In re A.M. CA4/1

Filed 6/30/23 In re A.M. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re A.M., A Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D081332
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. J521039)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
H.B.,
Defendant and Appellant;
M.M.,
Intervener and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed.
Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Intervener and Respondent.
H.B. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders concerning her
son A.M. She contends insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s
assertion of jurisdiction and its removal of A.M. from her custody. She also
claims the juvenile court abused its discretion by granting A.M.’s father,
M.M. (Father), sole physical custody and terminating jurisdiction. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother is a board certified physician in pediatrics and pediatric
emergency medicine. In 2015, she married Father and the couple lived in
Hawaii. Mother gave birth to A.M. in late 2017. When A.M. was two and
one-half years old, Mother went to the police because, among other things,
she claimed she saw Father in the bathtub with A.M. and he let A.M. touch
his private area. The State of Hawaii Department of Human Services (DHS
Hawaii) received several referrals relating to alleged sexual abuse, physical
abuse, or verbal abuse of A.M. by the parents. Mother obtained a one year
restraining order in Hawaii against Father based on her allegations of sexual
abuse. Mother filed for a divorce in April 2020 and the parents finalized their
divorce in July 2021. Under the terms of the dissolution and custody order,
the parents shared joint legal custody, Mother received physical custody of
A.M., and Father received supervised visitation with A.M. three times per
week.
Mother moved to San Diego in November 2021 where she worked at a
children’s hospital until May 20221 when she reported to police that she and
A.M. were being followed by a couple while at the beach. After that incident,
1 Undesignated dated references are to 2022.
2
she started working in telehealth seeing pediatric patients online. Five days
after this first incident, Mother reported to police that a man came up behind
her in a checkout line with a knife in his hand. Mother purchased a Kevlar
vest to protect herself because she was “very, very scared” another person
may approach her with a knife. That night, according to Mother, she noticed
missing documents on her computer related to Father, including audio and
video recordings of A.M.’s disclosures. Mother fled to Arizona for a week.
She returned to San Diego because she believed she had been followed to
Arizona. When she returned to California she found a “gallon’s worth” of
white powder under the driver’s seat of her car, went to the hospital and
asked to be tested for anthrax poisoning. Although Mother had a home, she
started residing at hotels in May and purchased new vehicles and new
phones to hide from people she believed Father had sent to kill her.
Between February to June, the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (Agency) received ten referrals, consisting of six for alleged
sexual abuse and two for alleged physical abuse. All ten referrals did not
meet the criteria for investigation. On June 2, Mother arrived at A.M.’s
school wearing a bulletproof vest. She had a loaded gun in the center console
of her car that the police confiscated. On June 9, Mother appeared at A.M.’s
school wearing a bulletproof vest and carrying a knife and pepper spray.
Mother told law enforcement she was being followed and Father wanted to
kill her to gain custody of A.M. Her demeanor “fluctuated between calm and
agitated” and she did not recognize the danger of bringing weapons to school.
Mother was placed on a section 5150 hold as a danger to others, and
A.M. went to Polinsky Children’s Center. During this hold, the Agency
learned that law enforcement had received 14 calls from several different
individuals over the past two to three weeks reporting Mother’s erratic
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behavior. On June 14, the Agency filed a petition alleging A.M. fell within
section 300, subdivision (b) due to Mother’s mental health issues. Mother
appealed the section 5150 hold and was released on June 15. At discharge,
the hospital recommended psychiatric and medical intervention and follow
up.
At the detention hearing on June 15, the juvenile court found there was
prima facie showing A.M. was described by section 300, ordered him
detained, and ordered supervised visitation for the parents. At this time,
A.M. resided with caregivers in a confidential resource home.2 On June 23,
A.M. underwent a forensic interview where he said that Father “ ‘put his
penis in [my] butt’ ” and tried to pee in his hair, but denied Father did
anything else to hurt him and provided little detail about the first incident.
A.M. expressed fear of Father and believed Father had tried to hurt Mother
with knives. He also reported fearing Mother when she yells at him.
At the July 6 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court found it
had jurisdiction, noted a Hawaiian restraining order against Father was set
to expire on September 6, invalidated a temporary restraining order Mother
had obtained in family court, and set the matter for a contested hearing. In
August, the parents completed their respective parenting classes. In
September, Mother was diagnosed with “other psychotic disorder not due to a
substance or physiological condition.” She was prescribed medication and
referred to North Central Mental Health Center. At the pre-trial status
conference on September 7, the Agency informed the juvenile court that
2 Mother also accused A.M.’s caretakers of sexual abuse. Mother told one
of her friends in late June that A.M.’s caretakers were abusing him by
putting A.M.’s penis in water to make it “ ‘nice and soft.’ ” The friend stated
Mother’s allegations against the caregivers were “very similar” to the
allegations Mother made against Father.
