In re Huff CA4/3

Filed 8/9/23 In re Huff CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re MICHELLE HUFF, G061433
on Habeas Corpus. (Super. Ct. No. 12HF3120)
OPINION
Original proceedings; petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petition granted in
part and denied in part.
Kravis, Graham & Zuker and Bruce Zucker, for Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney
General, Amanda J. Murray and Gregory J. Marcot, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Michelle Huff seeks a writ of habeas corpus based on her
challenge to a special condition of her parole that stated the following: “You shall inform
all persons with whom you have a significant relationship; e.g., dating and/or
roommate(s), about your criminal history, and you will inform your parole agent about
the relationship.” We grant the petition in part because the special condition, as applied
to justify a parole violation, failed Huff’s right to due process. The petition insofar as it
seeks to strike the special condition at issue in its entirety is denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Context of Huff’s Challenged Parole Condition
In 2016, Huff was convicted on three counts of committing lewd acts
against a minor under the age of 14 years old and one count of inducing that child to
commit a lewd act in 2012. Huff, then 45 years old, caused the then 11-year-old victim
to ingest drugs and drew the victim into sexual activity that Huff engaged in with her
boyfriend, while consuming drugs at Huff’s home.
Huff was released on parole as a sex offender in 2018. General and special
conditions for her parole were imposed and that same year Huff submitted a grievance
(not the one at issue here) for several of the special conditions, including one that used
the term “‘significant relationship.’” Huff asserted it was overbroad.
As part of the administrative response by the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), a district parole administrator interviewed Huff
for an hour and a half to learn more about her grievance. Ten days later, the
administrator wrote to Huff (2018 memorandum), concluding two of the challenged
conditions should be modified, but not the significant relationship condition. On that
point, the administrator explained: “Significant relationship in this context is referring to
having contact with individuals who have significant knowledge of you.”
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The record presented shows Huff filed more grievances and pursued
remedies for different aspects of her parole that provide peripheral context. For example,
it shows that in 2020, Huff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that resulted in the
vacatur of a special parole condition restricting how close she could get to places where
children congregated, but not for any prior version of the “‘significant relationship’”
condition at issue here. We limit our discussion to events relevant to her current petition
in this court.
B. Special Condition 13 and the Underlying Parole Violation Incident
In February 2021, Huff’s parole conditions were reorganized in a document
entitled “Notice and Conditions of Parole” (2021 notice), which contained the following
Special Condition of Parole No. 13 (the condition) imposed on her: “You shall inform all
persons with whom you have a significant relationship; e.g., dating and/or roommate(s),
about your criminal history, and you will inform your parole agent about the
relationship.” The reason for the condition is stated as follows: “Based on factors and
circumstances directly related to the offender’s commitment offense(s), the imposition of
this condition will assist in the goal of preventing the offender from committing
subsequent criminal offenses under federal, state, or local laws.”
According to the undisputed record presented, “before agreeing to abide by
the terms of her parole [through her signature two days later], Huff was provided with a
copy of her general and special conditions of parole, was given an opportunity to read all
of the parole conditions, and was afforded an opportunity to ask her parole agent[, Maria
Serrano,] any questions about those conditions.”
Two months after signing the notice, Huff had dinner with a friend, R.F., in
April 2021, which led to agent Serrano initiating a parole violation report against Huff,
based on the condition. Specifically, in a document entitled “Parole Violation Decision
Making Instrument” (PVDMI) Serrano asserted Huff violated the condition by (1) “not
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informing [Serrano] of [Huff’s] significant relationship and [(2)] by not providing a letter
from [R.F.], stating he is aware of her criminal history, as noted in” the condition. A
supervisor approved the recording of a parole violation and determined the appropriate
CDCR response would be to allow Huff to continue on parole.
C. Huff’s Pursuit of Administrative Remedies
Huff was notified of the PVDMI on May 4, 2021. Three weeks later, she
submitted two CDCR grievance forms, signed May 24, 2021. The first form contained
what we will refer to as “Claim 1” (because, for convenience, we adopt how the CDCR
and Huff refer to it), asserting the following: “Special Condition 013 re: ‘significant’
relationship is unclear on its face; See attached.”
The second form, which we will refer to as “Claim 2,” specifically focused
on the PVDMI. Huff asserted: “Parole Agent Serrano violated me because I was having
dinner with a childhood friend. He is not my ‘roommate, [sic]’ nor do I consider to be in
a ‘dating relationship’ with him as suggested by Special Condition 013. This condition is
void on its face and as applied to me, in violation of the federal and state constitutional
due process clauses because it is vague. This condition is regularly used by DAPO.” The
acronym refers to the Division of Adult Parole Operations, which is a division of the
CDCR. (Gov. Code, § 12838.1, subdivision (c).) We do not distinguish between them in
our discussion because the distinction is immaterial to this petition.
