In re T.H. CA1/3

Filed 7/20/23 In re T.H. CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re T.H.,
a Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
A165707
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Solano County Super. Ct.
T.H., No. J290728)
Defendant and Appellant.
T.H. appeals the order of the juvenile court sustaining allegations of a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that he received stolen
property (a car) in violation of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a).1 He
argues the court erred when it denied the motion to suppress his statements
made to police officers because they were involuntary and obtained in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). T.H. also
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
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contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he
knew the car was stolen. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 24, 2021, Christina D. left her 2016 Chevy Impala parked
in the driveway of her Sacramento home. When she returned the following
evening, the car was gone. She had not given anyone permission to drive the
car and reported it stolen.
On December 26, 2021, Bryan Hamilton, a Fairfield police officer,
responded to an alert from a license plate reader system that located
Christina’s car in front of T.H.’s family home. When Officer Hamilton
arrived, about four patrol cars were already there, all part of a plan to block
in the vehicle. Officer Hamilton waited down the road where spike strips
were set in case someone tried to flee with the car.
After about an hour, fellow officers issued an alert that T.H. had
entered the car, and they were initiating contact with him. Officer Hamilton
proceeded to the location of the car and, upon arrival, saw T.H. being
removed from a white Chevy Impala. The car was in generally good
condition, with no broken windows or body damage. Its license plate
matched that of Christina’s car.
T.H. was arrested and, after some back-and-forth with officers about
the reasons for his arrest, was given a Miranda warning. Officer Hamilton
wore a body camera which recorded the arrest. T.H. was 17 years old at the
time.
Following the Miranda warning, T.H. told Officer Hamilton that he
bought the Impala in Oakland the previous day for $600 and a pair of shoes.
T.H. had no documentation reflecting the purchase but said he was supposed
to return to get paperwork. Further, according to Officer Hamilton, after
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officers told him the car was stolen, T.H. “did say that he knew it was stolen,
and right after that he said that he didn’t know it was stolen.”
The Solano County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition
under Welfare & Institutions Code section 602 alleging T.H. received stolen
property, a motor vehicle, a felony in violation of section 496d, subdivision
(a).
At the contested jurisdictional hearing, T.H. unsuccessfully moved to
suppress all his statements after the Miranda warning. At the end of the
hearing, the court found the People met its burden in establishing T.H.
committed the felony violation and sustained the juvenile wardship petition.
At the dispositional hearing, the court denied T.H.’s motion to reduce
the felony charge to a misdemeanor. The court adjudged T.H. a ward of the
court and placed him on in-home probation, including 90 days in juvenile
hall. It also imposed various terms and conditions. T.H. now appeals the
court’s orders.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Suppress
T.H. contends the juvenile court violated his constitutional rights by
denying his motion to suppress statements made while in custody post-
Miranda. Specifically, he argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights because: (1) the police obtained his
waiver through psychologically coercive interrogation tactics; and (2) he did
not understand his rights and the consequences of waiving them. We are not
persuaded.
A. Additional Facts
At the outset of the jurisdictional hearing, T.H. moved to suppress the
statements he made to officers after he received the Miranda warning.
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The juvenile court reviewed and admitted into evidence Officer
Hamilton’s body camera footage depicting T.H.’s arrest and custodial
interrogation. The video showed the following:
It was late afternoon on a rainy, overcast day when Officer Hamilton
arrived at the scene, a residential street in front of T.H.’s family home.
Officer Hamilton joined about three other officers on the scene. Their patrol
cars, at least one with patrol lights flashing, surrounded the Impala which
was parked on the curb with the driver’s side door open. An officer walked
T.H. backwards from the front of the Impala to the rear of one of the patrol
cars while handcuffed behind his back. As he was being moved, T.H.
explained, “I just got this car.” Meanwhile, the front door of T.H.’s house was
open, and it appears his father was observing from the doorway.
While standing handcuffed behind the patrol car, T.H. asked, “Can I
ask please . . .” when the officer responded: “The car’s stolen.” T.H. returned:
“The car’s stolen? The car is stolen? I just got this car. I just got this car
from Oakland. I can show y’all proof and everything.” The officer replied,
“You bought it?” T.H. answered, “I just bought this.” At that point, T.H.’s
father appears to have said something from the house, prompting T.H. to
turn towards his house and say: “Huh? He said the car is stolen,” adding,
“Bro . . . Call . . . Bro . . . This n*** said . . . Bro. . . Why would I bring a stolen
. . .”
Another officer approached T.H. and they had the following exchange:
Officer (“O.”): Where’d you buy it from?
T.H.: Oakland.
