People v. Wallace CA1/4

Filed 5/31/23 P. v. Wallace CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A166462
v.
CLINTON D. WALLACE, (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. VCR238974)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted Clinton D. Wallace of three counts of being a
felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code1, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and
one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1)). Wallace claims on appeal that insufficient evidence
supports these convictions. He also argues that his statement
regarding his place of employment was obtained in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), and should not
have been used against him at trial. Finding no reversible error, we
will affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Bureau of Gambling Control for the California Department of
Justice (DOJ) received information regarding an illegal gambling
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise indicated.
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operation at 2408 Sacramento Street in Vallejo, California. Sources
referred to the gambling establishment as “the Buy Zone.” On
December 15, 2021, at about 9:00 a.m., DOJ agents executed a search
warrant at the property. Inside the main building on the property,
agents found evidence of gambling operations, as well as three females,
including Erika Montero, the alleged manager of the operation, and
Denise Helmeci.
There was also an outbuilding on the property that was about 50
feet long and 20 feet wide. Agents knocked on the front of the
outbuilding and announced they were executing a search warrant.
About 45 seconds later, Wallace “stumbled out of a back bedroom area”
of the outbuilding. Another person, Elijah Abeyta, came out as well.
Upon entry, agents found no other people.
The outbuilding appeared to be converted into a living dwelling,
with a small living room area, an area that appeared designed as a
bedroom, a bathroom, and a kitchenette. The place was messy, and
there were bags of clothes and other items strewn throughout the
building. There was old food in the kitchenette. In the rear of the
bedroom, there were many bags, primarily containing baby and
women’s clothes.
On or near a television stand in the front living room area of the
outbuilding, agents found the following: (1) a loaded shotgun; (2) an
unloaded shotgun; and (3) a lower-receiver for an AR-15 style rifle. The
loaded shotgun was behind a rug that had been nailed to the wall next
to the television stand. The unloaded shotgun was in the bottom,
slightly ajar drawer of the television stand. The lower receiver was in a
bag on the top shelf of the television stand. This bag also contained
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drill bits and screws that could be used to make a rifle, two upper
receivers for an AR-15 style rifle, an empty rifle magazine, and 20 live
ammunition rounds. Agents found a tactical box in the television stand
with drill bits; a jig, which an agent testified could be used to “mill out
or drill into the lower receiver of AR-15 style rifles”; various subparts of
an AR-15; four boxes of ammunition; and loose ammunition. A plastic
bag on the television stand contained six 12-gauge shotgun rounds and
a single rifle round. In addition, the rear stock of a rifle was behind the
television stand and there were four rifle rounds on a shelf by the front
door.
On the same shelf by the front door with the four rifle rounds, the
agents found paperwork belonging to Wallace. Agents found
“additional paperwork with [ ] Wallace’s name listed on it from a grey
luggage bag located in that same front living room.” Some men’s
clothing was in the luggage bag. In the bedroom, by “where [one’s]
head would lie for the bed,” agents found envelopes addressed to
Wallace with an address of Hopkins Drive in Fairfield. In the same
location, agents found an envelope addressed to Darnell Tailor. Also in
the outbuilding, agents found medication for Helmeci and paperwork in
Montero’s name.
Wallace’s mother testified that she lived on Hopkins Drive in
Fairfield in December 2021, and that Wallace used her address for his
mail. He had stayed at her house “off and on maybe a couple days here
or there” in the year and a half before the December 2022 trial.
However, in December 2021, Wallace told her that he was “living in
Vallejo, um, in a shack on Sacramento Street.” He also lived with his
stepdaughter in Vacaville for a few weeks in December 2021. Wallace
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told a probation officer that he lived with his mother in Fairfield, and
he told both his mother and the probation officer that he worked as a
security guard at the Buy Zone.
An amended information charged Wallace with three counts of
being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, sub. (a)(1)) and one
count of being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subdivision
(a)(1)). A jury found Wallace guilty on all counts. The trial court
sentenced him to four years in prison, and Wallace filed a timely
appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Substantial Evidence Claim
We first address Wallace’s claim that there was insufficient
evidence that he had actual or constructive possession of the firearms
or ammunition at issue. As set forth below, we agree with the Attorney
General that substantial evidence supports a conclusion that Wallace
constructively possessed these items.2
In analyzing this claim, “ ‘ “ ‘we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and
of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]
In conducting such a review, we “ ‘presume[ ] in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.] “Conflicts and even
testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the
2The Attorney General does not contend that there was
substantial evidence of actual possession.
