People v. Miller CA2/5

Filed 6/16/23 P. v. Miller CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B320983
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA043414)
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY MILLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Teri Schwartz, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No Appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
Michael Anthony Miller appeals the trial court’s order
denying his petition for vacatur of his conviction and
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resentencing under Penal Code section 236.15.
In 2000, Miller was convicted of corporeal injury on a
spouse (§ 237.5, subd. (a); count 1), assault by means of force
likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2),
and false imprisonment (§ 236; count 3). The jury found true the
allegation that Miller had suffered two prior convictions for
serious and or violent felonies within the meaning of the “Three
Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
Miller was sentenced to 25 years to life.
In 2021, Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) was
enacted. As relevant here, Assembly Bill No. 124 added section
236.15 to the Penal Code. Section 236.15 provides for vacatur of
convictions for nonviolent offenses if the offense was the direct
result of the defendant being a victim of intimate partner
violence or sexual violence. Assembly Bill No. 124 became
effective on January 1, 2022.
In 2022, Miller filed a motion to vacate his convictions,
which the trial court denied because Miller failed to plead facts
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that would entitle him to relief. Miller timely appealed.
Miller’s counsel filed a brief indicating he could find no
arguable issues to raise on appeal and requesting that this court
(1) inform Miller of his right to file a supplemental brief; and (2)
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The trial court included another ground for denying relief
that, in light of our disposition, we do not address here.
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exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the
record. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231–232.)
After receiving notice, Miller personally filed a brief raising
multiple contentions, which we address below.
DISCUSSION
Legal Principles
Section 236.15, subdivision (a) provides: “If a person was
arrested for or convicted of any nonviolent offense committed
while the person was a victim of intimate partner violence or
sexual violence, the person may petition the court for vacatur
relief of their convictions, arrests, and adjudications under this
section. The petitioner shall establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the arrest or conviction was the direct result of
being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence
which demonstrates that the person lacked the requisite intent to
commit the offense. Upon this showing, the court shall find that
the person lacked the requisite intent to commit the offense and
shall therefore vacate the conviction as invalid due to legal defect
at the time of the arrest or conviction.” “The petition for relief
shall be submitted under penalty of perjury and shall describe all
of the available grounds and evidence that the petitioner was a
victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence and the
arrest or conviction of a nonviolent offense was the direct result
of being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence.”
(§ 236.15, subd. (b).) Vacatur and resentencing are appropriate
only if: “After considering the totality of the evidence presented,
the court . . . finds all of the following: [¶] (1) That the petitioner
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was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence at the
time of the alleged commission of the qualifying crime. [¶] (2)
The arrest or conviction of the crime was a direct result of being a
victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence. [¶] (3) It is
in the best interest of justice.” (§ 236.15, subd. (g).)
Analysis
Miller contends that he is entitled to relief because he
proved he was a victim of intimate partner violence by a
preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, Miller points to
evidence that he was released and an unrelated case against him
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dismissed in Pasadena Superior Court Case No. GA039962.
This contention lacks merit. Miller sets forth the wrong
standard. He was required to provide clear and convincing
evidence of his eligibility (§ 236.15, subd. (b)), which is a more
difficult burden to meet. Standards aside, Miller’s evidence
demonstrates only that charges against him were dismissed. It
does not support his assertion that he was a victim of intimate
partner violence. Nor does it show that Miller’s convictions were
the direct result of that alleged intimate partner violence. Both
showings are required to establish eligibility for relief. (§ 236.15,
subd. (g).)
Miller next contends that the court should have granted his
section 236.15 petition because it was unopposed. Miller cites to
3
Miller attached to his petition a minute order in case
No. GA039962 reflecting that the cause was dismissed in the
interests of justice. The minute order does not reflect the nature
of the charges against him. In his supplemental briefing Miller
mistakenly refers to case No. GA039962 as case No. GA043414.
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section 236.15, subdivision (d), which states: “If opposition to the
petition is not filed by the applicable state or local prosecutorial
agency, the court shall deem the petition unopposed and may
grant the petition.” When interpreting a statute, our primary
objective is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent. (People v.
Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 95.) We do so by first looking to
the language of the statute. (Ibid.) When interpreting a statute
contained in the Penal Code, “ ‘[w]ords and phrases must be
construed according to the context and the approved usage of the
language . . . .’ ” (Ibid., citing § 7, subd. 16.) Here, it appears
that the Legislature intended to permit the court to grant an
unopposed petition in its discretion. The statute contains both
the words “shall” and “may” in the same sentence, which
indicates that the Legislature intended to make a distinction
between the authority to deem a petition unopposed (mandatory),
and the authority to grant the petition (discretionary). (See
Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, 551
[holding “may” permissive where used in the same statute as
“shall,” which is mandatory].) The trial court was not required to
grant Miller’s petition simply because it was unopposed.
Miller further argues that he was entitled to a hearing
under section 236.15. subdivision (f), which provides: “If the
petition is opposed or if the court otherwise deems it necessary,
the court shall schedule a hearing on the petition.” The word “if”
indicates a condition precedent to the granting of a hearing—i.e.,
a hearing must only be held where the petition is opposed
(inapplicable here) or where the trial court deems a hearing
otherwise necessary. The statute contains no criteria for
determining whether a hearing meets the catch-all requirement
of “otherwise necessary”; the judgment is left to the court. Here,
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the court did not conclude that a hearing was otherwise
necessary. Even if Miller was entitled to a hearing, he has shown
no prejudice. Section 236.15 requires a petitioner to provide a
description of “all of the available grounds and evidence” in
support of the petition. In compliance with the statute, Miller
provided the materials he relies upon to establish relief. As we
have discussed, Miller’s evidence does not meet the requirements
of section 236.15, and he does not claim, much less substantiate,
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been more
favorable if he had been permitted to appear at a hearing on the
matter.
Miller additionally contends that section 236.15,
subdivision (j) entitled him to a rebuttable presumption that he
was eligible for relief. This is incorrect. First, the provision
applies solely to persons “described in [s]ection 602 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code,” which Miller is not.4 Second, such
persons are entitled to a presumption of eligibilty only if they
establish “the arrest or adjudication was the direct result of being
a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence.” As we
have already discussed, Miller was unable to make this showing.
The remaining issues Miller raises relate to his underlying
trial and alleged errors in sentencing. Petitions for resentencing
are limited to the issues implicated by the statute governing the
resentencing procedure. (See, e.g., People v. DeHuff (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [appeal of denial of former § 1172.6
resentencing petition limited to issues implicated by statute].)
These issues do not fall within the scope of section 236.15.
4 Welfare
& Institutions Code, section 602 does not apply to
any person who was not a minor age 17 or younger at the time of
the offense.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the petition for resentencing
under section 236.15 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting, P. J.
KIM, J.
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