Citrus El Dorado v. Stearns Bank CA4/2

Filed 7/3/23 Citrus El Dorado v. Stearns Bank CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CITRUS EL DORADO, LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E077496
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1602653)
STEARNS BANK, et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John W. Vineyard, Judge.
Affirmed.
Everett L. Skillman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw, Giovanna A. Ferrari, Lawrence E. Butler, James M. Harris, and
Aaron Belzer for Defendants and Respondents.
A commercial developer lost a parcel of real property in a trustee’s sale following
a nonjudicial foreclosure. The developer, plaintiff and appellant Citrus El Dorado, LLC
(Citrus), sued several parties, including defendants and respondents FNBN-Rescon I,
LLC (Rescon) and Stearns Bank (Stearns). Documents recorded in the nonjudicial
1
foreclosure proceedings identify Rescon as the present beneficiary of the deed of trust
1
and Stearns as Rescon’s “exclusive servicing agent.”
In a nonpublished opinion, we held that Citrus had adequately pleaded a cause of
action for wrongful foreclosure against Stearns and Rescon, though several other alleged
causes of action were properly dismissed on demurrer. (Citrus El Dorado, LLC v.
Stearns Bank (Apr. 11, 2019, E067610) [nonpub. opn.].) After Citrus presented its case
in chief in a bench trial, the trial court granted Stearns and Rescon’s motion for judgment
on the wrongful foreclosure cause of action. It also denied Citrus’s motion for new trial.
Citrus asserts an array of purported errors and asks us to reverse the judgment and
remand for new trial. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2005, Citrus purchased a 9.25-acre parcel in La Quinta, California to develop a
residential housing tract. In 2007, Citrus entered into a “Construction Loan Agreement”
with First Heritage Bank, N.A. (First Heritage) to fund the construction’s first phase,
which consisted of ten completed houses, including three models, and 19 finished lots.
First Heritage was to disburse to Citrus a total of $13,394,000, including $6,450,000 at
closing to refinance Citrus’s preexisting debt secured by the property, and the remainder
1
Stearns and Rescon are related entities. As noted in a federal appellate opinion
arising from related litigation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
“created Rescon, and assigned its interest [in Citrus’s loan] to it.” (FNBN RESCON I,
LLC v. Citrus El Dorado, LLC (9th Cir. 2018) 725 Fed. Appx. 448, 450.) In a separate,
contemporaneous transaction, a subsidiary of Stearns “purchased the FDIC’s sole
membership interest in Rescon . . . .” (Ibid.) Stearns also “agreed to service the loan on
Rescon’s behalf.” (Ibid.)
2
in a series of incremental draws during construction. The loan was secured by a deed of
trust on the property.
After Citrus received some of the loan funds, First Heritage failed and the FDIC
was appointed as its receiver in July 2008. First National Bank of Nevada, which
participated in the loan with First Heritage, also failed and was placed into FDIC
2
receivership. The FDIC, as receiver for First Heritage, funded several more draw
requests by Citrus. The terms of Citrus’s loan provided for a maturity date of October 16,
2008, when the loan had to be fully repaid, with interest. The FDIC and Citrus agreed,
however, to extend the maturity date to April 16, 2009.
In February 2009, the FDIC notified Citrus that its loan had been assigned to “a
new lender” and that payments on the loan should be made to Stearns. When Stearns
began servicing the loan, there was a balance of undisbursed loan funds of over
3
$609,000. But when Citrus submitted a draw request for $169,856.01 in March 2009,
Sterns declined to fund it.
2
In this context, to participate in a loan means to purchase an interest in the loan.
(See, e.g., Southern Pacific Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Savings Assn. Mortgage Co. (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 634, 637 [describing loan participation agreement].) Here, First Heritage
was the originator of the loan and lead lender. Initially, First National Bank of Arizona
was the participant lender. First National Bank of Nevada acquired that participating
interest by merger with First National Bank of Arizona, before First National Bank of
Nevada in turn failed and was placed into FDIC receivership.
3
Invoices sent by Stearns show over $12.7 million was disbursed, yielding a
remainder of about $609,000. Citrus has disputed those invoices. The trial court,
however, found in favor of Stearns and Rescon as to how much Citrus owed, as well as
on the adequacy of Stearns’ accounting showing how those amounts were calculated.
3
On April 27, 2009, Stearns sent Citrus a “Notice of Event of Default and Demand
for Immediate Payment.” The notice stated that the loan had “matured on April 16,
2009” and that required payments had not been made, constituting an “immediate Event
of Default with no rights to cure . . . .” The notice gave Citrus several weeks to remit the
“total payoff balance” of over $13 million, including a principal balance of over $12.7
million. Citrus made no payment in response.
