Williams v. American Airports Corporation CA2/1

Filed 8/21/23 Williams v. American Airports Corporation CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
WINN WILLIAMS et al., B321408
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants, (Los Angeles County
and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 20STCV42610)
v.
AMERICAN AIRPORTS
CORPORATION,
Defendant, Cross-complainant,
and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kristin S. Escalante, Judge. Affirmed.
Kassouni Law and Timothy V. Kassouni for Plaintiffs,
Cross-defendants, and Appellants.
Cunningham Swaim, Michael J. Terhar, and Jonathan E.
Hembree for Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Respondent.
__________________________________
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court
erred in denying a motion filed under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP law, hereafter section 425.16) by
appellants Winn Williams and Sherlyn Williams to strike a cross-
complaint filed by respondent American Airports Corporation.1
We conclude the court did not err.
The Williamses were members of non-party Port Hangar
Association, Inc. Port Hangar Association leased space on an
airport owned by the County of Los Angeles and managed by
American Airports. Port Hangar Association subleased this
space to individuals, including the Williamses, who placed
portable aircraft hangars on the space.
Shortly before the master lease was set to expire, the
Williamses filed a complaint with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), contending that the refusal of the County
and American Airports to negotiate a lease renewal violated both
FAA grant assurances and federal law. Six months after the
FAA denied the complaint, Winn Williams attended several
meetings of the County Aviation Commission, criticizing both
American Airports and the County, and reporting his difficulties
with vacating the space the Williamses had been subleasing.
Eventually, after American Airports removed their portable
hangars and the personal property stored therein, the Williamses
sued both American Airports and the County for inverse
condemnation, conversion, discrimination, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
1 “The acronym ‘SLAPP’ stands for ‘strategic lawsuit
against public participation.’ ” (Episcopal Church Cases (2009)
45 Cal.4th 467, 473, fn. 1.)
2
In a cross-complaint, American Airports alleged that the
Williamses’ dilatory tactics and misrepresentations regarding
their intentions to vacate the space they had subleased
ultimately caused American Airports to incur more than $30,000
in costs in evicting them and removing and storing their
property. American Airports alleged causes of action for breach
of the lease agreement, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel.
In response, the Williamses filed a motion to strike the
cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP law, contending the cross-
complaint arose from the Williamses’ FAA complaint and Winn
Williams’s statements to the County Aviation Commission. The
trial court disagreed, finding that the Williamses had failed to
show that the cross-complaint was based on activity protected by
the anti-SLAPP law. We agree with the trial court and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. The Williamses’ Complaint
In November 2020, the Williamses sued American Airports
and the County. In April 2021, the Williamses filed a first
amended complaint, and in September 2021, they filed a second
amended complaint (SAC, the operative complaint). The SAC
alleged that, in August 1997, Port Hangar Association entered a
15-year lease (with an option to renew for five years) with the
County, leasing “vacant blacktop paved lots” on Brackett Field
Airport and subsequently subleased smaller sections of the lots to
2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history
relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
3
Port Hangar Association members. The Williamses placed
portable hangars on the space they subleased.
In 2002, American Airports “became the authorized agent
for the County . . . with respect to management and operations”
at the airport. In 2012, Port Hangar Association renewed the
lease for another five years.
In September 2018, after the lease had expired, American
Airports served Port Hangar Association with a 30-day notice to
quit.
In January 2019, American Airports filed an unlawful
detainer action against Port Hangar Association; a judgment for
possession was entered in February 2019. The Williamses
alleged the judgment did not apply to them, and that American
Airports continued accepting rent from them until May 2019.
