Asoau v. Tu'ufuli CA1/5

Filed 8/16/23 Asoau v. Tu’ufuli CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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poses of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
LEFANOGA ASOAU, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, A163904
v.
MAVERICK TU’UFULI, et al., (San Mateo County
Defendants and Appellants. Super. Ct. No. 21-CIV-00281)
In this litigation over control of the Samoan Congregational
Church of Jesus Christ in Daly City (the Church), the trial court
issued a preliminary injunction removing defendants Maverick
and Audrey Tu’ufuli from Church leadership pending trial. The
Tu’ufulis principally contend the court erred in finding the
Church is a subordinate member of the Congregational Church of
Jesus in Samoa and Abroad (the Mother Church); that it failed to
properly evaluate the balance of harms and the plaintiffs’
likelihood of prevailing on the merits; and that the preliminary
injunction improperly altered the status quo. These contentions,
to the extent not forfeited, are meritless. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
For reasons we will discuss, much of this dispute revolves
around whether the Church is a congregational church, as the
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Tu’ufulis contend, or a hierarchical church, as the trial court
found.
A congregational church is one that is strictly independent
of any higher religious organization. (Concord Christian Center
v. Open Bible Standard Churches (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1396,
1409 (Concord Christian).) In the case of a hierarchical church,
on the other hand, individual local churches are organized under
a higher ecclesiastical body, are subordinate to the larger
religious organization, and are bound by its orders and
judgments. (Ibid.; Singh v. Singh (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1264,
1276 (Singh), quoting Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679, 726-
727.)
When a hierarchical church is involved, courts defer to the
higher church tribunal’s decisions involving ecclesiastical
doctrine, practice, or polity (including the removal of clergy) but
may adjudicate disputes that are amenable to resolution under
neutral principles of law without resolving any underlying
ecclesiastical controversy. (Singh, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1276-1282; Concord Christian, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1411-1413 [deferring to church tribunal in litigation over
revocation of ministerial credentials].)
To the extent the relevant facts are undisputed, we
independently review the trial court’s interpretation of articles of
incorporation, bylaws, or other governing church documents and
its determination to defer to the decisions of the highest
authority within a hierarchical church. (Kim v. The True Church
Members of Holy Hill Community Church (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
1435, 1445; Concord Christian, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1407-1408.) However, we review determinations of disputed facts
for substantial evidence, considering all evidence and reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties
and resolving all conflicts in support of the judgment. (Concord
Christian, supra, at pp. 1407-1409.)
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B.
The evidence, viewed in accord with the above principles, is
as follows. Since its incorporation in 1964, the Church has been
governed by the Mother Church; has conducted itself in accord
with the Mother Church’s guidance, doctrines, constitution, and
bylaws; and has followed its practices, rules, customs and
regulations.
Article XII of the Mother Church’s constitution addresses
the qualifications of local churches. It states: “Each local church
shall have the rights of self Government under Jesus Christ, its
living head, and shall have the power to choose or call its pastor,
or request counsel and supervision of the executive council. It
shall elect its own official board and transact all other business
pertaining to its life as a local church.” Nonetheless, the pastor of
any local church “shall have ministerial credential issued by the
[Mother Church],” to be renewed annually by the Mother Church.
“All ministers holding credentials shall be subject to the
Executive Council in matters of conduct and doctrine.”
Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he local church shall recognize that the general
council and the Executive Council [of the Mother Church] have
the right [to] approve Scriptural doctrine and conduct; and to
disapprove of an un-scriptural doctrine or conduct.’ ”
The Mother Church’s constitution and bylaws contain no
provision allowing for an independent church within the
ecclesiastical organization. According to Reverend Alan Wendt, a
member of the Mother Church’s executive council (the council),
the Mother Church is “by definition a hierarchical church in
which the individual churches are organized as a body with other
churches having similar faith and doctrine, and with a common
ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head which is vested with
ultimate ecclesiastical authority over the individual
congregations and members of the entire organized church. If a
church leaves the Mother Church and becomes independent, it
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cannot continue to use the name of the organization, i.e. ‘Samoan
Congregational Church of Jesus. . . ,’ as it is the duly registered
property of the [Mother Church], and those persons holding titles
conferred by the [Mother Church] General Conference, such as
Pastor, Lay Preacher, or Deacon, are stripped of those titles.”