In July 2009, defendant Chicago Title Company (Chicago Title) recorded a
“Substitution of Trustee,” substituting Chicago Title as the new trustee under the deed of
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trust. The document identified Rescon as the “present Beneficiary” of the deed of trust,
and showed that it was executed by Stearns as Rescon’s “exclusive servicing agent.” On
the same date, Chicago Title recorded a “Notice of Default and Election to Sell,” also
executed by Stearns as Rescon’s “exclusive servicing agent.” Nevertheless, no
foreclosure was completed then. Instead, the parties engaged in years of litigation,
5
mostly in federal court.
With that litigation ongoing, in November 2014, Chicago Title recorded a new
“Notice of Default and Election to Sell.” According to this document, there was a total
balance due of over $20 million as of October 23, 2014. In February 2015, Chicago Title
4
The trial court sustained Chicago Title’s demurrer to the claims Citrus asserted
against it in this action, and we affirmed that ruling. (See Citrus El Dorado, LLC v.
Chicago Title Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 943, 952.)
5
This litigation is described in more detail in our earlier opinion. (See Citrus El
Dorado, LLC v. Stearns Bank, N.A., supra, E067610.)
4
issued a “Notice of Trustee’s Sale,” stating that the property would be sold at public
auction. The federal district court declined to stay the foreclosure sale. A “Trustee’s
Deed Upon Sale,” recorded March 6, 2015, indicates that the public auction took place on
6
March 5, 2015, and that Rescon was the highest bidder with a credit bid of $7.2 million.
The federal district court rejected Citrus’s efforts to add claims arising from the
foreclosure sale to its litigation. That case culminated in a jury verdict in favor of Citrus
on its breach of contract claim against Stearns (but not Rescon), awarding Citrus damages
of $1.2 million. (See FNBN Rescon I, LLC v. Citrus El Dorado, LLC, supra, 725 Fed.
Appx. at p. 450.) That award was affirmed on appeal. (Id. at p. 453.) The same jury
found against Rescon on its claims against several guarantors of Citrus’s loans, finding
Rescon had “acted in bad faith and was therefore precluded from recovering on the
7
guaranty.” (FNBN Rescon I, LLC v. Citrus El Dorado, LLC, supra, at p. 451.) That
finding, too, was affirmed on appeal. (Id. at p. 453.)
Citrus filed this lawsuit in March 2016. We held that the trial court properly
dismissed on demurrer several of Citrus’s alleged causes of action, but Citrus had
6
At a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the lender “is entitled to make a credit bid up
to the amount of the outstanding indebtedness.” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1238.) “The purpose of this entitlement is to avoid the
inefficiency of requiring the lender to tender cash which would only be immediately
returned to it.” (Ibid.)
7
The guarantors included Scott Shaddix, the managing member of Citrus, as well
as Craftsmen Homes, LLC, and Sweetwater Holdings, Inc. (FNBN Rescon I, LLC v.
Citrus El Dorado, LLC, supra, 725 Fed. Appx. at p. 450.)
5
adequately pleaded a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. (Citrus El Dorado, LLC
v. Stearns Bank, supra, E067610.)
After Citrus presented its case in chief in a bench trial on its wrongful foreclosure
claim, Stearns and Rescon moved for judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 631.8, subd.
(a).) The trial court tentatively indicated it would grant the motion, but it allowed Citrus
to file a written opposition and make an offer of proof. (Ibid.) The trial court was not
persuaded by Citrus’s opposition and offer of proof, so it granted the motion for
judgment. It explained its ruling in a statement of opinion proposed by Stearns and
Rescon and adopted over Citrus’s objections. The trial court also denied Citrus’s motion
for new trial.
II. DISCUSSION
Citrus contends that Stearns and Rescon’s motion for judgment should have been
8
denied and asks that we reverse and remand for a new trial. We are not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law
The “basic elements” of a wrongful foreclosure cause of action are: “‘(1) the
trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real
property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking
the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and
8
Stearns and Rescon argue that Citrus “forfeited its appeal by not fairly
summarizing the evidence, and by failing to attempt to demonstrate error under the
applicable standard of review.” We disagree with that sweeping claim, but, as
specifically noted, however, we find some arguments forfeited.
6
(3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor
tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.’”
(Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 408 (Miles).)
“Recognized exceptions to the tender rule include when: (1) the underlying debt is void,
(2) the foreclosure sale or trustee’s deed is void on its face, (3) a counterclaim offsets the
amount due, (4) specific circumstances make it inequitable to enforce the debt against the
party challenging the sale, or (5) the foreclosure sale has not yet occurred.” (Chavez v.
Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062.)
Under California contract law, “hindrance of the other party’s performance
operates to excuse that party’s nonperformance.” (Erich v. Granoff (1980) 109
Cal.App.3d 920, 930; see Civ. Code, § 1511 [“The want of performance of an
obligation . . . in whole or in part, or any delay therein, is excused by the following
causes, to the extent which they operate: [¶] . . . [w]hen such performance . . . is
prevented or delayed by the act of the creditor”].) Whether a party caused the delayed
performance or nonperformance of the other is a question of fact, to be decided by the
finder of fact. (See Semas v. Bergmann (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 758, 762 [stating that a
“promisor’s delay in performance is excused to the extent acts of the promisee caused
such delay” and reviewing causation findings for substantial evidence].)
