Martinez v. Valenzuela CA2/1

Filed 8/31/23 Martinez v. Valenzuela CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
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rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
RUBEN SANTOS MARTINEZ, B317158
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV39214)
v.
JAVIER AVIEL VALENZUELA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Rafael A. Ongkeko, Judge. Affirmed.
McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth,
James P. Wagoner, Timothy J. Buchanan and Lejf E. Knutson
for Defendant and Appellant.
Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, David R. Lira, Brittan
Cortney and Rachel M. Lannen for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________
Following a car versus motorcycle accident, Ruben Santos
Martinez, the motorcyclist, sued Javier Aviel Valenzuela, the
car driver, for negligence. The jury returned a defense verdict
but the trial court, finding the evidence compelled a finding that
Valenzuela was negligent in some degree, ordered a new trial.
Valenzuela appeals from that order, contending no substantial
evidence supports it and the court relied on incorrect legal
principles and failed to consider all the evidence and adequately
explain its reasoning. We disagree, and thus affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
A. The Accident Site
The accident occurred on Valley Boulevard (Valley) in
Los Angeles, which runs east and west.
The eastbound and westbound lanes on Valley were divided
by a double yellow line, the westbound side having five lanes.
The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour.
Approaching the accident site from the east (i.e., proceeding
westbound on Valley), one would pass an intersection with
Alhambra Avenue (Alhambra) on the right, which had two
left-turn and two right-turn lanes, then 150 to 200 feet later
would reach a driveway on the right coming from Troy’s Burgers
restaurant. The accident occurred just off the driveway’s apron.
Continuing westbound, one would reach an intersection with
Eastern Avenue (Eastern) about 150 to 200 feet after the
driveway.
A driver leaving Troy’s Burgers who wanted to go east on
Valley would first have to navigate five westbound Valley lanes:
a right-turn lane, three through lanes (numbered 3, 2, 1), and a
left-turn lane. The driver could then either: (1) turn right into
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the fifth westbound lane (Valley’s left-turn pocket) and make a
U-turn at Eastern, or (2) cross the fifth westbound lane and turn
left into Valley’s eastbound lanes, illegally crossing the double
yellow line to do so.
B. The Accident
Valenzuela, driving a Honda sedan, chose the first option.
Leaving Troy’s Burgers, he paused at the driveway apron,
looked left then right (and maybe left again), and entered
straight onto Valley intending to cross four lanes, turn right into
Valley’s left-turn pocket, make a U-turn at Eastern, and proceed
east on Valley.
He only made it halfway.
As Valenzuela was leaving the restaurant driveway,
Martinez, riding a motorcycle on Alhambra from the south,
turned right on a green light onto Valley from Alhambra’s
leftmost right-turn lane. He entered Valley’s westbound
number 2 lane, accelerated, and 150 to 200 feet later collided
in the middle of Valley with the front left corner of Valenzuela’s
south-facing Honda, sustaining serious injuries.
The evidence was equivocal as to who struck whom.
C. Trial
Martinez sued Valenzuela for negligence.
At trial, Martinez and Valenzuela presented dueling
percipient and expert accounts of the accident.
1. Investigation by Officer Victor Munoz
The investigating officer was Los Angeles Police
Department Officer Victor Munoz, whose report of the accident
was identified as an exhibit but not admitted into evidence.
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Munoz was permitted to read portions of the report aloud and
testify about them.
When he arrived at the scene, Munoz found Martinez in
the roadway injured. He took statements from each driver and
wrote in his report what he described at trial as “a paraphrase
or synopsis” of what they said.
a. Martinez’s account at the scene
According to Munoz’s report, Martinez said Valenzuela cut
him off while making a left turn onto Valley. Munoz denied that
Martinez told him Valenzuela “T-boned” him. “It would be the
other way around,” Munoz said.
Munoz testified that when he met Martinez again at the
hospital, he stated he was driving on Valley at 20–30 miles per
hour when Valenzuela’s Honda entered the roadway “to make
a left-hand turn directly in front of him.” Martinez told Munoz
that he decelerated to 10–15 miles per hour before colliding with
Valenzuela.
b. Valenzuela’s account at the scene
According to Munoz’s report, Valenzuela told Munoz that
he entered onto Valley from Troy’s Burgers with the intention
of going to the left-turn pocket and making a U-turn at Eastern.
