People v. G.A.

Filed 7/25/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A164980
v.
J. G.A., (Mendocino County Super. Ct.
No. MCUK-CRCR-10-10581-
Defendant and Appellant.
002)
J. G.A. (G.A.) appeals from an order extending his commitment under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 et seq.,1 which permits the
involuntary commitment of persons with a developmental disability if they
are found to be “a danger to self or others.” (§ 6500, subd. (b)(1).) Among
other things, G.A. contends (1) section 6500 violates due process because it
allows a court to order a commitment without proof of a recent overt act; and
(2) the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he posed a
danger to himself or others.
As both parties acknowledged during oral argument, under
section 6500, subdivision (b)(1)(A), a commitment order expires on the one-
year anniversary of the date of the commitment order. (People v. Nolasco
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 209, 218.) As such, G.A.’s commitment order expired
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.
1
on April 1, 2023, and the matter is technically moot. This case, however,
presents important and recurring issues of law concerning the applicability of
due process principles to section 6500 and the sufficiency of evidence
supporting a commitment. Accordingly, we will discuss these particular
issues to provide guidance, then dismiss the appeal as moot. (See, e.g.,
People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 215, 225–226 (Sweeney).)
For the reasons that follow, we conclude section 6500 does not violate
due process by dispensing with the need for proof of a recent overt act of
dangerousness. (See § 6500, subd. (b)(3).) We also conclude substantial
evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of G.A.’s danger to others
because it was based on the testimony of an expert witness whose opinion
relied on unsupported assumptions fact.
There is, however, significant ambiguity as to the meaning of the
statutory term “danger to self.” (§ 6500, subd. (b)(1).) At bottom, the
question is an important one of statutory interpretation. But the parties
have not adequately briefed the issue, and our legal research has found
conflicting indicia of the Legislature’s intent. Considering the seriousness of
the civil liberty and safety interests at stake, we deem it best to leave
construction of the statute to a future case with adequate briefing. To that
end, we note our observations on these issues, with the contemplation that
justice partners or community providers who may be interested in weighing
in on these issues might provide their input as amici curiae in future
proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2001, the People charged G.A. with lewd acts with a child under 14
years old (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), sexual battery by restraint (id.,
§ 243.4, subd. (a)), and false imprisonment (id., § 236). After finding G.A.
2
incompetent to stand trial, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings
pursuant to Penal Code section 1368 and committed G.A. to the Redwood
Coast Regional Center pursuant to Penal Code section 1370.1. G.A. never
regained competency, but he returned to the city where his parents lived and
received services through the Redwood Coast Regional Center up until 2008.
In February 2010, the People filed a felony complaint charging G.A.
with kidnapping with the intent to sexually assault, rape, annoy, or molest a
child under the age of 10 years old (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)), and sexual
intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10 years old (id., § 288.7,
subd. (a)). After finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the trial court held a
commitment hearing pursuant to section 6500 et seq. At that hearing, G.A.
stipulated to the evidence presented and made no argument that the
evidence failed to satisfy any constitutional or statutory requirements for
commitment. Over the years leading up to the recommitment petition filed in
2020, G.A. submitted to various reports being considered as evidence and
either explicitly or impliedly agreed with the extension of his commitment.
Though G.A. challenged his 2020 recommitment, his appeal was dismissed as
moot. (People v. [J.] G.A. (Sept. 29, 2022, A162897) [nonpub. opn.].)
In August 2021, the People filed the underlying petition to extend
G.A.’s commitment. The People alleged that G.A. suffers from moderate
developmental disability, that he represents a danger to himself or to others,
and that he was charged with the aforementioned sex offenses in 2010.
A court trial on the petition was held in January 2021. At the
beginning of the trial, counsel for G.A. moved to exclude any evidence that
might violate People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). The trial
court indicated counsel should make any necessary objections when and if
such evidence were proffered. The People moved for judicial notice of the
3
charges filed against G.A. in 2001 and 2010, but the court deferred ruling on
the motion. The following two witnesses were then called to testify.