In August 2019, Maverick1 was ordained as a lay preacher
at the Mother Church’s General Conference in Samoa. Later that
year, following the death of the Church’s pastor, its lay preachers
and a majority of its members asked the Mother Church to send a
delegation to Daly City to oversee the election of a new pastor
and to explain the Mother Church’s laws and guidelines
regarding the election. In the interim, senior lay preacher
Lefanoga Asoau served as an authorized leader of the Church
with the assistance of lay preacher Paulsin Tufono.
Maverick received the most votes at the election and was
consecrated on the following day to undertake communion and
perform certain other sacraments for the local congregation.
However, he was not ordained as pastor. Under the Mother
Church’s constitution, ordination—even of lay preachers—may
only take place at its General Conference in Samoa; indeed,
Maverick had been required to travel to Samoa for his ordination
as a lay preacher. Accordingly, Mother Church elders instructed
him that he could not officially take over Church leadership until
his ordination in Samoa, to take place in August 2020. In the
interim, he and Audrey were directed to make no major changes,
to maintain the Church’s status quo, and to cooperate with the
Church’s other lay preachers.
That did not happen. Maverick began referring to himself
as pastor and making changes to the Church’s operation,
practices, and services, all without consulting the lay preachers
1 Because Maverick and Audrey Tu’ufuli share a common
last name, we refer to them by their given names.
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or congregation. He and Audrey moved into the pastoral
residence against protocol and bylaws, refused demands to move
out, changed the locks and those of a second Church property,
and chose members for the Church board without input from the
Church’s lay preachers or membership.
A majority of the Church’s members, including all three of
its other lay preachers and the former pastor’s widow, conveyed
serious concerns about these developments to the Mother Church.
Around the same time, Maverick wrote the council requesting
that the Mother Church officially confirm his status as pastor.
The council rejected Maverick’s request and reiterated in writing
that he would not be certified as pastor until he was ordained in
Samoa. Until that time, his status would remain “ ‘Lay
Preacher/Designated Minister.’ ” The council also repeated its
instruction to make no major changes before his ordination.
Maverick nonetheless continued to hold himself out as
pastor of the Church. He took control of the Church’s bank
accounts; filed paperwork with the California Secretary of State
claiming to be the Church’s “president”; interfered with
management of Church property, rental collections, and
donations; unilaterally removed existing Church officers; and
appointed new directors and officers without membership input,
votes, or, in some cases, notice.
After attempts to resolve the differences between the two
factions proved fruitless, the council revoked Maverick’s
appointment as lay preacher and returned Church leadership to
senior lay preacher Asoau and the other lay preachers. Lay
preachers Asoau, Tufono, and Malaetele L’aulualo and Church
secretary Foetuese Maluia (jointly, the lay preachers) wrote to
Maverick confirming these actions.
Maverick and his followers did not comply. Purportedly
acting as the Church’s executive board secretary, Violeta Falo
Tiumalu informed the Mother Church that the Church had
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decided to separate from it and, with Maverick at its helm,
continue to operate as the Samoan Congregational Church of
Jesus Christ in Daly City.
In a written response, the council observed that numerous
Church members had informed it they were not present when the
decision was made to leave the Mother Church and were given no
voice in it. The council advised Tiumalu that the Mother
Church’s laws and regulations are binding on its member
churches and did not provide for an “ ‘independent’ ” church.
Furthermore, if the Church became independent it would be
forbidden from using the Mother Church’s name or its hymns,
hymnals, and other intellectual properties, and its lay preachers
and deacons would be stripped of their titles and barred from
participating in Mother Church conferences, meetings,
gatherings, and other forms of international communication.
The lay preachers filed a verified complaint against the
Tu’ufulis, naming the Church as nominal defendant. They then
moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking principally to remove
the Tu’ufulis from any position of authority or control over the
Church and its assets and to restore control to Asoau pending
trial.