“The standard of review of a judgment and its underlying findings entered
pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 631.8 is the same as a judgment granted
after a trial in which evidence was produced by both sides.” (San Diego Metro. Transit
7
Dev. Bd. v. Handlery Hotel, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 517, 528.) “In reviewing a
judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions
of law de novo.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) In many cases,
we review findings of fact for substantial evidence. (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 475, 501.) But when a party challenges on appeal a ruling that it failed
to carry a burden of proof, the substantial evidence standard is inappropriate, and “‘the
question . . . becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as
a matter of law.’” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465-466 (Sonic).) Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) “‘“uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.”’” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
The trial court found that Citrus had proved none of the elements of a wrongful
foreclosure cause of action. Citrus asserts that the evidence compels the opposite
conclusion. We find that Citrus is incorrect, focusing our discussion on Citrus’s
arguments on the first element, whether the foreclosure sale was “‘illegal, fraudulent, or
willfully oppressive.’” (Miles, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
1. Stated Redemption Amount
Citrus asserts that the “redemption figure” stated in the 2014 default notice—about
$20.2 million—was “wrongfully inflated.” Citrus contends that amount, based on a
8
principal balance of over $12.7 million, is wrong because “[t]he evidence only shows
approximately $8.7 million in loan proceeds, not $12.7 million.”
The evidence Citrus cites, however, accounts for only disbursements made directly
to Citrus. It does not account for disbursements made from loan funds directly to vendors
or government tax agencies that did not pass through Citrus accounts. The trial court
reasonably decided that the evidence, viewed in that context, does not compel the
conclusion Citrus would prefer.
Moreover, there is no reason why the trial court should have ignored other record
evidence that, particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment,
affirmatively supports its conclusions about principal balance and total redemption
amount. Such evidence includes contemporary account statements, audits, and other
records from Stearns and, earlier, the FDIC. It also includes numbers used and
9
9
statements made by Citrus itself, including in its final draw request, in a 2009
10 11
“Presentation of Claim” against the FDIC, and in correspondence with Stearns.
Thus, Citrus’s contention that the redemption amount stated in the default notice
was inflated is not supported by uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence, as would be
12
required to disturb the trial court’s findings. (See Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp.
465-466.) Citrus has not demonstrated the default notices were “illegal” or “fraudulent,”
9
Citrus stated that the undisbursed funds “before this draw” totaled “$609,290”,
applied for payment of $169,856.01, and certified that the balance remaining unfunded as
a result would be $439,433.61. Given an initial total of funds available under the loan of
$13,394,000, it follows that $12,784,710.38 in loan funds had been previously disbursed,
exactly the amount stated in the default notice.
10
Citrus stated that when First Heritage failed, “there was $2,358,863.36 in funds
available” for disbursement under the loan agreement, which correlates to a principal
balance at the time of over $11 million even before later distributions by the FDIC.
11
In correspondence with Stearns in April 2009 related to Citrus’s final draw
request, Citrus commented that in Stearns’s records of the loan, received from the FDIC,
“[t]he total funded is correct,” though “the payees are not.”
12
Citrus asserts that its “2012 judgment against Rescon affected the amount of
interest that could be included in the notices, making the notices defective.” This passing
assertion is not developed with reasoned argument, let alone citation to legal authority
and evidence in the record. Similarly, elsewhere in its briefing, Citrus states that the
“$20+ million redemption figures in the notices also resulted from gross miscalculations
of interest and fees.” Again, however, the statement is made in passing, without citation
to evidence or authority, and without explanation of the reasoning underlying it. We
decline to develop these arguments for Citrus and deem them forfeited. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellate briefs must [“[s]tate each point under a separate
heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if
possible, by citation of authority”; Heavenly Valley v. El Dorado County Bd. of
Equalization (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1345, fn. 17 [“[W]e need not address
contentions not properly briefed”].)
10
or that the foreclosure was wrongful in any other way because of an inflated redemption
amount.
2. Itemization of Amounts Owed
Citrus argues that the foreclosure was wrongful because Citrus “received no
proper response” to its demands for an accounting. The operative word here is “proper,”
as there is no dispute that Citrus received responses to its 2009 and 2013 requests for an
accounting. Citrus just does not view the responses it received as adequate. For the
reasons below, we do.
During the nonjudicial foreclosure process, “‘the debtor/trustor is given several
opportunities to cure the default and avoid the loss of the property.’” (Turner v. Seterus,
Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 527; Civ. Code, § 2924c, subd. (a)(1).) Generally, the
debtor “may either reinstate, or cure, the loan by bringing [its] payments current no later
than five business days before the scheduled sale [citations], or [it] may redeem, or pay
off, the loan by paying off the entire amount owed before the sale occurs [citations].”
(Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
757, 777-778.) By statute, the recorded notice of default must inform the debtor that
“[u]pon your written request, the beneficiary or mortgagee will give you a written
itemization of the entire amount you must pay,” and must include an address and phone
number to contact “[t]o find out the amount you must pay, or to arrange for payment to
stop the foreclosure . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 2924c, subd. (b)(1).)
11
Here, as of the April 16, 2009, extended maturity date of Citrus’s loan, the entire
amount owed was due, so making up late payments was not an option. Citrus twice
requested in writing an accounting, and twice received a response. These responses,
delivered within weeks after each request, stated the total payoff balance as of a
particular date, with the total broken out into principal, interest, and several categories of
fees and costs. The responses were more than adequate to inform Citrus of the total
amount needed to stop the foreclosure and provided some information about how the
amount was calculated. In our view, that is all that Civil Code section 2924c requires.
Citrus interprets “written itemization of the entire amount you must pay” (Civ.
Code, § 2924c, subd. (b)(1)) to mean something like a complete accounting of each
individual disbursement, interest charge, fee, and so on, rather than a summary consisting
of “lump sum” amounts. Citrus cites no authority in support of this reading of the
statutory language, however, and we are aware of none. The “written itemization”
provision is intended to give the borrower updated information about the amount needed
to reinstate or redeem the loan, which may properly include certain amounts beyond what
is stated in the notice of default. (See Civil Code, § 2924c, subds. (a), (b)(1); Anderson v.
Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 217 (Anderson) [upon
request, the beneficiary or mortgagee must “inform [borrower] correctly about the
amounts ‘then due’ on the obligations properly noticed in the notice of default and the
foreclosure costs”].) That information allows the borrower “to project the amount
presently due and to tender that amount,” either to cure the default or redeem the loan,
12
and thus stop the foreclosure. (Anderson, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 217.) It is the total
amount due, not a breakdown and justification of every portion of the debt, that matters
for that limited purpose.
Moreover, even in the absence of any response to a written request under Civil
Code section 2924c, let alone a purportedly inadequate response, the borrower may
reinstate or redeem the loan by tendering payment based on other available information.
(See Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., supra, 13
Cal.App.5th 757, 793 (Crossroads) [“Crossroads could have reinstated or redeemed the
loan by tendering payment based on the information Fannie Mae had provided in the
notice of default or the bankruptcy proof of claim”].) Where the parties dispute the
appropriate tender amount, the borrower may pay the higher amount “under protest . . . to
maintain possession of the property, and then seek to recover the amount it overpaid.”
(Ibid.) In the alternative, the borrower may tender a lower amount, and later satisfy the
tender requirement of a wrongful foreclosure claim by proving that the tendered amount
was equal to or exceeded the required amount. (See Anderson, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at
p. 217 [borrower will “prevail on the merits of the issue of sufficiency of the amount of
tender” if proven at trial that tendered amount equaled or exceeded amount required to
reinstate].) And, if the beneficiary or mortgagee’s failure to provide accurate information
caused the borrower’s tender to be less than the amount needed to cure the default or
redeem the loan, the borrower’s shortfall will be excused. (Ibid.)
13
No authority supports Citrus’s suggestion that just a failure to provide an adequate
itemization of the redemption amount, without more, may render a foreclosure illegal,
fraudulent, or willfully oppressive. Citrus cites Crossroads, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th 757,
782, for the proposition that “the lender’s failure to provide the requested accounting may
result in a wrongful foreclosure.” In fact, Crossroads observes that a beneficiary’s
failure to provide requested accounts combined with other circumstances can create
wrongful foreclosure liability. (Crossroads, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 782.) In
Crossroads, those other circumstances included the beneficiary’s refusal to accept
tenders, a broken promise to give the borrower notice, and the borrower’s “many”
statements that it “was ready, willing, and able to cure the default or pay off the loan
upon being provided the amount necessary to do so.” (Id. at pp. 769 [quote], 782.)
Our facts are meaningfully different. Unlike the borrower in Crossroads, Citrus
received payoff amounts several times but never tendered payment or expressed intention
13
to do so, either at the amount stated or at another amount it believed correct.
Crossroads does not suggest that failure to provide the requested accounting alone can
demonstrate a foreclosure sale was illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive.
3. Substitution of Trustee
Citrus argues that the foreclosure on the property is “void for lack of a proper
trustee.” In its view, because the recorded “Substitution of Trustee” appointing Chicago
13
Citrus has not argued that its offers to purchase the loan at discounted amounts
were tender offers. Correctly so. (See Crossroads, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 789 [for a
tender to be valid it “‘must be of full performance’” and “‘unconditional’”].)
14
Title as the new trustee under the deed of trust was signed by Stearns in its capacity as
“exclusive servicing agent,” rather than directly by the beneficiary of the deed of trust, it
is void. It is a close question whether this argument is simply without merit or whether it
is also frivolous. (See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 40 [an agent on behalf of beneficiary may execute substitution
of trustee]; Dimock v. Emerald Properties (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 868, 872 [same].)
Either way, it does not warrant extended discussion.
