People v. Hurtado CA2/1

Filed 6/27/23 P. v. Hurtado CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B320551
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA473878)
v.
JONATHAN HURTADO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
David Y. Stanley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Early in the morning of December 20, 2018, a gunman in a
two-door white Infiniti shot and killed Jerry Castro as Castro sat
in his car. An amended information filed on December 5, 2019,
charged defendant Jonathan Hurtado with Castro’s murder (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle
(§ 246). The information further alleged as to both counts that
Hurtado and a principal personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1)), that the
offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and that at the time of the offenses
Hurtado was out of custody on bail (§ 12022.1).
Hurtado’s first trial ended in a mistrial at his request due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. A retrial by jury resulted in
Hurtado’s conviction on both counts. With regard to the
enhancement allegations, Hurtado ultimately accepted the
prosecution’s offer to admit he personally used a firearm within
the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a) in lieu of a further
retrial on the enhancement allegations. The trial court
ultimately sentenced Hurtado to 35 years to life imprisonment.
On appeal, Hurtado argues the trial court erred when it
denied his Batson/Wheeler2 motion after the prosecution sought
to excuse an African-American prospective juror. He further
argues the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting
photographs depicting Hurtado holding firearms, as well as
evidence referring to Hurtado having a court date in an unrelated
case that demonstrated Hurtado’s connection to the white Infiniti
1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [106 S.Ct. 1712, 90
L.Ed.2d 69]; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.)
2
from which Castro was shot. Finally, Hurtado requests that we
review the sealed transcript of the trial court’s Pitchess3 in
camera proceeding to determine whether the trial court followed
the proper procedure for defense discovery of investigator
personnel records.
Under the deferential standards of review applicable to
these claims, we find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Summary
The facts introduced at the retrial resulting in conviction
established the following. On December 20, 2018, at about 12:20
a.m., Tommy A.4 was driving along Long Beach Boulevard. He
saw a young person spray-painting and a stopped Chevrolet
sedan ahead of his car. Tommy expected the spray-painter to get
into the Chevrolet when he finished painting because the car door
was open. Tommy was about to go around the Chevrolet when a
white car, likely a Toyota or Infiniti, with paper plates and tinted
windows passed Tommy’s car on the left and stopped alongside
the Chevrolet. The painter ran. After the painter began
running, Tommy heard five gunshots and saw orange-colored
gunshot sparks all coming from the same spot inside the white
car. He also saw a gun or hand (but not a whole arm) extended
out of the passenger side window of the white car. Although
Tommy could not tell if the shooter was on the driver’s or
3 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.
4As the trial court did, at least in part because several
witnesses were minors, we refer to witnesses by their first name
and last initial. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b).)
3
passenger’s side, the shots “were all from the passenger’s seat or
the passenger’s side or somebody reaching across the seat.”
Tommy could not tell how many people were in the white car.
After the shots were fired, the white car sped away and the
Chevrolet drifted to the corner. Tommy tried to follow the white
car, but was unable to keep up with it. He called 911, returned to
the scene, and spoke with police. A variety of surveillance
cameras in the area captured these events and those videos were
played for the jury. A defense expert who later analyzed the
surveillance footage testified there were three or possibly four
people in the white car.
City of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers
were called to the scene at 41st Street and Long Beach
Boulevard, arriving at 12:21 a.m. They found a sedan that had
collided with a wall; in the driver’s seat was an apparently-
deceased male with a gunshot wound to the side of his head.
They called for paramedics. An official with the Los Angeles City
Fire Department declared Castro dead, with a traumatic brain
injury from an apparent gunshot wound. A later autopsy
confirmed Castro had died of multiple gunshot wounds. He had
two fatal wounds to the head, one probably-fatal wound to the
neck, and one wound to the chest. Officers did not find any shell
casings at the scene of the shooting.
Prior testimony from Armando G. (who was unavailable as
a witness) was read to the jury. Armando was 14 years old in
December 2018, and referred to Castro as his cousin because they
had known each other for a long time, even though they were not
blood relatives. Armando said he was at home that night, not out
tagging, and he did not see Castro injured by gunshots. Video
was played of the incident; Armando denied it showed him
4
getting out of the Chevrolet after Castro was shot. A 911 call was
also played, purportedly from Armando. The caller identified
himself as being 14 years old, and he said his cousin had been
shot near the corner of 41st Street and Long Beach Boulevard.
