Target Corp. v. United States

Slip Op. 23-106
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
TARGET CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge
v.
Court No. 21-00162
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
OPINION
[Defendant’s USCIT Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim granted.]
Dated: July 20, 2023
Patrick D. Gill, Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A. of New York, N.Y., for Plaintiff
Target Corporation.
Alexander Vanderweide, Senior Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, U.S. Department of Justice of New York, N.Y., for Defendant United States.
With him on the briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General; Patricia M. McCarthy, Director; and Justin R. Miller, Attorney-in-Charge.
Of counsel was Edward N. Maurer, Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade
Litigation, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, of New York, N.Y.
Gordon, Judge: This action involves a challenge by Plaintiff Target Corporation
(“Plaintiff” or “Target”) of the denial of its protest of the reliquidation by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“Customs”) of 40 entries that Customs originally liquidated at the
incorrect antidumping duty rate. See Compl., ECF No. 6; see also Court No. 07-00123,
ECF No. 168 (Dec. 8, 2016) (“Judgment”); Court No. 07-00123, ECF No. 172 (Oct. 27,
2017) (“Initial Order of Reliquidation”); Home Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 43 CIT
___, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1368 (2019) (“Home Products I”). The court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), as compared to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) for Court No.
Court No. 21-00162 Page 2
07-00123, the precursor of this action. Before the court is Defendant’s USCIT Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim, ECF No. 8 (“Def.’s Mot.”); Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 10 (“Pl.’s Resp.”); Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11
(“Def.’s Reply”); see also USCIT R. 12(b)(6).
I. Background
This action follows Target’s unsuccessful attempt to challenge the reliquidation
of the subject entries that was ordered in Court No. 07-00123. See Court No. 07-00123,
Initial Order of Reliquidation; Home Products I. In that matter, the court entered judgment
pursuant to a stipulation of settlement that established an antidumping duty margin
of 72.29% for the first administrative review of imports of metal-top iron tables from China
(“subject merchandise”) and manufactured/exported by Since Hardware
(Guangzhou) Co., Ltd. (“Since Hardware”). See Court No. 07-00123, Judgment, ECF
No. 168 (Dec. 8, 2016) (“Judgment”).
In March 2017, several months after the entry of the Judgment, the Government
learned that Customs had erroneously liquidated 242 entries of the subject merchandise,
including Target’s 40 entries, at the original cash deposit antidumping duty rate of 9.47%
instead of the 72.29% rate set forth in the Judgment. 1 The Government then sought an
1 The Judgment had ordered “that the injunction enjoining liquidation of the subject
merchandise in this action, see Home Products International, Inc. v. United States, Court
No. 07-00123 (CIT Apr. 18, 2007), ECF No. 11 (prelim. inj. order) shall be dissolved, and
the covered entries liquidated in accordance with this entry of judgment.” Judgment.
The Judgment directed that the covered entries “produced or exported by Since
Hardware” were to be liquidated at a rate of 72.29 percent. Id.
Court No. 21-00162 Page 3
order directing Customs to reliquidate the 242 entries, since the 90-day window for
voluntarily reliquidation by Customs under 19 U.S.C. § 1501 had expired. See Court
No. 07-00123, Status Report, ECF No. 171 (Oct. 20, 2017). Home Products International,
Inc. (“Home Products”), Plaintiff in Court No. 07-00123, joined in the Government’s
motion. As an “affected domestic producer” under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000 (“CDSOA”), 19 U.S.C. § 1675,2 Home Products stood to lose
considerable compensation from the antidumping duties to be collected and distributed
to it under the CDSOA unless the erroneous liquidations were corrected.
In the absence of any objection at the time, and consistent with its inherent power
as an Article III court and the obligation to enforce its own judgments, the court entered
an order directing reliquidation at the 72.29% rate reflected in the Judgment. See Initial
Order of Reliquidation; see also Def.’s Mot. at 3. Shortly thereafter, Target became aware
of the court-ordered reliquidation and contested its lawfulness. Target then filed motions
to intervene under USCIT Rule 24(a) (intervention as of right) and Rule 24(b) (permissive
intervention), to reconsider, and to vacate the Initial Order of Reliquidation. See Court
No. 07-00123, ECF Nos. 173 (intervention), 176 (reconsideration), 177 (vacation).