In June 2019, American Airports refused to accept further
payments and claimed the Williamses had no right to keep their
portable hangars at the airport because Port Hangar Association
had been evicted. American Airports demanded the Williamses
remove their hangars and property from the airport. The
Williamses claimed they were trying to comply, but American
Airports made it difficult for them by removing their access to the
airport on several occasions, and by placing its own locks on the
Williamses’ portable hangars. Nevertheless, the Williamses
rented one County-owned hangar to temporarily store one of their
planes and most of their property before they moved to another
airport, and asked American Airports to rent them another
hangar. They specifically requested a vacant hangar near their
portable hangars, arguing they were entitled to accommodation
because both Williamses were cancer survivors and neither
Williams could walk very far.
4
American Airports refused to rent them a hangar and let
them know that both the County and American Airports wanted
their portable hangars removed by the end of October 2019 for a
public repaving project that would affect the space they were
using. Sometime in October 2019, American Airports and the
County removed the personal property from the Williamses’
portable hangars and destroyed the hangars. Thereafter,
American Airports refused to tell the Williamses in writing where
their property had been stored.
In April 2020, American Airports provided written notice as
to the location of the Williamses’ personal property, along with
instructions on how to retrieve the property. American Airports
also informed the Williamses it would not rent a hangar to them
because “Mr. Williams has caused issues in the past and is
difficult to handle.”
Based on these allegations, the SAC set forth causes of
action for inverse condemnation against the County, and
conversion, discrimination under Civil Code sections 51 and 52,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress against both
defendants.
B. The Cross-Complaint
In December 2021, American Airports answered the SAC
and brought a cross-complaint against the Williamses. The cross-
complaint alleged that, in September 2018, a 30-day notice to
quit was served on the Williamses. When the Williamses began
then sending checks directly to American Airports, the checks
stated they were for “ ‘tie-downs’ ” and American Airports did not
realize the Williamses were attempting to create a new month-to-
month tenancy. When American Airports realized the purpose of
these payments, it refunded the money.
5
American Airports made numerous attempts to have the
Williamses vacate the premises. In November 2018, Winn
Williams “expressly agreed” to clear out the contents of his
hangars. In December 2018, as part of an attempt to help the
Williamses vacate, American Airports offered to lease a hangar to
Winn Williams to store an aircraft, but informed him that the
rest of his personal property needed to be removed from the
airport. American Airports understood that this hangar would be
used for “ ‘aviation purposes’ . . . and not as a storage unit for
nonaviation purposes or for hoarding.”3 However, American
Airports alleged that the Williamses stored only one non-
airworthy aircraft that had not been flown for decades, and thus
was not using the hangar for aviation purposes.
In January 2019, American Airports filed an unlawful
detainer action, obtaining judgment in February 2019. In March
2019, after the Williamses “still had not made any reasonable
effort to vacate the premises . . . , the sheriff executed a lock out
pursuant to the Unlawful Detainer judgment and the
Williams[es] were notified of their rights to reclaim their
abandoned property.” In May 2019, the Williamses “were
advised of a possible public auction of their personal property and
were given fifteen (15) days to remove their property pursuant to
the terms of the Lease Agreement.” However, after Winn
Williams promised “he was ‘moving expeditiously’ to remove his
personal property,” American Airports refrained from auctioning
off the Williamses’ property. In September 2019, after the
Williamses still had not removed their property, American
3 The rental rate for a hangar used for aviation purposes
was “significantly lower” than the rate for non-aviation purposes.
6
Airports hired a professional moving company to move the
property into shipping containers, stored on airport grounds.
Based on these allegations, the cross-complaint alleged that
the Williamses breached the lease agreement by failing to vacate
the leased premises; failing to remove their personal property
from the leased premises; failing to reimburse American Airports
for the removal and storage of the Williamses’ property; and
failing to pay the proper rate for using a hangar to store non-
aviation property.