The caller said the shooters left in a two-door white Infiniti.
When the 911 call was played, Armando denied it was his voice
on the call and denied he previously told detectives that he called
an ambulance for Castro.
Hurtado was a member of the Ghetto Boyz gang. Castro’s
aunt testified Castro was probably a member of the 38th Street
gang; a LAPD detective testified Castro had tattoos indicative of
being a 38th Street gang member, including one saying “38” that
covered the majority of his back. The Ghetto Boyz and 38th
Street gangs are rivals. Castro’s aunt told police that Armando
had informed her Castro had been shot by a Ghetto Boyz gang
member driving a white Infiniti; during the shooting, the front
passenger had leaned back to allow the driver to shoot.
Later on the day of the shooting, LAPD Officer Jordan
Medwin heard about the shooting and that a white two-door car
had been identified as the suspect’s vehicle. On December 16,
2018, Mynor G. had informed Officer Medwin that some Ghetto
Boyz gang members in a white two-door Infiniti had pulled up
next to Mynor on the street and flashed a gun.5 As a result,
Officer Medwin and his partner patrolled territory claimed by the
Ghetto Boyz in search of a white two-door Infiniti.
5Mynor testified at trial that he did not know Officer
Medwin, and denied that he talked to police officers about Ghetto
Boyz gang members in a white Infiniti flashing a gun at him.
5
That patrol located a white Infiniti G37 with paper plates
parked in front of a residence on East 32nd Street. Police
stopped Hurtado on December 20, 2018, soon after he left the
residence in the white Infiniti. While clearing the trunk after the
traffic stop, an officer saw a shell casing and notified detectives.
A later search of the car yielded six shell casings, with most in
the rear seat or center console area, and a live bullet located by
the front passenger-side door. All six expended shell casings
were nine-millimeter Luger rounds fired from the same gun and
exhibited characteristics consistent with that gun being a Glock
pistol. Analysis of the three bullets recovered from Castro’s body
and car showed that they were consistent with nine-millimeter
Luger, .357 Sig, or .357 Magnum ammunition.
The search of the Infiniti also recovered a court document
related to Hurtado. The People showed the jury Hurtado’s
Snapchat story dated December 11, 2018, which contained a
photo of the Infiniti’s center console superimposed with the words
“Fuck court date today.” The court took judicial notice that
Hurtado had a court date on December 11, 2018.
Investigators retrieved other photos from Hurtado’s phone
number and his Snapchat social media account; those pictures
included Hurtado flashing gang signs and holding guns,
including a Glock semi-automatic with an extended magazine.
Logs for Hurtado’s phone number from December 20, 2018,
showed cell phone activity in the area of the shooting at 41st
Street and Long Beach Boulevard at 12:23 and 12:24 a.m. on
December 20, 2018.
Hurtado’s mother had purchased a white Infiniti on or
about December 7, 2018. In a police interview, Hurtado stated
that only he, his mother, and his sister drove that car. Several
6
latent fingerprints matching Hurtado were found in the white
Infiniti. An LAPD officer testified he had contact with Hurtado
on December 9, 2018, at a car wash in Ghetto Boyz territory
where Hurtado worked. At that time, Hurtado was driving a
white two-door Infiniti with paper plates.
B. Conviction and Sentencing
Trial was by jury. On March 16, 2020, while the jury was
deliberating, the court declared a mistrial due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Retrial commenced on July 6, 2021. The jury found
Hurtado guilty of first degree murder and shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle. It found the firearm allegations not true as to
Hurtado but true as to a principal. The jury also found the gang
allegations true. There was no verdict on the on-bail allegation,
as the court bifurcated it for later disposition.
Hurtado thereafter moved for a new trial based on changes
to the law applicable to the gang and firearm allegations
resulting from the passage of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2020-2021
Reg. Sess.). The court denied the motion as to the underlying
convictions but granted it as to the gang and firearm allegations.