4. Rescon Authority to Foreclose
Citrus contends that the foreclosure was unlawful because Rescon lacked the
authority to foreclose, proposing several reasons it believes that to be so. We find Citrus
has not demonstrated that Rescon lacked authority to foreclose.
First, Citrus argues that, under the terms of its loan and California law, the FDIC
and Rescon “needed Citrus’s consent for an assignment.” It is undisputed that Rescon
and the FDIC did not seek or receive such consent. Citrus concludes on that basis that
“the alleged assignment to Rescon is void for lack of written consent from Citrus,” and
thus Rescon had no authority to foreclose. Citrus’s conclusion, however, does not follow
from its premises.
“Congress has granted the FDIC as receiver express statutory authority to dispose
of receivership assets, thereby reducing the losses borne by federal taxpayers when
federally insured financial institutions . . . fail.” (Sahni v. American Diversified Partners
(9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Sahni).) The FDIC’s power to dispose of
15
receivership assets includes the power to “place the insured depository institution in
liquidation and proceed to realize upon the assets of the institution . . . .” (12 U.S.C. §
1821, subd. (d)(2)(E).) It also includes the power to “transfer any asset or liability of the
institution in default . . . without any approval, assignment, or consent . . . .” (Id., § 1821,
subd. (d)(2)(G)(i)(II).) Courts may not take “any action . . . to restrain or affect the
exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as . . . a receiver.” (Id., § 1821, subd. (j).)
“Because Congress specifically exempted the FDIC from having to obtain any
consent when effectuating the sale or transfer of receivership assets,” state law that would
require such consent is “preempted.” (Sahni, supra, 83 F.3d at p. 1059.) Sahni involved
a conflict with a California statute regarding “the rights, powers, and liabilities of general
partners” on the “issue of consent.” (Id. at p. 1059.) The principle also applies, however,
to other parts of state law, including contract law. (See Volges v. Resolution Trust Corp.
(2d Cir. 1994) 32 F.3d 50, 52 [receivers have broad powers to dispose of the assets of a
failed institution as they see fit, even if sale would violate state contract law].) Thus, the
FDIC’s assignment of the loan to Rescon without Citrus’s consent was “well within its
broad statutory powers as receiver” (Sahni, at p. 1059) even assuming Citrus is correct
that the loan’s terms, as interpreted under California contract law, would require Citrus’s
consent for such an assignment.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Bank of Manhattan, N.A. v. FDIC (9th Cir. 2015)
778 F.3d 1133 (Bank of Manhattan) does not require a different conclusion. Bank of
Manhattan and similar cases hold that the FDIC may not “breach pre-receivership
16
contracts without consequence.” (Id. at p. 1137 (italics added).) That consequence,
however, is only the possibility that the FDIC could be held liable for contract damages.
(Bank of Manhattan, 778 F.3d at p. 1136 [if “the [receiver] violate[s] pre-receivership
contracts rather than repudiate them [federal law] does not afford the [receiver] immunity
from subsequent actions for breach of contract”]; see also, e.g., Ambase Corp. v. U.S. (Ct.
Cl. 2004) 61 Fed.Cl. 794, 799 [federal law “is not directed to the pursuit of money
damages ex post as the result of FDIC actions.”].) Like any contracting party, absent
special circumstances not applicable here, the FDIC as receiver may choose “to breach a
14
contract and pay damages . . . instead of being required by law to perform.” (Huynh v.
Vu (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198; see Volges, supra, 32 F.3d at p. 52; 12 U.S.C. §
1821, subd. (d)(2)(J)(ii) [as receiver, FDIC may “take any action authorized by this Act,
which the [FDIC] determines is in the best interests of the depository institution, its
depositors, or the [FDIC]”].) No authority supports Citrus’s view that an action by the
FDIC that is within the scope of its power as receiver, but in breach of a pre-receivership
contract, is void.
Citrus also raises a hodgepodge of other arguments based on purported defects in
the documents showing assignment of the loan to Rescon. The arguments Citrus raises,
however, are of the sort routinely rejected in analogous contexts. (See, e.g., Debrunner v.
14
The federal district court dismissed the FDIC from its litigation because Citrus
had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. (See Citrus El Dorado, LLC v. Stearns
Bank, supra, E067610.)
17
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 433, 440 [“Plaintiff’s reliance
on the California Uniform Commercial Code provisions pertaining to negotiable
instruments is misplaced”]; Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 802, 819-820 [allegation that signature was unauthorized or constituted a
fraudulent robo-signature shows at most a voidable transaction, not void]; see also
Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 936 [“Unlike a voidable
transaction, a void one cannot be ratified or validated by the parties to it even if they so
desire”].) We already addressed at least one of the arguments Citrus asserts here, based
on the same documents, in our opinion on Citrus’s appeal of the dismissal of its claims
against Chicago Title. (See Citrus El Dorado, LLC v. Chicago Title Co., supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at p. 951 [“We are not persuaded that it was improper for Stearns, rather
than Rescon, to sign the notice of default”]; see § 2924, subd. (a)(1) [notice of default
may be recorded by trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized
agents].) We agree with the trial court that the “evidence and arguments offered by
Citrus to support its claims that the assignments by the FDIC of the Note and [deed of
trust] to Rescon were void are either inapplicable, misstatements of the law, misstatement
of the facts, or establish, at best, only that the assignments may have been voidable but
not void,” and that in fact “[n]one of the evidence presented by Citrus established a defect
in the chain of title from First Heritage to Rescon.” We do not find that any of Citrus’s
arguments in this vein merit further discussion.
