Ignacio Canela v. W. L. Montgomery

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IGNACIO CANELA, Case No.: 19cv1434-GPC (MSB) 12 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: 13 v. MOTION FOR STAY [ECF NO. 57] 14 KATHLEEN ALLISON, Secretary, 15 Respondent. 16 17 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge 18 Gonzalo P. Curiel pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of 19 the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Petitioner, a state 20 prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 21 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 10, 2019, raising the single, exhausted claim that the trial court 22 violated his federal constitutional rights when it revoked his right to self-representation 23 just prior to the start of trial. (ECF No. 1 at 2, 6-8.) Respondent answered on October 24 10, 2019. (ECF No. 13.) Petitioner requested thirteen extensions of the deadline to file 25 his traverse, which the Court granted, continuing the deadline from November 27, 2019, 26 to April 6, 2022. (See ECF Nos. 9, 15-16, 18, 21-37, 38-43, 46, 52, 54.) Plaintiff has not 27 filed a traverse. (See docket.) 2 constructively filed a “Motion for Stay and Abeyance to Exhaust Unexhausted Claims.” 3 (ECF No. 57.) Pursuant to Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), he asked the 4 Court to stay this case while he exhausts new ineffective assistance of counsel and 5 prosecutorial misconduct claims in state court. (Id.) Respondent opposed the stay 6 motion on April 29, 2022. (ECF No. 60.) Petitioner constructively filed his reply, entitled 7 “Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Opposition Motion for Petitioner’s Motion for 8 Stay and Abeyance” on May 25, 2022. (ECF No. 63.) The Court has considered the 9 motion to stay, opposition, reply, and the complete record. For the reasons set forth 10 below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s motion be DENIED. 11 I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 12 Petitioner was convicted by a jury of numerous criminal offenses, including 13 premeditated attempted murder of a police officer and several drug and firearm-related 14 offenses. (See ECF No. 14-38 at 396-400.) Petitioner was initially charged on October 15 20, 2013. (ECF No. 14-37 at 13.) Petitioner was represented by counsel until the Court 16 granted his motion for self-representation on June 5, 2015. (See ECF No. 14-38 at 148- 17 82.) The Court revoked Petitioner’s self-represented status and appointed counsel from 18 the Multiple Conflict Office on January 5, 2016. (ECF No. 14-38 at 191.) Petitioner’s 19 case was tried to a jury beginning on May 5, 2016, and ending on June 2, 2016, when 20 the jury returned guilty verdicts. (Id. at 198-237.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner 21 to fourteen years plus forty years to life on June 22, 2016. (Id. at 254-57.) 22 Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on July 10, 23 20191, raising a single claim that the trial court “denied [him] a fundamental 24 25 1 Under the “mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner’s filing of a state or federal habeas petition is deemed 26 filed when the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the court. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1106 n.2 27 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court here uses Petitioner’s signature date of July 10, 2019, when both Petitioner 2 to the start of trial.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) He had previously raised this claim by direct 3 appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review almost one year and ninety 4 days prior, on April 11, 2018. (ECF No. 49.) Respondent answered the federal Petition 5 on October 10, 2019, and filed a 3900-page Notice of Lodgment and Lodgment in 6 support thereof. (ECF Nos. 13, 14.) 7 Between January 2020 and November of 2021 resolution of this case was delayed 8 when the Court granted Petitioner’s numerous motions to continue his deadline to file a 9 traverse. (See ECF Nos. 16, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 40, 42, 46.) Reasons for the 10 various continuances included Petitioner’s lack of legal training; limited, intermittent 11 access to the law library and telephone; pending requests to the superior court for 12 transcripts and other discovery; and primarily, restrictions on prisoner movement and 13 interruptions to law library access due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (See ECF Nos. 15, 18, 14 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 37, 39, 41, 43.) On November 12, 2021, Petitioner filed a motion 15 for discovery and transcripts, asking this Court to order others to provide him with three 16 items/categories of documents. (ECF No. 49.) In an abundance of caution, the Court 17 granted a very limited amount of discovery that could potentially be relevant the 18 Faretta claim before the Court, and extended Petitioner’s traverse deadline to permit 19 him to review the same. (See ECF Nos. 51, 54.) Most recently, the traverse was due on 20 April 6, 2022. (ECF No. 54 at 2.) 