The court sentenced Hurtado to 25 years to life on the first
degree murder count and stayed the sentence on the shooting at
an occupied motor vehicle count pursuant to section 654. On
June 22, 2022, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hurtado admitted a
section 12022.5, subdivision (a) allegation that he personally used
a firearm in lieu of a further trial. The court sentenced Hurtado
to an additional 10 years on the firearm enhancement for a total
sentence of 35 years to life.
Hurtado filed a timely notice of appeal.
7
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Hurtado’s
Batson/Wheeler Motion
Background
Prospective Juror No. 65 (Juror 65) was a male African-
American who was single, lived in Los Angeles, had no children,
worked as a vehicle appraiser, and had never served on a jury.
He answered no to each of the trial court’s preliminary questions
that may have required further inquiry, such as whether he knew
anyone convicted of a crime or anyone in law enforcement.
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the venire whether
those who had previously served on a jury found the deliberations
were “overall respectful” and civil even if jurors disagreed.
Prospective Juror No. 90 responded in the affirmative. The
following discussion then took place:
“[Defense counsel]: . . . [I will] give you one more
hypothetical, an extreme case scenario. Say, it’s 4:00 o’clock on a
Friday, you’ve been deliberating. The vote is split 11 to 1. You’re
in the 11, and there’s one person who just doesn’t see the
evidence the same way. Would anyone—does anyone feel they
would be too concerned to pressure that one person to change
their vote just to be done with the process? Prospective Juror
No. 65, I saw you shaking your head ‘no.’ Sorry. We sometimes
react—
“Prospective Juror No. 65: I wouldn’t—
“[Defense counsel]: —to any—any reaction.
“Prospective Juror No. 65: No. Because, regardless of the
time that it is, even on a Friday, I would still want that we cover
every base, to make sure that everyone is agreeing on the right
8
out—like I say, the right outcome instead of, like, ‘Oh, I just want
to go home already.’
“[Defense counsel]: Right.
“Prospective Juror No. 65: Because it is—this is someone
else’s life that you’re going to delegate from here, so I would think
you would want to be as honest as possible and to make the right
decision.
“[Defense counsel]: That’s perfect. Does anyone—does
anyone else feel differently . . . . So let me give you just the flip
side of that. Say you’re the one, the one person who does not see
things the same as everyone else? And, of course, I’m not asking
you to not deliberate or just make your minds up right away. I’m
talking about after fully deliberating, fully reviewing all the
evidence, if you are still in a different—have a different
perspective from your fellow jurors, do any of you feel that you
would change your vote, if you weren’t convinced, just to be done
with the process?”
The record does not reflect a response from Juror 65 to this
last question.
Three days later, the prosecutor confirmed during voir dire
Juror 65 was comfortable with the burden of proof and that he
was “up to the task” to serve on the jury. Then, using its eighth
peremptory challenge, the prosecution sought to excuse Juror 65.
Defense counsel made a Batson/Wheeler challenge at sidebar.
The trial court and parties stated:
“[Defense counsel:] He did not give anything—any answers
that were problematic or showed anything that would go to cause
and answered that he was up for being a juror, had no,
essentially, negative or concerning answers in any other way. So,
basically, I would make the motion, based on him being African-
9
American and nothing—nothing that would show a basis, other
than race.
“The Court: All right. Based on the fact you’re just making
it on that one individual, I am going to find a prima facie case.
And I’ll turn it over to the People, and you can present the court
with your reasoning.
“[Prosecution]: Yes, your honor. My reasoning is, with
respect to Juror No. 65, when he was—when counsel was
questioning the panel about juror deliberations and talking about
whether or not other jurors would be sharing their thoughts and
would talk to each other, if there was an individual who was not
seeing things the same way, he was nodding his head repeatedly,
seeming to be affirming that it should not be a continued
discussion, that the discussion would end there. I think that’s
contrary to how the jury should be deliberating in this case.
“The Court: So that’s the reason for your—
“[Prosecution]: That is my reasoning.
“The Court: Any others?
“[Prosecution]: No.
“The Court: All right. And do you wish to be heard?
“[Defense counsel]: Your honor, I believe he nodded his
head at a lot of points. Some people are more expressive. But
there was nothing to support [the prosecution’s] insinuation as to
what that meant in that instance. And he did not follow up, and
we did not question him as to that today, so I think that inference
is far too speculative.
