DocketNumber: No. CR 17–00430 WHA
Citation Numbers: 309 F. Supp. 3d 778
Judges: Alsup
Filed Date: 2/16/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
INTRODUCTION
In this drug prosecution, defendant moves to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of his hotel room. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion is GRANTED , and the evidence flowing from the unlawful search must be suppressed.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On July 30, 2017, DEA Task Force Officer and San Bruno Police Department Detective James Haggarty arrived at a Super 8 Motel in San Bruno following a tip that defendant David Escobar was at the hotel selling narcotics. SBPD Corporal Jose Valiente and DEA Special Agents Brandon Cahill and Matthew Monschein joined to assist. The officers went to Escobar's hotel room around 9:30 p.m. Each wore clothing identifying himself as a police officer without firearms or handcuffs drawn. No police canines assisted until later that evening (Tr. 10:17-13:17; 54:19-56:8; 88:4-89:2; 112:18-115:25).
Detective Haggarty knocked on the door to Escobar's room. Escobar opened the door, stepping partially out into the hallway and letting the spring-loaded door close against him. Detective Haggarty introduced himself, then asked Escobar if they could speak to him about crime in the area. Escobar was wearing underpants when he came out into the hallway. Detective Haggarty suggested that they continue speaking inside of the hotel room.
*781Escobar responded, "yeah, I guess," and took a step back into the room.
Escobar did not motion the officers into the room but instead stood inside the entryway to the room as if ready to continue the conversation. In stepping back, however, Escobar pushed open the door to allow sufficient space for Detective Haggarty to walk around Escobar and enter the room. Escobar and Corporal Valiente immediately followed. Special Agents Cahill and Monschein entered last. At this point, Escobar did not voice any objection to the officers entering the room (Tr. 13:18-16:14; 33:20-35:15; 56:1-58:18; 72:3-73:19).
Immediately inside the room was a vestibule. The right side of the vestibule included a sink, microwave, and refrigerator, and the left side of the vestibule included a door to the bathroom. The main bedroom area lay just beyond the vestibule. On its far right stood a desk and television. Around the left corner of the vestibule stood a chair, a small nightstand, and a bed. A black bag with the word "Postmates" written in white sat on the floor next to the chair. As the officers would discover, the Postmates bag contained several pounds of methamphetamine (Gov. Exh. 1, 2; Def. Exh. F, G).
*782?
When Detective Haggarty walked past Escobar, he did not pause within the vestibule. Instead, he proceeded into the bedroom area, conducted a protective sweep, and came to rest near the television. Escobar eventually followed Haggarty. They proceeded to talk.
Corporal Valiente also walked completely through the vestibule, turned left, and continued towards the Postmates bag. After conducting their own protective sweep of the bathroom, Special Agents Cahill and Monschein remained in the vestibule (Tr. 16:6-14; 39:11-40:2; 72:12-22; 92:6-23).
The methamphetamine inside the Postmates bag was not visible from the vestibule or from the side of the room where Detective Haggarty and Escobar spoke. Rather, it could only be seen by standing directly over the Postmates bag and looking down through a softball-sized opening at one end of the zipped top. Once Corporal Valiente so positioned himself, he saw what he believed to be methamphetamine. After shining his flashlight through the opening into the bag to confirm its contents, Corporal Valiente placed Escobar in handcuffs. At this point Escobar asked whether the officers had a warrant (Tr. 62:6-66:12; 74:3-75:1; 124:12-16).
In August 2017, Escobar was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Escobar filed the instant motion to suppress in October 2017, and two evidentiary hearings on the motion were held on January 10 and January 16, 2018, respectively. The parties submitted supplemental briefing, which this order follows (Dkt. Nos. 1, 18, 36-38).
ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures *783protects the legitimate expectation of privacy of an occupant of a hotel or motel room. Bailey v. Newland ,
1. ESCOBAR WAS NOT SEIZED IN THE DOORWAY OF HIS HOTEL ROOM .
Escobar first argues that his contact with the officers in the threshold of his hotel room amounted to a unlawful seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Generally, the so-called "knock and talk" exception to the warrant requirement permits law enforcement officers to "encroach upon the curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants." United States v. Lundin ,
Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's "castle" with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant there of whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.
United States v. Cormier ,
Our court of appeals has had multiple opportunities to assess whether a "knock and talk" amounted to a seizure rather than a voluntary encounter. In United States v. Crapser , for example, police did not seize the defendant where four officers politely knocked on the defendant's motel room door in the middle of the day, did not draw attention to their weapons or use any form of physical force, made no effort to enter the motel room, and did not suggest that the defendant could not leave or return to his room.