Munoz thought this was credible. His report stated, “I observed
[Valenzuela’s] vehicle . . . was positioned facing slightly right,
consistent with [this] statement.” Clips and still shots of the
scene showed the position of Valenzuela’s car angled slightly
to the right towards the left-turn pocket on Valley.
Munoz’s report stated that Valenzuela said he looked “left
and right” before entering Valley and saw Martinez— “coming off
Alhambra onto Valley” (i.e., from Valenzuela’s left)— too late to
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react. Valenzuela said Martinez was driving between 60 and 65
miles per hour before he saw Valenzuela, then decelerated to
approximately 40 to 45 miles per hour before broadsiding him.
Officer Munoz testified that from the Troy’s Burgers
driveway there was a clear view of traffic merging from
Alhambra onto Valley. He testified that in the collision report he
did not note speed as a factor in the crash but would have done so
had it been a factor.
2. Plaintiff ’s Evidence
a. Martinez
Martinez testified that before the accident, he was on
his motorcycle stopped at a red light at Alhambra and Valley,
in the lane farthest from the curb. When the light turned green,
he proceeded onto Valley into the middle lane, going “maybe”
20-25 miles per hour when he first saw Valenzuela’s vehicle in
the roadway, coming at him, “[a]ll of a sudden,” “out of nowhere,”
“like a kamikaze pilot.” He braked and moved left to attempt
to avoid the collision but was unable to stop.
At his deposition, in a segment read into the record at trial,
Martinez had said Valenzuela’s car then struck his motorcycle on
the right side “like a T-bone.” As he testified: “I seen it when it
came at me and hit me.” He was uncertain if his brakes locked
up, and made no mention of skidding before the impact. He tried
to avoid the collision by braking and moving to the left into lane 1
but was unable to stop and was in lane 1 when Valenzuela hit
him. He went over the hood and landed in the left-hand turn
pocket.
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Martinez testified that at the hospital he told Officer
Munoz that Valenzuela’s car was not stopped. Had it been
stopped, Martinez would have stopped too.
b. Plaintiff ’s expert
Martinez’s expert, Jon Landerville, testified that the
accident was caused by Valenzuela crossing Valley in an unsafe
manner and failing to see Martinez approaching from the left.
Landerville said Valenzuela’s Honda accelerated to 15–18 miles
per hour as he entered and moved across Valley, and at impact
was traveling at 6.9 miles per hour. Martinez was going 35 miles
per hour but decelerated to 21.2 miles per hour just before
sideswiping off Valenzuela’s front bumper. Landerville saw no
problem with the acceleration rate of the motorcycle. He opined
that Valenzuela’s maneuver was unsafe regardless of whether
he was turning left or right, and Martinez was “clearly visible”
for six to seven seconds before the collision, giving Valenzuela
enough time to stop and yield to the motorcycle. Landerville
had no reason to disbelieve Valenzuela’s deposition testimony in
which he stated that he looked left, right and left when exiting
the driveway, but opined that he simply missed seeing the
motorcycle.
Damage to the wheel cover at the left front wheel of
the Valenzuela’s Honda, along with damage to the hood, led
Landerville to opine that the car was in motion at the time of
impact, which occurred very deep into Lane 1, almost into the
left-turn pocket. Photos of blood on the roadway showed that
Martinez’s body came to rest in the left-turn pocket.
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3. Defense Evidence
a. Valenzuela
For the defense, Valenzuela testified that he exited Troy’s
Burgers intending to turn right onto Valley and make a U-turn
at Eastern to head east towards his home. He stopped on the
driveway’s apron, looked left down Valley for two to three
seconds, looked right, and then looked left again. He could see
the general area where Alhambra and Valley merged but the
intersection was not entirely visible because “there’s a bend in
the road at Alhambra, you can only see a certain portion up to
where the streetlight is at.” Not seeing any vehicles, Valenzuela
proceeded toward the left-turn pocket.
As he entered Valley and got as far as the middle of lane 2,
Valenzuela heard the exhaust of a motorcycle engine, looked left
again, and for the first time saw Martinez merging at a high
speed into the center lane of Valley, about 100 feet and two or
three seconds away. Valenzuela came to a stop, already angling
slightly toward the left-turn pocket. Martinez shifted slightly to
his left but struck Valenzuela’s stopped car on the front end.
b. Defense expert
Valenzuela’s expert, Harm Jansen, testified that
Valenzuela made a proper assessment of the gap in traffic so
as to safely pull out from Troy’s Burgers. He testified that after
Martinez turned from Alhambra onto Valley he accelerated to
39 miles per hour, and Valenzuela had only 3.4 seconds to react.
