DocketNumber: Case No. 18-cv-03395-PJH
Citation Numbers: 343 F. Supp. 3d 891
Filed Date: 10/22/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
A. DoorDash's Motion to Compel Arbitration
"The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability." Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC,
The "first principle" that underlies the U.S. Supreme Court's arbitration decisions is that "[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of consent and thus is a way to resolve those disputes-but only those disputes -that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration." Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l B'hd of Teamsters,
Under the FAA, any party bound to an arbitration agreement that falls within the scope of the FAA may bring a motion in federal district court to compel arbitration and stay the proceeding pending resolution of the arbitration.
In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, the court's role is "limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc.,
The FAA provides that arbitration clauses "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
"[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
Plaintiff argues that defendant's motion to compel should be denied for two reasons.
*899First, plaintiff argues that the FAA does not apply to the Arbitration Agreement because it is exempt from the FAA's coverage under the transportation-worker exemption. Second, plaintiff argues that a generally-applicable California contract defense prohibits enforcement of the arbitration clause because the Arbitration Agreement prohibits plaintiff from seeking public injunctive relief in any forum. Finally, plaintiff asks the court to dismiss the action rather than stay it if arbitration is required.
1. The FAA's Transportation-Worker Exemption
A district court must first "assess whether a Section 1 exemption applies before ordering arbitration." In re Van Dusen,
Section 1 of the FAA exempts from its coverage all "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
"The plain meaning of the words 'engaged in commerce' is narrower than the more open-ended formulations 'affecting commerce' and 'involving commerce.' " Circuit City,
Plaintiff alleges that he "has worked as a delivery driver for DoorDash" in "San Jose, California." Compl. ¶ 3. He does not allege that he ever crossed state lines as part of his work. As such, there is no allegation that he engaged in interstate commerce under the definition of the narrowly-construed term. The Agreement is therefore not exempt from the FAA under
Plaintiff argues that DoorDash drivers are involved in the flow of interstate commerce because they facilitate the transportation of goods that originated across state lines. Although this would almost certainly be enough under the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause, the FAA is more narrow. Plaintiff also relies on Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc.,
2. Whether A Generally-Applicable California Contract Law Defense Prohibits Enforcement of The Arbitration Clause
State contract defenses may invalidate arbitration clauses if those defenses apply to contracts generally. Doctor's Assocs., Inc.,
Determining whether the Arbitration Agreement prevents all adjudication of public injunctive relief in any forum requires the court to consider two issues. First, the court considers whether plaintiff's complaint seeks public injunctive relief under California law. Second, the court considers whether the Arbitration Agreement prevents plaintiff from adjudicating a claim for such relief in any forum.
"[P]ublic injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law is relief that has 'the primary purpose and effect of' prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public. Relief that has the primary purpose or effect of redressing or preventing injury to an individual plaintiff-or to a group of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff-does not constitute public injunctive relief." McGill,
Here, plaintiff's operative complaint and proposed amended complaint both seek injunctive relief only for his California Labor Code claims. Compl. at 9; Dkt. 31-1 at 8. Those claims have the primary purpose and effect of redressing and preventing harm to DoorDash's employees. Indeed, plaintiff's argument makes clear that the injunctive relief he seeks would be entirely opposite of what McGill requires-any benefit to the public would be derivate of and ancillary to the benefit to DoorDash's employees (in the form of, for example, the company's increased tax payments and employees' possible decreased dependence on assistance from the state government). Therefore, Magana does not assert a claim for public injunctive relief under state law.
Even if the complaint did seek public injunctive relief, the Arbitration Agreement does not prevent adjudication of public injunctive relief in any forum, because the arbitrator may adjudicate a claim for such relief. Magana argues that the Arbitration Agreement has a Class Action Waiver provision which states that "an arbitrator shall not have any authority to hear or arbitrate any class, collective or representative action[.]" Dkt. 32 at 18 (quoting Agreement § XI.3). But a claim for public injunctive relief is not a class, collective, or representative action. See McGill,
3. Whether to Stay or Dismiss This Action
Given that the action must be compelled to arbitration, defendant asks the court to stay the action pending arbitration pursuant to the FAA's terms. Plaintiff requests that the court dismiss the action rather than stay it pending arbitration. He argues that dismissal is appropriate because the case presents a serious issue of public importance to decide on appeal, namely whether the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc should overturn O'Connor and adopt Bickerstaff.
