In re D.B. CA2/4

Filed 8/31/23 In re D.B. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re D.B., et al., Persons B320301
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
20LJJP00624,
20LJJP00624B,
20LJJP00624C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRITTANY B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Donald A. Buddle, Judge Affirmed.
David M. Yorton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Brittany B. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s denial of
her motion requesting a bonding study after reunification
services were terminated. We affirm.
Under Evidence Code section 730, a court may appoint an
expert to study the bond between a parent and a child. (See In re
Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1084.) “There is no
requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a
bonding study as a condition precedent to” terminating parental
rights. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.) A
juvenile court has broad discretion over whether to order a
bonding study. (Id. at pp. 1339-1340.) “The applicable standard
of review is whether, under all the evidence viewed in a light
most favorable to the juvenile court’s action, the juvenile court
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural
background because our opinion is unpublished and the parties
are familiar with the facts of the case and its procedural history.
(People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished
opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision
“does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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could have reasonably refrained from ordering a bonding study.”
(Id. at p. 1342.)
Our Supreme Court has encouraged juvenile courts to
“seriously consider, where requested and appropriate, allowing
for a bonding study or other relevant expert testimony.” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 633 fn. 4 (Caden C.).) This
statement was included in a discussion about the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i). Under that section, when reunification services have
been terminated and the “court determines . . . by a clear and
convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the
court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed
for adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) However, if the court
“finds that adoption of the child or termination of parental rights
is not in the best interest of the child” because of an ongoing
beneficial parent-child relationship, the court shall “follow a
process to select among permanent plans other than adoption.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, citing § 366.26, subd.
(c)(4)(A).) There are “three elements the parent must prove to
establish the exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and (2)
a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child
such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
The Supreme Court stated in a footnote that a bonding study or
other expert evidence may be useful in assessing whether the
child would benefit from an ongoing relationship with the parent.
(Id. at p. 633, fn. 4.)
Here, mother argues that under Caden C., a bonding study
was required to assist the juvenile court in determining whether
the beneficial parent-child relationship exception might apply
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here. We disagree. At the time the juvenile court denied
mother’s request, there was ample evidence in the reports about
the quality of mother’s relationship with the children. A. had
been removed from mother at the hospital shortly after her birth
in September 2020. D., nearly two years old, was removed from
mother’s care at the same time.2 Mother’s visitation with the
children was monitored from the October 9, 2020 detention
hearing onward.
Although mother’s visitation was initially unremarkable, it
became erratic over the life of the case. Detailed service logs
were submitted to the court, summarizing the monitors’
observations of mother’s visits with the children, including that
mother cooked for, played with, and appropriately interacted
with the children. The monitors also noted that D. resisted going
to visits with mother, mother struggled to address the needs of
two small children in her care at once, mother lacked a sense of
urgency when addressing the children’s needs, mother favored D.
over A., and D. did not express sadness when visits ended. In
addition, at the review hearing on September 28, 2021, mother
testified about her visits with the children, including what they
do together during visits.
Thus, at the time the juvenile court denied mother’s
request for a bonding study on May 4, 2022, mother’s visitation
with the children had been monitored for approximately 17
months, and evidence of the parent-child relationship was before
the court. When “the parent and child have been in the
dependency process for [twelve] months or longer, . . . the nature
2 Mother’s eight-year-old daughter was living with her father
and is not at issue in this appeal.
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and extent of the particular relationship should be apparent.
Social workers, interim caretakers and health professionals will
have observed the parent and child interact and provided
information to the court.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Although mother offers some general
assertions that bonding studies provide “critical” evidence, she
provides no authority or evidence suggesting that a bonding
study was warranted under the circumstances here, with
extremely young children, one of whom had never lived with
mother. (See In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1179
[bonding studies “are particularly informative in cases like Caden
C., in which the child was eight or nine years old and had a
complex parental relationship with both positive and negative
aspects”]; Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [when assessing
the parent-child relationship, courts consider factors such as
“‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs’”].)3
In short, mother has not demonstrated that the juvenile
court abused its discretion in denying her request for a bonding
study.
3 Mother also contends the juvenile court’s denial of her
request for a bonding study was “a quintessential denial of due
process.” She offers no legal support for this position, and
therefore it has been forfeited. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“When a point is asserted without
argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be
without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing
court’”].)
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s May 4, 2022 order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P.J.
MORI, J.
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