People v. Jackson CA2/8

Filed 6/8/23 P. v. Jackson CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B322629
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA265743-01
v.
JASMINE JACKSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles Count, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
J. Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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We review this appeal pursuant to People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). We affirm the trial court.
In 2007, appellant Jasmine Jackson was convicted of first
degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision
(a)1 and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in violation of
section 12034, subdivision (c). The jury found true gun
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d)
and (e)(1).
The trial court sentenced appellant to 50 years to life in
state prison for the murder and firearm enhancement and
imposed and stayed a mid-term sentence on the second count.
This court affirmed appellant’s conviction. (People v. Jackson
(July 8, 2008, B197767) [nonpub. opn.].)
On January 19, 2022, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 (formerly section
1170.95). (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, §10.) She was represented by
counsel during the proceedings. Appellant contended she could
not now be convicted of murder under changes made by Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). On May 20, 2022, the
People opposed the petition, pointing out that the jury was not
instructed on any theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime. The
People attached the jury instructions to their opposition papers.
As a second issue, because appellant was under the age of
26 at the time of her conviction, she was eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing. Based on this fact, her counsel also filed
a motion for a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th
261 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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The trial court granted the motion for a youthful offender
hearing under People v. Franklin, and appointed counsel to
represent her at the hearing. The trial court then denied the
resentencing petition because the jury was not instructed on any
theory that would have allowed it to impute malice to appellant
based on her participation in the crime. The trial court noted the
jury found true that appellant personally fired the fatal shots and
the only theory of liability argued by the People at trial was
malice aforethought.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. On
March 29, 2023, counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo. The brief raised no issues. Counsel also stated they
had told appellant she may file a supplemental brief within
30 days and had sent her the transcripts of the case as well as a
copy of the Delgadillo brief.
On March 30, 2023, we sent appellant a notice that a brief
raising no issues had been filed on her behalf. This court advised
appellant she had 30 days within which to submit a
supplemental brief or letter stating any ground for an appeal she
wishes this court to consider. Appellant was advised that if no
supplemental brief was timely filed, her appeal may be dismissed
as abandoned. On April 17, 2023, appellant filed a supplemental
brief which we discuss below.
Appellant first asks us to “reconsider and review my case.”
We decline to engage in independent review of the record.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231–232.)
Next appellant states she was 17 years old at the time of
the offense, “never had a fitness hearing” and was tried as an
adult. This issue is moot as the trial court granted her request
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for a Franklin hearing. To the extent it is not moot, we note the
mere filing of a section 1172.6 petition does not afford a petitioner
a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error. (People v. Farfan
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
Finally, appellant contends gun enhancement laws have
“changed,” rendering her sentence illegal. This issue is not a
proper subject of a petition filed under section 1172.6 and for that
reason, we do not consider it. (People v. Farfan, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J
VIRAMONTES, J.
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