Jansen opined that Martinez lost control and skidded before
impacting Valenzuela’s stopped vehicle.
Jansen concluded that Valenzuela acted as a reasonable
person would in the same scenario, and “the rate at which . . .
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Martinez accelerated into traffic was the causative factor for the
collision.” Martinez’s failure to anticipate that other road users
would not be ready for a fast acceleration into traffic, paired with
his inability to control the motorcycle, caused the collision.
4. Verdict
The jury was asked, “Was . . . Valenzuela negligent in the
operation of his vehicle?” By a vote of 9-3, it answered no.
D. New Trial Ruling
Martinez moved for a new trial on the grounds of
(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the jury, (2) jury misconduct,
and (3) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. He
argued that Valenzuela negligently violated his right of way
when he pulled out of the Troy’s Burgers driveway and failed to
proceed with reasonable caution.
The court found that the evidence established at least the
following:
“1. There is, at most, a 200-foot distance between the
[Troy’s Burgers] driveway and Alhambra . . . .
“2. Plaintiff made his right turn from Alhambra . . . to
westbound Valley . . . on a green signal and accelerated toward
what would be the eventual area of impact in the number 1
westbound lane on Valley . . . .
“3. Defendant exited the driveway of Troy’s Burgers,
intending to turn right onto westbound Valley . . . and enter
the left-turn pocket, at least three, if not four, lanes away to
the south, and slightly west of the driveway.
“4. Defendant inched forward from the driveway, but
states that when he reached the curb, although he looked to
his left toward Alhambra . . . , he did not see the motorcycle.
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But defendant told investigating officer Munoz that he saw the
motorcycle turning from Alhambra onto Valley at a high rate of
speed.
“5. Defendant had a clear line of sight as plaintiff would
be coming off Alhambra . . . toward westbound Valley . . . .
“6. Claiming not to see any vehicle, defendant stated he
crossed the first two lanes of westbound Valley and was halfway
into the next, or number one, lane when he first heard and then
saw plaintiff ’s motorcycle. Defendant was impeached with his
deposition testimony where he said he was ‘already in lane 2 . . . ,’
not halfway into lane 1, when he heard or noticed the motorcycle.
Either way, defendant was unable to clear all . . . traffic lanes
of westbound Valley to complete his intended turn when the
collision occurred.
“7. Defendant did not see plaintiff ’s motorcycle before
the collision until it was approximately 100 feet away. But, at
his deposition, defendant testified the motorcycle was ‘50 to 100
feet away.’ At trial, defendant described and/or marked on
exhibit 36–48 and 103 (identical exhibits) the general location
where he first saw the motorcycle, an area which he described
and/or marked as just south and west of the crosswalk area
where plaintiff would begin his right turn onto westbound Valley.
At that time, defendant testified plaintiff was already crossing
Valley . . . .
“8. Defendant testified that by the time he saw the
motorcycle about 50-100 feet away, depending on which
testimony of his we use, all he could do was brake as a collision
was inevitable.” (Capitalization & italics omitted.)
The court stated that “[a]fter weighing all of the evidence,
the court concludes the jury clearly should have reached a
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different verdict as to whether or not defendant was negligent.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
The trial court stated:
“There is sufficient and substantial evidence that,
whether defendant was turning right to cross the entire width
of westbound Valley to enter the left-turn pocket three lanes
away, or, even worse, making an illegal (and admittedly unsafe
and difficult) left turn from the driveway across the same
lanes and having to be attentive to both west and eastbound
[Valley /Alhambra] traffic (possibly 5 to 6 traffic lanes in total),
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care by entering
westbound Valley and making, or attempting to make, an unsafe
turn in violation of plaintiff ’s right-of-way. He claims he did not
see plaintiff ’s motorcycle before the collision until it was too late,
but he also told Munoz and testified that he saw the motorcycle
turn from Alhambra onto Valley. That should have been a red
flag for any vehicle wanting to cross Valley[’s] . . . three lanes
(or more to go eastbound). It is undisputed that the motorcycle
would have been available to be seen at Alhambra, at least 150–
200 feet to defendant’s left. As he ‘inched’ from the driveway and
decided to begin his turn and cross the lanes of westbound Valley,
defendant saw the motorcycle but began his crossing anyway.