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5. Loan Restructuring
Citrus argues that the foreclosure was “willfully oppressive” because “Stearns
stonewalled Citrus and offered no timely restructuring plan” in violation of “the public
policy favoring restructuring.” This argument conflicts with recent California Supreme
Court authority.
In Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 915 (Sheen), the court
held that a lender generally does not owe a borrower a duty to modify or even consider
modifying the borrower’s loan. (Ibid.) Sheen is an application of the economic loss rule,
which provides that there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted financial harm
unaccompanied by physical or property damage. (Id. at p. 922.) Sheen quotes with
approval language from Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096 (Nymark), adapting the economic loss rule to the lender-borrower
context: a “‘financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s
involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as
a mere lender of money.’” (Sheen, at p. 927 [citing Nymark, at p. 1096]; see also Lueras
v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 67 [“[A] loan
modification is the renegotiation of loan terms, which falls squarely within the scope of a
lending institution’s conventional role as a lender of money”].) Thus, Stearns could
foreclose on Citrus’s property without offering terms for restructuring the loan.
Citrus’s reliance on Majd v. Bank of America (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1293 (Majd)
for a different conclusion is misplaced. Majd held that the plaintiff homeowner could
19
maintain wrongful foreclosure and unlawful business practice claims based on his loan
servicer’s alleged violation of certain applicable federal regulations and procedures (the
“Home Affordable Modification Program” (HAMP)) designed to facilitate loan
modifications for homeowners. (Id. at pp. 1296, 1300-1304.) The court also noted that
the same alleged facts would have implicated California’s then-recently adopted
Homeowner Bill of Rights (HBOR), had it been in effect before the plaintiff’s
foreclosure. (Majd, at p. 1303; see Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 279, 295 (Morris) [HBOR is “a complex set of enactments . . . passed as a
legislative response to the ongoing mortgage foreclosure crisis in 2012”).) On our facts,
however, neither HAMP, nor HBOR, nor any other similar set of statutory or regulatory
provisions applies to require modification of Citrus’s loan, or that modification be
considered before foreclosure. (C.f. Majd, at p. 1301 [threshold eligibility requirements
for HAMP loan modification include that loan be secured by borrower’s primary
residence]; Morris, at p. 295 [HBOR is “focused specifically on residential mortgages”];
see also, e.g., Civ. Code, § 2920.5, subd. (c)(1) [defining “‘borrower’” to mean “any
natural person who is a mortgagor or trustor” potentially eligible for certain loan
modification programs]; id., § 2924.15, subds. (a)(1)(A), (2)(A) [limiting specified
provisions to loans secured by principal residence of either owner or tenant of owner].)
The rule applicable to Citrus’s loan is the one articulated in Sheen, not Majd.
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6. One Action Rule
As part of the earlier litigation between the parties, in 2009, Rescon filed a cross-
complaint against Citrus asserting two causes of action: (1) for judicial foreclosure, and
(2) for specific performance, appointment of a receiver, and an injunction. Citrus argues
that this cross-complaint triggered California’s one action rule, codified in Code of Civil
Procedure section 726, subdivision (a), and “disabled Rescon from being able to
foreclose.” Citrus is incorrect.
In relevant part, Code of Civil Procedure section 726 provides “(a) There can be
but one form of action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured by mortgage upon real property.” This “one action rule” generally “compels a
secured creditor to exhaust its security in a single judicial action before obtaining a
monetary deficiency judgment against the debtor.” (C.J.A. Corp. v. Trans-Action
Financial Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 664, 668.) “The purpose of the one action rule is
to prevent a secured creditor from enforcing its rights by seeking recourse to more than
one remedy, such as by obtaining both a money judgment on the mortgage debt and by
foreclosing on the mortgage.” (Id. at pp. 668-669.) If a creditor, in violation of the one
action rule, “sues on the obligation” without pursuing foreclosure on the security, the
creditor made “an election of remedies, electing the single remedy of a personal action,
and thereby waives his right to foreclose on the security or to sell the security under a
power of sale.” (Walker v. Community Bank (1974) 10 Cal.3d 729, 733.) “[A] creditor
21
who uses his ‘one action’ is thereafter barred even from nonjudicial foreclosure.”
(Aplanalp v. Forte (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 609, 614 (Aplanalp).)