Just under two months after Huff submitted her grievances, the CDCR
responded in a July 22, 2021 document entitled “Claimant Grievance Claims Decision
Response” (grievance decision). Claim 1 was deemed “rejected” as untimely, because
Huff signed her 2021 notice in February and did not submit her grievance form within 30
days.
For Claim 2, the CDCR’s grievance decision denied it as “[d]isapproved,”
reasoning as follows: “You[, i.e., Huff,] were found to have contact with a childhood
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friend, [R.F.], who[] you have known since you were 9 years old. You also advised your
agent that you have lunch or dinner periodically with [R.F.]. [He] is a significant person
in your life as described in Department Operations Manual (DOM) section 81020.7.1.”
For both claims, the CDCR advised Huff she could file an appeal with the
CDCR’s “Office of Appeals,” which she did. Specifically, according to her petition in
this court, “[o]n or about August 15, 2021,” she filed an administrative appeal for both
claims. Relevant here, for Claim 2, Huff asserted: “[the conclusion reached by the
CDCR] is wrong. For all of the reasons raised in my [grievance form], CDCR must
withdraw the [PVDMI] violation and remove Special Condition 13. Further, on behalf of
all parolees in California who have Special Condition 13 imposed upon them, I appeal.”
According to the record presented, the CDCR’s office of appeal received
Huff’s administrative appeal on August 23, 2021, but did not issue a substantive
response. Instead, in an October 23, 2021 document entitled “Claimant Appeal Claims
Decision Response”, the office wrote “Time Expired” and cited a 60-day regulatory
deadline. In an undisputed exhibit Huff presents, an associate director of the CDCR
wrote that “[a]s a result” of the deadline lapse, the “appeal is now closed. No further
action will be taken by the [CDCR] and no appeal of this action is permitted under the
regulations.”
D. Writ of Habeas Corpus
Huff then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court,
challenging the condition. The court concluded the condition is not unconstitutional and
denied the petition. Huff then filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus in this
court based on our original jurisdiction. (In re David (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 675,
680– 681.) We issued an order to show cause, ordering a return and traverse to be filed.
Huff asserts “the [c]ondition is facially overbroad and vague, and must be stricken.”
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DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine
As a threshold issue, the Attorney General, on behalf of the secretary of the
CDCR, argues the petition should be dismissed for this court’s lack of jurisdiction
because Huff failed to exhaust the CDCR administrative remedies that were available to
her. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude Huff exhausted her administrative
remedies for her vagueness challenge but not her overbroadness challenge.
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine “(1) . . . serves the
salutary function of mitigating damages; (2) . . . recognizes the quasi-judicial tribunal’s
expertise; and (3) . . . promotes judicial economy by unearthing the relevant evidence and
by providing a record should there be a review of the case.” (Campbell v. Regents of
University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 322; see Penal Code § 5058 [authorizing
CDCR secretary to “prescribe and amend rules and regulations . . . for the administration
of the parole of persons sentenced” like Huff]; see In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238,
254 [discussing habeas corpus relief for parolees and doctrine of separation of powers].)
At the time of Huff’s 2021 grievance and administrative appeal, relevant
CDCR regulations provided as follows: “Completion of the review process by the Office
of Appeals constitutes exhaustion of all administrative remedies available to a claimant
within the [CDCR].” (Former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3486, subd. (m).) The section
specifies that a claim is not exhausted, however, “if it was disallowed pursuant to . . .
subsection 3487(a),” (former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3486, subd. (m)), which at that
time required a grievance to be submitted “within 30 calendar days of discovering an
adverse policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the [CDCR].” (Former Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3487(a), incorporating deadline of former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,
§ 3482, subd. (b).)
Based on the regulations as they existed at the relevant time, Huff satisfied
all regulatory conditions needed to deem her administrative remedies exhausted on
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Claim 2, i.e., challenging Serrano’s May 4, 2021 PVDMI parole violation finding. The
record is undisputed Huff filed a timely grievance form for Claim 2 followed by a timely
administrative appeal of the CDCR’s grievance decision.
Contrary to the Attorney General’s position, it is ultimately immaterial to
Huff’s petition that she did not exhaust her available administrative remedies for Claim 1
— i.e., a facial challenge to the condition independent of any violation allegation. True,
Huff filed her May 2021 grievance more than 30 days after she signed the February 2021
notice containing the condition (former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3482, subd. (b)) and
that failure to meet the then applicable regulation amounted to a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies (former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3486, subd. (m) [“A claim is
not exhausted if it was disallowed pursuant to . . . 3487(a)”]; 3487, subd. (a)(1) [claim
can be rejected if “claimant did not submit the claim within the timeframe required by
subsection 3482(b)”]). But we conclude the points are ultimately immaterial in this
particular case because the analytical issues presented by Claim 2 cover the same
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fundamental question as Claim 1: is the condition unconstitutionally vague? We reject
the Attorney General’s position that a failure to facially challenge a parole condition
based on its initial notice categorically bars all future challenges to parole violation
findings based on that condition.