In contrast, our court of appeals found that an interaction between officers and a suspect outside of the suspect's apartment amounted to a seizure where he faced "the threatening presence" of four officers, one officer purposefully revealed his concealed weapon, the confrontation took place in a hallway shielded from public view, and the officers acted "in an officious and authoritative manner that indicated that [the suspect] was not free to decline" the officers' requests. Orhorhaghe,
This order finds the instant case dissimilar to Orhorhaghe. The facts presented instead compare to those in Cormier and Crapser . Here, although the interaction occurred at night and Escobar was never told he was free to leave, Detective Haggarty said nothing upon knocking on the door and the officers never drew weapons or handcuffs. Moreover, Escobar did not try to end the encounter in the hallway, and at no point did the officers indicate *784that he was unable to return to his room or otherwise end the conversation. Under the totality of the circumstances, Escobar was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he opened his door and began speaking with the officers in the threshold of his hotel room.
2. ESCOBAR CONSENTED, AT MOST, TO THE OFFICERS' LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE ROOM'S VESTIBULE .
There is no dispute that the officers entered Escobar's hotel room without a warrant. Consent, however, is a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on warrantless searches. Morgan v. United States ,
This order finds that Escobar consented, at most, to moving the conversation from the hallway to the vestibule, not from the hallway into the bedroom area. In the "absence of a specific request by police for permission to enter a home, a defendant's failure to object to such entry is not sufficient to establish free and voluntary consent."
Our court of appeals has made clear that an invitation to enter a dwelling does not, without more, give the officers permission to enter every room in that dwelling. United States v. Mejia ,
Here, the government has failed to show that Escobar gave any subsequent implied consent to the officers *785venturing throughout the entirety of his hotel room. "When seeking actual consent to enter someone's home, officers must generally make a 'specific request' to enter, and even then, they are permitted to stray only where any other visitor might be expected to go." United States v. Smith ,
Contrary to the government, United States v. Basher ,
United States v. Junne Kyoo Koh ,
The government argues that Escobar's consent did not reasonably confine the officers to the vestibule because the vestibule was small and not well lit. In particular, the government argues that Detective Haggarty reasonably went to the best lit area in the room (near the television) in order to continue speaking with Escobar. The vestibule did, however, have a light that could be turned on (Def. Exh. G). Moreover, Corporal Valiente located himself on the other side of the room near the Postmates bag, a location which the government does not contend was well lit.
Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances, this order finds that the officers exceeded the scope of Escobar's consent when they filled the entire suite.
*7863. NEITHER THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE NOR THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP DOCTRINE JUSTIFIES THE SEIZURE .
Two additional exceptions to the warrant requirement are the plain view doctrine and the protective sweep doctrine. Neither exception justifies the seizure at issue here. First , under the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize evidence even where an officer is not searching for it, "but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object." Horton v. California ,
Second, although Detective Haggarty and Special Agent Cahill conducted "protective sweeps" upon entering the hotel room, the government does not contend that these sweeps resulted in the discovery of the methamphetamine. Rather, as the government admits, the methamphetamine was only discovered when Corporal Valiente-who did not do a protective sweep-approached and looked into the Postmates bag. As a result, the protective sweep doctrine also does not justify the warrantless intrusion at issue here.
The Court notes its concern, however, with the conduct in this case. Here, it appears that the police timed their "knock and talk" at Escobar's hotel room for the late evening, an unsurprising time to find an occupant not fully dressed. When Escobar in fact answered in his underwear, they used this circumstance to suggest continuing the talk out of the public hallway. When Escobar gave the slightest indication of consent, they used it as an invitation to search the entire suite.
To be sure, the protective sweep doctrine has been upheld by the Supreme Court and by our court of appeals. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie ,
And while our court of appeals has applied the protective sweep doctrine to a dwelling that officers entered by consent, nothing in Garcia excuses the government from the requirement that a protective sweep be based on "articulable facts" that would lead a reasonable officer to believe a sweep was necessary to protect the officer's safety.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Escobar's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the warrantless search of his hotel room is GRANTED , and the evidence *787will be excluded from his trial. A status hearing on this matter is scheduled for MARCH 6 AT 2:00 P.M.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Court has tried hard to reconcile the conflicting testimony regarding the movements of the four officers and Escobar. The testimony is nearly consistent that Detective Haggarty made the first significant movement, namely from the hallway towards the television, passing immediately by Escobar. The testimony is also nearly consistent that Special Agents Cahill and Monschein entered the room last. The witnesses remain in hopeless conflict, however, over whether Corporal Valiente followed Detective Haggarty into the bedroom area (followed by Escobar) versus whether Escobar followed Detective Haggarty into the bedroom area (followed by Corporal Valiente). This order finds that Detective Haggarty was the first to enter the room and that Special Agents Cahill and Monschein were last. The Court has considered the conflicting testimony, but finds it unnecessary to determine the remaining steps in the sequence.