People v. Corrales CA2/1

Filed 6/7/23 P. v. Corrales CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B324793
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA179619)
v.
GEORGE CORRALES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, George Gonzalez Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.
Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
The resentencing court denied petitioner George Corrales’s
petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code former section
1170.95 renumbered in 2023 as section 1172.6.1 Corrales argues
the trial court made several errors but does not dispute
respondent’s argument that, as a matter of law, he is not entitled
to resentencing. We agree with respondent that as a matter of
law, Corrales is not entitled to resentencing because he was not
convicted based on a felony murder theory, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed
malice. Because Corrales is not eligible for resentencing relief as
a matter of law, the errors he alleges could not have prejudiced
him.
BACKGROUND
1. Amended information
In an amended information filed March 15, 2000, the
People alleged one count of willful, deliberate, premeditated
attempted murder. The People further alleged that Corrales
personally used a firearm within the meaning of sections 12022.5,
subdivision (a)(1) and 12022.53, subdivision (c).
2. Jury instructions
With respect to the attempted murder, the jury was
instructed: “In order to prove attempted murder, each of the
following elements must be proved[:] [¶] 1. A direct but
ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another
human being; and [¶] 2. The person committing the act
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent
to kill unlawfully another human being.”
The court further instructed the jury on the meaning of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder as follows in
pertinent part: “If you find the defendant guilty of attempted
murder you must determine whether this allegation is true or not
true. [¶] ‘Willful’ means intentional. ‘Deliberate’ means formed
or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought
and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed
course of action. ‘Premeditated’ means considered beforehand.
[¶] If you find that the attempted murder was preceded and
accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the
result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have
been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden
heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of
deliberation, it is attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder.”
The court also instructed the jury that if it found defendant
guilty of attempted murder, the jury “must determine whether
the defendant intentionally and personally discharged a firearm
in the commission” of the attempted murder. “The term
‘intentionally and personally discharged a firearm,’ as used in
this instruction, means that the defendant [himself] must have
intentionally discharged it.”
The court did not instruct the jury on felony murder, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory
of imputed malice.
3. Jury verdict
The jury found true the allegation that defendant
committed an attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and with
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premeditation. The jury also found true that Corrales personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm.
4. 2019 petition for resentencing
On March 26, 2019, Corrales petitioned for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. Without
appointing counsel for Corrales and without his presence, the
resentencing court denied his resentencing petition. The court
stated: “Having reviewed the overall court record in this matter,
including the Court of Appeal decision affirming the defendant’s
conviction (B144143), this court rules that the petitioner is not
eligible for relief pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 as he
was the actual killer and/or shooter which caused the death of the
underlying victim in the case. The section [former § 1170.95]
specifically provides that no relief shall be extended to any
individual who was the actual killer in a given scenario. [¶] The
record reflects that in 2000, the petitioner was convicted of
premeditated murder with the jury also finding true the various
alleged firearm allegations associated with the charge in the case.
The trial court sentenced the petitioner to a term of 20 years to
life in state prison. The conviction arises as a result of an
incident that occurred in 1998 wherein the petitioner personally
shot and killed a perceived rival gang member. [¶] In his
petition filed pursuant to P.C. 1170.95, the petitioner
Mr. Corrales, claims that he is entitled to relief for resentencing.
However, as reflected by the overall evidence surrounding the
incident the petitioner herein was the actual shooter who was
responsible for the victim’s death. Thus, as the actual killer
Mr. Corrales is not eligible for sentencing relief pursuant to P.C.
1170.95. See P.C. sections 189(a)(1) and 1170.95(a)(3). The
section fails to provide relief under circumstances where an
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individual was the actual killer in a given scenario.” The court
also found section 1170.95 unconstitutional, a claim that
appellate courts have since rejected. (People v. Cruz (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 740, 747.)
As Corrales points out, the resentencing court incorrectly
stated that he was convicted of premeditated murder when
instead he was convicted of premeditated attempted murder.
5. 2022 resentencing petition
Corrales filed a second petition for resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.6 in 2022. The resentencing court held a hearing
at which Corrales was represented by counsel but did not
personally attend. The resentencing court indicated it was
“standing by” its prior order. The court referred to Corrales as
the “actual killer and/or shooter who caused the death of the
underlying victim in the case.” The court also incorrectly referred
to Corrales as having been convicted of premeditated murder
when Corrales was convicted of premeditated attempted murder.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Corrales argues: (1) the resentencing judge
“mistakenly believes appellant was the actual killer convicted of
premeditated murder” and the error shows the judge did not
carefully review the record or was “confused” or “mixed up the
facts of two separate cases, or something else”; (2) the
resentencing court erred in “standing by” its prior opinion and
failing to reconsider the constitutionality of section 1172.6; and
(3) the resentencing court erred in relying on facts in the
appellate opinion considering Corrales’s direct appeal from the
judgment of conviction. With respect to prejudice Corrales
argues: “The error in considering the facts from the prior opinion
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is not harmless. As the State relied on the facts in the opinion
and the trial court did as well, the harm to appellant is clear.”
Respondent argues, among other things, that the
resentencing court properly denied the petition because, as a
matter of law, Corrales is ineligible for relief. Corrales offers no
retort having not filed a reply brief, and we agree with
respondent.
A. In 2019, the Legislature Changed the Law With
Respect to Murder and Allowed Eligible Persons To
Petition for Resentencing
“Senate Bill 1437 ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § l, subd. (f).)” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,
842 (Gentile).)
“To further that purpose, Senate Bill 1437 added three
separate provisions to the Penal Code. First, to amend the
felony-murder rule, Senate Bill 1437 added section 189,
subdivision (e): ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a death occurs is
liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶]
(1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not
the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
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described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’ ” (Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 842.)
“Second, to amend the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, Senate Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3)
(section 188(a)(3)): ‘Except [for felony-murder liability] as stated
in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.’ ” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
pp. 842–843.)
“Third, Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95 to provide a
procedure for those convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief
under the two ameliorative provisions above.” (Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) The Legislature subsequently amended
section 1170.95 to include attempted murder and manslaughter
and then renumbered it as section 1172.6. (People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3.)
“Under newly enacted section 1172.6, the process begins
with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
requirements for eligibility are met [citation], including that
‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to [Penal Code]
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective
date of Senate Bill 1437 [citation].” (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)
“When the trial court receives a petition containing the
necessary declaration and other required information, the court
must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition
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and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is
ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.
[Citations.] If, instead, the defendant has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to
show cause.’ [Citation.]” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
B. Corrales Is Not Eligible for Resentencing Relief
Here the record in the case establishes conclusively that
Corrales is ineligible for relief. The jury was not instructed on
felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or any other theory of imputed malice. The amendments to
sections 188 and 189 do not apply to Corrales. Therefore, as a
matter of law, Corrales cannot show that he “ ‘could not presently
be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
to [Penal Code] Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3)).” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
Even if we assume the resentencing court committed all the
errors Corrales identifies, there is no basis to reverse the court’s
order. None of the errors Corrales identifies prejudiced him.
(See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973 [applying People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 standard of prejudice to
denial of counsel to represent petitioner in section 1170.95
proceeding].) Corrales’s terse statement that the “harm to
appellant is clear” does not demonstrate that it is reasonably
probable absent any error he would have obtained a more
favorable result. Corrales could not have obtained a more
favorable result on his section 1172.6 petition because the jury
was not instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice. As
a matter of law, Corrales is thus ineligible for resentencing under
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section 1172.6, and cannot show prejudice from purported error
by the trial court. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a) [“A person convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with
the court” to have the conviction vacated].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying George Corrales’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J.
WEINGART, J.
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