The cross-complaint also alleged the Williamses breached
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the lease
agreement by (1) “Intentionally interfering with the business
affairs of the County and Cross-Complainant with respect to the
County’s planned re-pavement project that was expected to take
place on the subject premises”; (2) “Requesting multiple
extensions of time and accommodations to perform their duties
under the contract, namely removing their portable hangars and
contents therein from the premises for an anticipated re-
pavement project thereon, without any good faith effort to remove
or relocate”; (3) “Misrepresenting on numerous occasions to
Cross-Complainant that Cross-Defendants would vacate the
premises when they had no intent to do so and unnecessarily
prolonging the removal of the portable hangars and other
personal property on the subject premises”; (4) “Engaging in
dilatory conduct, despite Cross-Complainant’s numerous
accommodations, in vacating the subject premises and removing
their property thereon and frustrating the reasonable expectation
of the County and Cross-Complainant pursuant to the Lease
Agreement”; and (5) “Attempting to extort Cross-Complainant
and County to lease multiple permanent County-owned hangars
7
to them at Brackett Airport by refusing to timely remove their
portable hangars and items therein from the premises, with
knowledge of the potential harm to Cross-Complainant and the
County for failure to do so as a result of the planned re-pavement
project to take place on the subject premises.”4
The cross-complaint additionally alleged a cause of action
for quantum meruit for the costs incurred by American Airports
in removing and storing the Williamses’ property. Finally, the
cross-complaint alleged a cause of action for promissory estoppel,
claiming that because American Airports relied on the
Williamses’ false promises to vacate, it incurred costs after it was
forced to file an unlawful detainer action and remove and store
the Williamses’ property. American Airports requested
compensatory damages in excess of $30,000.
C. The Williamses Move to Strike the Cross-
Complaint
In February 2022, the Williamses answered the cross-
complaint. Three weeks later, they filed a special motion to
strike under section 425.16, arguing that the cross-complaint
arose from acts in furtherance of the Williamses’ right of petition
or free speech in connection with a public issue. Specifically, the
Williamses claimed American Airports’ cross-complaint arose
from “comments made by Winn Williams during the public
comment portion of the L.A. County Airport Commission
meetings” and “from the Williamses’ protected petitioning
4 The allegations for the breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing were included under the first cause of
action for breach of contract, rather than as a separate cause of
action.
8
activity of speaking out to the FAA.” The Williamses claimed
American Airports’ breach of contract action was based on the
comments to the Airport Commission because the cross-complaint
“refers specifically to Cross-Defendants’ requests for extensions of
time, their references to request for accommodation for their
disabilities, and their requests to rent additional hangars,” which
“interfered with [American Airports’] business and amounted to
extortion.” While the Williamses claimed that “an FAA
complaint was filed to prevent removal of the hangars,” they did
not explain how the cross-complaint arose from the FAA
complaint.
The Williamses also did not explain how the quantum
meruit cause of action arose from their petitioning activity,
arguing only that “the petitioning activity itself—the opposition
to removal of the hangars and other property—shows that
[American Airports] cannot prevail on its claim for quantum
meruit” because “[n]ot only did Winn and Sherlyn Williams NOT
request the removal and relocation of their property, they vocally,
repeatedly, and unequivocally objected to it” and filed “an FAA
complaint . . . to prevent removal of the hangars . . . .”
Finally, as to the promissory estoppel cause of action, the
Williamses argued it was based on their request for additional
time to vacate the premises, which was a “request . . . made in
public comments at a public hearing to [American Airports] as
the agent of the County” and was “therefore protected petitioning
activity.” The Williamses also argued none of the causes of action
had merit.
In March 2022, American Airports opposed the motion,
arguing that just because it filed its cross-complaint after Winn
Williams had engaged in protected activity did not mean the
9
causes of action arose from that activity. American Airports
contended that the motion to strike failed to address the “main
thrust of the breach of contract cause of action” which was that
“the Lease Agreement expired, and Cross-Defendants refused to
move, despite the lease expiring, despite [American Airports]
serving a valid notice to quit, despite [American Airports]
obtaining and validly serving an Unlawful Detainer Judgment in
February 2019, and despite [American Airports] offering to allow
an extra 120 to move and offering to perform the physical move
for free (offers which were not accepted).” American Airports
argued that the Williamses’ conduct did not constitute protected
activity.
