In re E.C. CA2/2

Filed 8/18/23 In re E.C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re E.C., a Person Coming B315124, B322648
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
21CCJP03306A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed and remanded
with directions.
Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________________
In this juvenile dependency appeal, D.O. (father) challenges
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and removal orders as
to his nine-year-old daughter, E.C. (daughter). Father argues
substantial evidence does not support any of the challenged
orders. We conclude substantial evidence supports both the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional removal
order as to daughter. We also conclude substantial evidence
supports the court’s order made at the six-month review hearing
to maintain daughter in her foster placement rather than return
her to father’s custody and care.
In addition, father argues we must reverse the challenged
orders for the independent reason that the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) and
the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry mandates
under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) and related California law. Although the
Department concedes error with respect to ICWA and related
California law, we conclude the proper resolution is not to reverse
the challenged orders, as father argues, but rather to remand
with directions that the Department and the juvenile court
correct their errors and comply with all mandates of ICWA and
related California law while the underlying proceedings remain
pending.
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Accordingly, we affirm and remand with directions.
BACKGROUND
1. The Family and Previous Child Welfare Involvement
L.C. (mother) is the mother of daughter and two younger
children, daughter’s half sister, S.M. (half sister), and half
brother, A.M. (half brother). J.M. is the father of half sister and
half brother. Although mother, half sister, and J.M. were
involved in the proceedings below, they are not parties to this
appeal.
Father and mother met in Connecticut, where they and the
above-listed family members lived. In a parentage statement
below, father indicated daughter lived with him in February and
March 2021. When the underlying proceedings began, the
Connecticut Department of Children and Families (Connecticut
Department) had an open case concerning mother, J.M., and half
brother, based on domestic violence between mother and J.M.
Under a safety plan, daughter was placed in the care of father’s
mother (paternal grandmother), who also lived in Connecticut.
On February 12, 2021, mother took daughter for an unmonitored
visit and never returned daughter to paternal grandmother’s
care. The next month, in March 2021, and without telling father,
mother moved to California with daughter and half sister.
Mother suffers from mental and emotional issues as well as
multiple substance abuse disorders. Mother has made false
allegations against J.M. and has verbally abused the children’s
maternal grandmother. Mother has refused mental health
services. Although the children had not been removed officially
from mother, a social worker with the Connecticut Department
stated “the children were supposed to be living with a relative
due to concerns about mother’s substance abuse and mental
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health.” That social worker indicated “it was more than likely
that the [Connecticut] Department was going to submit a petition
to the Court requesting a removal order.”
2. Petition and Amended Petition
In July 2021, the Department filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of daughter and
half sister (petition).1 The petition alleged four counts under
subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300. Specifically, the petition
alleged daughter and half sister were at risk of harm due to
mother and J.M.’s violent altercations (counts a-1 and b-1),
mother’s current and past substance abuse (count b-2), and
mother’s mental and emotional problems (count b-3). Father was
not named in the petition.
None of the parties appeared for the initial hearing on the
petition, at which time the juvenile court detained the children
from their fathers and conditionally released them to mother.
Soon after, however, the juvenile court removed and detained the
children from mother as well. Daughter and half sister were
placed with a foster family.
In early August 2021, a Department social worker spoke
with father. Father explained paternal grandmother had
temporary custody of daughter in Connecticut. Although he and
paternal grandmother were not supposed to do so, in February
2021, they allowed mother to have an unmonitored visit with
daughter. Mother never returned daughter to paternal
grandmother. Instead, mother took daughter and half sister to
Pennsylvania and then to California, where they stayed.
Although father called law enforcement after mother left
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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Connecticut with daughter, he was told he “ ‘couldn’t do much’ ”
because he did not have paperwork demonstrating he was
daughter’s father.
In mid-August 2021, the Department filed an amended
petition on behalf of daughter and half sister (amended petition).
The amended petition included the original four counts as well as
five new counts. The new counts alleged the children were at
risk of harm because: J.M. physically abused the children and
mother failed to protect the children from that physical abuse
(counts a-2 and b-4), J.M. abused drugs and mother failed to
protect the children from that substance abuse (count b-6),
mother abducted the children from Connecticut and father failed
to protect daughter from that abduction by allowing mother to
have unmonitored access to daughter in violation of Connecticut
court orders (count b-5), and father violated a Connecticut court
order by allowing mother to have unmonitored access to daughter
when he knew or should have known of mother’s substance
abuse, mental health issues, and ongoing domestic violence with
J.M. (count b-7).