“The Court: At this point I’m going to find that the
prosecutor has set forth a race-neutral reason for the exercise of
the peremptory as to Juror No. 65, based on his own observations
of the jurors and his inference from viewing the juror reacting in
10
certain ways to questions. So at this point I’m going to deny your
request for a Batson-Wheeler motion. All right.”
The trial court then thanked and excused Juror 65.
Neither the record on appeal nor the parties’ briefing indicates
the race of any other prospective or seated jurors.
Legal Principals and Standard of Review
“ ‘ “Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any
advocate’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective
jurors based on race.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Doing so violates both the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the
right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section
of the community under article I, section 16 of the California
Constitution.” ’ [Citation.] The law also recognizes ‘ “a
rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being
exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to
demonstrate impermissible discrimination.” [Citation.] “A three-
step procedure applies at trial when a defendant alleges
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. First, the
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution
exercised a challenge based on impermissible criteria. Second, if
the trial court finds a prima facie case, then the prosecution must
offer nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenge. Third, the
trial court must determine whether the prosecution’s offered
justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant
circumstances, the defendant has shown purposeful race
discrimination. [Citation.] ‘The ultimate burden of persuasion
regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never
shifts from, the [defendant].’ ” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and
Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 759-760.)
11
“[A]s a general matter, our review of a trial court’s denial of
a Batson/Wheeler motion is deferential, ‘examining only whether
substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] “We
review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a
prosecutor’s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges
‘ “with great restraint.” ’ [Citation.] We presume that a
prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional
manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to
distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.” ’ ([Citation];
see also [People v.] Smith [(2018)] 4 Cal.5th [1134,] 1147-1148 . . .
[since ‘ “ ‘ “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on
demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s
province.’ ” ’ [Citation.] . . . [I]n reviewing a trial court’s
reasoned determination that a prosecutor’s reasons for striking a
juror are sincere, we typically defer to the trial court” ’].)
[Citation.] [¶] Of course, restraint in this context does not mean
abdication. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘Although we generally “accord great
deference to the trial court’s ruling that a particular reason is
genuine,” we do so only when the trial court has made a sincere
and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied
to each challenged juror.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 860, 870, italics omitted.)
Analysis
Hurtado argues “the prosecutor’s claimed reason for
excusing this juror has no support in the record and in fact is
directly contradicted by the colloquy with Juror 65 on this
subject.” In our view, the colloquy was ambiguous. Defense
counsel’s question, “[D]oes anyone feel they would be too
concerned to pressure that one person to change their vote just to
be done with the process,” was somewhat opaque. One could
12
interpret it as asking whether someone would feel comfortable
pressuring someone to change their vote, or as asking whether
someone would feel uncomfortable pressuring someone to change
their vote. Thus, one could fairly interpret, as the prosecutor did,
Juror 65’s repeated shaking of the head when defense counsel
questioned how to approach a situation where there was a juror
who saw things differently than the majority of other jurors as
indicating Juror 65 would not seek to convince that holdout juror
to change their view. Or one could interpret Juror 65’s response,
as Hurtado does now, to reflect that Juror 65 thought continued
deliberations were important to make sure all jurors agreed on
the right outcome and that there was no basis for concern about
how Juror 65 would approach a situation with a holdout juror.
Reflecting this ambiguity, defense counsel did not correct
what Hurtado now claims was a misstatement about the colloquy
with Juror 65 when making the Batson/Wheeler motion. Defense
counsel agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that Juror 65
repeatedly nodded his head. Defense counsel’s argument in
response to the prosecutor’s proffered reason for excusing Juror
65 was instead that Juror 65 was an expressive individual, and
the prosecutor’s inference of what the head nodding meant was
too speculative.
“ ‘A prospective juror may be excused based upon bare looks
and gestures . . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Fiu (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 360, 398-399.) “ ‘ “[R]ace-neutral reasons for
peremptory challenges often invoke a juror’s demeanor . . . ,
making the trial court’s first-hand observations of even greater
importance. In this situation, the trial court must evaluate not
only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory
intent, but also whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said
13
to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror
by the prosecutor. We have recognized that these determinations
of credibility and demeanor lie ‘ “peculiarly within a trial judge’s
province,” ’ [citations], and we have stated that ‘in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, we would defer to [the trial court].’