Subsequently, the court stayed implementation of the Initial Order of Reliquidation
and re-postured the post-judgment relief sought by the Government and Home Products
as a supplemental proceeding to enforce the Judgment under USCIT Rule 71. See Court
No. 07-00123, Order Issuing Stay Pending Disposition of Target’s Motions, ECF No. 188
2 Also known as the Byrd Amendment, the CDSOA was enacted in October 2000 and
repealed in February 2006.
Court No. 21-00162 Page 4
(Dec. 22, 2017). In disposing of Target’s multiple requests for relief, this Court addressed
the unusual circumstances before it by providing a comprehensive overview of
the matter’s procedural posture, the erroneous liquidations by Customs, the powers of
the U.S. Court of International Trade, how the finality of liquidation operates in traditional
customs duty cases, and how finality operates in the international trade context
(i.e., antidumping and countervailing duties), focusing on the court’s power and authority
to correct liquidations not in accordance with a court order or judgment. See generally
Home Products I.
The following provides context for understanding the unique facts that gave rise
to this action. Though it was a purchaser/importer of the subject merchandise from
Since Hardware, Target chose not to participate in the underlying administrative review
and subsequent § 1581(c) litigation, Court No.07-00123. As Target was not a party
to the administrative proceeding below, it had not perfected a right to intervene in Court
No. 07-00123. Target, therefore, could not challenge the merits of the litigation that led
to the Judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(B) (“in a civil action under section 516A of
the Tariff Act of 1930, only an interested party who was a party to the proceeding
in connection with which the matter arose may intervene, and such person may intervene
as a matter of right”); USCIT Rule 24(a)(1). Additionally, while USCIT Rule 24(b)(1)
provides for permissive intervention by any person who is “given a conditional right to
intervene by a federal statute” or “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action
a common question of law or fact,” that form of intervention is not available in § 1581(c)
litigation. See, e.g., Ontario Forest Indus. Assoc. v. United States, 30 CIT 1117, 1130
Court No. 21-00162 Page 5
n.12, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1322 n.12 (2006) (“The court notes that here jurisdiction is
founded under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). Section 2631(j) of Title 28 allows permissive
intervention in such suits. In contrast, under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), intervention may only
be sought as a matter of right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(B).”); see also Dofasco Inc. v.
United States, 31 CIT 1592, 1594–95, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286–87 (2007) (collecting
cases explaining unavailability of permissive intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)).
Whether Target could have earlier sought interested party status and participated
throughout the lengthy and expensive administrative process before the U.S. Department
of Commerce (“Commerce”) is a moot point. Cf. U.S. Magnesium LLC v. United States,
31 CIT 792, 793 (2007) (“While it may be true that TMI could have sought intervention
of right earlier in this matter or initiated its own action to contest the Final Results,
given the statutory scheme and this Court’s rules and jurisprudence, the court cannot now
see how TMI may, pursuant to USCIT Rule 24(b), permissively intervene in this matter.”
(internal citations omitted)). In the final analysis, Target, as the importer of 40 of the
entries of the subject merchandise, was fundamentally and fully protected
by the advocacy of its supplier—the foreign manufacturer/exporter, Since Hardware—
throughout the administrative process as well as in the follow-on litigation, Court
No. 07-00123.
Regarding Target’s post-judgment attempt to intervene in Court No. 07-00123,
the court explained that USCIT Rule 24 and 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j) were inapplicable
in these circumstances because these provisions appertain to intervention by a litigant
who was a party to the administrative proceeding below, which Target was not. Again,
Court No. 21-00162 Page 6
as Target’s rights were fully protected by the foreign manufacturer/exporter in the matter
before Commerce and the court, Target had no reason or incentive to intervene in the
case-in-chief in Court No. 07-00123. 3 Target’s “rights” arose only upon the issuance of
the Initial Order of Reliquidation.