3. Adjudication and Disposition
Prior to adjudication, a Department social worker spoke
with father and paternal grandmother. Father told the social
worker he was aware of domestic violence between mother and
J.M. but he did not know the details of it. He said mother told
him many times that J.M. threatened to kill her. Father also
stated he was aware of mother’s alcohol and drug abuse and
previous child welfare cases in Connecticut. He said, “ ‘It was an
ongoing thing throughout the years of [daughter] from birth
through now. Her mother always had prior DCF cases.’ ”
Although father believed mother smoked marijuana and drank
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alcohol daily, he indicated a feeling of helplessness. He stated,
“ ‘These things come to me too late like what can I do about it?
It’s already happened. I can’t do anything about it. . . . Every
time I get information it’s always late.’ ” Finally, father told the
social worker he was not sure about mother’s mental health. He
believed mother took medication for depression. Although father
was not living with mother when she was in Connecticut and in a
relationship with J.M., father stated, “ ‘[S]he seemed kind of off
every time I talked to her. . . . Kind of paranoid basically.’ ” As of
early August 2021, father had not spoken with daughter since
mother left with her in February of that year. Father wanted to
visit with daughter.
Father also spoke with the social worker about the
Connecticut Department’s most recent involvement with the
family. Father stated the Connecticut Department became
involved due to domestic violence between mother and J.M.
Father said the Connecticut Department had not yet filed a case
in court, but a safety plan had been developed under which
daughter was to stay with paternal grandmother. Father
explained daughter did not stay with him because he did not
have a room for her.2 Although father and paternal grandmother
both indicated they were given shared custody of daughter,
neither had documentation to support that. Father stated that,
under the safety plan, mother was restricted to monitored visits
with daughter. Nonetheless, on February 12, 2021, the day
mother failed to return daughter, father and paternal
grandmother had allowed mother to have an unmonitored visit
2 This seems to conflict with father’s parentage form filed
with the juvenile court, which stated daughter lived with father
during February and March 2021.
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with daughter. Paternal grandmother told the social worker
mother previously had taken daughter for visits without
returning her. Paternal grandmother said, “[Mother] keeps
taking her and not bringing her back and I had to go find her
every time. She took them twice before.” She noted she had
raised concerns repeatedly with the Connecticut Department but
she did not receive “much direction” and felt the Connecticut
Department “was not doing anything to help.”
On March 8, 2021, almost one month after mother failed to
return daughter, father contacted law enforcement in
Connecticut to report mother had taken daughter to California.
When asked why he waited one month before making the report,
father stated he and paternal grandmother “were giving [mother]
the time and opportunity to do the right thing.” Paternal
grandmother reported she and father began to worry when
mother did not return daughter on February 12, but they had
been “in contact with [mother] and were giving her the
opportunity to do the right thing and return [daughter].”
Because neither father, paternal grandmother, nor the
Connecticut Department could provide documentation of the
stated custody arrangement, law enforcement was unable to take
any action.
In August 2021, the Connecticut superior court issued an
order declining to take jurisdiction over daughter. The order
stated, as to daughter, “[T]he matter in the Superior Court for
Juvenile Matters at Bridgeport, Connecticut was withdrawn on
April 9, 2021.”
In a September 2021 report for the court, the Department
expressed its concerns about the family. As to father, the
Department noted although he “reported concerns regarding the
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mother’s ongoing mental health issues, substance abuse and
domestic violence with [J.M.],” “father failed to take appropriate
action to protect his child [daughter] and reported that he did not
take action because he does not like to involve Law Enforcement
in such matters.” The Department was also concerned that
father “allowed the mother to take [daughter] and have
unrestricted access to the child despite [the Connecticut
Department] involvement and Court orders indicating that the
child is to have monitored visits with the mother.” The
Department believed father did not appreciate the gravity of the
situation.
A combined adjudication and disposition hearing was held
on September 14, 2021. After hearing argument, the juvenile
court sustained the amended petition in its entirety, including
the two counts involving father’s conduct (counts b-5 and b-7).
