Husteel Co. v. United States

Slip Op. 14-148
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
HUSTEEL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
NEXTEEL CO., LTD. and HYUNDAI
HYSCO,
Consolidated Plaintiffs,
ILJIN STEEL CORPORATION, AJU
BESTEEL CO., LTD., and SEAH STEEL
CORP.,
Plaintiff-Intervenors,
v. Before: Jane A. Restani, Judge
UNITED STATES, Consol. Court No. 14-00215
Defendant,
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
BOOMERANG TUBE LLC, ENERGEX
TUBE (A DIVISION OF JMC STEEL
GROUP), TEJAS TUBULAR PRODUCTS,
TMK IPSCO, VALLOUREC STAR, L.P.,
WELDED TUBE USA INC., and MAVERICK
TUBE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Intervenors.
OPINION
[Motions to enjoin liquidation of entries pending challenges to antidumping investigation
granted.]
Dated: December 18, 2014
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 2
Donald B. Cameron, Julie C. Mendoza, R. Will Planert, Brady W. Mills, Mary S.
Hodgins, and Sarah S. Sprinkle, Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, of Washington, DC, for
plaintiff.
J. David Park, Nazakhtar Nikakhtar, Henry D. Almond, Yujin K. McNamara, and Yun H.
Lee, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, of Washington, DC, for consolidated plaintiffs.
Joel D. Kaufman, Richard O. Cunningham, Alice A. Kipel, and Henry N. Smith, Steptoe
& Johnson LLP, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff-intervenor ILJIN Steel Corporation.
Neil R. Ellis, Dave M. Wharwood, Rajib Pal, and Shawn M. Higgins, Sidley Austin,
LLP, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff-intervenor AJU Besteel Co., Ltd.
Jeffrey M. Winton, Law Office of Jeffrey M. Winton PLLC, of Washington, DC, for
plaintiff-intervenor SeAH Steel Corp.
Melissa M. Devine and Emma E. Bond, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington D.C., and Mykhaylo A. Gryzlov, Office of the Chief
Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington,
DC, for defendant.
Jeffrey D. Gerrish, Robert E. Lighthizer, and Jamieson L. Greer, Skadden Arps Slate
Meagher & Flom, LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor United States Steel
Corporation.
Roger B. Schagrin, John W. Bohn, and Paul W. Jameson, Schagrin Associates, of
Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenors Boomerang Tube LLC, Energex Tube, Tejas Tubular
Products, TMK IPSCO, Vallourec Star, L.P., and Welded Tube USA Inc.
Robert E. DeFrancesco, III., Alan H. Price, Adam M. Teslik, and Laura El-Sabaawi,
Wiley Rein, LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor Maverick Tube Corporation.
Restani, Judge: Before the court are the motions for injunctions of liquidation and
eventual liquidation in accordance with the results of litigation filed by plaintiff Husteel Co.,
Ltd., consolidated plaintiffs Nexteel Co., Ltd. and Hyundai HYSCO, and plaintiff-intervenors
ILJIN Steel Corporation, AJU Besteel Co., Ltd., and SeAH Steel Corp. (collectively,
“movants”). Movants seek to enjoin the defendant, together with the delegates, officers, agents,
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 3
and employees of the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“Customs”), from liquidating at rates applicable at the time of entry, certain
unliquidated entries covered by Commerce’s final determination in Certain Oil Country Tubular
Goods from the Republic of Korea: Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and
Negative Final Determination of Critical Circumstances, 79 Fed. Reg. 41,983 (Dep’t Commerce
July 18, 2014) (“Final Determination”). Defendant consents to the motions. Defendant-
intervenors United States Steel Corporation (“U.S. Steel”) and Maverick Tube Corporation
(“Maverick”) oppose the motions. The court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(c) (2012). For the following reasons, the motions are granted.