As to its cause of action for quantum meruit, American
Airports contended the Williamses had failed to show it arose
from any protected activity. Finally, as to the promissory
estoppel cause of action whereby American Airports contended
the Williamses had asked for more time to vacate the hangar,
American Airports contended its cross-complaint never alleged
the Williamses made these requests at a public hearing, and
instead alleged they had made multiple promises directly to
American Airports to vacate the space. American Airports also
argued there was a “strong probability” it would succeed on the
merits.
The Williamses filed a reply brief, reiterating that the basis
of American Airports’ cross-complaint was statements made by
Winn Williams at a public hearing, and arguing that even if some
of the activity underlying American Airports’ claim was
unprotected, the cross-complaint was still subject to a special
motion to strike because the protected activity was not “merely
10
incidental but an essential part of the alleged activity upon which
liability arises.”
D. The Court Denies the Williamses’ Motion
In March 2022, the court denied the Williamses’ motion. It
found that American Airports’ “Cross-Complaint does not base
any liability on Plaintiffs’ petitioning activity” and that the
allegedly protected activity (complaints to the FAA and the
County) “does not relate to the basis of liability.” The court
expressly found that: “The [Cross-Complaint] is completely silent
on any of the cited complaints to the FAA or the County. Instead,
the [Cross-Complaint] seeks liability based on alleged breaches of
contract which are disconnected from any presented petitioning
activity. (CC ¶¶ 51–57 [The Williams[es] failed to remove their
hangars/personal property as required by the lease and delayed
the re-pavement project without any legal grounds]; ¶¶ 61–63
[seeking reimbursement for expenses related to the removal of
Plaintiffs’ personal property]; ¶¶67–84 [cross-complainants relied
on the Williams[es]’ promises to voluntarily vacate the premises
at their own expense and their purported needs for
accommodations to vacate the premises, and thereby provided
Cross-Defendants with certain accommodations at the cross-
complainants’ expense].) Thus, the [Cross-Complaint] does not
seek any liability based on Plaintiffs’ petitioning activities.”
Because the court found that the Williamses failed to meet their
burden to demonstrate that the activity complained of was
protected under the anti-SLAPP law, it declined to consider
whether American Airports’ causes of action were legally
sufficient.
The Williamses timely appealed.
11
DISCUSSION
“The grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed
de novo.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781,
788.) Our Supreme Court has summarized the two-step analysis
required by the anti-SLAPP statute as follows: “At the first step,
the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all
allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief
supported by them. . . . If the court determines that relief is
sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the
statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on
protected activity is legally sufficient and factually
substantiated.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.)
“At the first step of the analysis, the defendant must make
two related showings. Comparing its statements and conduct
against the statute, it must demonstrate activity qualifying for
protection. (See § 425.16, subd. (e).) And comparing that
protected activity against the complaint, it must also
demonstrate that the activity supplies one or more elements of a
plaintiff’s claims.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 871, 887.) In other words, the party seeking to strike a
claim must show that it arises from protected activity. (See id. at
pp. 884, 887–888.) “A claim arises from protected activity when
that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1057, 1062.)
“Motives are irrelevant under section 425.16, and ‘a claim
filed in response to, or in retaliation for, threatened or actual
litigation is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute simply because
it may be viewed as an oppressive litigation tactic.’ [Citation.]
12
‘That a cause of action arguably may have been triggered by
protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from
such.’ ” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 493–
494, quoting City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.)
“In other words, a claim does not ‘arise from’ protected activity
simply because it was filed after, or because of, protected activity,
or when protected activity merely provides evidentiary support or
context for the claim. [Citation.] Rather, the protected activity
must ‘supply elements of the challenged claim.’ ” (Rand
Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621,
quoting Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063, 1064.)
A. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
American Airports alleged that the Williamses breached
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the lease
agreement by: (1) intentionally interfering with American
Airports’ business affairs with respect to the repaving project; (2)
requesting multiple extensions of time and accommodations to
vacate without expending any good faith effort to vacate; (3)
misrepresenting on numerous occasions to American Airports
that they would vacate the premises without actually intending
to do so; (4) engaging in dilatory conduct in vacating the space
and removing their property; and (5) trying to force American
Airports and the County to lease multiple permanent County-
owned hangars to them by using their refusal to timely remove
their portable hangars and items from the space.
On appeal, the Williamses argue that, because “[e]ach of
these alleged statements and actions advanced the Williamses’
efforts to obtain relief from the FAA and the County Aviation
13
Commission,” their activity was protected under section 425.16,
subdivisions (e)(1), (e)(3), and (e)(4). We disagree.
1. Section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and
(e)(3)
Section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(3), provide that
an “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech’ ” includes “any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law” and “any written or oral
statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” The
Williamses argue that these subdivisions apply because the
statements and conduct in the five allegations American Airports
made “arose in official proceedings authorized by law” and “in
public forums, including the FAA and the County Aviation
Commission.” Their argument is unsupported by the allegations
in the cause of action.
The first, fourth, and fifth allegations (intentionally
interfering with the business affairs of the County and American
Airports regarding the repaving project, engaging in dilatory
conduct in vacating the premises, and attempting to force
American Airports and the County to lease certain hangars to the
Williamses by weaponizing their refusal to timely vacate) concern
the Williamses’ failure to vacate in a timely manner the premises
where the repaving project was to take place. Failing to vacate is
self-evidently not a written or oral statement or writing.
And while the second and third allegations (requesting
multiple extensions of time to vacate the premises without
making a good faith effort to vacate and misrepresenting their
intentions to vacate) involve statements, the Williamses cite
14
nothing to demonstrate these were statements made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or in a public forum.
Indeed, the cross-complaint alleged the Williamses
“[m]isrepresent[ed] on numerous occasions to Cross-Complainant
that Cross-Defendants would vacate the premises.” (Emphasis
added.)
Because the statements and conduct alleged were not
statements made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or in a public forum, they are not protected activity
under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) or (e)(3).
2. Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4)
The Williamses also contend the conduct and statements
complained about constituted protected activity under section
425.16, subdivision (e)(4). Subdivision (e)(4) states that protected
activity includes “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise
of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) We reject the argument that
the conduct and statements alleged in the cross-complaint were
“made in furtherance of [the] Williamses’ free speech and
petitioning rights to obtain relief from the FAA and the County
Aviation Commission on issues relating to a public airport that
serves vital public purposes.”
While the Williamses claim they “filed a formal complaint
with the FAA alleging that the County and [American Airports’]
refusal to negotiate a renewal of the Lease violated their
obligations under FAA grant assurances and federal law,” and
that Winn Williams “attended seven open meetings of the County
Aviation Commission in which he made public comments
criticizing the County and [American Airports] for their operation
15
and management of the Airport,” neither the FAA complaint nor
Winn Williams’s attendance at open meetings was mentioned in
the cross-complaint.
“ ‘[T]he issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the
pleadings.’ [Citations.] Thus, the act or acts underlying a claim
for purposes of an anti-SLAPP statute is determined from the
plaintiffs’ allegations. [Citation.] Because the issues to be
determined in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the
pleadings, we will not ‘insert into a pleading claims for relief
based on allegations of activities that plaintiffs simply have not
identified . . . . It is not our role to engage in what would amount
to a redrafting of [a] complaint in order to read that document as
alleging conduct that supports a claim that has not in fact been
specifically alleged, and then assess whether the pleading that
we have essentially drafted could survive the anti-SLAPP motion
directed at it.’ ” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 883, italics omitted.) Nothing in the
record indicates the misrepresentations American Airports
complained of were made in the FAA complaint or in the open
meetings before the County Aviation Commission.