Count b-5 alleged father failed to protect daughter because he
allowed mother to have an unmonitored visit with daughter
despite court orders requiring monitored visits only. Count b-7
alleged both that father violated a court order requiring mother
to have monitored visits with daughter and that father knew or
reasonably should have known of mother’s substance abuse,
mental health issues, and domestic violence with J.M.
The juvenile court declared daughter a dependent of the
court under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300. The court
removed daughter from mother’s and father’s custody and care.
“[B]ased on the information from Connecticut,” the court treated
father as a previously custodial parent and found daughter’s
return to father’s custody and care would be detrimental to
daughter’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being.
The court’s factual basis for removal from father was father
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“previously failed to protect these children, in that he allowed the
mother to take these children and then failed to file a missing
persons report for 30 days, when the mother left Connecticut for
California with the children.” The court ordered reunification
services for both mother and father. Father was ordered to
participate in a parenting program and enroll in individual
counseling. Father was granted monitored visits.
4. Six-month Review Hearing
Prior to the six-month review hearing, the Department
submitted a few reports to the court. By the end of June 2022,
father had completed a 10-week parenting program. Father
stated he would receive counseling services once he had
completed his parenting program. By August 2022, however,
father had not yet enrolled in individual counseling. Father’s
visits with daughter were held by phone or on-line and were
mostly consistent with no issues reported.
After multiple continuances, the six-month review hearing
was held on August 10, 2022, eleven months after the
adjudication and disposition hearing. At the review hearing, the
juvenile court held father’s progress with his case plan had been
substantial and mother’s progress with her case plan had been
unsubstantial. The court found return of daughter and half
sister “to the physical custody of their parents will create a
substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, physical
and emotional well-being.” The court continued reunification
services for both father and mother and ordered daughter to
remain in her placement.
5. Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
In July 2021, father filed his ICWA-020 form (parental
notification of Indian status form), indicating none of the listed
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choices applied to him. The following month, mother filed her
ICWA-020 form, indicating she had no Indian ancestry as far as
she knew.
In August 2021, the juvenile court held it “does not have
reason to know that [daughter] is an Indian Child, as defined
under ICWA, and does not order notice to any tribe or the BIA.
Parents are to keep the Department, their Attorney and the
Court aware of any new information relating to possible ICWA
status.”
6. Appeals
Father timely appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings and dispositional orders as well as the court’s orders
made at the August 10, 2022 review hearing. We granted
father’s request to consolidate the appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Jurisdiction
a. Justiciability
As an initial matter, we address the justiciability of father’s
appeal. The Department argues father’s challenge to jurisdiction
is not justiciable because, in addition to the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings based on father’s conduct, the court also
based jurisdiction on mother and J.M.’s conduct, which findings
have not been appealed. Thus, regardless of our decision on
father’s appeal, dependency jurisdiction will remain.
We agree dependency jurisdiction will remain regardless of
the merits of father’s appeal. (In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
1154, 1161.) We disagree, however, that we cannot or should not
address the merits of father’s challenge to the jurisdictional
findings as to him. The Department’s position ignores our
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in which the court held, “[W]here
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a jurisdictional finding ‘serves as the basis for dispositional
orders that are also challenged on appeal’ [citation], the appeal is
not moot.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283.) This is the
case here. Following its jurisdictional findings, the juvenile court
removed daughter from father, ordered father to participate in
reunification services, and maintained daughter’s removal from
father at the six-month review hearing, all of which orders father
challenges on appeal. Thus, although dependency jurisdiction
would remain even if we reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings as to father, father’s appeal of the jurisdictional findings
is not moot because those findings “ ‘serve[] as the basis for
dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal.’ ” (Ibid.)
b. Applicable Law
In this case, the juvenile court exercised its jurisdiction
under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300. Because the two
counts pertaining to father were brought under subdivision (b),
we focus on that subdivision.
Under section 300, subdivision (b), a juvenile court may
assert dependency jurisdiction over a child when, among other
things, “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result
of . . . [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child. [¶] (B) The
willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the
custodian with whom the child has been left.” (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1)(A) & (B).)