OVERVIEW
Movants are Korean producers and exporters of oil country tubular goods, that challenge
various aspects of Commerce’s Final Determination in the antidumping investigation covering
oil country tubular goods from Korea. In their motions, they seek to enjoin liquidation of entries
of their merchandise covered by the Final Determination during the pendency of this court action
in order to ensure that they receive any potential benefits that might result from judicial review
of the Final Determination. According to movants, the injunctions are necessary because
liquidation of their entries will moot their challenges to the Final Determination, at least as it
pertains to the entries that are liquidated. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806,
810 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that once liquidation occurs, a subsequent court decision on the
merits can have no effect on the antidumping duties assessed on the liquidated entries, even if
the duties ultimately are determined to be erroneous). U.S. Steel and Maverick argue that the
injunctions are unwarranted.
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 4
DISCUSSION
The court “may enjoin the liquidation of some or all entries of merchandise covered by a
determination of . . . [Commerce] . . . , upon a request by an interested party for such relief and a
proper showing that the requested relief should be granted under the circumstances.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(c)(2). The purpose and effect of granting such an injunction is to preserve the status
quo during the pendency of the judicial proceedings in order to ultimately provide parties any
relief the court grants. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2) (providing that “entries, the liquidation of
which was enjoined under subsection (c)(2) of this section, shall be liquidated in accordance
with the final court decision in the action”); Ugine & ALZ Belg. v. United States, 452 F.3d 1289,
1297 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In deciding whether to enjoin liquidation, the court considers the
following factors: 1) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted; 2)
the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; 3) the balance of equities between the parties;
and 4) whether an injunction is in the public interest. See, e.g., Wind Tower Trade Coalition v.
United States, 741 F.3d 89, 95 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ugine, 452 F.3d at 1292. The court has
traditionally applied a “sliding scale” approach to this determination, whereby no single factor
will be treated as necessarily dispositive, and the weakness of the showing on one factor may be
overcome by the strength of the showing on the others. See Ugine, 452 F.3d at 1292–93; Corus
Grp. PLC v. Bush, 26 CIT 937, 942, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1353–54 (2002). The court will
discuss each factor in turn.
1. Irreparable Harm
The first factor that the court considers is the potential irreparable harm to the movants
should the injunctions be denied. Although the court is to consider the four factors described
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 5
above, this factor traditionally has been given the greatest importance. See Corus Grp., 26 CIT
at 942, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (collecting cases). The original legislative history of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(c)(2) suggests that the court will consider the factors to ensure that liquidation is
enjoined only in “extraordinary circumstances.” S. Rep. No. 96-249, at 248–49, 253 (1979),
reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 634, 639. Such history no longer accurately reflects the
current law, judicial precedent, and agency practice.
Because of the unique nature of antidumping and countervailing duty challenges, the
court routinely enjoins liquidation to prevent irreparable harm to a party challenging the
antidumping or countervailing duty rate. See Wind Tower Trade Coalition, 741 F.3d at 95 (“As
observed by the CIT, in antidumping and countervailing duty cases preliminary1 injunctions
against liquidation have become almost automatic due to the retrospective nature of U.S. trade
remedies, the length of the judicial review process, and the cruciality of unliquidated entries for
judicial review.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). As explained in Zenith, once
entries are liquidated, there is no provision permitting reliquidation if the court later determines
that the duty rates assessed on those entries were erroneous. 710 F.2d at 810. A party
challenging the duty rate is thus deprived of its right to judicial review if the entries are
liquidated. See id. Respondents might be subjected to duties that are unwarranted under the
trade laws, and petitioners have “a strong, continuing, commercial-competitive stake in assuring
1
“Preliminary” is a proper description of only part of the injunctions sought here, and it
is to this aspect of the injunctions that the court’s Rule 56.2 refers. The form of injunction
sought here, which is commonly utilized, appears to permanently enjoin liquidation not in
accordance with the conclusive results of the litigation pursuant to statutory rights. See attached
injunction and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e).