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based on the expiration of the Hawaiian restraining order, it was moving
Father to unsupervised visitation. In late September, the Agency placed
A.M. with Father. The social worker attempted to get updates about
Mother’s progress in services from North Central Mental Health Center but
was unable to do so because Mother had only signed a limited release of
information. In November, Mother discharged herself from services and was
allegedly seeing a nurse practitioner.
The contested adjudication and disposition hearing took place in early
December. After receiving the Agency’s reports into evidence, the court
heard testimony from Mother’s expert Dr. Abraham Lobenstein, who had
performed a psychological evaluation on her. The court also heard testimony
from the social worker, and Mother.
The juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true by a
preponderance of evidence, stating that the evidence was “pretty clear” A.M.
has been entangled in Mother’s delusions and was at risk physically and
emotionally from his exposure to these delusions. It noted Mother had failed
to follow Dr. Lobenstein’s recommendations that she continue her
medications, remain in therapy, and rely upon third-party observers to
determine if A.M. was abused. It did not find Dr. Lobenstein’s testimony that
Mother showed signs of improvement as sufficient to ameliorate the current
risk to A.M. The court found Mother to be “an intelligent person who knows
what to say at the right time” but “I don’t have a person who I think is
without risk.”
The court found by clear and convincing evidence A.M. should continue
to be removed from Mother. It added that even if Mother’s delusions were
true, A.M. should not be exposed to those fears and Mother had not shown
enough improvement to ameliorate the risk of harm to A.M.’s physical and
5
emotional health. It noted that under Welfare and Institutions Code3 section
361.2, it was required to place A.M. with Father unless it found such
placement would be detrimental to A.M. It found no detriment because
Mother’s allegations against Father have not been substantiated, “[a]ll we
have really are the words, and the words have been repeated by the child
because they’ve been put in the child’s mouth.” Because the court had no
concerns regarding Father, it exercised its discretion to terminate
jurisdiction, ordering that Father have legal and physical custody of A.M.,
with supervised visitation for Mother.
DISCUSSION
I.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional and
Dispositional Findings
A. General Legal Principles
A parent may seek review of both the jurisdictional and dispositional
findings on an appeal from the dispositional order. (Cynthia D. v. Superior
Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) We review the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional and dispositional orders for substantial evidence. (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) The burden of proof for jurisdictional findings is
preponderance of the evidence; for removal, it is clear and convincing
evidence. (Cynthia D., at p. 248.) In applying the substantial evidence
standard of review, “ ‘ “we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence
to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.”
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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[Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent
judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J., at p. 773.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings
To establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the
Agency must show: “(1) [a] parent’s . . . neglectful conduct or failure or
inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or
illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601.) A court “need not wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to
protect the child.” (Id. at p. 602.) A parent’s “ ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct
will continue.’ ” (Ibid.) However, “ ‘[t]o establish a defined risk of harm at
the time of the hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation
to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Facts supporting
allegations that a child is one described by section 300 are cumulative.’
[Citation.] Thus, the court ‘must consider all the circumstances affecting the
child, wherever they occur.’ ” (In re. T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.)
The petition alleged a substantial risk existed that A.M. will suffer
serious physical harm or illness based on Mother’s delusions. (§ 300, subd.
(b)(1).) Mother claims that insufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional
finding because the court based its decision on stale events that occurred in
June and not on any current evidence of risk of harm. She asserts that
insufficient investigation was done regarding her allegations about Father
and, if she had no history of delusions, her continued concerns about possible
sexual abuse of A.M. by Father would be a sign of good parenting.
7
As a preliminary matter, the record does not support Mother’s claim
that her allegations of sexual abuse by Father were inadequately
investigated. The Agency obtained the family’s child welfare services history
from Hawaii which revealed all allegations against Father were unconfirmed,
no physical evidence of harm to A.M. was found, and Hawaii closed its
investigation. Rather, there were several reports that Mother was coaching
A.M. A Kauai police officer reported Mother appeared to be coaching A.M.
