened her
leg so I can put it on her, she said, “Is the bruise still there?” I
looked around and I said, “I can’t see a bruise[]. . .” I asked her
how she got the bruise[]. . .[ ]She said her daddy did it. I said
what do you mean your daddy did it. I’m now panicking, so I
5 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
6
recorded it. She pretty much said “he touched it.” So I said what
happened and recorded it.’” Aunt provided a video in which
minor can be heard stating that father “‘touched it . . . because he
wanted to touch it.’” (Bolding and italics omitted.) Aunt also
reported that minor told her that “only adults are allowed to
touch her down there” and “‘[m]y daddy said if an adult wanted to
touch me down there then they can.’”
Mother reported that, in early May 2021, minor returned
from father’s home wearing the same underwear she had on
when she had left. The underwear was “filled with gross stuff.”
Minor complained that her vaginal area itched, so mother
purchased “itch medicine” and told minor that they would go to
the doctor if it did not improve in two days. Because minor
“didn’t say anything about it,” they “didn’t do anything” and
minor left for Kentucky. Minor had not previously disclosed any
sexual abuse.
Father acted in a hostile manner toward the dependency
investigator. For example, when the investigator called to
introduce herself and to schedule an interview, father stated:
“‘I’m fucking tired of this shit.’” In text messages, he claimed
that mother and her family were “the only ones messing up [his]
child’s life.” (Bolding and italics omitted.) He stated that he had
scratched minor’s back, but he denied touching her
inappropriately. He opined that the allegations were made in
response to his claim against mother for child concealment when
minor was taken to Kentucky. According to father, “Karma
comes in many different forms and it will get to [mother] for
doing this to me.”
In text messages between the parents from May 2021,
mother informed father that minor had “a HORRIBLE infection
7
down there” and that she had returned home with the same
underwear she had left wearing. Father responded that he had
minor change her underwear the previous night. Father told
mother that it was her responsibility because minor lived with
her and, if minor lived with him, her hygiene “wouldn’t be w[hat]
it is[.]”
Medical records indicated that, on June 11, 2021, aunt
brought minor to a doctor, who diagnosed minor with
vulvovaginitis.
According to an officer with the Los Angeles Police
Department, the investigation into the allegations of sexual
abuse had been closed, as there was insufficient evidence to
complete a criminal report against father.
Last Minute Information for the Court (Sept. 2, 2021)
DCFS provided the juvenile court with a transcript of the
July 6, 2021, forensic interview conducted with minor. Minor
stated that she experienced pain when her “dad was touching it
down there.” It occurred at nighttime when father was
scratching minor’s back.
Adjudication Hearing
After entertaining oral argument at the adjudication
hearing on October 27, 2021, the juvenile court explained that it
found evidence that father inappropriately touched minor’s
vaginal area and that the temporal proximity between the
touching and minor’s infection gave rise to the inference that the
touching caused the infection and resulting pain. The court
sustained count b-16 of the petition as pled and count b-27 as
6 The sustained b-1 count states: “[M]other . . . and
father . . . medically neglected the child by failing to take the
child to a medical doctor when the child reported pain in the
8
amended by interlineation and declared minor a dependent of the
court under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court dismissed
count d-1, which had been brought under section 300,
subdivision (d), in accord with DCFS’s request.8
The juvenile court removed minor from the parents’
custody and ordered her suitably placed with grandmother.
DCFS was ordered to provide reunification services to the
parents. Father was granted monitored visitation; mother was
granted unmonitored visitation with minor in grandmother’s
home so long as grandmother was home.
Family Reunification Period
In February 2022, the maternal grandparents’ resource
family approval application was denied. DCFS requested an
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children assessment for
aunt and her husband in Kentucky, which the juvenile court
ordered in March 2022.
child’s vaginal area. On [June 11, 2021], the child was diagnosed
[with] Vulvovaginitis. Such medical neglect of the child on the
part of the mother and father[] endangers the child’s physical
health and safety, and places the child at risk of serious physical
harm, damage, danger and medical neglect.”
7 The sustained b-2 count states: “[F]ather . . .
inappropriately touched the child by touching the child’s vagina,
with the father’s hands, and underneath the child’s
clothing. . . . Such inappropriate touching of the child by the
father, . . . endangers the child’s physical health and safety and
places the child at substantial risk of serious harm, damage,
danger, [and] inappropriate touching.”
8 The juvenile court explained that it did not find evidence
that father touched minor for his own sexual gratification—in
other words, there was “no evidence of sexual intent.”
9
DCFS delayed visitation between father and minor because
grandmother reported that minor “was extremely fearful of”
father and had nightmares about father killing her. Minor also
stated once that she did not want to visit with father. When a
social worker spoke to minor in early March 2022, minor reported
that she was no longer experiencing nightmares about father.