21 On April 5, 2022,2 Petitioner filed the instant Motion for a Stay and Abeyance, 22 indicating for the first time that he wishes to bring additional claims of ineffective 23 assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. (ECF No. 47 at 1, 6.) He 24 specifically claims that trial counsel failed to “conduct a reasonable investigation, hire 25 26 2 The Court again applies the mailbox rule. (See supra, n.1.) The Court finds Plaintiff’s signature date on both the motion and the proof of service establish a constructive filing date of April 5, 2022. (See 27 ECF No. 47 at 6-8); see also Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (using proof of service to 2 and charges. . . . [and] present corroborating evidence and facts.” (Id. at 6.) He claims 3 that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, withheld evidence by redacting 4 discovery, tampered with evidence and “placed extra burdens on Petitioner with 5 unfound[ed] charges, enhancements and evidence.” (Id.) Respondent urges the Court 6 to deny Petitioner’s stay motion, because his two claims “are untimely as they do not 7 relate back to the original timely claim in the pending Petition in which Canela 8 challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to represent himself at trial.” (ECF No. 9 60 at 2.) In reply, Petitioner appears to argue that his new ineffective assistance of 10 counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims relate back to his timely Faretta claim 11 because had the trial court permitted him to continue representing himself, he would 12 not have a basis for the other two claims.3 (See ECF No. 63 at 2 (“[H]ad Petitioner’s 13 Faretta rights . . . not been terminated, Petitioner would have presented to the trial 14 court and jury all relevant information and facts being brought before the present court. 15 . . . Also information that was being withheld by the prosecution . . . .”).) 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 A. Legal Standard 18 A federal court may not address a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner 19 has exhausted state remedies with respect to each claim raised. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 2254(b)(1)(A); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982). Generally, to satisfy the 21 22 3 The Court notes Petitioner’s representation that lack of access to the law library rendered him unable 23 to conduct any legal research in support of his reply. (ECF No. 63 at 1.) Petitioner specifically describes a lockdown that lasted from May 6 to May 19, 2022, and submits an “Inmate Request for Interview,” 24 which demonstrates that he was also denied access to the law library due to a staff shortage on May 25 25 and 26, 2022. (Id. at 1-2, 5.) However, the Court also notes that Petitioner did not request additional time to permit him to perform legal research, and instead indicated he would “respond as 26 best as one can.” (Id. at 2.) Based on the foregoing, the Court does not understand Petitioner to be requesting additional time. The Court remains mindful of its obligations to liberally construe 27 Petitioner’s filings and independently review the record. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2 highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it,” or “demonstrate[ ] that no state 3 remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 4 Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). 5 Pursuant to the Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), all 6 federal habeas petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and claims not 7 exhausted and presented to the federal court within the one-year period are forfeited. 8 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). A district court may not consider a “mixed” federal habeas 9 petition–a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. 10 at 522. 11 A petitioner may move to stay this federal proceeding while he returns to state 12 court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 659-60 (9th 13 Cir. 2005); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d. 742, 770-71 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The two 14 procedures used to stay a federal habeas case in such circumstnaces are the “stay and 15 abeyance” and “withdrawal and abeyance” procedures. 16 Under the “stay and abeyance” procedure, a district court has discretion to stay a 17 “mixed” federal habeas petition, while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust 18 the unexhausted claims without losing his right to federal habeas review due to the 19 relevant one-year statute of limitations. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273-78. Once the petitioner 20 exhausts the state court remedies for all his claims, the district court lifts the stay and 21 allows the petitioner to proceed in federal court on all claims. See id. at 277. The “stay 22 and abeyance” procedure is available only in “limited circumstances” when the 23 following three conditions are met: (1) the petitioner demonstrates “good cause” for 24 failing to first exhaust his claims in state court; (2) the unexhausted claims potentially 25 have merit; and (3) there is no indication that petitioner intentionally engaged in 26 dilatory litigation tactics. Id. at 277-78; see also Mitchell v. Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 1166, 27 1171 (9th Cir. 2015) (same). The procedure allows petitioner’s “mixed” petition to 2 petitioner’s claims. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. 3 Alternatively, a “mixed” federal petition may be stayed pursuant to “withdrawal 4 and abeyance” procedure outlined in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 5 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 6 2007). A Kelly abeyance requires compliance with the following three-step procedure: 7 (1) petitioner files an amended petition deleting his unexhausted claims; (2) the district 8 court “stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing 9 petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims”; and 10 (3) petitioner subsequently seeks to amend the federal habeas petition to reattach “the 11 newly-exhausted claims to the original petition.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th 12 Cir. 2009) (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-71). A stay under Kelly does not toll AEDPA’s 13 limitations period with respect to unexhausted claims. King, 564 F.3d at 1140-42. The 14 petitioner is allowed to amend his newly-exhausted claims back into his federal petition 15 only if the claims are timely under the AEDPA or “relate back” to the exhausted claims in 16 the pending federal petition. Id. at 1140-41, see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662- 17 64 (2005). A new claim relates back to an existing claim if the two claims share a 18 “common core of operative facts.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664. “[A] Kelly stay will be denied 19 when the court finds such a stay would be futile.” Knowles v. Muniz, 228 F. Supp. 3d 20 1009, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (internal citation omitted). 21 B. Analysis 22 Despite his use of the “stay and abeyance” language, Petitioner asks that the 23 District Court enter a “Kelly stay,” so that he may return to state court to exhaust claims 24 of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. (ECF No. 57 at 5- 25 6.) He specifically cites to Kelly as the basis of his motion and articulates the Kelly 26 standard and procedure. (See id.) Additionally, his petition includes only one exhausted 27 claim, and he has not sought to amend his complaint to add his unexhausted ineffective 2 Patton v. Beard, No. 14-CV-569-BEN (BLM), 2015 WL 1812811, at *4 (S.D. Cal April 20, 3 2015) (“The Court notes that because Petitioner’s Petition contains only exhausted 4 claims, it is not a mixed petition, and thus Rhines is inapplicable.”) (citations omitted). 5 Although Petitioner’s case is somewhat different from a typical petitioner bringing 6 a Kelly stay motion, many Courts have analogized similarly situated petitioners to those 7 who have already completed step one of the Kelly withdrawal and abeyance process. 8 See Haskins v. Schriro, No. CV 05-3252-PHX-MHM (JM), 2009 WL 3241836, at *7 (D. Ariz. 9 Sept. 30, 2009) (“This Court acknowledges that Petitioner did not start on the same 10 procedural ground as the normal Kelly petitioner; with a mixed petition. Petitioner is, 11 however, in the same procedural posture as any Kelly-petitioner that has taken step- 12 one; he possesses a fully exhausted habeas claim and prays that the Court grant a stay. 13 Accordingly, the Court believes the rules governing Kelly apply in the instant case.”); see 14 also, e.g., Patton, 2015 WL 1812811, at *6 (applying Kelly to the petitioner’s request to 15 stay a fully exhausted petition so that he could exhaust new claims), Taylor v. Gonzalez, 16 Civil No. 11cv1109 WQH (RBB), 2012 WL 3648141, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (same 17 and collecting cases). 18 Respondent argues that under Kelly, Petitioner should not be permitted to stay 19 his federal petition because the two claims he seeks to exhaust are already untimely and 20 do not relate back to the Faretta claim in Petitioner’s original petition. (ECF No. 60 at 3- 21 4.) Respondent is correct that because a petitioner will only be allowed to amend a 22 complaint to add a newly exhausted claim at step three of the Kelly procedure if the 23 claim is either independently timely or relates back to a timely claim, a petitioner will 24 only be entitled to a Kelly stay if his unexhausted claims meet that standard. McCreary 25 v. Spearman, Case No.: 18-cv-00789-CAB-BGS, 2018 WL 6567881, at *4 (“Critically, 26 because a Kelly stay does not toll AEDPA’s one-year statutory deadline, an untimely 27 petitioner is precluded from such a stay unless he is entitled to statutory or equitable 2 entitled to a stay of his fully exhausted Petition if his new . . . claim is not otherwise 3 time-barred by AEDPA”); Hughes v. Walker, No. 2:10-cv-3024 WBS TJB, 2012 WL 4 346449, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012) (“Petitioner’s new claims must [] either ‘relate 5 back’ to original claims raised in the federal habeas petition for a Kelly stay to be 6 warranted or must be independently timely under AEDPA.”). Therefore, Petitioner is 7 only entitled to a Kelly stay if his unexhausted claims are timely under AEDPA, either 8 independently or by relation back. 9 1. Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are untimely under AEDPA. 