Defendant concedes he would not have proceeded forward had he
seen the motorcycle before he decided to cross. But, importantly,
according to his statement to Munoz, which was read to the jury,
he did see the motorcycle ‘turn [westbound] on Valley . . . from
Alhambra . . . at a high rate of speed.’ These circumstances
would support a finding of defendant’s negligence.
“If defendant maintains he did not see plaintiff when
he decided to turn, then defendant simply was not attentive
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to westbound Valley traffic west of Alhambra. Such traffic,
of course, would have the right-of-way over those exiting the
driveway, 150–200 feet away. Even if defendant looked and
saw the motorcycle, he clearly miscalculated the available gap
in westbound traffic coming from his left to safely complete either
a right or left turn without endangering such traffic. This gap
becomes even more problematic for the turning maneuver
defendant intended because defendant has always contended
that he saw the motorcycle approaching at a high rate of speed.
While a factfinder might also find plaintiff was partially at fault
in some way, there was insufficient evidence to absolve defendant
completely of any negligence inasmuch as plaintiff ’s motorcycle
was available to be seen. In fact, the motorcycle was seen, and,
as instructed in special instruction [No.] 1, it was ‘close enough’
to constitute an immediate hazard as defendant made his
decision to enter Valley . . . and make whatever turn he was
about to make, especially if he intended to cross at least three
wide lanes of traffic. This decision required defendant to
‘continue to yield the right-of-way’ to plaintiff (see . . . Veh.
Code[,] § 21804[, subd.] (a)]) until defendant could cross all lanes
of westbound Valley ‘with reasonable safety.’ He clearly did not
do the latter.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.)
The court stated that although “not essential to this
ruling,” Valenzuela’s testimony about intending to make a right
turn rather than a left was not credible, and it was “more likely
that [he] was intending to complete a left.”
The court granted Martinez’s motion for new trial, and
Valenzuela appeals.
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DISCUSSION
Valenzuela contends the order granting a new trial must
be reversed because the court relied on erroneous legal principles
and failed to adequately explain its reasoning, and no substantial
evidence supports the order.
A. Legal Principles
A new trial may be granted only on grounds specified
in Code of Civil Procedure section 657, one of them being
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 657.) “A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground
of insufficiency of the evidence . . . unless after weighing the
evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including
reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly
should have reached a different verdict or decision.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 657.)
An order granting a new trial must identify the grounds
relied upon and specify the reasons why the evidence supports
those grounds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) “Specifications for new
trial are sufficient if they make a record sufficiently precise to
permit meaningful review. [Citation.] Specifications are
insufficient if simply couched in the form of conclusions or
statements of ultimate fact.” (Tramell v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 157, 170.)
An order granting a new trial based “exclusively upon
an erroneous concept of legal principles applicable to the cause”
must be reversed. (Conner v. Southern Pacific Co. (1952)
38 Cal.2d 633, 637, see also McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180
Cal.App.4th 56, 94.)
“The standards for reviewing an order granting a new
trial are well[-]settled. After authorizing trial courts to grant a
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new trial on the ground[ ] of . . . ‘[i]nsufficiency of the evidence,’
section 657 provides: ‘[O]n appeal from an order granting a
new trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence . . .
such order shall be reversed as to such ground only if there is
no substantial basis in the record for . . . such reason[ ].’ . . .
Thus, we have held that an order granting a new trial under
section 657 ‘must be sustained on appeal unless the opposing
party demonstrates that no reasonable finder of fact could have
found for the movant on [the trial court’s] theory.’ [Citation.]
Moreover, ‘[a]n abuse of discretion cannot be found in cases in
which the evidence is in conflict and a verdict for the moving
party could have been reached . . . .’ [Citation.] In other words,
‘the presumption of correctness normally accorded on appeal
to the jury’s verdict is replaced by a presumption in favor of
the [new trial] order.’ ” (Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22
Cal.4th 405, 411–412 (Lane).)
B. The Trial Court Applied Correct Legal
Principles
1. The Court Employed No Improper
Presumption
The trial court’s order stated that “[w]hile a factfinder
might also find plaintiff was partially at fault in some way, there
was insufficient evidence to absolve defendant completely of any
negligence.” (Capitalization & italics omitted.)
