1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT CLEVELAND, an individual, Case No.: 3:19-cv-00672-RBM-BGS 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 13 v. THE BEHEMOTH’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO BIFURCATE THE 14 THE BEHEMOTH, a California ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, 15 Defendants. 16 [Doc. 62] 17 18 On March 4, 2022, Defendant The Behemoth (“Defendant”) filed a Motion in 19 Limine to Bifurcate the Issue of Punitive Damages (“Motion”). (Doc. 62.) On March 18, 20 2022, Plaintiff Robert Cleveland (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition to the Motion 21 (“Opposition”). (Doc. 77.) In the Motion, Defendant requests the Court bifurcate the issue 22 of punitive damages into a separate trial phase to eliminate unfair bias and promote 23 efficiency. (Doc. 62 at 5.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion is 24 DENIED. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff is a former quality assurance specialist at Defendant, a video game 27 development company headquartered in San Diego. (Doc 1–2 at 4.) On February 20, 2019, 28 Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging that from March 2016 to February 2018, 1 “Defendant[] subjected Plaintiff to systemic employment discrimination based on his 2 gender” and “engendered, endorsed, and/or ratified a hostile work environment violative 3 of state and federal law.” (Id. at 4, 7.) 4 In particular, Plaintiff brings claims for: (1) hostile work environment/sexual 5 harassment in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act, (2) retaliation in 6 violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act, (3) wrongful termination in 7 violation of public policy, (4) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 8 17200, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) negligent infliction of emotional 9 distress, (7) failure to prevent harassment, (8) hostile work environment/sexual harassment 10 in violation of Title VII [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq.], and (9) retaliation in violation of 11 Title VII [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq.]. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s complaint has requested 12 general, compensatory, and/or special damages in any amount to be proven at trial. (Id. at 13 21.) The complaint also requests punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and 14 deter Defendant from harming other employees. (Id.) 15 In the instant Motion, Defendant “moves the Court for an order bifurcating the issue 16 of punitive damages into a separate trial phase.” (Doc. 62 at 1.) Defendant believes 17 bifurcation will promote efficiency at trial and will safeguard against the unfair prejudice 18 that Defendant is likely to suffer if Plaintiff is permitted to present evidence of Defendant’s 19 financial condition prior to a finding of liability. (Id.) Plaintiff counters that bifurcation is 20 “unwarranted” in this case and does not promote judicial economy. (Doc. 77 at 2–3.) 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 42(b) provides that “[f]or convenience, to 23 avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one 24 or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” FED. 25 R. CIV. P. 42(b). A district court has “broad discretion” in determining whether to bifurcate 26 a trial under Rule 42(b). Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 27 2002). The party seeking bifurcation has the burden of proving bifurcation is justified. 28 Spectra-Physics Lasers, Inc., v. Uniphase Corp., 144 F.R.D. 99, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Defendant argues that “[b]ifurcation of the punitive damages issue is necessary 3 because, under California law, proof of a defendant’s financial condition is a prerequisite 4 to a punitive damages award.” (Doc. 62 at 3 (citing Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 5 110 (1991).) Defendant cautions that “[a]llowing Plaintiff to present evidence of 6 Defendant’s finances presents a danger that the jury will improperly consider Defendant’s 7 financial condition when deciding liability or amount of compensatory damages.” (Doc. 8 62 at 4.) Therefore, prejudice can be avoided by bifurcating the punitive damages issue 9 into a separate trial phase. (Id.) 10 Defendant also explains bifurcation will “promote judicial economy by only 11 allowing presentation of evidence of Defendant’s financial condition if liability is 12 determined.” (Id.) Defendant argues that none of Plaintiff’s claims require a showing of 13 Defendant’s financial condition to determine liability, and Plaintiff should be required to 14 establish malice, opposition, or fraud before Defendant’s financial condition is introduced. 15 (Id.) 16 Plaintiff contends that, in the Ninth Circuit, “[b]ifurcation is the exception, rather 17 than the rule, of normal trial procedure.” (Doc. 77 at 1 (citing Hangarter v. Provident Life 18 & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004).) Additionally, “[t]his case is about 19 Plaintiff’s harm caused by [Defendant’s] facilitation of pedophilic, harassing, and 20 homoerotic overtures and media and other content in his workplace.” (Doc. 77 at 3.) Thus, 21 Plaintiff argues that liability evidence presented in the first trial would overlap with 22 evidence of “oppression and reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s rights” that would be 23 presented in the second trial. (Id.) Therefore, denying Defendant’s motion will actually 24 promote judicial economy and avoid the duplicity of bifurcation. (Id.) Moreover, 25 Defendant’s concern that the jury will improperly consider Defendant’s financial position 26 when determining liability or the amount of compensatory damage is meritless because 27 such concern may be addressed with proper jury instructions. (Id. at 1.) 28 / / / 1 Here, the Court is not convinced that evidence of Defendant’s financial position will 2 be overly prejudicial or influential to a jury such that bifurcation would be necessary. See 3 See Hamm v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (noting 4 “[t]he most persuasive argument in favor of separating the issue of a defendants’ wealth 5 from the rest of the trial is that the defendants will be somehow prejudiced if information 6 of their finances is intermingled with the evidence on the issue of liability”). Moreover, 7 any concerns about potential prejudice may be directly addressed with the appropriate jury 8 instructions. See, e.g., Aiello v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1129 (D. Nev. 9 2019) (“[a]ny concerns about prejudice or confusion on the jury’s part can be properly 10 addressed through jury instructions and counsels’ opening statements and closing 11 arguments”); Afshar v. City of Sacramento, No. CIV S–04–1088LKKJFB, 2007 WL 12 779748, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2007) (denying bifurcation where “[c]oncerns about 13 potential prejudice to the defendant may be directly addressed with appropriate limiting 14 instructions” or “a special verdict form”). 15 Additionally, Defendant has not met its burden of proving that bifurcation is 16 necessary, and the Court does not find that bifurcation will promote judicial economy. See 17 People v. Hernandez, 33 Cal. 4th 1040, 1050 (2004) (explaining the party seeking 18 bifurcation has the burden of proving it is justified); see also Spectra-Physics Lasers, Inc. 19 v. Uniphase Corp., 144 F.R.D. 99, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding the defendant had “not 20 met its burden of proving that the bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid 21 inconvenience or prejudice to the parties”). Rather, the Court is convinced that judicial 22 economy is best served by resolving this action in a single proceeding. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 42. 24 Therefore, the Court will not bifurcate the issue of punitive damages into a separate 25 proceeding. 26 IV. CONCLUSION 27 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED. 28 / / / 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 || DATE: October 6, 2022 3 —_ Fehon Mtg 4 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28