“[S]ection 300 does not require that a child actually be
abused or neglected before the juvenile court can assume
jurisdiction.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “The
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legislatively declared purpose of these provisions ‘is to provide
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection,
and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk
of that harm.’ (§ 300.2, italics added.) ‘The court need not wait
until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction
and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” (In re I.J.,
supra, at p. 773.) “ ‘The purpose of dependency proceedings is to
prevent risk, not ignore it.’ ” (Jonathan L. v. Superior Court
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1104.)
c. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings [and disposition order] of
the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In determining whether substantial
evidence exists such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
order challenged on appeal is appropriate, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the challenged order. (Ibid.)
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“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value’; such that a reasonable trier of fact
could make such findings.” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th
187, 199.) Substantial evidence “ ‘is not synonymous with any
evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)
d. Substantial evidence supports dependency
jurisdiction based on father’s conduct.
Father argues substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as to him because there
was no Connecticut court order limiting mother to monitored
visits with daughter and the evidence does not support a finding
that father knew or should have known of mother’s substance
abuse, mental health issues, and domestic violence with J.M.
We conclude the evidence amply supports a finding that
father knew of mother’s substance abuse, mental health issues,
and domestic violence with J.M. As noted above, father told a
Department social worker he knew there was domestic violence
between mother and J.M., that mother told him J.M. threatened
to kill her, and that the Connecticut Department’s recent
involvement with the family was due to domestic violence
between mother and J.M. Father also stated he believed mother
took medication for depression and said she “seemed kind of off”
and “paranoid.” Finally, father reported he knew mother had
substance abuse issues, including smoking marijuana and
drinking alcohol daily, but felt helpless to do anything about it.
The evidence is less clear as to whether a Connecticut court
had limited mother to monitored visits with daughter, but there
is still sufficient evidence of such an order when we view the
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record in the light most favorable to the court’s order (as we
must). Father, paternal grandmother, and the Connecticut
Department all referenced a safety plan that had been in place to
protect daughter and her half siblings. The Connecticut superior
court also indicated there had been an open case involving
daughter when it noted that case was dismissed in April 2021,
after mother had absconded with daughter to California. That is
substantial evidence. Regardless, whether by court order or
Connecticut Department directive, the evidence is clear father
believed mother’s visits with daughter had to be monitored for
daughter’s safety. Yet, despite his own understanding, he and
paternal grandmother allowed mother an unmonitored visit with
daughter, which resulted in mother taking daughter out of state
and, eventually, to California.
Despite knowing mother had left Connecticut with
daughter, that mother suffered from serious mental health and
substance abuse issues, and that the Connecticut Department
had already been involved with his family, father took no action
to locate and ensure daughter’s safety until almost one month
later, when he filed a report with his local law enforcement.
Based on the record before us, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as to
father.
2. Removal
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When a child has been adjudged a dependent child within
the meaning of section 300, the juvenile court “may limit the
control to be exercised over the dependent child by any parent” if
necessary to protect the child. (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).) Section 361,
subdivision (c)(1) permits the juvenile court to order a child
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removed from his or her parent if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the child is, or would be, at substantial
risk of harm if returned home and there are no reasonable means
by which the child can be protected without removal. “ ‘ “The
parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been
actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the
statute is on averting harm to the child.” ’ ” (In re A.S. (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 237, 247, disapproved on another ground by
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7 (O.B.).)
In making its determination, the juvenile court may consider the
parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances. (In re
A.S., at p. 247.)
We review the juvenile court’s removal order under the
substantial evidence standard of review. (In re Nathan E. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 114, 123.) “In reviewing for substantial evidence
to support a dispositional order removing a child, we ‘keep[ ] in
mind that the [juvenile] court was required to make its order
based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.’ ”
(Ibid.; O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.)
b. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s removal order.
Father argues substantial evidence does not support a
finding that daughter would have been in danger if placed in
father’s care and any doubt about that should have been resolved
in favor of placing daughter with father. We disagree.
The facts supporting jurisdiction also support the juvenile
court’s removal order. Additionally, the evidence shows father
was unable to care for daughter in his home because there was no
room for her there. Also, it appears daughter had lived with
father, if at all, only in February and March 2021. Based on the
15
record before us, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s removal order.