“on things to say, and how to say them.” The videos Mother submitted to
Hawaiian law enforcement were “indicative of coaching of the child to
perform gestures.” Additionally, DHS Hawaii noted that the alleged sex
abuse lacked “context” and it “appears at times [Mother] coaches [A.M.] to
disclose sex abuse. There is concern for the content that [A.M.] shares with
little to no detail.” The social worker echoed this concern. Referring to her
expertise in dealing with sexual abuse cases, the social worker remarked that
A.M. has not shown any behaviors suggesting sexual abuse such as
bedwetting or night terrors, nor have any sexually inappropriate behaviors
been observed by third parties.
The social worker considered Mother’s allegations against Father to be
serious and stated the Agency “investigated throughout the life of this case.”
Additionally, Mother testified that A.M. had undergone three forensic
interviews and an emergency room evaluation. Despite this investigation,
the Agency did not believe Mother’s allegations of sexual abuse by Father.
The juvenile court agreed with the Agency. It found Mother’s claims that
Father sexually abused A.M. had “been evaluated over and over again” but
the claims had not been substantiated in any of the forensic interviews or any
of the investigations and A.M. has “stated the same things that have been
stated to him.” On this record, the juvenile court concluded Mother’s
8
allegations against Father were unsubstantiated. Our job is not to reweigh
the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 773), and we reject Mother’s suggestion that her continued allegations
against Father demonstrated good parenting.
We also reject Mother’s claim the court improperly based its decision on
events that occurred when the dependency petition was filed and not on the
current evidence of risk of harm. In October, four months after the Agency
filed the petition, Mother continued to allege sexual abuse by Father. Mother
claimed that during a supervised visit she asked A.M. whether “his Dad ha[d]
done anything,” with A.M. responding that Father “wipes him after he poops”
and put his finger in his anus. Mother informed A.M. that Father was “not
supposed to be doing that.” Thereafter, Mother told a social worker that
Father had cancelled a visit the past Saturday not due to car trouble but
because Father “is now molesting [A.M.] and he doesn’t want her to find
proof” and complained the court had given custody of A.M. to Father
“ ‘despite her allegations and “proof” that [Father] had molested [A.M.]’ ” In
early November, the social worker received an email from the center
supervising Mother’s visits stating that “[d]ue to [Mother’s] in-directable and
inappropriate behavior towards [the] staff” it would no longer monitor
visitations for her. Among other things, Mother was not willing to be
redirected regarding her hostile behavior or having appropriate conversations
in front of A.M.
On December 1, approximately six months after the Agency filed the
dependency petition and one week before the contested hearing, Mother made
another report to Hawaiian law enforcement regarding alleged sexual abuse
of A.M. by Father. That month, Mother also contacted Father’s ex-wife and
asked her to testify that Father molested A.M. At the contested hearing,
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Mother claimed Father would be “on his best behavior until today’s court
date” but that placing A.M. with Father would be detrimental to A.M.
because “there still is a grave risk for that abuse to occur.”
Mother also continued to believe someone had hacked her computer to
delete evidence of Father’s sexual abuse of A.M., and inconsistently claimed
Father had planted photos on her phone and I-Cloud showing he had sexually
abused A.M. She also continued to believe people had followed her on the
beach and the man in the checkout line “was there for [her] because he was
like glaring at [her], smiling at [her], holding the knife, waiting for [her] to
see it.” She claimed this incident was related to the photos disappearing on
her phone and attributed this to Father. When asked whether she still
believed people had been following her in Arizona, Mother replied:
“I don’t know. I saw two camcorders in Phoenix. And they
appeared to be moving the camera as I drove by. But they
could have been filming for the morning news and showing
the traffic jams and everything like that. I don’t know if
they were following me or not, but I was so scared when I
left here that I was scared I was going to be followed. So I
was looking around for people that could have been
following me. So I don’t know if it was real or not.”
Based on this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably believe
Mother still experienced the same delusions which previously caused her to
flee to another state, wear a bulletproof vest, and pickup A.M. from school
carrying a knife and pepper spray. The record supports the juvenile court’s
finding that A.W. remained at risk of both emotional and physical harm and
in need of juvenile court intervention.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Removal Order
When a minor has been adjudged a dependent child of the court under
section 300, the juvenile court may limit the control to be exercised over the
dependent child by the parent or guardian. (§ 361, subd. (a).) A dependent
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child may not be taken from the physical custody of the parent with whom
the child resides unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that there is a “substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected” without removal. (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘The
court may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present
circumstances.’ ” (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126.)