Izaak Talamaivao is an employee at “Radiant Living” who has worked
with G.A. weekly since 2017. According to Talamaivao, G.A. can care for his
hygiene by himself, but he probably could not use a thermometer or call 911
in an emergency. G.A. can describe what is on a television screen but cannot
remember it or fully grasp the content. G.A. does not know his own
telephone number or address. Two to three years prior, G.A. wandered away
from a gym and was found at a nearby bus stop without his caregiver.
Dr. Albert Kastl, a psychologist, testified that he evaluated G.A. in
November 2021, and about eight previous times starting in 2001. When
conducting his recent evaluation, Dr. Kastl reviewed prior reports and
evaluations, including some from other providers. His testing of G.A.’s I.Q.
resulted in a score of 42, which was similar to prior evaluations. This score
indicated G.A. is very significantly impaired and has a “moderate intellectual
disability,” a fixed and untreatable diagnosis. Based on tests and interviews,
Dr. Kastl opined that G.A. cannot perform basic daily skills without
supervision and guidance, and that he is impulsive due to cognitive
limitations and emotional factors. Dr. Kastl did not recall reviewing G.A.’s
criminal records but was familiar with his criminal cases from reading
unspecified documents. When asked if he was familiar with G.A.’s 2010
charges, Dr. Kastl responded affirmatively and stated those charges arose
from G.A. allegedly offering two young girls money for sex and moving young
girls from one area to another. Counsel for G.A. objected. The court
overruled the objection but indicated it would consider only the testimony
that Dr. Kastl was familiar with the 2010 charges.
4
Dr. Kastl concluded that G.A. poses a danger to himself because he is
very impulsive; he is unable to modify his behavior in light of experience and
unable to make social judgments; and he is at risk of wandering and being
vulnerable to predatory people. Dr. Kastl also concluded that G.A. poses a
danger to others, particularly children, because he “functions as a much
younger individual” and is “unable to modulate . . . impulses and feelings”
and acts on them “whenever there is an opportunity.” According to Dr. Kastl,
G.A. needs constant supervision to prevent his access to children. When
asked why he believed G.A. would pose a danger of acting sexually
inappropriately with children, Dr. Kastl pointed to an incident sometime
after 2010, during which G.A. sexually assaulted a female on a bus. Counsel
for G.A. objected, and the court indicated it would not consider the testimony
for the truth of the matter due to Sanchez. Dr. Kastl went on to testify that
past behavior is the best predictor of behavior and that given G.A.’s past
behavior and “inability to profit from experience,” the only thing preventing
the recurrence of prior behavior is supervision by another person.
When questioned if he ever asked G.A. about particular instances of
inappropriate sexual behavior, Dr. Kastl indicated he had not because G.A. is
incapable of communicating in that way, which he knew based on G.A.’s
inability to respond to other questions. Dr. Kastl indicated that G.A.’s
language is limited to a few phrases and single words, and that he is
incapable of communicating, for example, why he left the gym during the
incident described by Talamaivao. When asked if he was assuming the truth
of the facts underlying the criminal charges against G.A., Dr. Kastl indicated
he was.
After the hearing, the trial court invited and received supplemental
briefs addressing the issues. On April 1, 2022, the court issued an oral ruling
5
granting the petition to extend the commitment based on its findings that
G.A. continues to have a developmental disability from which he will not
recover, and that he continues to present a danger to himself and others
because of his disability. In a written order filed the same day, the court
indicated the commitment would expire on August 17, 2022. The court also
indicated it was taking judicial notice of “Mendocino County cases 01-44124
and 10-10581,” i.e., G.A.’s 2001 and 2010 cases. G.A. appealed.
DISCUSSION
Despite its mootness, we have retained this case to address G.A.’s
contentions that (1) due process requires proof of a recent overt act to support
a finding under section 6500 that a person with a developmental disability
poses a danger to self or others; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to
support his recommitment. We begin with a brief overview of the statutory
scheme governing section 6500 commitments.
A. Overview of section 6500 commitments
Section 6500 provides: “A person with a developmental disability may
be committed to the State Department of Developmental Services for
residential placement other than in a developmental center or state-operated
community facility, as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 6509, if the
person is found to be a danger to self or others.” (§ 6500, subd. (b)(1).)