10 The one-year AEDPA statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of: 11 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 12 13 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 14 removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 15 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 16 recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 17 the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 18 19 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 20 21 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 22 The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review on April 11, 23 2018, and Petitioner’s judgment became final for purposes of AEDPA ninety days later, 24 on July 10, 2018. (See ECF No. 14-49); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 25 1999) (limitations period does not begin to run until after expiration of ninety-day 26 period for seeking certiorari). Accordingly, the AEDPA statute of limitations in this case 27 began to run on July 11, 2018, the day after Petitioner’s conviction became final, and 2 begins to run the day after the conviction becomes final). Petitioner constructively filed 3 his habeas petition in federal court on July 10, 20194, the day before the statute ran. 4 (ECF No. 1.) Because Petitioner filed his Petition before the AEDPA deadline had passed, 5 the Faretta claim therein is timely. However, the new claims that Petitioner seeks to 6 exhaust before adding them to an amended petition are not timely unless Petitioner is 7 entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling. 8 AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision suspends the one-year statute of limitation 9 period while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 10 review” is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, “the time when a 11 qualifying [state habeas] application is pending shall not be counted toward a period of 12 limitation.” Id. At the time that Petitioner signed his federal habeas petition, the day 13 before the AEDPA statute of limitations expired, Petitioner indicated in his Petition that 14 he had not “previously filed any habeas petitions in any state court with respect to this 15 judgment of conviction.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Petitioner does not indicate, either in the 16 present stay motion or his reply, that he has filed any state habeas petitions addressing 17 the claims he now seeks a stay to exhaust. (ECF Nos. 57, 63.) Instead, Petitioner 18 appears to now be asking for a stay so that he might file a state habeas petition in the 19 first instance. Considering that Petitioner claims his delay is related to “the [recent] 20 humanitarian COVID-19 crisis and state wide lockdowns,” that interfered with his law 21 library access, it is untenable that he filed a state habeas petition raising his 22 unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims 23 before the AEDPA deadline passed on July 11, 2019, the day after he filed his federal 24 25 4 Under the “mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner’s filing of a state or federal habeas petition is deemed 26 filed when the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the court. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1106 n.2 27 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court here uses Petitioner’s signature date of July 10, 2019, when both Petitioner 2 prisons. (See id. at 2); see also, e.g., Coleman v. Newsom, 455 F. Supp. 3d 926, 931 3 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (“Although the current record is unclear as to when [state officials] 4 began planning a response to COVID-19, they started implementing preventive 5 measures [in California prisons] at least as of March 11, 2020, when normal visiting at 6 CDCR institutions was canceled statewide, fact sheets and posters on the pandemic 7 were delivered to the inmate population, and additional hand-sanitizing dispenser 8 stations were ordered.”) Petitioner’s timely federal habeas petition did not statutorily 9 toll the AEDPA deadline. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001) (“[A]n 10 application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State post- 11 conviction or other collateral review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).”) 12 Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling. 13 In addition to statutory tolling, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations may be 14 subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 15 631, 645 (2010). However, the threshold to trigger equitable tolling is high, and 16 therefore it is not available in most cases. Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 17 2010). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas petitioner has the burden of 18 establishing two elements: (1) “he has been pursuing his rights diligently,” and (2) 19 “some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (citing 20 Pace, 544 U.S. at 418); see also Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2014) 21 (same). The failure to file a timely petition must be the result of external forces, not the 22 result of the petitioner’s lack of diligence. Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107. A petitioner must 23 establish that the extraordinary circumstances caused the failure to timely file. See 24 Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005), reh'g granted, opinion modified 25 on unrelated grounds, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). 26 As noted above, the only argument applicable to equitable tolling in Petitioner’s 27 motion is that “[d]ue to [recent] humanitarian COVID-19 crisis and statewide lockdowns, 2 being incarcerated makes it “difficult to conduct any proper research into ones [sic] 3 appeal.” (ECF No. 63 at 1.) 4 Addressing first Petitioner’s claim that restrictions related to COVID-19 somehow 5 prevented him from timely filing, the Court finds this argument lacks merit. Because 6 Petitioner’s AEDPA deadline of July 11, 2019 passed before COVID-19 began to impact 7 California prisons as previously noted, this cannot be a basis for statutory tolling. 8 Next, the Court addresses Petitioner’s generalized complaints about the 9 challenges created by incarceration: 10 [I]f it’s not one thing[,] it’s another with the prison’s policies and procedures. From being transfered [sic] at any moment, to a humanitarian crisis like 11 Covid-19, to incidents that cause cancelations and shutdowns of everything 12 from law library time, education, self help programs, etc., etc. 13 (ECF No. 63 at 1.) Petitioner has provided no evidence that any specific limitations 14 incident to his incarceration prevented him from filing his habeas petition during the 15 relevant time period, from July 11, 2018, to July 11, 2019. Petitioner does not articulate 16 any specific time(s) when some feature of his incarceration prevented him from 17 progressing with his federal habeas petition. Generalized, non-specific claims such as 18 Petitioner’s “cannot establish that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from 19 filing a federal habeas petition” due to a failure “to demonstrate with any specificity a 20 connection between the alleged denial of access and his untimely petition.” Quintero v. 21 Haws, No. 07-CV-0579-H (POR), 2008 WL 553651, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008) (finding 22 petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling based on non-specific allegations “that 23 prison policies, lockdowns, and his job demands restricted his access to the law library”); 24 see also Xayasomloth v. Cate, No. 08CV260 BEN (AJB), 2009 WL 514286, at *8 (S.D. Cal. 25 Feb. 27, 2009) (“Because Petitioner does not document the exact duration of any 26 lockdown or his attempts to access the law library, the Court cannot say that the library 27 access restrictions were the but-for and proximate cause of Petitioner's untimeliness for 2 “would essentially eviscerate equitable tolling because every prisoner would be entitled 3 to make such claims.” Storie v. Kramer, No. 1:06-cv-01796-AWI-TAG HC, 2009 WL 4 306705, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009), report and recommendation adopted by 2009 WL 5 899970 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2009). 6 Further, the nature of the unexhausted claims articulated in the Petitioner’s 7 Motion to Stay suggests that he was aware of the facts that form the basis of these 8 claims at the time of trial, and he was not diligent in pursuing them. Petitioner’s 9 ineffective assistance of counsel claim focuses on his trial counsel’s “failing to conduct a 10 reasonable investigation, hire experts, refusing to call on witnesses, [and] not properly 11 objecting to unwarranted presentation of evidence and charges.” (Id. at 6.) These are 12 all things that Petitioner would have been aware of during his 2016 trial. In fact, 13 Petitioner concedes this when he argues in his reply that he would have presented the 14 facts that underly his unexhausted claims at trial if the trial court had not revoked his 15 right to represent himself. (ECF No. 63 at 2.) Petitioner specifically explains that his trial 16 counsel had the information underlying the claims he now seeks to raise, because he 17 provided it to her. (Id. (“Information that trial counsel had it in her possession, was 18 aware of from Petitioner and trial counsel still refused to investigate or present to court 19 and jury whatsoever. Also information that was being withheld by the prosecution . . . 20 .”).) Despite his knowledge of these facts, he has waited nearly seven years to ask this 21 Court for a stay so that he may attempt to raise these claims or the first time in state 22 court. 23 The same is true regarding the prosecutorial misconduct claim, which appears to 24 be based on materials taken from discovery and trial testimony. (See ECF No. 57-1 25 (Exhibits to Stay Motion); see also ECF No. 14-25 at 25 (the court and counsel discussing 26 after the Court granted Petitioner pro per status, how “in order for [Petitioner] to get 27 the cleanest possible discovery,” the prosecutor would be reissuing all discovery to 2 demonstrated diligence when he waited nearly four years to raise his claims based on 3 events known at trial). 4 2. Petitioner’s new claims do not relate back to his properly filed claim. 