Valenzuela argues this statement in effect presumed that
both parties were partially at fault, and therefore shifted the
burden to Valenzuela to prove he was not negligent, an incorrect
legal principle. We disagree.
The court’s statement was based on the evidence, not a
presumption. It was undisputed at trial that when Valenzuela
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exited the driveway at Troy’s Burgers, he had a clear view to
his left for 150 to 200 feet, and Martinez was in his line of sight.
Valenzuela nevertheless proceeded to the middle of Valley
before stopping. A reasonable factfinder could conclude from this
evidence that Valenzuela was negligent to at least some degree.
No presumption was necessary.
2. The Court Did Not Rely on a U-turn
Theory
In its order, the trial court stated, “While not essential
to this ruling, the court finds defendant’s testimony on a key
point not credible. . . . [¶] . . . Although there was no evidence
that a U-turn was permitted or prohibited from [the]
left-turn pocket . . . [at Valley and Eastern, where Valenzuela
stated he intended to make a U-turn], the court does not find
defendant’s U-turn testimony to be the more credible scenario.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
Valenzuela argues that because a U-turn was permitted
at the intersection, the court’s order was based on an erroneous
legal concept.
We disagree. The court expressly did not rely on this point
but merely recited (correctly) the state of the evidence: The
propriety of a U-turn at Eastern was not discussed. Whether a
U-turn was in fact allowed was irrelevant to both the order and
the case because both sides agreed it did not matter whether
Valenzuela intended to turn right or left out of the Troy’s Burgers
driveway—the accident occurred before he could do either.
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C. The Order Was Sufficiently Specific
Valenzuela argues the order granting a new trial was
insufficiently specific because it failed to state the relied-upon
ground and the reasons supporting it. We disagree.
“The requirement for stating the grounds and specifying
the reasons for each ground is to encourage careful deliberation
by the trial court before ruling and to provide a record sufficiently
precise to permit meaningful review.” (Kolar v. County of
Los Angeles (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 873, 880.) A “brief descriptive
statement” will often suffice. (Scala v. Jerry Witt & Sons, Inc.
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 359, 368 (Scala.) “It is helpful if the court
declares what witnesses it believed, what testimony was to be
disregarded or the value of any impeachment. [Citation.] . . .
[Citation.] The court should briefly identify criticized evidence.”
(Bigboy v. County of San Diego (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 397, 404.)
Here, the trial court stated the ground for granting a new
trial: “insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.”
The court clearly stated the reason supporting this ground:
“There is sufficient and substantial evidence that, whether
defendant was turning right . . . or . . . left . . . , defendant failed
to exercise reasonable care by entering westbound Valley and
making, or attempting to make, an unsafe turn in violation of
plaintiff ’s right-of-way.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Valenzuela argues the trial court failed to identify the
portion of the record that convinced the court Valenzuela was
negligent. We disagree. After stating the ground for the new
trial order and the reason supporting it, the court then described
at length the evidence supporting its conclusion:
Valenzuela “claims he did not see plaintiff ’s motorcycle
before the collision until it was too late, but he also told Munoz
15
and testified that he saw the motorcycle turn from Alhambra
onto Valley. That should have been a red flag for any vehicle
wanting to cross Valley[’s] . . . three lanes (or more to go
eastbound). It is undisputed that the motorcycle would have
been available to be seen at Alhambra, at least 150–200 feet
to defendant’s left. As he ‘inched’ from the driveway and decided
to begin his turn and cross the lanes of westbound Valley,
defendant saw the motorcycle but began his crossing anyway.
Defendant concedes he would not have proceeded forward had he
seen the motorcycle before he decided to cross. But, importantly,
according to his statement to Munoz, which was read to the jury,
he did see the motorcycle ‘turn [westbound] on Valley . . . from
Alhambra . . . at a high rate of speed.’ These circumstances
would support a finding of defendant’s negligence.” (Boldface &
capitalization omitted.)
Even if Valenzuela did not see Martinez, the court
explained, “then defendant simply was not attentive to
westbound Valley traffic west of Alhambra. Such traffic,
of course, would have the right-of-way over those exiting the
driveway, 150–200 feet away. Even if defendant looked and
saw the motorcycle, he clearly miscalculated the available gap
in westbound traffic coming from his left to safely complete
either a right or left turn without endangering such traffic.