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reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge
or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity
of the facts upon which a determination depends.” ’ ” (People v. Harris
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 849.)
This standard of review also applies “ ‘in cases in which the
prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]
“ ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that
circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of
which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury,
not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘If the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court
that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” ’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 849–850.)
“The firearm- and ammunition-possession offenses prohibit a
felon from ‘possess[ing]’ or having ‘under custody or control’ the given
item (§§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1)), and they are general-
intent crimes that require knowing possession of the prohibited item.
[Citations.] Possession may be actual or constructive. ‘ “A defendant
has actual possession when the weapon is in his [or her] immediate
possession or control,” ’ i.e., when he or she is actually holding or
touching it. [Citations.] ‘To establish constructive possession, the
prosecution must prove a defendant knowingly exercised a right to
control the prohibited item, either directly or through another person.’
[Citations.] Although a defendant may share possession with other
people, ‘mere proximity’ or opportunity to access the contraband,
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‘standing alone, is not sufficient evidence of possession.’ ” (People v.
Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 131–132.)
“Conviction is not precluded . . . if the defendant’s right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where the contraband was
located is shared with another.” (People v. Valerio (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d
912, 921; People v. Rushing (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 622.) Nor is
there a requirement that the defendant be the legal owner of the
location where the contraband is located. (See People v. Williams
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 603, 625 [drugs and weapons found in
room defendant used in his aunt’s house].)
Here, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that Wallace constructively possessed the firearms
and ammunition. Wallace contends that the evidence was insufficient
because it established mere proximity and not that he owned or
controlled the outbuilding, but the evidence was not so limited. When
the police arrived at the outbuilding at around 9:00 a.m., Wallace
emerged from the bedroom area. Mail addressed to Wallace was found
in the crack between the mattress in the bedroom and the wall. In the
front room with the firearms and ammunition, agents found
ammunition on a shelf along with Wallace’s paperwork. A suitcase
containing male clothing and more of Wallace’s paperwork sat in the
same room. The buildings at issue were located at 2408 Sacramento
Street in Vallejo, and Wallace’s mother testified that Wallace told her
that he was living in a shack on Sacramento Street in Vallejo in
December 2021. His mother also testified that Wallace worked at the
Buy Zone, and the evidence established that the Buy Zone was on the
same property as the outbuilding. This evidence thus supported a
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conclusion that Wallace was residing in the outbuilding and
constructively possessed the firearms and ammunition as charged.
The Alleged Miranda Violation
Wallace’s second claim is that the court erroneously admitted his
statement to a probation officer that he was working at the Buy Zone in
violation of his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pages 478–
479, which requires that certain admonitions be given before a
suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation can be
admitted in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The Attorney General
counters that Wallace’s statement fell within Miranda’s booking
exception, and, in any event, the error was harmless. We agree with
the Attorney General’s latter point, so we do not decide whether the
booking exception applies.
Any error in admitting the probation officer’s testimony as to
Wallace’s statement about the Buy Zone was not prejudicial.
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Elizalde
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542.) Wallace argues that his statement was
prejudicial because it was key to establishing that he possessed the
prohibited items for his work, his statement was akin to a confession,
and the prosecution highlighted his statement in closing argument.
But Wallace made the exact same statement to his mother. Wallace’s
mother testified that Wallace was working as a security guard, and she
could not remember the name of the establishment, but it was “a
gambling place.” She then remembered and said, “It was the Buy
Zone.” The defense did not attack Wallace’s mother’s credibility. In
closing, the prosecutor argued that Wallace told his mother he was
living in a shack on Sacramento Street, and the prosecutor immediately
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thereafter stated that Wallace had said he was working at the Buy
Zone as a security guard. There was no attribution of Wallace’s
statement as one given solely to the probation officer, and the
testimony of both Wallace’s mother and the probation officer relayed
the exact same information. Moreover, regardless of any testimony as
to where he worked, Wallace and his indicia were at the search location
when and where the prohibited items were found. Accordingly, any
admission of the probation officer’s duplicative testimony as to
Wallace’s place of employment was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
FINEMAN, J.3
People v. Wallace (A164662)
Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,
3
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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