5 Though Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not independently timely, Petitioner 6 could be permitted to amend if the new claims relate back to original, properly filed 7 claim. Respondent contends, without much explanation, that the ineffective assistance 8 of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims Petitioner seeks to exhaust do not relate 9 back to his Faretta claim. (ECF No. 60 at 2, 3-4.) Though he does not invoke the 10 “relation back doctrine” by name, Petitioner raises an argument that the Court 11 construes as one for relation back—that the ineffective assistance and prosecutorial 12 misconduct would not have occurred without the trial court’s termination of his self- 13 representation. He claims that “had Petitioner’s[] Faretta rights . . . not been 14 terminated, Petitioner would have presented to the trial court and jury all relevant 15 information and facts being brought before the present court. . . . Also information that 16 was being withheld by the prosecution . . . .” (ECF No. 63 at 2.) 17 In habeas cases, as in other civil cases, an amendment “relates back to the date of 18 the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim . . . that arose out of the 19 conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original 20 pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (a habeas petition may 21 be amended “as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil action). Even 22 when the claim is based on the same trial and conviction, it “does not relate back (and 23 thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief 24 supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set 25 forth.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. Relation back requires claims to be “tied to a common 26 core of operative facts.” Id. at 664. “Mayle requires a comparison of a petitioner’s new 27 claims to the properly exhausted claims left pending in federal court.” King, 564 F.3d at 2 tsoe ta nfo ortrhig itnhael pfaecttitsi oonn twhahti crhel iiet db oanse adn i atsp pcleanimdesd. wFirristtte, nw ien sdterutemrmenint eto w hhealpt 3 claims the amended petition alleges and what core facts underlie those claims. Second, for each claim in the amended petition, we look to the body 4 of the original petition and its exhibits to see whether the original petition 5 “set out” or “attempted to . . . set out” a corresponding factual episode, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B)—or whether the claim is instead “supported by 6 facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set 7 forth,” [citation]. 8 Ross v. Williams, 950 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Daniels v. 9 Ross, 141 S. Ct. 840 (2020) (citing Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650, 664). 10 The facts underlying Petitioner’s unexhausted claims of ineffective assistance of 11 counsel and prosecutorial misconduct differ in both time and type from those 12 supporting the timely Faretta claim in his original petition. Petitioner’s ineffective 13 assistance of counsel claim, by its very nature, involves the conduct of trial counsel 14 when Petitioner was no longer permitted to represent himself. Petitioner alleges his 15 trial counsel failed to “conduct a reasonable investigation [and] hire experts, refuse[d] 16 to call on witnesses, [did] not properly object[] to unwarranted presentation of evidence 17 and charges,” and “refused to present corroborating evidence and facts.” (ECF No. 57 at 18 6.) It also involves the substance of the case against him, insofar as Petitioner must 19 show both deficient performance and prejudice therefrom. Strickland v. Washington, 20 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). 21 Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct allegations, while not detailed by Petitioner, 22 involve the prosecutor’s actions (not those of Petitioner). Petitioner specifically alleges 23 the prosecutor withheld alcohol analysis evidence, knowingly used perjured testimony, 24 tampered with evidence, and placed unfounded burdens on Petitioner in a number of 25 ways. (ECF No. 57 at 6.) These allegations involve details about the evidence provided 26 to Petitioner and his lawyers in discovery, presented to the jury at trial, and the impact 27 2 prosecutorial misconduct claim: ‘The evidence at issue must be favorable to the 3 accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence 4 must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice 5 must have ensued.’”) (internal citation omitted); Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th 6 Cir. 2013) (“[P]rosecutorial misconduct of the kind that occurred here violates the 7 constitutional rights of the defendant and requires a reversal of the conviction if (1) the 8 testimony was actually false, (2) the prosecutor knew it was false, and (3) the false 9 testimony was material (i.e., there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 10 could have affected the judgment).”). In his stay motion, presumably to support his 11 unexhausted claims, Petitioner details evidence related to the prosecutor’s redaction of 12 alcohol analysis evidence and alleged tampering with drug, taser, and firearm evidence 13 (such as arguably inconsistent statements and evidence). (ECF No. 57 at 3-6.) 