Section 6500, subdivision (a)(2), specifies that “ ‘[d]evelopmental
disability’ ” has the same meaning defined in the Lanterman Developmental
Disabilities Services Act (LDDSA) (§ 4500 et seq.). In section 4512, the
LDDSA defines developmental disability as “a disability that originates
before an individual attains 18 years of age, continues, or can be expected to
continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial disability for that
individual.” (§ 4512, subd. (a)(1).) In turn, “ ‘[s]ubstantial disability’ means
6
the existence of significant functional limitations” in three or more
enumerated major life activities, such as self-care, receptive and expressive
language, learning, self-direction, capacity for independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency. (§ 4512, subd. (l).) Developmental disability
includes “intellectual disability” and “disabling conditions found to be closely
related to intellectual disability.” (§ 4512, subd. (a)(1).)
Section 6500 does not define “ ‘[d]angerousness to self or others,’ ” but
the term includes “a finding of incompetence to stand trial . . . when the
defendant has been charged with . . . a violation of Section 288 . . . .” (§ 6500,
subd. (a)(1).)
Over the years, California courts have imposed additional requirements
for commitment under section 6500, out of the recognition that “ ‘civil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty
that requires due process protection.’ ” (In re O.P. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
924, 928–929 (O.P.), quoting Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425.)
As relevant here, courts have held that due process requires proof “that a
person’s [developmental disability] causes him or her to have serious
difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior.” (People v. Bailie (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 841, 847–850, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barrett
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1109 (Barrett); Sweeney, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 225.) Moreover, “due process demands proof of current dangerousness,
linked to the defendant’s [developmental disability],” and a finding of
dangerousness cannot be based “solely on a finding that [the defendant] had
been adjudged incompetent to stand trial and charged with a felony
[described by section 6500].” (O.P., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 931–933,
italics added.)
7
The statutory scheme contemplates that various people, including an
individual’s parent, conservator, or any person designated by a court, may
request that “the person authorized”—i.e., the district attorney or county
counsel—file a petition for commitment of the individual under section 6500.
(§§ 6500, subd. (b)(5), 6502.) After a petition is filed, the trial court must
appoint the director of “a regional center for the developmentally disabled” or
a designee to conduct an examination and submit a report (§ 6504.5,
subds. (a)–(b)) functioning as “a professional pretrial evaluation of the
person’s history, condition, and behavior” (Barrett, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 1104). The report must include an assessment of the individual and a
recommendation regarding the least restrictive residential placement that
promotes the goals of treatment while considering public safety. (§ 6504.5,
subds. (b)–(c).)
The court must set a hearing on the petition (§ 6503), and the
individual proposed for commitment has a right to a jury trial upon request
(Barrett, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1096–1097). The prosecution has the
burden to prove the elements necessary for a section 6500 commitment
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Money v. Krall (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 378, 348.)
If it is found “that the person has a developmental disability, and is a danger
to self or to others, . . . the court may make an order that the person be
committed to the State Department of Developmental Services for suitable
treatment and habilitation services,” meaning “the least restrictive
residential placement necessary to achieve the purposes of treatment.”
(§ 6509, subd. (a).)
A commitment order under this statutory scheme automatically expires
after one year but subsequent petitions for additional periods of commitment
are permitted. (§ 6500, subd. (b)(1)(A)–(B).) “If subsequent petitions are
8
filed, the procedures followed shall be the same as with the initial petition for
commitment.” (§ 6500, subd. (b)(1)(B).)
B. Due process does not require proof of a recent overt act for
a finding of dangerousness under section 6500
Section 6500, subdivision (b)(3), provides: “If the person with a
developmental disability is in the care or treatment of a state hospital,
developmental center, or other facility at the time a petition for commitment
is filed pursuant to this article, proof of a recent overt act while in the care
and treatment of a state hospital, developmental center, or other facility is not
required in order to find that the person is a danger to self or others.” (Italics
added.)
G.A. contends that where, as here, no criminal conviction or finding of
probable cause by a magistrate or grand jury was ever made, due process
requires that a finding of dangerousness be established by proof of a “recent
overt act” even though the statute expressly dispenses with the need for such
proof if the person proposed for commitment is receiving the statutorily
contemplated care or treatment when a commitment petition is filed.