Finally, father relies on the First District’s decision in In re
M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137 (M.C.). We agree with the
Department, however, that M.C. is unpersuasive as it is legally
and factually distinct from the instant case. In M.C., the Court of
Appeal held the juvenile court erred when it failed to place the
minor child with his father, who earlier had left the minor with
the minor’s drug-addicted mother. (Id. at p. 146.) In contrast to
the instant case, at the time the father in M.C. left his child with
the mother, there were no open child welfare proceedings
concerning the family. Also, by the time of the disposition
hearing in M.C., the father there not only had prepared a safe
plan of care for his child, but also had completed a parenting
class identified by the Department. (Id. at p. 145.) The father’s
ex-wife also testified the father had been a good father for their
three now-adult children, with no child welfare involvement. (Id.
at pp. 144–145.) In contrast, here, the record does not reveal
father had proposed a safe plan for daughter’s return to his
custody nor does it show father took quick action to alleviate the
reasons for daughter’s detention. Additionally, in M.C., the court
was reviewing the juvenile court’s application of section 361.2,
subdivision (a), as opposed to section 361, subdivision (c), which
is at issue here. (Id. at p. 152.)
3. Six-month Review Hearing
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
After a child is removed from parental custody, “the
juvenile court must review the case at least once every six
months.” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242,
249.) At the six-month review hearing, “the court shall order the
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return of the child to the physical custody of their parent or legal
guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the return of the child to their parent or legal
guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) “At these review hearings there is
a statutory presumption that the child will be returned to
parental custody unless the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that ‘the return of the child would create a substantial
risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the
minor.’ ” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 249.)
In making its decision, the juvenile court must consider
“the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent or
legal guardian and the extent to which they availed themselves of
services provided.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) “The failure of the
parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make
substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall
be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.”
(Ibid.) “[T]he purpose of the reunification plan is ‘to overcome the
problem that led to removal in the first place.’ ” (In re Mary B.
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1483.)
We review the juvenile court’s risk of detriment finding for
substantial evidence. (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960,
966.)
b. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s risk of detriment finding.
Father claims the court erred when it refused to return
daughter to his custody and care at the six-month review
hearing. Father claims there was no substantial evidence to
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support a risk of detriment finding as to daughter if she was
returned to father’s care. We disagree.
As noted above, father’s court-ordered case plan included a
parenting program and individual counseling. By the time the
six-month review hearing was held (which was close to one year
after the juvenile court declared daughter a dependent of the
court and ordered father’s reunification case plan), father had
completed a 10-week parenting program. He had not yet begun
(let alone completed) the individual counseling portion of his case
plan. Thus, although father was making progress and the
juvenile court found his progress had been “substantial,”
substantive work remained for father to complete in order to
address and alleviate the reasons for daughter’s placement. In
addition, it is unclear whether daughter had ever physically lived
with father. Father’s parentage form stated daughter recently
had lived with him for two months, but elsewhere the record
demonstrates daughter was living with paternal grandmother
during that same time frame. In any event, the evidence
indicates father never had physical custody of daughter for any
substantial amount of time and, when she was ostensibly in his
care, he allowed mother to take daughter for an unmonitored
visit, which eventually concluded with daughter declared a
dependent of the court in California. Finally, although father
relies on In re E.D., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th 960, we find that case
factually distinct and, therefore, unpersuasive here.
Given the totality of the record before us, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s risk of
detriment finding made at the six-month review hearing.
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4. ICWA
Father argues the Department and juvenile court failed to
comply with the mandates of ICWA and related California law.
In particular, father notes the Department failed to question
known family members (such as paternal grandmother) with
whom the Department had contact during the proceedings below.
As a result of the deficient ICWA inquiries, father argues we
must reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings,
dispositional orders, and orders made at the six-month review
hearing. The Department concedes it and the juvenile court
failed to comply with the inquiry mandates of ICWA and related
California law. The Department does not concede, however, that
these deficiencies require reversal in this case. We agree with
the Department.
The conceded ICWA deficiencies do not require reversal of
the findings and orders on review in this appeal. There is no
indication of potential ICWA relationships and the underlying
case has not concluded. As jurisdiction continues below, the
juvenile court and the Department can resolve any doubts by
conducting an adequate and appropriate ICWA investigation.
Thus, we remand with directions that the juvenile court and the
Department make the appropriate and adequate inquiries to
proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s September 14, 2021, jurisdictional
findings and dispositional orders and the August 10, 2022 orders
are affirmed. The matter is remanded with directions that the
juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services comply with the Indian Child
Welfare Act and related California law.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
HOFFSTADT, J.
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