Uriarte v. Matrai CA1/4

Filed 6/1/23 Uriarte v. Matrai CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MICHELE URIARTE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166135, A166232
v.
GYORGY MATRAI, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 1902312)
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
We address here the latest two appeals to reach us filed by
Gyorgy Matrai, who is representing himself in a marital dissolution
action with his former spouse, Michele Uriarte.2 Uriarte did not file a
respondent’s brief or any other documents in either appeal, so we
decide them based on Matrai’s opening briefs and the incomplete record
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to the
1
California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. In an
order dated May 2, 2023, we consolidated these appeals for argument
and decision. Matrai’s opening briefs are largely identical, including
with respect to virtually all of the statutes and court rules he cites.
Matrai has filed multiple appeals challenging various orders
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issued in the same underlying action. One appeal remains pending,
while the rest have been resolved against him by opinion or summary
dismissal.
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he supplied. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).) Because we
conclude that all aspects of the two trial court orders Matrai challenges
are not appealable, we will dismiss the appeals.
The first order, entered on September 2, 2022, “dropped from
calendar” six of Matrai’s motions and requests for orders because he
failed to appear at the August 29, 2022 hearing on those requests. In
the same order, the court directed Matrai to pay $4,999.99 in sanctions
to Uriarte for his failure to respond to her discovery requests, and
directed Uriarte to create a compendium cataloguing the various
discovery requests to which Matrai had not responded.
The second order, entered September 15, 2022, removed from
calendar another five of Matrai’s requests for orders relating to
custody, visitation, and other issues, again based on his failure to
appear at the hearing on those requests (scheduled for September 15,
2022); the order also continued a hearing on an order to show cause
why additional sanctions should not be imposed on him.
DISCUSSION
It is somewhat difficult to tell whether Matrai has included in the
record any of the requests for orders that the court “dropped from
calendar” based on his failure to appear at the two hearings. But
whether or not rulings on those requests would be appealable, the trial
court did not rule on them, and there is no indication that Matrai asked
the court to re-calendar them. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(d)
[“If a party fails to appear at a law and motion hearing without having
given notice [that the party will not appear], the court may take the
matter off calendar, to be reset only upon motion, or may rule on the
matter”].) “ ‘[A]n order is not appealable unless declared to be so by the
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Constitution or by statute.’ ” (In re Brekke (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 196,
199.) Interim orders not disposing of all causes of action in a case
generally are not appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1);3
Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 384.)
Matrai has not provided any authority to establish the appealability of
the orders insofar as they took his requests for orders off calendar
based on his non-appearance.
Matrai also challenges the September 2 Order insofar as it
imposed $4,999.99 in sanctions pursuant to sections 2023.010 and
2023.030 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, based on Matrai’s
failure to respond to discovery. Section 904.1, subdivisions (a)(11)
and (a)(12), permit appeals from orders or interlocutory judgments
“directing payment of monetary sanctions by a party . . . if the amount
exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).” (Italics added.) The sanctions
order here does not meet the statutory threshold for appealability.
Matrai appears to challenge the portion of the September 2 Order
requiring Uriarte to compile a compendium of her discovery requests,
although his complaint is that she does not need the discovery because
she already has the information she seeks. “Generally, discovery
orders are not appealable. [Citation.] Instead, the challenge to a
discovery order must await appeal from a final judgment.” (Aixtron,
Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 387; see Doe
v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432–
1433 [considering appealable aspect of order imposing monetary
sanction in excess of $5,000, but declining to consider other
3 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
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nonappealable discovery-related aspects of order]; Freidberg v.
Freidberg (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 754, 764 [discovery orders generally are
not directly appealable].) Therefore, Matrai has not established that
any aspect of the September 2 Order he challenges is appealable.
Finally, Matrai appears to challenge the order to show cause why
further sanctions should not be imposed on him, but the September 15
Order merely continued the date of the hearing on it. Section 904.1,
subdivision (a) does not make an order that continues a hearing date
appealable. In general, procedural orders setting case dates are not
appealable. (Governale v. Bethlehem Pacific Coast Steel Corp. (1965)
235 Cal.App.2d 837, 843.) Therefore, Matrai has not identified
anything appealable in the September 15 Order either.
Because nothing Matrai raises is appealable, we dismiss the
appeals. (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275,
277.) While we recognize that Matrai is proceeding without counsel, we
caution that the filing of frivolous appeals, whether because they are
from non-appealable orders or because they are not supported by
citations to a proper record and appropriate authority, can result in the
imposition of sanctions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1).)
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DISPOSITION
The appeals are dismissed. Uriarte is entitled to recover her
costs on appeal, if any.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
FINEMAN, J. *
*Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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