Father visited minor on March 29, 2022. This was his first
monitored visit since August 2021. The social worker observed
that minor was happy to see father and did not display any fear
toward him. Father behaved appropriately.
As of April 2022, mother continued to reside in
New Mexico. Mother had several video calls with minor each
week. Mother completed a 52-week parenting program and was
participating in individual counseling.
DCFS reported that father had “attempted” compliance
with his court-ordered programs. Between November 2021 and
March 2022, father tested positive for marijuana eight times
when he submitted to random drug tests. Father stated that
marijuana helped his anxiety, but he did not have a prescription
for it. He reported contacting a few agencies regarding individual
counseling, but he had not yet received a response. Father had
not participated in his parenting program.
Six-Month Status Review Hearing
At the six-month status review hearing on April 27, 2022,
the juvenile court found that continued jurisdiction was
necessary and that returning minor to parental custody would
create a substantial risk of detriment to her. The court found by
clear and convincing evidence that the parents were not in
substantial compliance with their case plans despite DCFS
offering reasonable services and making reasonable efforts to
10
enable minor’s return home. The court ordered that the parents
receive further family reunification services.
Notices of Appeal
On October 29, 2021, mother and father each filed a notice
of appeal from the jurisdictional findings and the removal of
minor from their custody at the adjudication hearing. On May 5,
2022, father filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s
April 27, 2022, findings and orders at the six-month status
review hearing.9
Subsequent Events
At the 12-month status review hearing on November 15,
2022, the juvenile court found that father’s progress had been
substantial, terminated the suitable placement order, and
ordered minor to be returned to father’s home.
DISCUSSION
I. The jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
A. Applicable law
Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court has
jurisdiction over and may adjudge to be a dependent of the court
a “child [who] has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result
of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to
adequately supervise or protect the child” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A))
or as a result of “[t]he willful or negligent failure of the parent . . .
to provide the child with adequate . . . medical treatment” (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1)(C)).
9 On August 8, 2022, we granted father’s motion to
consolidate the appeals arising from these notices of appeal.
11
“[S]ection 300 does not require that a child actually be
abused or neglected before the juvenile court can assume
jurisdiction. The subdivision[] at issue here require[s] only a
‘substantial risk’ that the child will be abused or neglected. The
legislatively declared purpose of these provisions ‘is to provide
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection,
and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk
of that harm.’ [Citation.] ‘The court need not wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the
steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J. (2013)
56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
B. Standard of review
Jurisdictional findings must be made by a preponderance of
the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) We review those findings for
substantial evidence—“evidence that is reasonable, credible and
of solid value. [Citations.] We do not evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or
determine the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record
favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if
there is other evidence supporting a contrary finding.” (In re R.V.
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.)
“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for
its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s
jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
12
supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged
statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.
[Citations.]” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451
(Alexis E.); see also In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 284 [“where
there are multiple findings against one parent; the validity of one
finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the
others”].)
C. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings based on the parents’ medical neglect of
minor.10
By at least May of 2021, both parents were aware that
minor experienced painful irritation in her vaginal area, with
mother describing it to father as “HORRIBLE.” Instead of taking
minor to a medical doctor to diagnose and treat the issue, the
parents exchanged text messages blaming the other for the
situation. Minor reported that she told father about her pain, but
he did not buy her medicine. Mother bought “itch medicine” for
minor, but the issue had not resolved and neither parent had
sought professional treatment for minor when she was sent
across the country to aunt’s home in Kentucky on June 9, 2021.
It was aunt who finally took minor to a doctor on June 11, 2021,
who diagnosed minor as suffering from vulvovaginitis.
10 Because we affirm the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction on this basis, we need not reach the merits of father’s
challenge to the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction based on
allegations that he inappropriately touched minor and decline to
exercise our discretion to do so. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 283–284; Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.)
13
The evidence before the juvenile court was sufficient to
support the finding that the parents “willful[ly] or negligent[ly]
fail[ed]” to provide minor “with adequate . . . medical
treatment[,]” placing her at substantial risk of serious physical
harm. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
In resisting this conclusion, the parents attempt to
minimize the severity of minor’s medical condition and resulting
pain. Father argues that mother took reasonable steps to
address minor’s vaginal pain short of taking her to a doctor.
Mother points to statements that minor received regular medical
care and was up-to-date on her vaccinations. Both parents
contend that no serious physical harm befell minor, with father
speculating that because antibiotics were not prescribed, she
must not have suffered any type of serious untreated infection.