The FAA provides that:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit *902is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
The court sees no reason to depart from the FAA's plain language in this instance. The court is not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that dismissal of this action is appropriate to expedite his attempt to seek en banc appellate review of O'Connor. Fist, the Ninth Circuit very recently rejected Bickerstaff, and this court is not persuaded that there is any legitimate basis to reconsider that opinion. Second, even if the Ninth Circuit adopted Bickerstaff, Magana would not benefit from that decision due to the material factual distinctions between Bickerstaff and Magana's complaint, as discussed above. As such, the action is STAYED pending arbitration.
B. Magana's Motion for a Protective Order and Corrective Notice
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(d) provides in part:
In conducting an action under this rule, the court may issue orders that: ... (C) impose conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors ... or (E) deal with similar procedural matters.
"[A] district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties. But this discretion is not unlimited, and indeed is bounded by the relevant provisions of the Federal Rules." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard,
The Ninth Circuit has identified "usual concerns weighing in favor of restrictions," specifically: "(1) solicitation of direct representation of class members who are not formal parties, (2) solicitation of funds and agreements to pay fees, (3) solicitation by defendants of requests to opt out, and (4) communications which may be confusing or misleading, or create an impression which *903reflects adversely on the court." Domingo v. New England Fish Co.,
Regarding the potential abuses and potential interference plaintiff alleges, the court can discern two potentially-relevant concerns: solicitation by defendants of requests to opt out of the class, and communications which may be confusing or misleading.
First, it is evident that DoorDash's communication did not request that anyone opt out of this litigation, or take any action at all specifically with respect to this litigation.
Second, it is difficult to characterize DoorDash's communication as confusing or misleading at all, especially with respect to this litigation. DoorDash's communication contained a general statement about potential state legislation, a link to more information about it, and information about how drivers who agree with DoorDash can petition their government. Any effect on this case from a driver reviewing and taking action based on the email is too remote and speculative to implicate any interest in this case. The political activity of the email is also too remote from the subject of this litigation to make the omission of this action confusing or misleading.
C. Magana's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
"Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend 'shall be freely given when justice so requires.' " AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc.,
The court GRANTS plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff Magana is COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE HIS CLAIMS AGAINST DOORDASH. This action is hereby STAYED until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Plaintiff's motion for a protective order and corrective notice is DENIED. Finally, the court GRANTS plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, although the action will remain stayed until arbitration of Magana's claims is complete. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within seven days from the date of this order, or he may decline to file an amended complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Plaintiff also argues that the communication constituted a violation California Labor Code §§ 1101(b) & 1102, and that the court should order a corrective notice under Rule 23(d) based on the alleged statutory violations. The court notes that plaintiff has not sought to amend his complaint to state claims based on these alleged labor code violations, but instead seeks to adjudicate the merits in a Rule 23(d) motion. First, the record is not sufficiently clear at this early stage of litigation to weigh the potential interference with the rights of the parties, especially considering the substantive, merits-based findings plaintiff's argument would require the court to make. Second, even if it violated the labor code, DoorDash's communication is not confusing or misleading-nor does it raise any of the other usual concerns weighing in favor of restrictions-and therefore does not merit a corrective notice under Rule 23(d).
For the reasons stated at the hearing, and because the filing does not comply with this court's local rules, plaintiff's notice of supplemental authority filed at Docket Number 43 is STRICKEN from the record.
Adding Roussel as a plaintiff is not futile because he alleges that he opted out of the arbitration provision of the Arbitration Agreement. As such, it appears that he can bring his claims against DoorDash in court rather than through arbitration. Moreover, at this stage it does not appear to be futile for Roussel to attempt to allege claims on behalf of a putative class of those who have, like him, opted out of agreements to arbitrate claims against DoorDash.