Because the juvenile court must make its finding that a ground for removal
exists under the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof (§ 361, subd.
(c)), “the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have
found it highly probable that the fact was true” (Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011).
Mother submits she did not pose a substantial risk of harm to A.M. if
he was returned to her custody because no evidence existed she continued her
prior behavior of expressing her fears to A.M. She complains the court
simply reiterated its reasoning from its jurisdictional finding without
explaining what current behaviors proved by clear and convincing evidence
she posed a substantial risk of harm to A.M. if he were returned to her
custody.
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence a
child cannot safely remain in the home. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Here, the
juvenile court relied on section 361, subdivision (c)(1), finding by clear and
convincing evidence that A.M. should continue to be removed from Mother’s
custody for the same reasons it already stated in making its jurisdictional
finding. As we previously noted, a week before the contested hearing, Mother
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again contacted Hawaiian law enforcement regarding alleged sexual abuse of
A.M. by Father. Although the Agency concluded Mother’s allegations against
Father were unsubstantiated, at the contested hearing Mother continued to
believe Father posed a risk to A.M. She also maintained her initial belief
that people had followed her on the beach and a man in a checkout line held a
knife and was there for her. (Ante, pt. I.B.) Accordingly, the social worker
opined that Mother’s mental health still posed a high risk to A.M.’s well-
being.
During the investigation, A.M.’s therapist reported that A.M. “was
concerned about [Mother’s] level of worry as she talked openly about her
worries in front of [A.M.]” At the hearing, the social worker expressed
protective concerns regarding A.M.’s emotional well-being from being exposed
to Mother’s ongoing claims he was being sexually abused. Dr. Lobenstein
similarly concluded, assuming A.M. had not been sexually abused, Mother’s
act of discussing sexual abuse with A.M. would be harmful to him. Dr.
Lobenstein also testified that Mother’s behavior of taking dramatic steps to
protect herself from imagined danger is very stressful to a child and can
cause emotional harm to the child. Dr. Lobenstein opined Mother could
alleviate protective concerns regarding A.M. by participating in
psychotherapy, continuing her medications, and relying on third-party
observers to make conclusions regarding possible abuse issues regarding
A.M.
At the time of the hearing, however, the Agency did not know what
services Mother was currently engaged in and had no progress report or
treatment goals from Mother’s service providers because Mother had only
recently signed a full release. Mother was seeing two mental health
providers but allowed the Agency to speak to only one provider who could not
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opine on Mother’s safety regarding A.M. Significantly, there is no evidence
Mother attempted to use a third-party observer to validate her abuse
concerns before she again contacted Hawaiian law enforcement. Also, a list
of Mother’s mental health appointments shows the number of appointments
she attended decreased each month with her attending only four
appointments in November. This record supported the juvenile court’s
conclusion that if returned to Mother’s care, A.M. would be at risk of physical
and emotional harm.
Mother next contends the Agency and the court failed to consider
reasonable alternatives to removal. She claims no evidence existed showing
she would not follow court orders and submits any remaining concerns about
her could be addressed through a safety plan and the provision of family
maintenance services. She asserts her case is similar to In re Ashly F. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 803 (Ashly F.), in which the juvenile court “did not ‘state the
facts’ supporting its conclusion.” (Id. at p. 810.) Mother submits the court’s
removal order amounts to a miscarriage of justice and requests we remedy it
by reversing with instructions to follow the mandates of subdivisions (c)(1)
and (e) of section 361.
Before the juvenile court may remove a child from a parent’s custody
there must be clear and convincing evidence of “no reasonable means” of
protecting the child other than removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)4 When
removing a child under section 361, “[t]he court shall make a determination
as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the
4 As a reasonable means to protect the child, the court must consider
removing the offending parent from the home (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)(A)) and
allowing a nonoffending parent to retain physical custody if the nonoffending
parent presents an acceptable plan demonstrating the ability to protect the
child from future harm (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)).
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need for removal of the minor from his or her home” and also “shall state the
facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.” (Id., subd. (e).)
Likewise, the Agency was required to include a discussion of its reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate removal in its social studies. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).)
