DocketNumber: No. 43485
Citation Numbers: 87 Ct. Cl. 248
Judges: Booth, Giseen, Littleton, Whaley, Williams
Filed Date: 5/2/1938
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/23/2022
delivered the opinion of the court:
The. subject-matter of this case — namely, the increased rental allowances for the period January 6,1931, to October 10, 1932, inclusive — is res adjudicata by the findings of fact and judgment of the court entered April 6, 1936, in Case 42869. (82 C. Cls. 693.) In that case plaintiff sought to' recover increased rental and subsistence allowances for the period December 1, 1928, to January 1, 1936, on the ground that his mother was dependent upon him for support and the period involved in that claim included the period for which increased rental allowances are here sought to be recovered. The facts with reference to whether plaintiff’s mother was dependent upon him for her chief support during the period involved in the prior case (including the period involved in this case) and the facts with reference to the further question whether plaintiff was entitled to the increased statutory rental and subsistence allowances because of such dependency were directly involved and were specifically considered,, determined, and adjudicated by the court on all the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in Case 42869.
In accordance with the customary and long-established practice in cases involving claims for statutory rental and subsistence allowances authorized by law for officers of the Army and the Navy who have dependents, the plaintiffs, in such cases, have not been required in the first instance to prove the exact amount of the increased rental and subsistence allowances due such officers, but have been permitted, if they so desired, to confine their proof in the first instance to the facts concerning dependency and whether public quarters were available or furnished in order to avoid the trouble and expense of proving facts which would not be necessary to a decision in the case if dependency should not be established-When the facts with reference to dependency and quarters have been submitted and the court has found the facts established thereby, proof by the plaintiff of the amount of the increased rental and subsistence allowances due and to be included in the judgment of the court, together with such fur
In Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. United States, supra, this Court (at pp. 48-49) said:
The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified. This general rule is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually determined by them.
The cases of United States v. O'Grady, 22 Wall. 641; Hobbs v. United States, 19 C. Cls. 220; Carroll v. United States, 31 C. Cls. 315; and Adams et al. v. United States,
Plaintiff contends that a “new issue” is presented in this case which was not before the court in the former suit, 42869, and that the judgment in the first suit is not, therefore, a bar to this action. The new issue relied upon by plaintiff to sustain the present suit is in reality the sufficiency of his evidence, obtained by his call upon the General Accounting Office, upon which he made a motion for judgment and upon the basis of which judgment was computed and entered. Clearly this is not a new or different question from that before the court in the first case. The right or question asserted in the prior suit specifically concerned the increased rental and subsistence allowances for the period December 1, 1928, to January 1, 1936. This is clearly established by the allegations of the petition in the prior suit (finding 1) and plaintiff’s motion for call filed February 3,1936 (finding 2). If the right to the increased rental allowance of $2,231.33 here sought to be recovered was not involved and was not before the court in the prior suit, the question of the sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence submitted in that case as to the amount due could not arise. The matter presented by the present suit is therefore merely a failure of proof upon one point in the first case. St. Louis, Brownsville, and Mexico Railway Co. v. United States, supra. Counsel for plaintiff was not bound by the reply of the Comptroller General to his call until he had submitted it to the court as evidence in his case. Even then plaintiff’s counsel could have made an additional call upon the General Accounting Office or other department for any further or additional information necessary to show the correct amount of rental allowances due for the period of the claim from December 1,1928, to January 1, 1936. He did not do so but accepted the information and computation furnished by the Comptroller General, submitted the same to the court for consideration as evidence in
In the first suit, No. 42869, plaintiff alleged that his mother was dependent upon him for her' chief support and that he was entitled to statutory rental and subsistence allowances payable to an officer of his rank during the
The finding thus relied upon by the Railway does not show that these two claims were not among “the matters involved in the controversy” in the earlier case. On the contrary, it shows that they were there in controversy. And it suggests that the Railway, after the introduction of the report of the Treasury Department, acquiesced in the latter’s conclusion that as to these two claims “nothing is due.” Compare United States v. Frerichs, 124 U. S. 315, 320; Michot v. United States, 31 Ct. Cls. 299; Vaughn v. United States, 34 Ct. Cls. 342. The case is unlike Spicer v. United States, 6 Ct. Cls. 34; Book v. United States, 31 Ct. Cls. 272; and Adams v. United States, 33 Ct. Cls. 411. As to these two claims the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Quite apart from our conclusion that the question presented in the case at bar is res adjudicaba and may not therefore again be litigated in a separate suit, the right to maintain the present suit upon the claim presented is specifically prohibited by section 178 of the Judicial Code (sec. 285, Title 28, U. S. C. A.), which is as follows: “The payment of the amount due by any judgment of the Court of Claims, and of any interest thereon allowed by law, as provided by law, shall be a full discharge to the United States of all claim and demand touching any of the matters involved in the controversy.”