G.A. has identified no decision holding that, in the absence of a
criminal conviction or finding of probable cause, due process requires proof of
a recent overt act for a finding of dangerousness in the type of circumstances
contemplated under section 6500, subdivision (b)(3). Nor have we found any
authorities mandating such a requirement. There is, however, “substantial”
authority holding generally that due process “does not require proof of a
recent overt act to establish dangerousness sufficient to warrant a civil
commitment.” (People v. Felix (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 607, 619–620 (Felix),
and cases cited; accord, Project Release v. Prevost (2d Cir. 1983) 722 F.2d 960,
973–974 (Project Release), and cases cited; In re Maricopa County Cause No.
MH-90-00566 (1992) 173 Ariz. 177, 184 [where civil commitment statute
9
required “clear and convincing evidence of a substantial probability of harm,”
proof of recent overt act not required].) This aligns with the holding in O.P.
that due process is satisfied so long as the section 6500 commitment is
predicated upon proof of “current dangerousness [to self or others] and not
merely a prosecutor’s allegation that an incompetent person committed a
violent felony.” (O.P., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 934, italics added.)
That the Legislature explicitly rejected a requirement for proof of a
recent overt act in this context reflects a rational policy choice. When a
person with a developmental disability is “in the care or treatment of a state
hospital, developmental center, or other facility at the time a petition for
commitment is filed” (§ 6500, subd. (b)(3)), the supervised nature of the
environment may provide little or no opportunity for the commission of overt
acts of danger to oneself or others. Here, for example, the nature of G.A.’s
criminal charges suggests he may have a predisposition to commit a specific
type of sexual offense—i.e., sex crimes against children—which he cannot act
on in his current monitored environment. Because, as a practical matter,
proof of a recent overt act may not exist in cases where one has been
receiving care and treatment in a supervised setting, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the person’s continuing developmental disability and
current dangerousness should suffice for a civil commitment. (See Felix,
supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 619–620 [rejecting petitioner’s contention that
commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act implicitly requires
proof of a recent overt act where 10 years had elapsed since he was last out of
custody].) Put another way, “ ‘[d]ue process does not require that the absurd
be done before a compelling state interest can be vindicated.’ ” (Felix, at
p. 618, citing People v. Martin (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 714, 725 (Martin).)
10
G.A.’s authorities are not to the contrary. True, the courts that have
rejected the call for proof of a recent overt act of dangerousness have done so
in cases where the original commitment followed criminal convictions. (E.g.,
Felix, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 610; People v. Buttes (1982) 134
Cal.App.3d 116, 119; Martin, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 716; People v.
Henderson (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 475.) But those courts had no occasion to
consider whether such a requirement must be imposed outside of that
particular context. Accordingly, they provide no authority for the broad
proposition that, absent a conviction or a finding of probable cause, proof of a
recent overt act must be shown to support a finding of dangerousness in a
civil commitment case. (See Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization (1999) 21
Cal.4th 310, 332 [no case is authority for a proposition not considered by the
court].)
G.A. contends requirement of a recent overt act is supported by In re
Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251 (Smith). There, the California Supreme Court
contrasted commitments under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act)
with involuntary commitment procedures and one-year conservatorships for
people with mental illnesses under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000
et seq.) (LPS Act). (Smith, at pp. 1267–1268.) “[U]nder the SVP Act those
currently in prison with the requisite convictions for sexually violent offenses
can be subject to continued civil commitment solely on the basis of findings
that an individual has a mental disorder that makes it likely he or she will
engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. (§§ 6601–6604.) On the other
hand, those not in prison, including those who also have prior convictions for
sexually violent offenses, can be subject to long-term civil commitment [under
the LPS Act] only when . . . they are determined to be gravely disabled or to
have a mental disorder and to be a danger to self and others as shown by
11
recent acts.” (Smith, at p. 1268, italics added.) In G.A.’s view, this passage
supports a general requirement for proof of a recent overt act of
dangerousness in cases where a criminal conviction or probable cause finding
is lacking. We cannot agree.