[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346,
361.)
There is no dispute Juror 65 shook his head repeatedly—
defense counsel noted it before questioning Juror 65, and again
during the Batson/Wheeler motion by admitting Juror 65 “nodded
his head at a lot of points.” Given that one could subjectively
read Juror 65’s undisputed gestures to raise a concern with his
approach to jury deliberations, the trial court did not err in
finding the prosecutor set forth a credible, race-neutral reason for
the preemptory challenge to Juror 65. The inquiry is not
objective but subjective—“whether the advocate exercising the
challenge had an honest and racially neutral reason for doing so.”
(People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 803, italics omitted.) As
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the
prosecution’s challenge to Juror 65 was not made on the basis of
group bias alone, the court did not err in denying Hurtado’s
Batson/Wheeler motion regarding that prospective juror.
B. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When
Making Evidentiary Rulings
We turn next to Hurtado’s claim that the court erroneously
admitted certain photographs of firearms and evidence of his
court date in another matter.
1. The Applicable Law
Evidence Code section 352 permits the exclusion of
evidence, among other things, if “[t]he court in its discretion . . .
14
[determines that] its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Evidence is substantially more
prejudicial than probative [citation] [only] if, broadly stated, it
poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the
reliability of the outcome” [citation].’ [Citation.] ‘ “The prejudice
which . . . Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not
the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from
relevant, highly probative evidence.” [Citations.] “Rather, the
statute uses the word in its etymological sense of ‘prejudging’ a
person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.” ’ [Citations.]
The potential for such prejudice is ‘decreased’ when testimony
describing the defendant’s uncharged acts is ‘no stronger and no
more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged
offenses.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110,
144.)
“We apply an abuse of discretion standard to review a trial
court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under [Evidence
Code] section 352.” (People v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
pp. 144-145.) Even if the trial court abuses its discretion when
admitting evidence, we will not reverse a conviction unless there
is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have
achieved a more favorable outcome had the evidence been
excluded. (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 931; People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837.)6
6 We reject Hurtado’s argument that the harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.E.2d 705] applies here, as the evidence
at issue does not implicate issues of fundamental unfairness.
15
2. Photographs of Firearms
The weapon used to murder Castro was never recovered.
The People sought to admit photos of Hurtado obtained from his
social media accounts and cell phone showing him brandishing
pistols that were consistent with the suspected murder weapon.
Specifically, the People sought to introduce a photo of a nine-
millimeter Glock pistol with an extended magazine lying across
the center console of Hurtado’s car, additional photos of the same
Glock pistol, a photo of Hurtado posing in the driver’s seat of a
car with a nine-millimeter pistol on his lap, and a still from a
video showing a semiautomatic firearm in the center console of
Hurtado’s car.
Hurtado argues the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting these photographs because there was insufficient
evidence connecting the depicted firearms to the murder weapon.
We disagree. Six nine-millimeter casings were found in
Hurtado’s car; all were likely fired from a Glock pistol. The three
bullets found at the crime scene were also consistent with nine-
millimeter ammunition. All of the challenged photographs except
one showed a Glock pistol; those photographs thus showed the
potential murder weapon and were probative of guilt. As for the
remaining photograph, the court found it relevant because
although the displayed gun was not a Glock, it was still a nine-
millimeter weapon (and thus the same potential caliber as the
(E.g., People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 951-952 [“When
evidence is erroneously admitted, we do not reverse a conviction
unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the defendant would have occurred absent the error”], citing
People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; People v. Partida
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [same].)
16
murder weapon), and the picture was taken close in time to the
murder. The court further noted the picture showed Hurtado
displaying gang signs with the nine-millimeter weapon tucked
into his waistband, and the photograph was therefore relevant to
intent and motive given that the victim was from a rival gang.
We perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s admission
of these photographs. Ballistics testing indicated the murder
weapon was consistent with a nine-millimeter pistol, and likely,
but not conclusively, a Glock. Although the evidence did not
establish any of the guns in the photographs were necessarily the
murder weapon, any of them might have been—the requisite
degree of connection between each of the firearms and the
murder weapon was shown. Furthermore, the photograph of the
non-Glock pistol was relevant not only because it might have
been the murder weapon, but also to Hurtado’s motive and intent
to shoot a rival gang member that was otherwise a stranger to
him as it showed him displaying gang signs with the nine-
millimeter weapon tucked into his waistband. The evidence
“ ‘was thus relevant and admissible as circumstantial evidence
that [Hurtado] committed the charged offenses.’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Homick (2012) 55 Ca.4th 816, 876.)
3. Evidence Referring to Court Date
The trial court admitted evidence that an unspecified court
document related to Hurtado was found in the Infiniti, and that
Hurtado’s Snapchat story for December 11, 2018, contained an
image of the Infiniti’s center console with the words “Fuck court
date today” superimposed across it. Hurtado argues this
evidence was highly prejudicial and had no probative value, and
the trial court therefore erred in admitting it. We disagree.
17
Before admitting this evidence, the court asked outside the
presence of the jury whether Hurtado was conceding sole use of
the Infiniti. Hurtado, as was his right, refused any such
concession. The judicial paperwork found in the car (a bail
receipt) was not admitted; the court prohibited any reference to
the document being a bail receipt and limited the prosecution to
eliciting whether the search found “paperwork relating to a court
date in connection with [Hurtado].” That court paperwork
relating to Hurtado was found in the car (along with shell casings
and a bullet) helped to establish Hurtado’s dominion and control
over the Infiniti. Evidence that Hurtado had a court date,
without any other detail, was not unduly prejudicial given the
probative nature of the testimony.
As for the Snapchat story image, the court took judicial
notice that Hurtado had a court date on December 11, 2018, in
another matter. The Snapchat image, along with its message
about a court date, showed Hurtado’s connection to the Infiniti
near in time to Castro’s murder. The posting of the image to
Snapchat, a mobile phone application, was also probative of
Hurtado’s connection to the mobile phone number identified as
his—a mobile phone that was in the area of the murder at the
time it happened. Nor was the evidence unduly prejudicial. The
photograph was not graphic and did not disclose anything about
the nature of the other case. While the Snapchat image
expressed Hurtado’s upset with having a court date, it did not
indicate what if anything he intended to do about that upset,
what that case involved, or anything else prejudicial. It therefore
did not pose an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings
or the reliability of the outcome given its probative value. (People
v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 146.)
18
C. We Find No Error in the Trial Court’s Pitchess
Motion Ruling
Hurtado requests we make an independent review of the
trial court’s ruling on his Pitchess motion with regard to two
LAPD officers, Medwin and Esteban Aguilar, who were involved
in the murder investigation. The Attorney General does not
object.
A criminal defendant is entitled to the discovery of
confidential police officer personnel records if the information
contained therein is relevant to defend against the charge.
(Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 537-538.) To obtain such
records, the defendant must show good cause; he must “establish
. . . a logical link between [a proposed defense] and the pending
charge” and “articulate how the discovery being sought would
support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s
version of events.” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1011, 1021; see Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) Discoverable
information “is limited to instances of officer misconduct related
to the misconduct asserted by the defendant.” (Warrick, supra, at
p. 1021.)
Under People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229 to 1232,
upon a defendant’s request, we may review the sealed transcript
of a trial court’s in camera Pitchess hearing to determine whether
the trial court disclosed all relevant documents.7 We have done
7 The police officers’ personnel records are not part of the
record on appeal. We have only the sealed transcript of the trial
court’s in camera review. When the confidential personnel
records themselves are unavailable, the appellate court may
conduct an adequate review by considering only the sealed
19
so. The proceedings were stenographically recorded; a custodian
of records was present and placed under oath, indicating she had
brought all responsive documents with her. The custodian
identified and presented for review matters for the relevant
officers, which the trial court reviewed. The custodian also
provided the court with the police officers’ personnel records,
which it reviewed. The court concluded there was no discoverable
information because there was nothing demonstrating either
officer’s lack of credibility. The trial court properly complied with
the required Pitchess procedures.8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
transcript. (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1209; People
v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.)
8 Hurtado also argues that the trial court’s errors
cumulatively prejudiced him. Because we find no error in the
first instance, there is nothing to cumulate.
20