In its 2009 cross-complaint, Rescon did exactly what the single action rule
requires by seeking a monetary judgment as part of its cause of action for judicial
foreclosure. Rescon sought “a judicial decree of foreclosure under the Deed of Trust, to
direct the sale of the Property encumbered by the deed of trust, to declare the amount of
indebtedness due [Rescon] and to determine the personal liability of Borrower . . . for any
deficiency remaining thereafter, and enter judgment accordingly.” Its prayer for damages
separated out the remedies it sought by cause of action, and included a request for a
money judgment on only the first cause of action for judicial foreclosure, specifying that
proceeds of the foreclosure sale should be applied to the amount due under the judgment.
Importantly, the mere commencement of a lawsuit, even if in violation of the one
action rule, does not waive the creditor’s right to later foreclose on the security or to sell
the security under a power of sale. (See Shin v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th
542, 547 [“‘the mere commencement of an action by the creditor that does not include a
foreclosure of all the real property security is not in violation of the rule since the creditor
may dismiss the action before judgment or amend the complaint to include a foreclosure
of all of the security’”], quoting 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) Deeds of
Trust and Mortgages, § 9:105, p. 348, italics in original & fns. omitted.) Rescon’s
judicial foreclosure cause of action was dismissed without prejudice before trial by
22
stipulation of the parties. Thus, the 2009 cross-complaint’s first cause of action does not
count as Rescon’s one action.
Rescon’s second cause of action in the 2009 cross-complaint, seeking specific
performance, appointment of a receiver for the property, and issuance of an injunction,
also did not trigger the one action rule. By statute, the appointment of a receiver under
Code of Civil Procedure section 564 does not constitute an action within the meaning of
section 726. (Code Civ. Proc., § 564, subd. (d) [“Any action by a secured lender to
appoint a receiver pursuant to this section shall not constitute an action within the
meaning of subdivision (a) of Section 726”].) Rescon’s second cause of action fell
squarely within Code of Civil Procedure, section 564, subdivision (b)(11), providing for
appointment of a receiver in “an action by a secured lender for specific performance of an
assignment of rents provision in a deed of trust, mortgage, or separate assigned
document.” The second cause of action expressly invoked the assignment of rents
provision of the deed of trust, and the corresponding part of the prayer for relief sought
appointment of a receiver to take possession of the property with the powers set forth in
the assignment of rents provision. On the second cause of action, the prayer for relief
also sought injunctive relief, but included no request for a monetary judgment.
In some situations, a receiver’s actions taken on behalf of a secured creditor may
run afoul of section 726. (See In re 500 Ygnacio Associates Ltd. (Bankr. N.D.Cal. 1992)
141 B.R. 191, 194-195 [receiver applied proceeds taken from rents and profits to pay an
23
indebtedness owed to a secured lender].) Here, however, no receiver ever was appointed,
since the court found for Citrus on that cause of action.
In sum, Rescon’s 2009 cross complaint complied with the one action rule by
seeking a monetary judgment only as part of a cause of action for judicial foreclosure.
That cause of action did not count as Rescon’s one action because it was dismissed
before trial. The cross complaint’s second cause of action proceeded to trial, but did not
seek a monetary judgment. It sought only specific performance of the deed of trust’s
assignment of rents provision, appointment of a receiver, and injunctive relief, none of
which triggers the one action rule. Thus, Rescon did not use its one action on the 2009
cross complaint. The 2015 nonjudicial foreclosure was not barred by the one action rule.
Citrus’s analogy to Aplanalp, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 609, is inapt. In Aplanalp,
the plaintiff borrowers obtained a tort judgment against the defendant creditors. (Id. at p.
612.) The defendants satisfied that judgment by obtaining a court ruling setting off the
tort judgment against payments the plaintiffs owed them on a secured debt. (Ibid.)
Aplanalp held that the defendants’ exercise of their right of equitable setoff was an action
within the meaning of the one action rule, so subsequent nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings were improper. (Id. at pp. 614-615.) This case is different. Citrus has not
argued that Stearns sought to satisfy the tort judgment Citrus obtained against it through
an equitable setoff. Indeed, the appeal of that judgment was not final until years after the
2015 trustee’s sale. (See FNBN Rescon I, LLC v. Citrus El Dorado, LLC, supra, 725
Fed. Appx. at p. 448 [filed Feb. 1, 2018].) Instead, Citrus’s arguments about the one
24
action rule focus entirely on Rescon’s 2009 cross complaint. For the reasons above,
those arguments are unpersuasive.
7. Failure to Fund Draw Request
Citrus proposes that the foreclosure was willfully oppressive because “Stearns
forced the Citrus loan into foreclosure” by refusing to fund Citrus’s final draw request,
causing the project to “grind[] to a halt.” The trial court found that the project did not in
fact run aground because of Stearns’s failure to fund a draw request, but for various other
15
reasons, for which Stearns and Rescon bore no responsibility. We cannot find that the
trial court’s findings lacked the support of substantial evidence.