The court concluded “[r]easonable efforts have been made to prevent
and eliminate the need for the removal” of A.M. from Mother’s home but did
not “state the facts” supporting this conclusion. (See In re L.O. (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 227, 247 [factual findings deficient because they failed to address
reasonable means of preventing removal from father’s custody]; Ashly F.,
supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [court failed to state facts supporting its
conclusion that reasonable efforts had been made to eliminate the need for
removal].) Additionally, the Agency failed to include a discussion of
reasonable efforts in its social studies—it merely concluded reasonable efforts
had been made to prevent removal.5
This error alone does not warrant reversal. The failure to make the
required findings under section 361, subdivision (e) is deemed harmless if
“ ‘ “it is not reasonably probable such finding, if made, would have been in
favor of continued parental custody.” ’ ” (In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 247.) On this record, we find it not reasonably probable the result would
have been more favorable to Mother but for this error. At the contested
5 In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency concluded that A.M.
could not be safely returned to Mother. Under the heading “Reasonable
Efforts” the Agency noted it held CFT meetings separately with Mother and
Father, a CSF referral had been submitted for Mother, an Optum/TERM
therapy referral had been submitted for A.M., and a CASS referral was
submitted for A.M. We reject the Agency’s contention that these notes
adequately satisfied its obligation to discuss the reasonable efforts it made to
prevent or eliminate removal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).)
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hearing, the Agency concluded no reasonable means existed to protect A.M.
“given the history and the escalating behaviors of [Mother].” On appeal, she
suggests the Agency’s concerns could be addressed through a safety plan, the
provision of family maintenance services, or living with a roommate.
However, she fails to explain how these alternatives would have allowed A.M.
to safely remain in her custody given the evidence of her continued delusional
thinking.
Dr. Lobenstein opined Mother could alleviate protective concerns by
relying on third-party observers to make conclusions regarding possible
abuse issues regarding A.M. But at the time of the hearing, Mother still
relied on her own observations which included talking to A.M. Additionally,
Mother’s delusions continued despite her participation in services, and
Dr. Lobenstein explained he did not expect Mother’s delusions “to disappear
from the time I saw her in July until now. This is something that takes work
and time.” Thus, if returned to Mother’s custody, A.M. would again be
subjected to Mother’s delusions, which the Agency and Dr. Lobenstein agreed
would be detrimental to him.
On this record, we find it improbable the juvenile court would have
made a different decision on the question of A.M.’s removal even if it had
made all the factual findings required by section 361, subdivision (e).
Therefore, the error was not prejudicial and does not require reversal.
II.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Terminating Jurisdiction
Following placement of a child with the noncustodial parent, the
juvenile court has the discretion to either terminate its jurisdiction with
custody orders, or require a home visit within three months, or continue its
supervision with reunification services. (§ 361.2, subds. (b)(1)-(3).) We
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review the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction for abuse of
discretion. (In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 535, fn. 7.) We will
reverse the juvenile court only if it exceeded the bounds of reason. (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) We review the court’s factual
findings in support of its order terminating jurisdiction for substantial
evidence. (In re A.J., at p. 535, fn. 7.)
In this case, the juvenile court selected the first option, granting Father
full custody and terminating jurisdiction without ordering reunification
services for Mother. Mother submits the court abused its discretion when
terminating jurisdiction because it did not consider the benefit of placing
A.M. with Father and ordering reunification services for her. We find no
abuse of discretion.
The court opted to terminate jurisdiction, one of the three allowable
statutory options. It explained the reason for choosing one of the remaining
two options was the existence of ongoing concerns regarding Father that
merited keeping the case open, but stated it and the Agency had no concerns
regarding Father that merited continuing jurisdiction. The evidence here
does not support a finding that continuing juvenile court jurisdiction was
necessary to protect A.M.6 Mother also failed to demonstrate the advantage
6 Father demonstrated to the Agency his ability to care for A.M.’s
physical and emotional needs. A.M. had been residing with Father for over
two months by the time of the challenged order. During closing argument,
A.M.’s guardian ad litem informed the court that A.M. enjoys living with
Father. The director of A.M.’s daycare center reported that in the two
months A.M. has been with them A.M.’s anxiety has subsided, his prior
aggression toward his classmates has changed to a “caring attitude for his
classmates” and “[t]he relationship between [Father and A.M.] has grown
tremendously from day one until now and we can’t wait to see it further
blossom.”
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of continuing jurisdiction or explained how a safety plan, reunification
services or roommate would protect A.M. from her continued delusions.
Because the evidence supports the order, we conclude the court did not abuse
its discretion in terminating its jurisdiction over A.M. If Mother believes
there is a change in circumstances, she may seek modification or termination
of the custody and visitation order in the family court. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
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