O.: Was it like a dealership? Was it like offer-up? Craigslist?
T.H.: No, off of somebody. I just bought it off somebody.
O.: How did you communicate with them?
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T.H.: Some dude in Oakland, I knew him through somebody. I don’t
know him personally.
O.: How did you communicate with them?
T.H.: Through my friend. I wouldn’t bring a stolen . . .
At that point, Officer Hamilton stated, “[T.], we’re going to sit you in
the car, read you your rights, and talk to you a little bit more about it ok?”
T.H. responded, “Yeah.” Officer Hamilton continued, “Because obviously
we’ve got a lot of questions for you alright?” As he made his way to the
backseat of the patrol car, T.H. said, “Bro I knew this car was stolen bro . . .
but this n*** . . . bro.” Another officer replied, “You’re saying you knew this
was stolen?” and T.H. stated, “No because it sounded [too] good to be true,”
and entered the back seat of the patrol vehicle. As he slid further into the
car, T.H. stated: “I paid six hundred.”
Standing outside the open rear door of the patrol car, Officer Hamilton
said to T.H.: “[T.], like I said, we got a bunch of questions so I’m gonna read
you your rights . . . [¶] . . . so I can ask you those questions so you can kinda
tell me what you know because it sounds like a big mix up.” T.H. responded,
“Yeah” at least a couple of times. Officer Hamilton then gave T.H. the
following Miranda advisements: “So you do have the right to remain silent.
You have the right to an attorney and have that attorney present both before
and during your questioning. Anything you say may be used against you in
court. And if you can’t afford to hire an attorney, one will be provided to you
free of charge if you wish.” Officer Hamilton then asked T.H.: “Do you
understand all those?” T.H. responded, “Yeah.”
After receiving T.H.’s response, Officer Hamilton (while remaining
standing outside the backdoor of the patrol car) and T.H. (still seated in the
backseat) had the following exchange:
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H.2: So I understand you bought the car in Oakland, how long ago?
T.H.: Yesterday. Literally last night.
H.: How’d that transaction go?
T.H.: I met him through my friend in Oakland. It was in an apartment
and my friend, I swear to God, he told me he had a car for me. Let me see it.
You feel me? He let me see the car . . . like . . . I wouldn’t bring no stolen car
in front of my house. . . .
H.: Right.
T.H.: Like he . . . gave me the car. I seen it. He let me drive it. He like
“it’s not stolen or nothing.” I’m like okay okay, where the paperwork? He
said . . . “Just come back and get it today.” I was supposed to go back out
there and get the registration and stuff for the car.
H.: Okay.
T.H.: I gave him six hundred dollars and some shoes for the car.
H.: Okay.
T.H. Like I just got off probation and shit like . . .
H.: You didn’t think something was up with that . . . what year is
that . . . 2022?
T.H.: No, that car? No.
H.: I think it’s pretty new isn’t it?
T.H.: I don’t know. It’s just like . . . I wouldn’t, I didn’t steal no car. I
literally didn’t steal the car.
H.: I . . . I don’t think you stole the car at all. But don’t you think it’s
probably hot if you’re paying six hundred dollars and a pair of shoes for a
newer car? I mean, this ain’t no ’92 Honda.
2 H. refers to Officer Hamilton.
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T.H.: Because, because. He knew the guy. He talking bout, he got the
. . . he gets cars off the auction. So like he gets cars off the auction that’s not
expensive.
T.H. further stated that he didn’t know the name of the person from
whom he bought the car. He stated that he did not receive any papers when
buying the car, such as a bill of sale. He informed Officer Hamilton of the
rough location in Oakland where he bought the car. T.H. emphasized that he
wouldn’t drive in a stolen car. The post-Miranda interrogation lasted
approximately two minutes.
After watching the body camera footage, the court heard testimony
from Officer Hamilton and the arguments of the parties.
The court denied T.H.’s motion to suppress. It explained: “In this case
there’s nothing in the record that persuades the court that the minor did not
understand and waive his Miranda rights . . . [¶] He was informed of his
rights by the officers and he answered in the affirmative without hesitation
that he did understand them. He indicated in comments that he had been on
probation, so there is an indication that he has familiarity with the criminal
justice system. The court does not find coercion on behalf of law enforcement,
the court does not find that the officer’s comments promise leniency or
implied he would be released if he spoke with the officers. [¶] Under all the
circumstances of this encounter the court finds that the minor’s will was not
overborne at the time he made statements to the officers. Based upon that,
the minor’s statements to the officers are found to be voluntary after a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.”
