People v. Hagen CA2/1

Filed 8/31/23 P. v. Hagen CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B323695
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA158173)
v.
THOMAS HAROLD HAGEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, John A. Torribio, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Thomas Harold Hagen appeals from a judgment entered
after a court trial at which the trial court found him guilty of
second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.)1 The prosecution’s
evidence presented at trial indicated, in pertinent part, that
Hagen and the robbery victim were both homeless and
acquainted with one another. In April 2022, Hagen approached
the van where the victim lived, asked to see the phone she was
holding, and said it was his. When she declined, he prevented
her from closing the van door, hit her in the face and head, and
took items from her hands, including the phone, her money, and
her keys. On August 31, 2022, the trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed Hagen on formal probation for
three years with terms and conditions, including that Hagen “not
harass, bother, molest, annoy, or communicate” with the robbery
victim and “stay away from” her. In addition to the stay-away
order that was a condition of Hagen’s three-year probation, the
court also issued a separate 10-year criminal protective order
requiring Hagen to stay away from the victim. Hagen contends,
the Attorney General concedes, and we agree that the 10-year
criminal protective order was unauthorized in this case and must
be stricken for the reasons explained below.
DISCUSSION
As the parties agree, there is no statute authorizing a 10-
year postconviction protective order based on the robbery
conviction in this case.
Section 136.2, governing criminal protective orders,
“authorizes protective orders which ‘are “operative only during
the pendency of criminal proceedings and as prejudgment
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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orders.” ’ [Citations.] The only purpose of a section 136.2
protective order is to ‘ “protect victims and witnesses in
connection with the criminal proceeding in which the restraining
order is issued in order to allow participation without fear of
reprisal.” ’ [Citation.] Accordingly, section 136.2 generally does
not authorize a trial court to impose a postjudgment restraining
order against a criminal defendant.” (People v. Corrales (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 283, 285-286.)
There are exceptions to this general rule, but they are not
applicable here. Section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) authorizes a
criminal court to issue a postconviction restraining order against
a defendant, valid for up to 10 years, when the defendant has
been convicted of certain enumerated offenses including, but not
limited to, domestic violence, human trafficking, and rape. (See
also § 273.5, subd. (j) [authorizing restraining orders, valid for up
to 10 years, for crimes involving domestic violence].) It is
undisputed that the circumstances here did not involve domestic
violence or any of the other offenses enumerated in section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1) or other statutes authorizing postconviction
restraining orders for specific offenses. Thus, the 10-year
postconviction restraining order based on Hagen’s robbery
conviction is unauthorized and must be stricken. (See People v.
Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901 [“Defendant’s convictions
for robbery and assault are not domestic violence offenses”;
accordingly, the “court did not have statutory authority to impose
the [10-year] postconviction protective order, and it must be
stricken”].)
Hagen does not challenge the trial court’s authority to
impose a stay-away order as a condition of his probation that
lasts the duration of his probation. (See People v. Selga (2008)
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162 Cal.App.4th 113, 120 [trial court “has broad discretion to
impose reasonable probation conditions” in “light of the
circumstances of the offense” under section 1203.1, including a
stay-away order].)
DISPOSITION
The 10-year criminal protective order issued in this case on
August 31, 2022 is stricken. In all other respects, the judgment
is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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