The issue in Smith was whether the SVP Act permitted an SVP
commitment to proceed where, after SVP commitment proceedings were
initiated against the petitioner, the felony conviction serving as the basis of
the petitioner’s custody was reversed on appeal. (Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th at
p. 1255.) Smith included the above-quoted passage as part of an equal
protection analysis which favored a construction of the SVP Act that did not
permit such proceedings to continue. (Id. at pp. 1262–1269.) But in
describing the criteria for LPS Act commitments, Smith was not purporting
to cast doubt on other commitment schemes based on different criteria and
different required showings. Nor was Smith implying that the Legislature
was powerless to authorize civil commitments without proof of a recent overt
act of dangerousness under the type of circumstances specified in
section 6500, subdivision (b)(3), or that due process requires such proof to
justify all commitments in cases lacking evidence of a conviction or probable
cause finding. We see nothing in Smith that so suggests. Moreover, G.A.
fails to address the portion of the quoted passage indicating that a long-term
civil commitment under the LPS Act can be justified on grounds of grave
disability—e.g., an inability to provide for one’s basic personal needs—
without proof of a recent overt act. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1).)
G.A.’s other authorities are likewise unavailing, as none of them
indicates that proof of a recent overt act is constitutionally required for a civil
commitment if a criminal conviction or a finding of probable cause is lacking.
(See, e.g., Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, 176, 178
12
[requiring a hearing and written findings to find a person gravely disabled
under amendments to the LPS Act]; Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715,
731, 738 [holding that Indiana’s law allowing indefinite commitment solely on
grounds of incompetency violated due process and that Indiana must either
institute civil commitment proceedings or release a defendant who will not
attain competency to proceed to trial in the foreseeable future].) Nor do the
authorities address why due process principles might be violated when proof
of a recent overt act of dangerousness is not required for recommitment when
the person with a developmental disability is in the care or treatment of a
state hospital, developmental center, or other facility.
As for Suzuki v. Yuen (9th Cir. 1980) 617 F.2d 173, that case concerned
a Hawaiian civil commitment statute that provided for psychiatric
hospitalization (with no less restrictive alternatives) of mentally ill persons in
need of care or treatment who were a danger to themselves or others or to
property. (Id. at pp. 174–175, fn. 2.) In striking down the statute on due
process grounds, the federal district court concluded in relevant part: “The
proper standard is that which requires a finding of imminent and substantial
danger as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat.” (Id. at p. 178,
quoting Suzuki v. Alba (D.Haw. 1977) 438 F. Supp. 1106, 1108, 1110, 1112,
italics omitted.) Although the Ninth Circuit in Suzuki v. Yuen agreed that
“the danger must be imminent to justify involuntary commitment,” it did not
specifically address the district court’s requirement of a “recent overt act,
attempt or threat.” (Suzuki v. Yuen, at p. 178.)
Nonetheless, even assuming Suzuki v. Yuen adopted the district court’s
recent overt act requirement, federal decisions are not binding on this court.
(People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 480.) More to the point, courts in
California and elsewhere have rejected the need for such proof and have
13
instead indicated that due process is satisfied as long as there is evidence of
current dangerousness. (See O.P., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 934; Felix,
supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 619, and cases cited; accord, Project Release,
supra, 722 F.2d at pp. 973–974, and cases cited.) We stand with these
authorities.
In sum, we reject G.A.’s contention that due process requires proof of a
recent overt act notwithstanding the express language of section 6500,
subdivision (b)(3), providing to the contrary.
C. Substantial evidence review
G.A. next contends the grounds for extension of his commitment were
not established by substantial evidence. We agree, in part.
In conducting a substantial evidence review, we “ ‘ “view the evidence
in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence must
be ‘ “of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible and of
solid value.” ’ [Citation.] The issue must be resolved in light of the entire
record.” (People v. Cuevas (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 94, 106–107.) We bear in
mind that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the
court’s finding in this case, and the degree of confidence such a finding
requires. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005, 1007–1008,
1011.)
Here, G.A. concedes there is substantial evidence that he has a
developmental disability. We accept that concession, noting Dr. Kastl
testified that recent IQ tests of G.A. resulted in a score of 42, which reflects a
“very significant impairment” and is in the range of “moderate intellectual
14
disability.” We turn first to discuss G.A.’s challenge to the trial court’s
finding that he poses a danger to others.