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 6
that its competing importers will not escape the monetary sanctions deliberately imposed by
Congress.” See id. These concerns led the court in Zenith to conclude “that the consequences of
liquidation . . . constitute irreparable injury.” Id. Suspension of liquidation thus is necessary to
ensure effective judicial review of agency action and to guarantee that the rates are consistent
with the outcome of the litigation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2) (providing that “entries, the
liquidation of which was enjoined [by court order], shall be liquidated in accordance with the
final court decision in the action”).
U.S. Steel and Maverick do not disagree with the premise that liquidation can constitute
irreparable harm. Rather, U.S. Steel and Maverick argue that there is no immediate threat of
liquidation, and thus there is no irreparable harm that is imminent to justify an injunction. They
note that movants are challenging Commerce’s final determination in an antidumping
investigation. Under the U.S. trade laws, the duty rates determined in an investigation set the
cash deposit rates for the imported merchandise. See OKI Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 11
CIT 624, 627, 669 F. Supp. 480, 482 (1987). The final rates are not settled until Commerce
completes any requested administrative review of the antidumping order covering those entries.
Id. Parties may request a review twelve months after the order is issued, and the review itself
lasts about a year. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a); OKI Elec. Indus., 11 CIT at 627, 669 F. Supp. at 483.
Upon completion of the review, Commerce issues liquidation instructions to Customs. See 19
U.S.C. § 1675(a). According to U.S. Steel and Maverick, because Commerce will not issue
liquidation instructions until at least a year from the date of the Final Determination (i.e.,
September 2015), movants are not faced with any prospect of irreparable harm at present, and
the motions therefore should be denied. The court disagrees.
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 7
Movants are required to show a “presently existing, actual threat” of injury. Zenith, 710
F.2d at 809. A confluence of considerations leads the court to conclude that the injunctions are
proper at this time, even if the threat of injury is not “imminent” in the same sense it is following
an administrative review. First, the court notes that under current law, the rate established in an
investigation can be used as the final assessment rate if no party requests a review of the affected
entries. 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.212(c), 351.213(b) (2014). U.S. Steel’s and Maverick’s arguments
that the injunctions are premature might have had greater force when the court first was given
the power to grant injunctions of liquidation, as the antidumping statute required an
administrative review every year. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982). The law was changed in 1984,
however, to require administrative reviews only when an interested party requests one. See
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties; Administrative Reviews on Request; Transition
Provisions, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,556, 32,556 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 13, 1985). Today, when no
review is requested, entries are liquidated at the cash deposit rate without further notice. 19
C.F.R. § 351.212(c). Ensuring that movants receive the full benefit of their judicial challenge to
the investigation, and possibly to the order itself, may obviate the need for future administrative
reviews, or may settle issues that are likely to reoccur in future reviews without the need for
additional litigation. See Ipsco, Inc. v. United States, 12 CIT 676, 680–81, 692 F. Supp. 1368,
1372–73 (1988) (discussing these considerations). Issuing the injunctions at this point also
protects movants from any negative ramifications of an erroneous liquidation, which may
become final if not protested in a timely manner and would moot the movants’ challenges to the
antidumping duty rates set in the investigation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514; AK Steel Corp. v. United
States, 27 CIT 1382, 1387–89, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322–23 (2003) (treating erroneous
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 8
liquidation in violation of court-issued injunction as void); LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. United
States, 21 CIT 1421, 1428–29, 991 F. Supp. 668, 675–76 (1997) (same).
Of potentially more pressing concern regarding the timing of the motions is U.S. Court of
International Trade Rule 56.2, pursuant to which the relevant motions were made. That rule
provides that “[a]ny motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the liquidation of entries that
are the subject of the action must be filed by a party to the action within 30 days after service of
the complaint, or at such later time, for good cause shown.” USCIT R. 56.2(a). Rule 56.2
instructs parties that a motion for an injunction should normally be filed early in the proceedings,
unless extenuating circumstances are present. The rule makes no exception for investigation
cases, rather than administrative review cases, where an early injunction clearly is needed. An
injunction likely will be needed at some point in the litigation to prevent liquidation partially or
wholly mooting the case or to prevent unnecessary administrative reviews. Thus, a party may
not be justified in ignoring the applicable 30-day deadline just because the harm will occur
sometime down the road. What constitutes “good cause” for delay has not been established. By
waiting until immediately before the deadline to request an administrative review runs to request
an injunction, a party runs the risk that it will be barred from obtaining the injunction by a strict
interpretation of the court rule.