14 Petitioner’s timely claim here pertains to the trial court’s revocation of his pro per 15 status. (See ECF No. 1.) Evaluation of this claim requires an examination of Petitioner’s 16 conduct as a self-represented litigant and whether the trial court properly found that he 17 engaged in “serious and obstructionist misconduct.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 18 834 n.46 (1975); see also ECF No. 1 at 7 (Petitioner arguing in his Complaint that “his 19 convictions should be reversed because he was erroneously denied his fundamental 20 constitutional right to self-representation when the trial court abused its discretion and 21 revoked petitioner’s pro per status just prior to the start of trial without a specific and 22 adequate warning, without consideration of alternative sanctions, without sufficient 23 showing that petitioner was disruptive or dilatory in a manner that threatened to 24 subvert the core concept of a trial or to compromise the court’s ability to conduct a fair 25 trial, and without making adequate record as to how appellant’s[sic] misconduct would 26 seriously threaten core integrity of the trial”). Improper denial of self-representation is 27 not amenable to harmless error analysis, and therefore it does not require Petitioner to 2 conduct as a pro per defendant, and whether that justified the trial court’s revocation of 3 Petitioner’s pro per status. The facts underlying the substantive case against Petitioner 4 have no bearing on his Faretta claim here, where the behavior that precipitated the trial 5 court’s revocation of Petitioner’s pro per status was primarily related to Petitioner’s 6 refusal to identify which of over 2,000 photographs in discovery he needed printed for 7 trial, while insisting that if every photograph was not printed for him, he would ask for 8 discovery in front of the jury. (ECF No. 14-4 at 34-43, 66-80.) 9 To the extent that Petitioner argues a causal relationship between his exhausted 10 claim and the two he seeks to exhaust, the Court notes that the applicable standard, 11 discussed and applied above, asks whether there is a common core of operative facts, 12 not whether one claim may have permitted an opportunity for another to arise. 13 Further, other court decisions disprove this theory by finding no relation back where 14 one alleged error made it possible for another to occur. See, e.g., Medina v. People, 15 Case No. CV 19-8153 JGB (PVC), 2020 WL 5217150, at *4-*5 (C.D. Cal Jul. 28, 2020) 16 (finding that petitioner’s two claims related to the sufficiency of the evidence related 17 back to a timely poorly pled sufficiency of the evidence claim, while an excessive 18 sentencing claim did not); Hughes, 2012 WL 346449, at *6 (finding new claim related to 19 a bribed witness giving allegedly perjured testimony at the preliminary hearing did not 20 relate back to exhausted claim that the admission of that testimony at trial violated the 21 petitioner’s right to confront witnesses against him). 22 The operative facts relevant to Petitioner’s expansive, unexhausted claims vary 23 dramatically from those relevant to Petitioner’s narrow, exhausted claim. Accordingly, 24 this Court finds that the unexhausted claims do not relate back to the claim in 25 Petitioner’s original habeas petition and they are untimely under AEDPA. See, e.g., 26 Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding the new claim did not 27 relate back where “[the petitioner’s] original claim related to the evidence admitted at 1 || McGrail v. Gamboa, Case No. CV 18-3642 JVS (PVC), 2022 WL 1511778, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2 || Mar. 29, 2022) (holding that the petitioner’s Marsden/Faretta claim and others did not 3 relate back to timely ineffective assistance of counsel and Vienna Convention claims), 4 ||report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1261968 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2022); 5 || Haskins, 2009 WL 3241836, at *6 (finding Brady claim different in time and type from 6 || due process and IAC claims because “it implicates prosecutorial misconduct, whereas 7 || the original claims focus on the actions of trial counsel and the trial-court judge”). 8 Il. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 9 Because Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are untimely under AEDPA and do not 10 |/relate back to his timely claim, any attempt to amend to add these claims after 11 || Petitioner’s proposed Kelly stay would be futile. IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 12 || District Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and 13 || Recommendation; (2) DENYING Petitioner’s motion to stay [ECF No. 57]. 14 IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 1, 2022, any party to this action may file 15 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 16 captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 18 || Court and served on all parties no later than July 15, 2022. The parties are advised that 19 || failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 20 || objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 21 || Cir. 1998). 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 ||Dated: June 17, 2022 _ = _ 2 SF — 3s Honorable Michael S. Berg United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28