B. Applicable Law
“The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
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against himself . . . .’ [Citation.] In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, the United
States Supreme Court ‘ “adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a
suspect’s Fifth Amendment right from the ‘inherently compelling pressures’
of custodial interrogation.” [Citations.]’ Under Miranda and its progeny, ‘ “a
suspect [may] not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she
knowingly and intelligently has waived the right to remain silent, to the
presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, to appointed counsel.” ’ [Citation.]
To be valid, a Miranda ‘waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was
the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion,
or deception” [citation], and knowing in the sense that it was “made with a
full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 787, 809 (Jones).)
“Juveniles, like adults, may validly waive their Miranda rights.”
(Jones, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 809.) “To establish a valid waiver of
Miranda rights, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [Citation.]
Determining the validity of a Miranda rights waiver requires an evaluation
of the defendant’s state of mind and an inquiry into the circumstances of the
interrogation. [Citation.] When a juvenile’s waiver is at issue, consideration
must be given to factors such as the juvenile’s age, experience, education,
background and intelligence, and whether he or she has the capacity to
understand the Miranda warnings, the nature of their Fifth Amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. [Citations.] On review,
we defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by sufficient
evidence, but independently review whether the waiver was voluntary.” (In
re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177, 1189.)
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C. Analysis
We have reviewed the video footage of T.H.’s detention and conclude
the totality of the circumstances supports the juvenile court’s determination
that T.H. made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda
rights.
Officer Hamilton read T.H. his Miranda rights and asked if he
understood. T.H. responded affirmatively that he understood his rights and
then proceeded to respond to Officer Hamilton’s various questions about the
car. While T.H. did not say words along the lines of “I waive my rights,”
courts have regularly recognized the validity of implicit waivers in similar
circumstances involving juveniles. (See, e.g., People v. Nelson (2012) 53
Cal.4th 367, 375 (Nelson) [juvenile’s voluntary responses to officer’s questions
post-Miranda waiver after juvenile confirmed understanding of rights
constituted valid waiver]; People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1169
(Lessie) [juvenile implicitly waived Miranda rights by willingly answering
questions after acknowledging he understood those rights].) Moreover,
Officer Hamilton and his fellow officers appeared calm, civil, and professional
in their interactions with T.H. and their conduct was not overbearing,
threatening, or coercive. No officer promised T.H. leniency in exchange for
his testimony nor did any officer threaten to prosecute T.H. if he did not
speak with them.
For his part, T.H. appeared to understand why he was being detained
and the officer’s questions. He did not appear afraid of the officers or unable
to fully comprehend what was happening. At the time, he was just shy of his
18th birthday by two months and had prior arrests. As the juvenile court
observed, T.H. was not a stranger to criminal proceedings. T.H. himself
informed the officers that he had just completed probation. He had
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previously been declared a ward of the juvenile court in 2019 and had
completed probation in that matter. In sum, the prosecution met its burden
in establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that T.H. impliedly
waived his Miranda rights by answering Officer Hamilton’s questions and
the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
T.H. argues there was no knowing, intelligent, or voluntary waiver of
Miranda rights because the police used psychologically coercive tactics to
obtain the waiver by isolating and interrogating him in the backset of a
patrol car apart from his father; inducing his statements by minimization
strategies, promising leniency, and deception; and cajoling T.H. into talking
to him based on repeated statements implying that T.H. would talk to him
before being read his Miranda warning. We reject these arguments.
Placing T.H. in the backseat of the patrol car for questioning was not
unduly coercive. The interrogation occurred while there was still daylight on
a residential street in front of T.H.’s house. The patrol car was a large SUV,
and the door was open to the street and neighbors while the interrogation –
which lasted only approximately two minutes – took place. The officers
comported themselves professionally and with courtesy. The officer’s decision
to not hold the interview in front of T.H.’s father or in the house did not
invalidate the waiver. (See Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 375 [failing to
seek consent from parent did not invalidate juvenile’s waiver].) While in the
patrol car, T.H. never indicated that he wanted to speak with his father, and
there is no indication that officers would have prevented him from doing so
had he made the request. When he communicated with his father earlier by
yelling across the front yard, no officer stopped him from doing so.
To the extent Officer Hamilton’s statement that the incident appeared
to be a “big mix up” can be characterized as a minimization tactic, it did not
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implicitly promise T.H. any sort of leniency that invalidated the waiver. “ ‘It
is well settled that a confession is involuntary and therefore inadmissible if it
was elicited by any promise of benefit or leniency whether express or implied.
However, mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for
the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a
promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.’ ” (People v.
Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) Moreover, even where there is an
express or implied promise of leniency, a subsequent admission by a suspect
is not involuntary unless the promise was “the motivating cause of the
decision to speak.” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1088.) None
of the officers ever induced T.H.’s statements with any promise of leniency.
While Officer Hamilton’s “big mix up” statement encouraged T.H. to tell the
truth, it did not convey any benefit T.H. would receive in exchange for his
cooperation. And even before he was Mirandized, T.H. spontaneously
expressed that he knew the car was stolen.
Officer Hamilton also did not cajole or trick T.H. into waiving his
rights. In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 476, the court warned that “evidence
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of
course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” (Id.
at p. 476.) T.H. asserts that Officer Hamilton engaged in such cajoling and
trickery by stating, or presuming, that T.H. would speak to him after being
read his advisements. Again, T.H. had already made several spontaneous
statements about his purchase of the car before Officer Hamilton interjected
and told him that they were going to seat him in the patrol car then “read
[him his] rights and talk to [him] a little bit more about it.” Even as he was
being walked to the back of the patrol car, he continued to make more
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admissions such as “Bro I knew this car was stolen . . .” T.H.’s statements
did not result from any trickery.
T.H. also argues there was no knowing, intelligent, or voluntary waiver
because he did not comprehend the nature of his constitutional rights and the
consequences of waiving them. He avers he lacked the requisite level of
comprehension based on the rapid way his rights were given and the absence
of any written advisements to review. We are not persuaded. At the time of
his arrest, T.H. was 17 years old – two months shy of turning 18 – and a high
school graduate, indicating he had the capacity to understand the Miranda
warnings as given. Our review of the video footage shows that Officer
Hamilton recited the Miranda warnings in a reasonable, comprehensible
manner in a normal conversational tone and speed. There was nothing in the
video indicating that T.H. misheard or misunderstood any advisement given;
he expressly confirmed he understood his rights and showed no confusion.
Finally, T.H. contends there was no knowing, intelligent, or voluntary
waiver based on the totality of the circumstances. We remain unpersuaded.
Nothing in the record suggests T.H. was unable to understand, or did not
understand, the meaning of the rights to remain silent and to have the
assistance of counsel, and the consequences of waiving those rights. As
noted, T.H. was very close to 18 years old and a high school graduate. (See
People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 384–385 [valid Miranda waiver by 13-
year-old]; In re Charles P. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 768, 772 [valid Miranda
waiver by 12-year-old].) While no evidence was offered regarding whether
T.H. had previously been advised of his rights under Miranda, his comment
to Officer Hamilton that he “just got off probation” revealed some familiarity
with the criminal justice system that reasonably informed his waiver. (See
Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [knowing and intelligent waiver informed
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by defendant’s prior probation and previous interactions with criminal justice
system as a juvenile].) When the totality of the circumstances are considered,
it does not support a finding that T.H.’s statements to Officer Hamilton were
the result of coercive police tactics that overcame his will and rendered his
statements involuntary. The juvenile court accordingly did not err in
admitting the statements at trial. Having reached this conclusion, we need
not address T.H.’s argument that he suffered prejudice from any purported
error.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
T.H. asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that he received stolen property in violation of section 496d. We
disagree.
A. Additional Facts
Following the contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found
the People met its burden in establishing T.H. committed the felony violation
of section 496d, subdivision (a) and sustained the petition. The court
expressly found: (1) the Impala was stolen from Sacramento; (2) T.H.
purchased the stolen car; and (3) T.H. knew the car was stolen when he
bought it.
With respect to its finding that T.H. knew the car was stolen, the court
explained: “[A]s it relates to knowledge, I base [my finding] on a number of
factors, which include comments he made at the time of his arrest, quote,
‘Bro, I knew this car was stolen, Bro, but this’. . . . And then Officer Hamilton
said, ‘You said you knew this was stolen?’ And he says, ‘No, because it
sounded [too] good to be true,’ which is kind of an equivocation – not ‘kind of,’
it is an equivocation because first he said he knew it was stolen, and then he
says ‘no,’ and then he says ‘because it sounded [too] good to be true,’ which, in
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and of itself, doesn’t make a lot of sense, and it seems to be an attempt to
back-track what his statement was about knowing the car was stolen.” The
court also cited the terms of the transaction to support its finding: “600
dollars and a pair of sneakers for a 2016 Chevrolet Impala automobile that . .
. was in good condition, no damage, was in good running order. Clearly it got
from Sacramento to Oakland and then Oakland to Fairfield with no
mechanical defects. So you clearly have a motor vehicle whose value was
clearly in excess of the 950 dollars that was the subject of this transaction.