Requiring movants to wait until Commerce issues its final results in an administrative
review, as U.S. Steel and Maverick propose, also unnecessarily places the movants at risk
stemming from Commerce’s 15-day policy for issuing liquidation instructions. Commerce’s
policy is to issue liquidation instructions within 15 days of the final results of an administrative
review or, presumably, the expiration of the time to request a review. See Tianjin Mach. Imp. &
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 9
Exp. Corp. v. United States, 28 CIT 1635, 1649–50, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1309 (2004).
Commerce does not notify interested parties when the liquidation instructions actually are
issued. Mittal Steel Galati S.A. v. United States, 31 CIT 730, 739 n.7, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1273,
1282 n.7 (2007). The propriety of the 15-day procedure is questionable, as the court has held it
to be unlawful in certain cases. See SFK USA Inc. v. United States, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1316,
1327–28 (CIT 2011) (issuing a declaratory judgment that Commerce’s use of the 15-day
procedure was unlawful); Tianjin, 28 CIT at 1650–51, 353 F. Supp. 2d at1309–10 (holding that
Commerce’s 15-day procedure is not in accordance with law). But see Mittal, 31 CIT at 737–38,
491 F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (expressing disapproval but holding that the 15-day procedure is a
reasonable interpretation of the statute in facial challenge to the procedure). Under Commerce’s
unwise, and possibly unlawful, 15-day procedure, the movants will have very little time to file
and obtain an injunction once the final results are effective. As the court stated in Mittal, the 15-
day procedure creates “the possibility [that] Commerce and Customs may act so quickly, as to
practically foreclose interested parties from obtaining judicial review of the subject entries
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.” 31 CIT at 738, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, the court determines that based on the first factor, movants are
faced with a sufficiently imminent and serious harm to warrant issuance of the statutory
injunctions sought. The court further emphasizes that delaying the injunctions likely will invite
trouble, and neither U.S. Steel nor Maverick has suggested any reason demonstrating that it
would be prejudicial or otherwise inequitable to grant the injunctions at this point in the
proceedings. Assuming arguendo that harm is not imminent in the sense normally associated
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 10
with injunctive relief in advance of resolution of the merits, the remaining factors also support
granting relief and the court now proceeds to discuss those factors.
2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
When the irreparable harm factor tilts decidedly in favor of the movant, the burden of
showing likelihood of success on the merits is lessened. Qingdao Taifa Grp. Co. v. United
States, 581 F.3d 1375, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ugine, 452 F.3d at 1292–93. In such
circumstances, “it will ordinarily be sufficient that the movant has raised serious, substantial,
difficult and doubtful questions that are the proper subject of litigation,” Nmb Sing. v. United
States, 24 CIT 1239, 1245, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1140 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted), or that the movant “has at least a fair chance of success on the merits,” Wind Tower
Trade Coalition, 741 F.3d at 96. See also Ugine, 452 F.3d at 1294–95 (refusing to deny
injunction when ultimate outcome on the merits was not “clear-cut”). Movants have raised a
number of important issues in their complaints that are of the kind commonly raised, and
successfully litigated, before the court. The parties generally have devoted little effort in their
respective briefs arguing the relative merits of the claims. The court notes, however, that neither
U.S. Steel nor Maverick has cited any legal authority or record evidence suggesting that the
claims raised are so dubious that the injunctions should be denied. Compare Wind Tower Trade
Coalition, 741 F.3d at 94, 100 (upholding denial of injunction when movant’s legal position on
merits was directly contrary to caselaw on point). The court is satisfied, at this point in the
proceedings, that the movants have raised “serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful questions
that are the proper subject of litigation,” Nmb Sing., 24 CIT at 1245, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1140,
and that the movants have “at least a fair chance of success on the merits,” Wind Tower Trade
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 11
Coalition, 741 F.3d at 96.