The trial court found the evidence established that the
Mother Church is a hierarchical church and, accordingly, applied
the ecclesiastical rule of deference to its decision to remove the
Tu’ufulis from Church leadership. It further found the lay
preachers had established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
and, with the exception of the Tu’ufulis’ continued residence in
Church housing, that the interim harm to them if injunctive
relief were denied outweighed the harm to the Tu’ufulis if it were
granted. Accordingly, the court declined to enjoin the Tu’ufulis
from occupying the Church residence but otherwise granted the
injunction as requested.
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DISCUSSION
A.
The Tu’ufulis contend the trial court erred in deferring to
the Mother Church’s decision to remove them from Church
leadership and control.2 In their view, the Church’s corporate
documents—specifically, its articles of incorporation, bylaws, and
constitution—and, to some extent, those of the Mother Church,
unambiguously and definitively establish that it is an
independent congregational church. They maintain the court
“failed to adequately consider” or outright “disregarded” those
documents, choosing instead “only to give weight to the one-sided
historical recitation provided by plaintiffs’ declarations.”
The argument ignores both the record and a basic rule of
appellate practice. First, the trial court explicitly considered (and
rejected) the Tu’ufulis’ position that language in the Church’s
governing documents proved the Church is strictly independent.
Second, weighed against that language, the court found more
compelling the governing documents from the Mother church as
well as witness declarations about the churches’ relationship,
their history, and the parties’ actions. (See Concord Christian,
supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1409-1411.) The Mother Church’s
constitution and bylaws, notably, describe an international
cooperative fellowship of churches, based in Samoa, that
generally allows local churches to govern themselves but retains
authority over all spiritual teaching and over the ministerial
credentials for all pastors. We may not disturb the trial court’s
finding. “ ‘With rhythmic regularity it is necessary for us to say
that where the findings are attacked for insufficiency of the
evidence, our power begins and ends with a determination as to
whether there is any substantial evidence to support them; that
2 The Tu’ufulis erroneously claim the court deferred to “the
individual plaintiffs,” rather than to the Mother Church. It did
not.
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we have no power to judge of the effect or value of the evidence, to
weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or
to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences
that may be drawn therefrom.’ ” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th
ed. 2008) Appeal, § 365, pp. 423–424, quoting Overton v. Vita–
Food Corp. (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370.)
The Tu’ufulis attempt to reframe this argument in their
reply brief, asserting for the first time in this appeal that the
court erred in considering extrinsic evidence (by which they
apparently mean the Mother Church’s governing documents as
well as plaintiffs’ declarations) to “contradict or vary . . .
unambiguous” terms of the Church’s governing documents. We
do not consider this argument because the Tu’ufulis did not raise
it in their opening brief. (See Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16
Cal.4th 469, 482, fn. 10; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 56.) For the same reason, we also deem forfeited
the claim in their reply brief that the court erred in applying the
ecclesiastic rule of deference “because [the Mother Church] is not
even a party to the action.” Their further assertion that the lay
preachers lack standing is unsupported by legal authority or
analysis, and so is also forfeited. (See In re Tobacco Cases II
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 779, 808 (In re Tobacco Cases).)
B.
We reject the Tu’ufulis’ remaining arguments as well.
In evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction, the
trial court must evaluate two related factors: the likelihood that
the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial, and the likely
interim harm to the plaintiff without the injunction as compared
to the harm to the defendant with it. (Ryland Mews Homeowners
Assn. v. Munoz (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 705, 711 (Ryland Mews).)
On appeal from the grant of an injunction we review the court’s
legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for
substantial evidence, interpreting the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in all reasonable
inferences in support of the trial court’s order. The ultimate
decision rests in the trial court’s discretion and will not be
reversed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason or contravenes
uncontradicted evidence. (Id. at pp. 711-712.)