The parents disregard the reasonable inferences that minor’s
vulvovaginitis did not progress to an even more serious medical
issue because of aunt’s prompt action once minor arrived in
Kentucky despite the parents’ medical neglect and that there was
a risk of reoccurrence.11
More generally, the parents’ arguments essentially ask us
to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do under our standard
of review. (In re R.V., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.) Instead,
11 Mother contrasts the instant case with In re Petra B. (1989)
216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1170, in which a juvenile court exercised
jurisdiction where the record reflected a lack of medical
treatment along with a doctor’s statement about the risk of
infection, and In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996, involving a
child with a history of cancer. Neither case, however, stands for
the proposition that a finding of medical neglect under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires an expert opinion about
medical risk or must involve a life-threatening condition.
14
we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the juvenile court’s ruling. (Ibid.) Having identified
substantial evidence to support the finding of jurisdiction, “it is of
no consequence” that other evidence or inferences drawn from the
evidence might have supported a contrary finding. (Bowers v.
Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874, italics omitted.)
II. The dispositional order removing minor from mother’s custody
is supported by substantial evidence.
A. Applicable law
Before removing a minor from a parent’s custody, the
juvenile court is required to “make one of five specified findings
by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361, subd. (c).) One ground
for removal is that there is a substantial risk of injury to the
child’s physical health, safety, protection or emotional well-being
if he or she were returned home, and there are no reasonable
means to protect the child. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) ‘“Clear and
convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability. The
evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It
must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent
of every reasonable mind. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Actual harm
to a child is not necessary before a child can be removed.
‘Reasonable apprehension stands as an accepted basis for the
exercise of state power.’” (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147,
154.)
B. Standard of review
We review a dispositional order removing a minor from
parental custody for substantial evidence. (In re V.L., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Because the juvenile court must make
its finding that a ground for removal exists under the clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof (§ 361, subd. (c)), “the
15
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011).
C. Analysis
The same evidence that supports the juvenile court’s
exercise of dependency jurisdiction over minor based on medical
neglect also constitutes substantial evidence from which the court
could find it highly probable that minor would be at risk of
substantial danger if she returned to mother’s custody. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).)
Mother contends that there were alternative means to
protect minor short of removal, suggesting that “the [juvenile]
court could have ordered that [m]other regularly update the
social worker about [minor]’s medical status and/or could have
conditioned placement with [m]other on [m]other’s addressing of
such needs.” But such alternatives would be reliant on mother’s
self-reporting and ability to perceive the risks minor faced and
what constituted a proper response to those risks. Given
persistent questions about mother’s substance abuse, the fact
that she remained out-of-state, and father’s long-standing
concerns about minor’s hygiene in mother’s care, the court could
reasonably conclude that such measures would not abate the risk
to minor.
III. Father’s challenges to the removal of minor from his custody
and to the reasonable services finding are moot.
It is a court’s duty, including in the dependency context,
‘““to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be
carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions
or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
16
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’
[Citation.]” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
“Due to the dynamic nature of juvenile dependency
proceedings, a subsequent order of the juvenile court may render
an issue on appeal moot. [Citation.]” (In re M.F., supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at p. 110.) “[T]he critical factor in considering
whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate
court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.”
(In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) “For relief to be
‘effective’, two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff
must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
plaintiff seeks. [Citation.]” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 276.)
In light of minor’s return to father’s custody at the 12-
month status review hearing on November 15, 2022, father’s
challenges to the dispositional order removing minor from him
and to the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding at the six-
month status review hearing are moot. Father has already
obtained the relief he would if we reversed the dispositional
order: the return of minor to his custody. As for the reasonable
services finding, “[t]he remedy for the failure to provide court-
ordered reunification services to a parent is to provide an
additional period of reunification services to that parent and to
make a finding on the record that reasonable services were not
offered or provided to that parent.” (In re A.G. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1005, italics omitted.) Again, because minor
has already been reunified with father, such relief would have no
practical, tangible impact on father’s legal status and would
therefore be ineffective. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
17
p. 277 [“relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible
impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status[]’”].)
Father contends that these issues are not moot because
they could prejudice him in future proceedings. Specifically, he
argues that the removal order could provide the foundation for
termination of parental rights and the bypass of reunification
services in a future dependency matter, and that the reasonable
services finding is a prerequisite for the termination of parental
rights at a section 366.26 hearing. That any of these concerns
would materialize given that minor has been returned to father’s
custody is too speculative to avoid mootness. (See In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278 [rejecting proposition “that
speculative future harm is sufficient to avoid mootness”].)
We also decline to exercise discretionary review of these
moot issues. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 287 [“A
reviewing court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is
appropriate to exercise discretionary review to reach the merits of
a moot appeal”].)
18
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
dispositional order removing minor from mother’s custody are
affirmed. DCFS’s motion for partial dismissal is granted; we
dismiss as moot father’s appeal of the dispositional order
removing minor from father’s custody and of the reasonable
services finding at the six-month status review hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
19