1. Dangerousness to others
The record reflects substantial evidence that G.A. falls within the
statutory contemplation of “ ‘[d]angerousness to self or others’ ” set out in
section 6500, subdivision (a)(1), insofar as G.A. was found incompetent after
he was charged with sex crimes against children in 2010 (Pen. Code, §§ 209,
subd. (b) & 288.7, subd. (a)) and in 2001 (§§ 288, subd. (a), 243.4, subd. (a)).
Though the foregoing evidence appears to fall within the explicit
statutory terms for a commitment, case law holds that due process requires
more. Specifically, “due process demands proof of current dangerousness,”
linked to the proposed committee’s developmental disability, and a finding of
dangerous cannot be based “solely on a finding that [the proposed committee]
had been adjudged incompetent to stand trial and charged with a felony
[described by section 6500].” (O.P., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 931–932,
italics added.)
In this case, the only evidence that G.A. is a danger to others is the
charges against him and the subsequent findings of incompetence. True, Dr.
Kastl provided an expert opinion that G.A. poses a current danger to others,
particularly children. But Dr. Kastl based his opinion primarily on G.A.’s
alleged past instances of misconduct, which Dr. Kastl learned about and
assumed were true from his review of unspecified records. In Dr. Kastl’s
opinion, past behavior is the best predictor of behavior and, in view of G.A.’s
past behavior and “inability to profit from experience,” he concluded the only
thing preventing the recurrence of G.A.’s prior behavior is supervision by
another person. In assessing whether Dr. Kastl’s opinion provided
substantial evidence for a finding of danger to others, we consider Dr. Kastl’s
15
reliance on hearsay in forming his opinion and the evidentiary value of his
opinion.
In Sanchez, the California Supreme Court confirmed that experts “can
rely on background information accepted in their field of expertise” and “on
information within their personal knowledge.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 685.) Experts may also rely “on hearsay in forming an opinion, and may
tell the [factfinder] in general terms that [they] did so.” (Ibid.) But
importantly, Sanchez held that an expert cannot “relate as true case-specific
facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven
by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (Id. at p. 686.)
There appears no dispute that Sanchez applies to the present commitment
proceeding. (People v. Bona (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 511, 515, 520; People v.
Jeffrey G. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 501, 507; People v. Yates (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 474, 483.)
Here, the trial court specifically indicated it would consider only the
testimony that Dr. Kastl was familiar with the prior criminal charges and not
consider his testimony for the truth of the matters stated. Accordingly, we
may assume the court did not view Dr. Kastl’s testimony as providing actual
proof that G.A. committed sexual misconduct in 2001 and 2010. Nor do we.
But the fact remains that Dr. Kastl’s opinion of G.A.’s current
dangerousness to others was based not only on his observations of G.A.’s
continuing state of impairment and developmental disability, but primarily
on his understanding of G.A.’s past behavior, which he developed from his
review of unspecified records referencing the 2001 and 2010 incidents.
In assessing the evidentiary value of Dr. Kastl’s opinion, we are
mindful that an expert witness “does not possess a carte blanche to express
any opinion within the area of expertise.” (Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado
16
Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117.) When an expert’s
opinion is “based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support,” or “on
speculative or conjectural factors,” it has “no evidentiary value.” (Ibid., and
cases cited.) Moreover, a judgment based solely on an expert opinion that
relied on such assumptions and factors must be reversed for lack of
substantial evidence. (People v. Wright (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 537, 545
(Wright).)
Applying these principles, we cannot conclude that Dr. Kastl’s opinion
furnished substantial evidence of G.A.’s current dangerousness to others.
The record reflects that Dr. Kastl’s opinion was based, in the main, on factual
assumptions he made after reviewing unspecified documents referencing
alleged incidents of prior sexual misconduct. But the People did not identify
or present the documents in question, and offered no evidence supporting the
veracity of their contents. Nor was there any other evidence showing that
G.A. actually engaged in the prior incidents of misconduct. (Wright, supra,
4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 545–546.) Because Dr. Kastl’s opinion of G.A.’s current
dangerousness to others relied on unsupported assumptions of fact, it did not
suffice as substantial evidence supporting G.A.’s recommitment. (Id. at
p. 545.)
