Lalonne v. NewRez CA2/2

Filed 6/6/23 Lalonne v. NewRez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JULIET LALONNE, B312976
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC707310)
v.
NEWREZ LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Robert B. Broadbelt III, Judge. Affirmed.
Juliet Lalonne, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Klinedinst, Ian A. Rambarran and Robert M. Shaughnessy
for Defendants and Respondents.
______________________________
In a rambling and largely unintelligible brief, plaintiff and
appellant Juliet Lalonne purports to appeal from a judgment of
dismissal entered against her and in favor of defendants and
respondents New Penn Financial, LLC (now NewRez, LLC, dba
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing), Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
following defendants’ successful demurrer.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Complaint and judgment in favor of defendants
On May 24, 2018, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit1 against
defendants and eight others. On October 28, 2019, following an
order sustaining defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend,
the trial court entered judgment against plaintiff and in favor of
defendants.
Statement of disqualification
Nearly eight months later, on June 25, 2020, plaintiff filed
a document titled: “1. FILE ON DEMAND [¶]
2. EMERGENCY 6/25/20 hearing [¶] 3. Motion to recuse for
cause—Judge Broadbelt, 28 U.S.C. 455(a) and CCP 170.1.” The
primary basis for seeking disqualification was the trial judge’s
“past professional partnership in 2008 at the law firm of Dreier
Stein Kahn Browne Woods George LLP where Marc Dreier was
an equity partner. In or about 2009, Mr. Dreier was convicted of
investment fraud.” The document presented no facts or evidence
suggesting that the trial judge had any involvement with the
1
Plaintiff did not provide us with a copy of her pleading in
the appellate record.
2
criminal activities of the former law partner, and none of the
allegations regarding the former partner were related to the facts
of plaintiff’s current action.
The filing also suggested that the trial judge’s assignment
to the matter was suspicious because his chambers and
courtroom were, at one time, located adjacent to the chambers
and courtroom of the trial judge who had presided over a related
unlawful detainer action regarding the same underlying property
and the same defaulted loan.
Finally, the document asserted that the trial judge was
biased because of the manner in which he ruled on matters and
otherwise managed the proceedings in the action, including his
refusal to enter defaults against unserved defendants.
Trial court’s order striking the statement of disqualification
The trial court construed the filing as a statement of
disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
170.32 and struck it pursuant to section 170.4 because, “‘on its
face,’” the document disclosed no legal grounds for
disqualification.
In addition, the trial judge provided a verified answer
establishing no bias or prejudice and acknowledging that he
knew of no facts or circumstances that would require
disqualification or recusal.
Plaintiff did not petition the Court of Appeal for review of
the trial court’s order.
2
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3
Remainder of the action is dismissed
On March 18, 2021, the trial court dismissed the remainder
of the action because plaintiff failed to file proper proofs of service
showing that the summons and operative pleading had been
served on the eight other defendants (the unserved defendants).
Appeal
On April 19, 2021, plaintiff filed her notice of appeal from
the March 18, 2021, dismissal order, asserting “FRAUD ON THE
COURT DISMISSAL BEING MOVED TO FEDERAL AS WELL
FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF POS, BRIBERY
CONSIPRACY OF JUDGES.”
DISCUSSION
It is well-established that a trial court judgment is
“‘presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent,
and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general
principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
Plaintiff has not overcome this burden. Issues are raised
that are not thoroughly fleshed out or supported by record
citations and/or legal authority. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [appellant bears the burden of
supporting a point with reasoned argument]; County of
Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591 [appellant
must present argument on each point made]; Guthrey v. State of
California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 [appellate court is
not required to make an independent, unassisted search of the
appellate record].) We decline to consider the issues raised in
plaintiff’s opening brief that are not properly presented or
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sufficiently developed to be cognizable, and we treat them as
waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; People v.
Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19; In re David L. (1991)
234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1661; Mansell v. Board of Administration
(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545–546.) Plaintiff’s election to act as
her own attorney on appeal does not entitle her to any leniency as
to the rules of practice and procedure. (Rappleyea v. Campbell
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; Gamet v. Blanchard (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1246–1247.)
With these principals in mind, and ignoring the hyperbole
and tone of plaintiff’s appellate briefs,3 we have attempted to
address the merits of the issues raised by plaintiff.
I. Plaintiff’s appeal concerning the 2019 judgment is untimely
To the extent plaintiff is challenging the trial court’s
judgment of dismissal following defendants’ successful demurrer,
her appeal is untimely.4 California Rules of Court, rule
8.104(a)(1) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed on or
before the earliest of either (1) 60 days after the appellant is
served with notice of entry of judgment, or (2) 180 days after
entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B) &
(C).)
3
Plaintiff makes a host of unfounded inflammatory
comments regarding the trial judge in this case.
4
The fact that plaintiff may have filed a petition for review
in the California Supreme Court has no bearing on the timeliness
of this appeal.
5
Here, judgment was entered October 28, 2019. At the
latest, plaintiff had until April 25, 2020 (180 days later), to file
her notice of appeal. Because the instant notice of appeal was not
filed until April 19, 2021, any challenge to the judgment entered
in favor of these defendants is untimely. We lack jurisdiction to
consider it. (Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized
Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56.)
II. Trial court’s order striking plaintiff’s section 170.3 challenge is
not appealable
On appeal, plaintiff seems to argue that the trial court
improperly struck her disqualification statement.
Section 170.3, subdivision (d), provides, in relevant part:
“The determination of the question of the disqualification of a
judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a
writ of mandate . . . filed and served within 10 days after service
of written notice of entry of the court’s order determining the
question of disqualification.” (§ 170.3, subd. (d).) “[T]he statute
means what it says: Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3,
subdivision (d) provides the exclusive means for seeking review of
a ruling on a challenge to a judge, whether the challenge is for
cause or peremptory.” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395,
444.)
Simply put, the order plaintiff challenges is not appealable.
Because plaintiff did not file a timely writ of mandate after the
trial court struck her statement of disqualification, we cannot
review the trial court’s order.
III. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
remainder of the action in 2021
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing the
remainder of her action in 2021 for delay in prosecution. To the
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extent her argument is based upon her contention that the trial
court was biased, that claim fails for the reasons set forth above.
Setting that aside, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the
trial court erred. A trial court “may in its discretion dismiss an
action for delay in prosecution” (§ 583.410, subd. (a)) if “[s]ervice
is not made within two years after the action is commenced”
(§ 583.420, subd. (a)(1)). We review an order dismissing a
complaint for failure to prosecute for abuse of discretion.
(Williams v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1994)
23 Cal.App.4th 84, 91.)
Plaintiff filed her complaint on May 24, 2018. Nearly three
years later, she still had not provided proof of service on the
unserved defendants, despite being given multiple opportunities
to do so. She offers no reasonable explanation for the delay.
(Williams v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra,
23 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.) Under these circumstances, she has not
demonstrated that the trial court committed reversible error.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT
________________________, J.*
KWAN
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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