3. Balance of the Equities
The third factor the court considers is the balance of the equities. As explained, movants
are threatened with the possibility of having their entries liquidated with duties that they claim
are unlawful, without judicial recourse. Any burden to the government is likely to be minimal,
as cash deposits at the rates set in the Final Determination will continue, until changed by the
ultimate results of litigation.2 Should the injunctions be granted, the only harm to the
government appears to be the possible inconvenience occasioned by the delay in liquidation.
See OKI Elec. Indus., 11 CIT at 632–33, 669 F. Supp. at 486. Notably, the defendant has
consented to the movants’ motions. In their oppositions to the motions for injunctions, U.S.
Steel and Maverick fail to even suggest that they would be harmed by the injunctions. The court
additionally notes that one of the central concerns Congress expressed in the legislative history
in allowing injunctions was the detrimental effects of enjoining liquidation on commercial
certainty. S. Rep. No. 96-249, at 253, 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 638. These concerns appear to be
most naturally associated with respondents and their importers, whose entries are kept in limbo
during litigation. These parties are left to wonder whether they will receive refunds on the
deposits, or whether additional duties will be owed. Because cash deposits continue to be
collected, domestic producers are not nearly as prejudiced by the commercial uncertainty that
results from suspending liquidation. In this case, the parties most likely to be prejudiced by
2
This litigation, rather than affecting the status of the underlying order, may affect
deposit rates. If the final results of an administrative review issue before this litigation is
complete, new deposit rates may be set. What effect these injunctions would have on preserving
the results of this litigation in such a circumstance need not be decided at this juncture.
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 12
suspension of liquidation (i.e., the respondents) are the parties moving for an injunction, and
Congress’s concerns expressed in the initial legislative history are thus further dampened in this
case. Accordingly, the court finds that the balance of equities tips in the favor of movants.
4. Public Interest
Finally, the court considers whether granting the injunctions would be against public
policy. Granting the injunctions would ensure that movants are able to obtain meaningful relief
in challenging the Final Determination. Securing judicial review and ensuring that Commerce
properly administers the antidumping laws are in the public interest. See Nmb Sing., 24 CIT at
1245, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1141 (“It is well settled that the public interest is served by ensuring
that [Commerce] complies with the law, and interprets and applies the international trade statutes
uniformly and fairly.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Timken Co. v. United
States, 6 CIT 76, 82, 569 F. Supp. 65, 71 (1983) (“Short-circuiting [a party’s statutory right to a
judicial hearing following an averse agency determination] by allowing the subject matter to
escape the reach of a reviewing court cannot be in the public interest.”). Securing judicial
review of the Final Determination at this time also promotes judicial efficiency, in that issues
that could reoccur in later reviews can be judicially reviewed before any possible errors are
repeated. It is also possible that future administrative reviews might be avoided altogether. See
Ipsco, 12 CIT at 680–82, 692 F. Supp. at 1372–73; OKI Elec. Indus., 11 CIT at 632–33, 669 F.
Supp. at 486 (“The public interest will be better served by issuing rather than denying the
injunction since unnecessary time consuming and costly administrative reviews will be avoided
by the government.”). The court therefore concludes that the injunctions accord with public
policy.
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 13
CONCLUSION
On balance, the four factors support granting the injunctions. As in most cases before the
court, the movants seeking injunctions against liquidation will be protected from their judicial
challenges being mooted, while there will be little, if any, harm to the other parties by granting
the injunctions. The court accordingly grants the movants’ motions. One typical injunction is
attached hereto for clarity. Individual orders regarding the other movants’ motions will enter
separately.
Additionally, the court wishes to commend the defendant for consenting to these
motions. As explained, the government will not be harmed in any meaningful way by the
granting of the motions, whereas movants have a legitimate interest in the injunctions being
granted. The government seems to have concluded, quite wisely, that this is an issue that it has
no need to fight over, thereby attempting to save everyone time, expense, and effort.