2. Dangerousness to self
Next, we turn to discuss the trial court’s finding that an extended
commitment was appropriate because G.A. poses a danger to himself. In
short, the parties dispute whether this finding is substantially supported by
the testimony of Talamaivao and Dr. Kastl concerning the degree of G.A.’s
intellectual and functional limitations, such as his inability to perform basic
daily skills without support or guidance, his inability to either modify his
behavior in light of experience or make social judgments, his impulsiveness,
17
and his vulnerability to predatory people. At the heart of this dispute is a
lurking but important question of statutory interpretation: what is the
meaning of “ ‘[d]angerousness to self’ ” in the context of section 6500?
Section 6500 itself does not provide a clear definition of the phrase
(People v. Hartshorn (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152 (Hartshorn)), though
it incorporates the definition of “developmental disability” as provided in
section 4512 of the LDDSA.2 But there is another LDDSA provision—not
mentioned by the parties—which seemingly bears on the issue here. That
provision appears to authorize persons with developmental disabilities to file
a habeas corpus petition seeking release from a commitment (see § 4800), as
follows: “If the person is charged with a violent felony and has been
committed to his or her current placement pursuant to . . . Section 6500, and
the court finds (A) that the adult requesting release or for whom release is
requested is not a person with a developmental or intellectual disability, or
(B) that he or she is able to provide safely for his or her basic personal needs
for food, shelter, and clothing, the court shall, before releasing the person,
determine that the release will not pose a danger to the health or safety of
others due to the person’s known behavior.” (§ 4801, subd. (c)(3), italics
added.) This statute suggests, at least facially, that persons with
developmental disabilities may be subject to ongoing commitment if they are
unable to provide for their own basic needs.
2
To reiterate, section 6500, subdivision (a)(2), incorporates section 4512’s
definition of “ ‘[d]evelopmental disability’ ” as “a disability that originates
before an individual attains 18 years of age, continues, or can be expected to
continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial disability for that
individual” (§ 4512, subd. (a)(1), italics added) and its further definition of
“ ‘[s]ubstantial disability’ as “the existence of significant functional
limitations” in three or more enumerated major life activities, such as self-
care, receptive and expressive language, learning, self-direction, capacity for
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency (§ 4512, subd. (l)).
18
Apart from the LDDSA, we note Hartshorn, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th
1145 and People v. Alvas (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1459 looked to the LPS Act in
holding that section 6500 contemplates “conduct that presents the likelihood
of serious physical injury” and not merely “[t]he vagaries of emotional injury,
mere apprehension of physical injury, speculation and conjecture.”
(Hartshorn, at pp. 1153–1154; Alvas, at p. 1467.) Though the parties appear
to disagree over whether this construction of section 6500 could be satisfied
by the evidence in this case, neither party questions Hartshorn and Alvas’s
reliance on the LPS Act to ascertain the meaning of dangerousness under
section 6500 (see Alvas, at p. 1467). We have found no decisions either
following or criticizing this aspect of Hartshorn and Alvas, and the
Legislature has not amended section 6500 in response to these cases.
Assuming the LPS Act is properly consulted for purposes of
interpreting section 6500’s “danger to self” language, we note the act appears
to distinguish “grave disability” from a person’s dangerousness to self. Under
the LPS Act, the term “grave disability” is defined to mean “[a] condition in
which a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide
for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” (§ 5008,
subd. (h)(1)(A).) That the term “grave disability” contemplates something
other than a person’s dangerousness to self is reflected in section 5150, which
includes references to both concepts in authorizing short term emergency
detention when a person, “as a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger
to others, or to themselves, or gravely disabled.” (Italics added.)