This gap becomes even more problematic for the turning
maneuver defendant intended because defendant has always
contended that he saw the motorcycle approaching at a high
rate of speed. While a factfinder might also find plaintiff was
partially at fault in some way, there was insufficient evidence
to absolve defendant completely of any negligence inasmuch
as plaintiff ’s motorcycle was available to be seen. In fact, the
16
motorcycle was seen, and, as instructed in special instruction
[No.] 1, it was ‘close enough’ to constitute an immediate hazard
as defendant made his decision to enter Valley . . . and make
whatever turn he was about to make, especially if he intended to
cross at least three wide lanes of traffic. This decision required
defendant to ‘continue to yield the right-of-way’ to plaintiff . . .
until defendant could cross all lanes of westbound Valley
‘with reasonable safety.’ He clearly did not do the latter.”
(Capitalization & italics omitted.)
The court’s citation to the record was more than adequate.
(Cf. Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 646
(Estes) [“the trial court ‘should not be burdened with giving a
comprehensive review of the evidence’ ”].)
Contrast the trial court’s rationale here with the stated
reasons in an analogous ruling that our Supreme Court held
were insufficient: “In the case at bar the specification of reasons
merely recited that under the court’s view of the evidence (1) the
defendant was not negligent and (2) the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence proximately causing his injuries.” (Scala,
supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 364 [conclusory reasons do not suffice].)
We conclude that the trial court’s statement of reasons
reflected that the court evaluated all the evidence and was
sufficiently specific to provide for meaningful appellate review.
Valenzuela argues meaningful review is impossible because
the trial court’s finding that Valenzuela both saw and did not see
Martinez was so ambiguous as to obscure the theory on which the
court relied.
We disagree. The theories are not inconsistent, but
alternative: Valenzuela was negligent whether or not he saw
Martinez. If he saw him, he should have yielded. If he did not
17
see Martinez, he was inattentive because his line of sight was
clear, and Martinez was in it.
D. The Order Was Supported by Substantial
Evidence
Valenzuela argues that even if the trial court’s order was
procedurally proper, it was unsupported by substantial evidence.
We disagree.
It was undisputed that Martinez made a right turn from
Alhambra to westbound Valley on a green signal and had the
right-of-way. It was undisputed that Valenzuela entered onto
Valley and stopped halfway, broadside to oncoming traffic.
Officer Munoz testified that Valenzuela told him he saw Martinez
turn westbound onto Valley from Alhambra, approximately 150
to 200 feet away. This evidence alone supported the trial court’s
conclusion that Valenzuela saw Martinez in time to yield but
negligently failed to do so.
Even Valenzuela’s theory at trial—that he did not see
Martinez until immediately before the accident—supported
the court’s order. Valenzuela described the scene and placed
marks on map exhibits showing his clear line of sight to
Alhambra. Officer Munoz also testified that from the Troy’s
Burgers driveway there was a clear view of traffic merging from
Alhambra onto Valley. Thus, even if Valenzuela did not see
Martinez, the court was justified in concluding he should have.
“ ‘An abuse of discretion cannot be found in cases in which
the evidence is in conflict and a verdict for the moving party
could have been reached under the theory expressed in the
order for a new trial.’ ” (Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 643,
italics omitted.) As our high court observed in Lane: “The trial
court sits much closer to the evidence than an appellate court.
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Even the most comprehensive study of a trial court record cannot
replace the immediacy of being present at the trial, watching
and hearing as the evidence unfolds. The trial court, therefore,
is in the best position to assess the reliability of a jury’s verdict
and, to this end, the Legislature has granted trial courts broad
discretion to order new trials. The only relevant limitation on
this discretion is that the trial court must state its reasons for
granting the new trial, and there must be substantial evidence
in the record to support those reasons.” (Lane, supra, 22 Cal.4th
at p. 412.)
Here, the trial court watched and heard several witnesses
describe the accident while interacting with maps and diagrams
of the scene. From this immersion in the evidence, the court sits
in a better position than we to assess the factual reliability of the
verdict.
We conclude that the court considered all of the record,
relied on correct legal principles, and adequately stated
its reasons for granting a new trial, and those reasons were
supported by substantial evidence. It was therefore no abuse
of discretion to order a new trial.
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DISPOSITION
The order granting a new trial is affirmed. Respondent is
awarded his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
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