Unfortunately, U.S. Steel and Maverick did not take the same stance, even though the same
calculus would seem to apply, as they similarly do not face any harm by the granting of the
injunctions. The court presumes that counsel for U.S. Steel and Maverick, as officers of the
court, had reason to oppose the motions beyond annoying the movants and increasing litigation
expenses, although what those reasons were was not made clear to the court in the opposition
papers. Moreover, the court wonders whether U.S. Steel and Maverick’s position might be
somewhat short-sighted. Although an administrative suspension might be in place, mistakes can
happen. For example, Customs could erroneously liquidate entries in contravention of
Commerce’s instructions. Under this hypothetical, importers presumably could protest under 19
U.S.C. § 1514 and challenge the liquidation. Domestic producers such as U.S. Steel and
Consol. Court No. 14-00215 Page 14
Maverick, however, do not have the same protest rights under 19 U.S.C. § 1514. See Cemex,
S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1323 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that § 1514 does not
provide an avenue for a domestic producer to contest Customs’ improper liquidation of entries).
Unless voluntarily undone by Customs, liquidation under that scenario would appear to be final,
and the domestic producers’ ability to obtain relief in their own challenge to an antidumping
determination (whether in this case or in future cases) likely would be lost. On the other hand,
actions taken by Customs or Commerce in contravention of a court-ordered injunction have been
treated as void and do not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the challenge. See AK Steel, 27
CIT at 1387–89, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1322–23; LG Elecs. U.S.A., 21 CIT at 1428–29, 991 F.
Supp. at 675–76. In this hypothetical, it would appear the domestic producers have a stronger
interest in having an injunction granted, as they otherwise do not have the same protections as
importers from the risks described. Such a case is not before the court at this time, and the
foregoing is merely speculation as to the outcome under that hypothetical. The court simply
wishes to stress that parties should be thoughtful in deciding which battles to fight and be
mindful of the possible ramifications of their positions in future cases. Injunctions will issue.
/s/ Jane A. Restani
Jane A. Restani, Judge
Dated: December 18, 2014
New York, New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
HUSTEEL CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
NEXTEEL CO., LTD. and HYUNDAI
HYSCO,
Consolidated Plaintiffs,
ILJIN STEEL CORPORATION, AJU
BESTEEL CO., LTD., and SEAH STEEL
CORP.,
Plaintiff-Intervenors,
v. Before: Jane A. Restani, Judge
UNITED STATES, Consol. Court No. 14-00215
Defendant,
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
BOOMERANG TUBE LLC, ENERGEX
TUBE (A DIVISION OF JMC STEEL
GROUP), TEJAS TUBULAR PRODUCTS,
TMK IPSCO, VALLOUREC STAR, L.P.,
WELDED TUBE USA INC., and MAVERICK
TUBE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Intervenors.
ORDER
Upon consideration of Plaintiff Husteel Co., Ltd.’s (“Husteel”) Partial Consent Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, and all other papers and proceedings herein, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant, United States, together with its delegates, officers, agents,
and servants, including employees of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S.
Department of Commerce, is enjoined during the pendency of this litigation, including any
appeals, from issuing instructions to liquidate or making or permitting liquidation of any entries
of oil country tubular goods from the Republic of Korea:
(i) that were produced and/or exported by Husteel Co., Ltd.;
(ii) that were the subject of the United States Department of Commerce’s final
determination in Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From the Republic of
Korea: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Negative Final
Determination of Critical Circumstances, 79 Fed. Reg. 41,983 (Dep’t of
Commerce July 18, 2014); and
(iii) that were entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, on or after July 18, 2014 up to
and including September 30, 2015; and it is further
ORDERED that the entries subject to this injunction shall be liquidated only in
accordance with the final court decision in this action, including all appeals and remand
proceedings, as provided in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Jane A. Restani
Jane A. Restani, Judge
Dated: December 18, 2014
New York, New York