Notably, “grave disability” is not a term appearing in the statutory
scheme encompassing section 6500. Thus, one might view this omission as
significant given that the Legislature could similarly (and explicitly) have
allowed for commitment of developmentally disabled persons who cannot
19
safely provide for their basic needs. (Cf. People v. Salmorin (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 738, 750 [“when the Legislature wants to define a crime using
aggregation principles, ‘it knows how to say so’ ”].) On the other hand, some
have observed in the LPS context that dangerousness to self is implicit in
one’s inability to provide for one’s basic needs. (Doe v. Gallinot (C.D.Cal.
1979) 486 F.Supp. 983, 991 [“California’s ‘gravely disabled’ standard . . .
implicitly requires a finding of harm to self: an inability to provide for one’s
basic physical needs”]; see Byun, Gravely Disabled: The Vestigial Prong of
5150 Designations (2021) 34 J.L. & Health 190, 205–206.) In any event, the
parties have not addressed what legislative intent, if any, may be gleaned
from section 6500’s omission of the term “gravely disabled.”
Moreover, among the cases cited by the parties, one California Supreme
Court case viewing older versions of these commitment statutes had this to
say regarding legislative purpose: “The sole state interest [of former
sections 6500 through 6512], legislatively expressed, is the custodial care,
diagnosis, treatment, and protection of persons who are unable to take care of
themselves and who for their own well being and the safety of others cannot
be left adrift in the community.” (Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 137,
italics added.) Though the statutory scheme has since been revised,
pronouncements such as this suggest there may be a current expression of
legislative purpose that we have not had the opportunity to appraise because
the parties have offered no clear or adequate analysis concerning the proper
interpretation of section 6500.
For his part, G.A. notes that section 4507 in the LDDSA provides that
“[d]evelopmental disabilities alone shall not constitute sufficient justification
for judicial commitment” and that “[p]ersons who constitute a danger to
themselves or others may be judicially committed pursuant to [section 6500]
20
if evidence of such danger is proven in court.” He also cites section 4502,
subdivision (b)(2), which guarantees rights for people with developmental
disabilities, such as the right to treatment and habilitation services in the
least restrictive setting. We acknowledge these statutes serve to ensure that
people with developmental disabilities have the right to “dignity, privacy, and
humane care” and the right to “treatment, services, and supports” provided
“in natural community settings” to “the maximum extent possible.” (§ 4502,
subd. (b)(2).) Such statutes might also be viewed as supporting the
conclusion that depriving such people of their liberty through a civil
commitment should require more than a mere finding of a developmental
disability as defined in section 4512, subdivisions (a)(1) and (l).
Nonetheless, G.A. attempts no explanation or legislative analysis of
what the LDDSA statutes might allow in terms of a showing of danger to self
under section 6500. For example, G.A. does not address the potential overlap
between (1) the symptoms or behaviors that indicate a developmental
disability under section 4512 and (2) the symptoms or behaviors of a
developmental disability that render people a danger to themselves. In short,
it is unclear whether section 6500 could or should be construed as largely
precluding the consideration of the symptoms or behaviors constituting a
“ ‘[d]evelopmental disability’ ” and a “ ‘[s]ubstantial disability’ ” (§ 4512) as
evidence establishing a person’s dangerousness to self.
In sum, there are conflicting indicia of legislative intent concerning the
proper interpretation of section 6500 and its contemplation that persons with
developmental disabilities are subject to civil commitment if they are found to
pose a danger to themselves. Considering the lack of adequate briefing and
the seriousness of the civil liberty and safety interests at stake, we decline to
21
offer a construction in this moot case. Nonetheless, we note our observations
to provide some analytical considerations in future litigation.
DISPOSITION
We conclude subdivision (b)(3) of section 6500 does not violate due
process by dispensing with the need for proof of a recent overt act of
dangerousness. We also conclude substantial evidence did not support the
finding of G.A.’s dangerousness to others. However, we decline to decide
whether substantial evidence supported the finding of G.A.’s dangerousness
to himself. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P.J.
_________________________
Petrou, J.
People v. J. G.A. (A164980)
22
Trial Court: Mendocino County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Keith Faulder
Counsel: Law Office of Jean F. Matulis, Jean F. Matulis, under
appointment by the First District Appellate Project for
Defendant and Appellant
Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E.
Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M.
Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Arthur P.
Beever, Deputy Attorney General, and Lisa Ashley Ott,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent
23