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Huff presents her vagueness argument as two independent prongs, by
contending the condition was void both “on its face and as applied” for Serrano’s May 4,
2021 PVDMI parole violation finding. (Capitalizations omitted, italics added.) For the
reasons discussed below, the distinction is immaterial for this petition because we would
not grant relief based on a conclusion the condition is categorically (i.e., “on its face”)
vague. (See Bucklew v. Precythe (2019) 587 U.S. ____ [139 S.Ct. 1112, 1127] [“A facial
challenge is really just a claim that the law or policy at issue is unconstitutional in all its
applications. So classifying a lawsuit as facial or as-applied affects the extent to which
the invalidity of the challenged law must be demonstrated and the corresponding ‘breadth
of the remedy,’ but it does not speak at all to the substantive rule of law necessary to
establish a constitutional violation”].)
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Notwithstanding our conclusion that the difference between Claim 1 and
Claim 2 is analytically immaterial in this particular case, we decline to entertain an aspect
of Huff’s vagueness argument she presents us but did not present to the CDCR: her
assertion that the challenged condition’s use of the term “‘criminal history’” adds to its
unconstitutional vagueness. Given the framework of our merits analysis for the
vagueness question (discussed further below), we decline to address the assertion because
Huff did not first raise it to the CDCR.
Additionally, we do not address another contention Huff presents us but did
not present to the CDCR: that the condition is not only unconstitutionally vague but also
unconstitutionally overbroad. “The concept of unconstitutional vagueness is related to
the concept of unconstitutional overbreadth, but ‘there are important differences.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 630.) Like the “criminal
history” challenge, there is no mention of overbroadness in any of Huff’s relevant
documents to the CDCR.
In other words, given the particular circumstances of this petition and our
aim to promote the policies behind the doctrine of exhausting administrative remedies,
we conclude the vagueness challenge that was presented to the CDCR through Claim 2
satisfied the doctrine and is therefore properly presented for this court’s adjudication. We
also conclude, however, that particular arguments that were not presented to the CDCR
with the claim are not properly before this court.
B. Huff’s Exhausted Vagueness Challenge
We review a constitutional vagueness challenge de novo. (In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887–888 (Sheena K.).) “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness
challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair
warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement
and providing adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are
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‘embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 890, citing the U.S. Const., 5th and 14th Amends.;
Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.)
Rooted in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Connally v.
General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 (Connally), in its most traditional
application, “[t]he vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘“a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] A vague law ‘not only fails to provide adequate notice to those who must
observe its strictures, but also “impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In
deciding the adequacy of any notice afforded those bound by a legal restriction, we are
guided by the principles that ‘abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific
context,’ and that, although not admitting of ‘mathematical certainty,’ the language used
must have ‘“reasonable specificity.”’ [Citation.]” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 890.)
In Sheena K., the California Supreme Court reviewed a probation condition
imposed on a juvenile requiring her to “‘not associate with anyone disapproved of by
probation.’” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 878; see People v. Austin (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 778, 787 [no distinction between analysis of probation and parole
conditions].) Relevant here, the high court concluded that “as imposed by the juvenile
court, the probation condition [wa]s unconstitutionally vague, but as modified by the
Court of Appeal, the condition satisfie[d] federal constitutional requirements.” (Sheena
K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 879.)
The curative change implemented by the Court of Appeal was that it added
to the original condition, a clarification that the object of the condition, i.e., “‘anyone
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disapproved of by probation,’” had to be known by the juvenile to be disapproved of
before any alleged violative association occurred. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 878.) The change was key because, with it, the juvenile would be “advised in advance
whom she must avoid.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890; see id. at p. 891 [“We
agree with the Court of Appeal that in the absence of an express requirement of
knowledge, the probation condition imposed upon defendant is unconstitutionally
vague”].) This touched on the first of two grounds that can invalidate a parole condition
as unconstitutionally vague: when the condition (1) “fails to give ordinary people fair
notice of the conduct it punishes, or [(2) is] so standardless that it invites arbitrary
enforcement.” (Johnson v. United States (2015) 576 U.S. 591, 595, citing Kolender v.
Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357–358.)