* * * If one may allege in his petition two causes of action, and submit his case on the petition and accompanying proofs, obtain two judgments thereon, and years afterwards disturb those judgments on an allegation of lack of identity in the subject matter adjudicated, because the plaintiff itself, for reasons of its own, submitted no proof as to one cause of action set up in its petition and claimed for, but contented itself with judgment for the other, manifestly litigation would be interminable. The court had jurisdiction of the cause, the petition covered the subject matter of complaint, identical with the one here involved, and having disposed of the case the judgment, under the law, forecloses the controversy, not only as to the point adjudicated, but as to all other points which might properly be adjudicated. California Bridge & Construction Co. v. United States, 50 C. Cls. 40. * * *
Under the statute [sec. 178, Judicial Code] we are precluded from reconsidering a claim after an appropriation has been made therefor and payment accepted by the plaintiff. Pilkington v. United States, 36 C. Cls. 357; Russell's case, 15 C. Cls. 168; Vaughn v. United States, 34 C. Cls. 342; United States v. Frerichs, 124 U. S. 315, 320. As said by the Supreme Court, “the payment of the amount of the judgment would ipso facto satisfy the demand.”
Again, section 179 of the Judicial Code provides:
“Any final judgment against the claimant on any claim prosecuted as provided in this chapter shall forever bar any further claim or demand against the United States arising out of the matters involved in the controversy.”
This statute is comprehensive and bars any further claim or demand for any matter arising and involved in the controversy. Our judgments are conclusive until set aside upon motion for a new trial. United States v. O'Grady, 22 Wall. 641.
In Michot v. United States, supra, cited by the Supreme Court in St. Louis, Brownsville, and Mexico Railway Co. v. United States, supra, a letter-carrier recovered a judgment in this court and at the same term filed a motion to correct
It is well settled and needs no citation of authorities that a court has power at any time during the term at which a judgment or decree is rendered to correct, modify, or vacate the same. And it is equally well settled that unless steps be taken during the term at which such judgment or decree is rendered, by motion or otherwise, to correct or set aside such judgment, the control thereof will pass beyond the court. (Schell v. Dodge, 107 U. S. 629, 630, and authorities there cited.) (p. 302.)
* * * the claimant by accepting payment of the judgment thereby released all errors in the judgment and waived the motion he had previously filed to correct the same (p. 303).
The judgment being fully discharged, there is nothing to correct. The judgment as between the parties is dead; the claimant by accepting payment thereof waived his motion and thereby released the errors he had previously sought to correct. Thus ended the case (p. 304).
The case of Russell v. United States, supra, related to an amount which, through an error, had not been included in the judgment theretofore entered. The judgment previously entered was paid and accepted. This court held under circumstances more favorable to the plaintiff there than the circumstances involved in the case at bar that under section 1092, Revised Statutes (section 178 of the Judicial Code), the receipt by the plaintiff of payment of judgment of the court was not only a full discharge by the United States of all claim and demand touching any of the matters involved, but it was also a release of all errors in the judgment.
Plaintiff further contends that under the court’s findings of fact and conclusion of law entered February 3, 1936, and the evidence subsequently submitted by leave of the court, the amount of rental and subsistence allowances actually and