Was it a business transaction, arm’s length transaction? No, it wasn’t. It
was all cash, pair of shoes. We don’t have the names of any of the individuals
involved. A friend connected [T.H.] with the person who sold it to him, with
no names, no paperwork for the car. . . . And then he says he was told to
come back and get [the paperwork] the next day. That’s not the kind of
transaction that is – involves anything of an arm’s length legitimate
transaction. [¶] And coupled with his earlier statement where he said,
quote, ‘I knew the car was stolen,’ and the terms of this transaction, that this
was clearly, to the parties involved, the sale of stolen merchandise.”
B. Applicable Law
Our review of T.H.’s substantial evidence claim is governed by the same
standard applicable to adult criminal cases. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1020, 1026.) “ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ ‘ “[O]ur role
on appeal is a limited one.” [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence rule,
we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that
the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]
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Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the
opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the
judgment.’ ” (Ibid.)
Section 496d, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who buys or
receives any motor vehicle [and other listed types of vehicles] that has been
stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or
extortion, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, or who conceals,
sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any motor
vehicle . . . from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained,
shall be punished . . .” (§ 496d, subd. (a).) Thus, a conviction for receiving
stolen property requires that the prosecution prove: (1) the vehicle was
stolen; (2) the defendant received, concealed, or withheld the vehicle from the
owner; and (3) the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. (§ 496d, subd, (a);
People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 224.) “Knowledge that property was
stolen can seldom be proved by direct evidence and resort must often be made
to circumstantial evidence.” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
T.H. does not raise any contentions related to the first two elements of
the crime, arguing only that the evidence fell short of establishing the third
element, namely, that he knew the car was stolen when he bought it.
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the court’s
finding that this knowledge element was satisfied. When T.H. was arrested
and walked to the back seat of the patrol car, he stated, “Bro, I knew this car
was stolen.” When one of the officers asked if he knew the car was stolen,
T.H. replied, “No because it sounded [too] good to be true.” Although the
statements appear contradictory, they indicate T.H.’s awareness of the
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lopsided terms of the deal and could indicate the vehicle was stolen. Further,
as the juvenile court emphasized, other circumstances also suggested T.H.
knew the car was stolen. T.H. appeared not to know the name of the person
he bought the car from and could not disclose the identity of the seller. He
did not identify the friend who acted as their go-between. He did not
purchase it at a dealership or in response to an ad listing. He was given no
bill of sale or any other paperwork to document the purchase or ownership.
(See People v. Williams (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 952, 958, superseded by
statute on other grounds [“It is well established that evasive answers by a
defendant to material questions with reference to the ownership of stolen
property, or to the manner in which the defendant claims to have acquired
such property, or, as is generally stated, a failure on the part of the defendant
to satisfactorily explain his possession, may be sufficient upon which to base
an inference of guilty knowledge.”].) Moreover, he paid only $600 and a pair
of shoes for a 2016 car in good condition. (See People v. Malouf (1955) 135
Cal.App.2d 697, 706 [knowledge that property was stolen can be established
by sale of property at grossly inadequate price].) These dubious
circumstances surrounding T.H.’s purchase of the car further support the
court’s inference that he knew it was stolen.
T.H. argues that his statement – “I knew the car was stolen” – was not
an admission but an expression of his “despair, disbelief, and frustration” at
having been told by police that the car was stolen and being arrested.
Because he subsequently clarified he did not know the car to be stolen, only
that it was a deal too good to be true, T.H. claims the value of this “isolated
evidence was controverted and undermined” by his repeated statements that
he did not know the car was stolen. But a reversal for insufficient evidence is
unwarranted “ ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatsoever is
16
there sufficient substantial evidence” ’ ” to support the trier of fact’s findings.
(See People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Despite his subsequent
backtracking, the trier of fact could reasonably have understood his initial
statement to officers that he knew the car was stolen to be his unfiltered,
genuine view of the car he was purchasing. Based on this initial statement
and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the sale, the juvenile court
was presented sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably infer T.H.
knew the car was stolen.
None of T.H.’s other arguments undermine the substantial evidence in
the record in support of the court’s finding on knowledge. For instance, T.H.
argues that there was no evidence to support the court’s finding that the car’s
value exceeded $950 because there was no evidence of the value of the car or
the shoes. He also asserts that there was no evidence that he made any false
claims about how he obtained the car, or that he made any alterations to the
car to change its appearance. In light of the evidence that reasonably
establishes T.H. knew the car to be stolen, the absence of this other evidence
highlighted by T.H. does not warrant reversal on a substantial evidence
review.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
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_________________________
Petrou, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P.J.
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
A165707/People v. T.H.
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