In this matter, the condition’s wording — “You shall inform all persons
with whom you have a significant relationship; e.g., dating and/or roommate(s), about
your criminal history, and you will inform your parole agent about the relationship” —
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outside of “dating” and “roommate” relationships, are consistent with a conclusion that
the condition is unconstitutionally vague because of the open-ended nature of significant
relationship. Outside of dates and roommates, the condition leaves reasonable persons to
necessarily guess as to who qualifies as a person Huff had a significant relationship with
and allows different reasonable views on whether the condition applies without providing
a sufficiently objective rubric to resolve a dispute. (Connally, supra, 269 U.S. at p. 391.)
But the above does not end our analysis of the question. Next, we look to
imputable context to provide clarification. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890
[“‘abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific context’”], citing People ex rel.
2
The undisputed record shows Serrano’s May 4, 2021 PVDMI parole
violation did not rest on a finding that R.F. was either Huff’s roommate or partner in a
dating relationship, the only two examples specified by the condition. Had such a finding
been made, our analysis would be limited to reviewing whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the CDCR’s finding of one of those relationships.
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Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1116–1117 [“A contextual application of
otherwise unqualified legal language may supply the clue to a law’s meaning, giving
facially standardless language a constitutionally sufficient concreteness”].) The Attorney
General claims such context for this matter through an internal manual definition.
As quoted earlier, the CDCR, in its July 2021 grievance decision cited the
claimed manual at the end of its explanation to Huff, as follows: “You were found to
have contact with a childhood friend, [R.F.], who[] you have known since you were 9
years old. You also advised your agent that you have lunch or dinner periodically with
[R.F.] [He] is a significant person in your life as described in Department Operations
Manual (DOM) section 81020.7.1.” The manual, according to the Attorney General,
contains the following definition of “‘significant other”’: “‘a person who has significant
knowledge of the parolee. This includes, but is not limited to, an individual who makes
up a parolee’s support group, family, friends, neighbors, associates, church members,
colleagues, members of social groups, etc. Individuals who play a consistent part in the
parolee’s life before, during and after parole.’”
The Attorney General contends the manual’s definition of significant other
sufficiently addresses any ambiguity that exists within the condition. We note first that
the need for what amounts to a three-sentence paragraph in the manual to clarify the
condition suggests the latter standing alone is vague. Separately, even assuming without
deciding that the quoted portion could provide legally sufficient context to clarify the
condition, it cannot serve as a valid basis for the PVDMI at issue here because it was
confirmed at oral argument in this court that neither the manual nor its proffered
clarification was ever delivered to Huff.
For different reasons, we also conclude a separate factual point of context
in the record fails to clarify the ambiguity of significant relationship in the condition.
The record shows that during her 2018 grievance that led to the CDCR’s 2018
memorandum, Huff was given the following response by the authoring district
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administrator, quoted earlier: “Significant relationship in this context is referring to
having contact with individuals who have significant knowledge of you.”
The response did not clarify from whose perspective significant should be
determined. So, again, outside of dating and roommate relationships, it remained
substantially open to subjective viewpoint what type of relationship would qualify as
significant. (See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) p. 1662, col. 2 [Defining
“significant” as: “1. Embodying or bearing some meaning; having or expressing a sense.
2. Standing as a subtle sign of something; expressive of some hidden or obscure meaning.
3. Of special importance; momentous, as distinguished from insignificant”].)
In sum, we arrive on the same side of the unconstitutional vagueness
question Sheena K. analyzed. The problem there was not that the juvenile could be
barred from associating with certain individuals; the problem was that it was
unreasonably vague as to how the juvenile could know who the prohibited individuals
were. Analogously, according to the record presented, the condition at issue here
required Huff to guess in advance who would be covered by the condition based on the
CDCR’s uncommunicated interpretation of a significant relationship, including who had
significant knowledge of her. As a result, this additionally reinforced the other
independent ground for deeming a legal mandate unconstitutionally vague: it risked a
baseline “so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” (Johnson v. United
States, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 595).
We point out the examples included in the condition, “dating and/or
roommate(s),” save it from amounting to a categorical violation of the vagueness
doctrine. That is, if the sole question before us was to determine if the condition was
unconstitutionally vague in all of its applications, we would answer in the negative. But
given that neither of the examples were what the CDCR relied on to find Huff had
violated the condition in May 2021, we conclude the condition was applied in a manner
that violated the vagueness doctrine because it failed the common intelligence test
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underlying cases in line with Sheena K. Huff and her parole agent could reasonably
disagree on whether her relationship with R.F. qualified as a significant relationship, and
whether he had significant knowledge of Huff, without a reasonably objective basis to
resolve differing views. The condition’s inclusion of two examples of other types of
significant relationship[s] did not save its application in this instance.
DISPOSITION
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted in part. The petition
insofar as it seeks to strike the special condition at issue in its entirety is denied. The
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is ordered to vacate its May 4,
2021 parole violation finding in this matter.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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