Although the Tu’ufulis assert the court failed to adequately
evaluate the probability of prevailing at trial and the relative
balance of harms, their opening brief gives short shrift to those
factors. As to the balance of harms, they simply assert that the
court “failed to recognize the extraordinary harm [the Church]
has [suffered] and continues to suffer.” As to the interim harm to
the lay preachers without an injunction, they say nothing. We
are not persuaded. In any case, the Tu’ufulis forfeit the issue by
failing to cite the record or make a cogent legal argument. (See
In re Tobacco Cases, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.)
The Tu’ufulis’ discussion of the likelihood of success at trial
is equally lacking. Again without citing the record or providing
legal argument, they assert that (1) the lay preachers “failed to
submit admissible credible evidence stablishing [sic] the
likelihood of prevailing on their claims” and (2) the court
“appl[ied] the wrong standard.” These points are likewise
forfeited. (In re Tobacco Cases, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.)
They further contend the court erred on this point because their
then-pending demurrer “presented numerous legal arguments
establishing defects in plaintiffs’ claims.” This point is
irrelevant.3 The court expressly considered the issue and
concluded that the Tu’ufulis had not shown the lay preachers
could not amend to state a claim for declaratory relief if the
demurrer were sustained. (See Handyspot Co. of Northern
California v. Buegeleisen (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 191, 194 [court
3 To be clear, the demurrer is not before us and we express
no views on its merits. Nor could we, as the Tu’ufulis have not
even identified the purported defects.
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may grant injunction if it appears complaint can be amended to
state a cause of action].) The Tu’ufulis identify no error as to that
finding.
Next, they claim the trial court improperly “disrupted the
status quo” by “stripping [the Church] of its leadership” and
“instat[ing] the individual plaintiffs as the church leaders.”
Although their argument is not entirely clear on this point, its
significance apparently lies in the general principle that
injunctions compelling a party to perform an affirmative act that
changes the status quo are subject to stricter review on appeal
than injunctions that prohibit someone from carrying out a
particular act. (See Ryland Mews, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p.
712, fn. 4; People ex rel. Herrera v. Stender (2012) 212
Cal.App.4th 614, 630 (Herrera).)
The argument is misplaced. Rather than requiring the
Tu’ufulis to do some affirmative act, the injunction prohibits
them from continuing to occupy Church leadership positions
pending trial. (Cf. Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of
Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1045-1050 [order that board
of supervisors rescind appointment and seat a replacement
supervisor to be appointed by the governor required affirmative
act].) We are also unpersuaded that the injunction was
mandatory simply because the trial court restored the Church
leadership to the lay preachers pending trial. (See id. at p. 1046;
id. at pp. 1044-1045 [prohibitory injunction restores the “ ‘ “last
actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending
controversy” ’ ”].) Given the trial court’s findings that the church
is, and has always been, hierarchical, it makes more sense to
revert temporarily to the leadership of the lay preachers, who
recognize the relationship with the Mother Church and have
proper ministerial credentials, as opposed to Maverick, who
rejected the relationship with the Mother Church and was
stripped of his credentials. In any case, even under a stricter
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standard of review, the Tu’ufulis do not convince us that the
preliminary injunction is unlawful or that the trial court should
instead have enmeshed itself more deeply in the church’s affairs
by leaving Maverick in charge but regulating his behavior.
Finally, we reject their claim that the court should have
addressed the control of Church assets under civil property law,
independently from its analysis of the Church leadership dispute.
As a general matter, courts may resolve church property disputes
under neutral principles of law applicable to all property
disputes. (Concord Christian, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1411.)
Not so, however, where resolution of a property dispute depends
on the resolution of a controversy over religious doctrine,
practice, or polity requiring judicial deference to ecclesiastical
decisions. (Id. at pp. 1411-1412.) Here, as explained ante in
section A of this discussion, the trial court properly deferred to
the Mother Church’s decision to remove Maverick from his
leadership position and, with it, his authority over Church
property. (See Id. at p. 1411 [rule of deference applies to
decisions regarding clergy credentials and church
administration].)
DISPOSITION
The order and preliminary injunction are affirmed.
Plaintiffs are entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(1), (a)(2).)
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______________________
BURNS, J.
We concur:
____________________________
JACKSON, P.J.
____________________________
SIMONS, J.
A163904
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