Even were we to consider the FAA complaint and Winn
Williams’s public comments, the Williamses fail to demonstrate
how the conduct alleged in the cross-complaint was done in
furtherance of the complaint or those comments. “An act is in
furtherance of the right of free speech if the act helps to advance
that right or assists in the exercise of that right.” (Tamkin v.
CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 133, 143.)
Making misrepresentations to American Airports about their
intentions to vacate the premises did not help the Williamses
advance their complaint that American Airports violated FAA
16
grant assurances and federal law by refusing to negotiate a
renewal of the lease agreement—especially when the Williamses
admit the FAA denied their complaint in August 2018 and
American Airports alleged that it was in November 2018 when
Winn Williams “expressly agreed” to clear out the contents of his
hangars and in May 2019 when he claimed to be “ ‘moving
expeditiously’ to remove his personal property.” Nor do we see
how the Williamses’ foot-dragging advanced their right to
criticize the County and American Airports, or assisted them in
exercising that right. American Airports’ cause of action for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not
based on an FAA complaint or the Williamses’ critical comments,
but rather on their failure to vacate the premises and the
misrepresentations they made to American Airports about
vacating the premises. Therefore, we agree with the trial court
that the alleged conduct is not covered under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4).
B. Quantum Meruit
The cross-complaint alleges that, because the Williamses
repeatedly failed to move their portable hangar and personal
property from the premises, American Airports was required to
do it for them, and “[t]he reasonable value of the services
performed by Cross-Complainant in conferring the aforesaid
benefits to Cross-Defendant is in excess of $30,000.00.”
Quoting Pacific Bay Recovery, Inc. v. California Physicians’
Services, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 200, the Williamses contend
on appeal that “[t]o prevail on its quantum meruit claim,”
American Airports must demonstrate it “ ‘was acting pursuant to
either an express or implied request for such services from the
defendant . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 214, italics removed.) The Williamses
17
contend that any request they purportedly made for services “was
included among Winn Williams’[s] statements to the County
Aviation Commission regarding the difficulties he and Sherlyn
Williams were experiencing in relocating their portable hangars
and other property due to the County and [American Airports’]
conduct” and therefore the quantum meruit claim “necessarily
arises from protected speech and petitioning activity.” The
Williamses’ argument misses the mark.
American Airports does not contend the Williamses made
an express request for it to remove and store their belongings.
The cross-complaint made clear that the Williamses refused to
remove their property, despite offers from American Airports to
help. Instead, American Airports alleged that it was forced to act
due to the Williamses’ failure to remove the property (i.e., that
the Williamses’ lack of action constituted an implied request for
services). But the Williamses’ failure to act does not constitute a
statement Winn Williams made to the County Aviation
Commission and is therefore not protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute.
C. Promissory Estoppel
In its final cause of action, the cross-complaint alleged that
the Williamses “promised Cross-Complainant multiple times . . .
that they would timely vacate the subject premises at their own
expense.” American Airports relied on that promise and incurred
costs when the Williamses failed to honor their promise. The
Williamses claim that their promise to vacate was “the subject of
Winn Williams’[s] public comments to the County Aviation
Commission” and therefore the alleged promise was
communicated to American Airports “as part of the same
18
protected speech and petitioning activity” on which American
Airports based its other causes of action. We disagree.
The Williamses claimed Winn Williams went to numerous
meetings of the Los Angeles County Airport Commission to
advocate for Port Hangar Association to enter into a new lease,
and to criticize American Airports and the County. Meeting
minutes submitted by the Williamses also reflected that Winn
Williams made comments that they were “in the process” of
vacating their hangar. But neither advocating for a lease
renewal, nor criticizing American Airports’ management, nor
reporting that the Williamses were in the process of vacating
their hangar constitutes a promise to vacate the hangar.
Therefore, American Airports’ promissory estoppel cause of action
does not arise from Winn Williams’s comments at the County
Airport Commission and is not protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute.
DISPOSITION
The court’s order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
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