Our earlier opinion found that Citrus had adequately alleged facts from which it
could be inferred that Stearns and/or Rescon prevented Citrus from completing the
development by failing to fund Citrus’s final draw request. (Citrus El Dorado, LLC v.
Stearns Bank, N.A., supra, E067610.) That failure, Citrus plausibly alleged, caused
Citrus to be unable to complete the development and receive the revenue from sales to
consumers that was needed to stave off default on the loan. (Ibid.)
The trial court found, however, that the evidence did not support Citrus’s
allegations. Instead, it found the evidence established a number of intervening causes,
not the responsibility of Stearns or Rescon, that caused Citrus’s default, including: (1)
even the entire unfunded balance of loan funds would have been insufficient to complete
15
It is irrelevant for our purposes that the trial court made these factual findings in
discussing whether Citrus was excused from tendering payment of the loan, rather than
whether the foreclosure was willfully oppressive.
25
construction of the first phase of the development, let alone the lesser amount requested
in the unfunded draw request; (2) even if the remaining funds had been sufficient and
promptly provided upon request, there was insufficient time remaining at that point to
complete construction of the phase one houses, obtain the permissions required before
placing them on the market, and then sell them before the loan matured; (3) even if the
phase one houses could have been completed and sold in time, their sale could not have
generated enough revenue to pay back even the principal amount borrowed, especially
but not only because of the poor housing market in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis;
and (4) Citrus “never intended to repay the note upon its maturity—intending instead to
negotiate extended financing.” Citrus has not argued that any of these findings lack the
support of substantial evidence, and our review of the record confirms that such an
argument would be unavailing. Given such evidence, the trial court had ample basis to
conclude that the failure to fund Citrus’s final draw request was not a cause, let alone the
cause of Citrus’s default.
In support of a different conclusion, Citrus asserts that the record compels the
conclusion that the failure to fund the draw request caused Citrus to suspend construction
at the project in March 2009 because it could not pay its contractors. Even if this is true,
however, it does not establish that Citrus’s default was caused by the failure to fund the
draw request. The trial court’s factual findings, grounded in substantial evidence, support
its conclusion that default on the loan payments was already inevitable by that point, even
if Citrus’s draw request had been funded.
26
Although its facts are somewhat different, the reasoning of Jacobs v. Tenneco
West, Inc. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1413 (Jacobs) is instructive. That case involved
contracts that included a condition requiring approval by the defendant company’s board
of directors. (Id. at p. 1415.) The company failed to submit the contracts to its board for
approval or disapproval. (Id. at p. 1416.) The consequence of that breach was waiver of
the condition of board approval unless the company could “prove that the breach did not
contribute materially to the nonoccurrence of the condition by showing that the board of
directors would not have approved the contracts even had they been submitted to the
board in a timely manner.” (Id. at p. 1417.) Analogously, Citrus plausibly pleaded that
Stearns and Rescon essentially forfeited their right to foreclose on the property because
their failure to approve Citrus’s last draw request caused Citrus’s default. Stearns and
Rescon could avoid that consequence of their breach by demonstrating that, as a matter of
fact, their failure to fund Citrus’s draw request, even though wrongful, did not contribute
materially to Citrus’s default. The trial court found Stearns and Rescon carried that
burden of proof, and substantial evidence supported that conclusion.
8. Federal Jury Finding of Bad Faith
Citrus suggests that the federal jury’s finding that Rescon acted in bad faith as to
Citrus’s final draw request is “binding here,” compelling a finding that “‘Rescon’ caused
an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive foreclosure.” That separate litigation,
however, did not involve claims arising from the foreclosure on Citrus’s property. And
as discussed in the previous section, substantial evidence shows that failure to fund
27
Citrus’s final draw request, which was at issue in that litigation, did not cause the
foreclosure. Again, Jacobs is instructive. There, the defendant company’s bad faith
failure to submit the contracts to its board to approve or disapprove—more precisely, a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing—did not preclude it from
demonstrating that the board, “in the exercise of good faith,” would have disapproved the
contracts had they been timely submitted for consideration. (Jacobs, supra, 186
Cal.App.3d at p. 1415.) Here, the wrongful failure to fund Citrus’s draw request, even if
in bad faith, did not preclude Sterns and Rescon from showing that the foreclosure was
not caused by the earlier breach of their obligations, and that the foreclosure was
conducted in good faith.
C. Conclusion
Citrus has not demonstrated that the evidence compels the conclusion that Stearns
and Rescon caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive foreclosure, as would be
needed to disturb the trial court’s determination on the first element of its wrongful
foreclosure claim. On that basis alone, the judgment for Stearns and Rescon must be
affirmed. We need not and do not address the merits of the parties’ arguments on other
16
disputed issues.
16
We reserved for consideration with this appeal a request for judicial notice filed
by Citrus on April 14, 2022. The request is denied, as the documents Citrus asks us to
notice are either already in our record one way or another, unnecessary to our analysis, or
both.
28
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Stearns and Rescon are awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
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