As neither Target nor Customs were parties to Court No. 17-00123, and due to the
potential impact on Target’s entries of the post-judgment relief sought by the Government
and Home Products, the court addressed Target’s opposition to the Initial Order
of Reliquidation and its various motions through the vehicle of USCIT Rule 71.
See USCIT R. 71 (“When an order grants relief for a nonparty or may be enforced against
a nonparty, the procedure for enforcing the order is the same as for a party.”).
The objections raised by Target were thus considered in the context of that separate,
supplemental, post-judgment proceeding—a proceeding that was grounded in equity,
specifically focused on the power and authority of the U.S. Court of International Trade
to enforce its own judgment.
In considering Target’s objections, the court balanced the various factors involved,
including the timeline relating to the discovery in August 2017 of the erroneous
liquidations that occurred in March 2017, and the relative alacrity with which
the Government and Home Products sought reliquidation once they discovered
the problem. Home Products I, 43 CIT at ___, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 1375–77; cf. Cemex,
3As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC” or “Court of Appeals”)
observed, the net effect of granting Target relief would be to preserve a “windfall from
Customs’ failure to properly implement a court order.” Home Products Int’l, Inc. v. United
States, 846 F. App’x 890, 895 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Home Products II”).
Court No. 21-00162 Page 7
S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Cemex”) (“Ad Hoc should
have moved the Court of International Trade to enforce the judgment in 1998, rather than
in 2003”). As a result, the court determined that it had the authority to order reliquidation
and issued an affirmative injunction (“Final Order of Reliquidation”) that, inter alia, vacated
and superseded the Initial Order of Reliquidation. Home Products I, 43 CIT at ___, 405 F.
Supp. 3d at 1378. It also directed Customs to promptly reliquidate the subject entries in
conformity with the Judgment, and denied as moot Target’s motions to intervene and to
stay implementation of, and to reconsider and vacate, the Initial Order of Reliquidation.
Id.
Target then appealed Home Products I. See Court No. 07-00123, Docketing of
CAFC Appeal No. 2020-1202, ECF No. 206 (“Appeal”). In the period between the
issuance of Home Products I and the filing of the Appeal, Customs reliquidated all
242 entries, including Target’s 40 entries, consistent with this Court’s December 8, 2016
Judgment. See Def.’s Mot at 5. Target paid the reliquidated amounts and filed Protest
No. 1401-20-102470 (“Protest”) against the reliquidations. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7. In view
of the Appeal, Customs suspended consideration of the Protest. See id. ¶ 26.
On appeal, both Target and the Government agreed that Target had not satisfied
the requirements for intervention as of right pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(B).
However, they urged the Court of Appeals to consider that Target should fall into
the “unique interest” exception to the rule against non-party appeals, so the court could
reach Target’s arguments regarding the Final Order of Reliquidation. See Home
Products II, 846 F. App’x at 893–94. The Court of Appeals did not agree. Id. at 894.
Court No. 21-00162 Page 8
After examining the various formulations of the unique interest exception, the Court of
Appeals applied the following test: (1) whether the non-party participated in the
proceedings below; (2) whether the non-party has a personal stake in the outcome;
(3) whether the equities favor hearing the appeal; and (4) whether the non-party has an
alternative path to appellate review of the decision. Id. The court found that Target
satisfied the first two factors but not the last two:
Target’s nonparty appeal is in tension with the ordinary
process of intervention. . . . Target effectively asks that
we ignore that it sought intervention and skip directly
to considering this case as a nonparty appeal. We decline
to do so. To ensure that the exceptions to the rule against
nonparty appeals remain narrow, we conclude that equity
required Target, whose motion to intervene was denied,
to appeal and contest the denial of intervention. As Target
failed to follow that procedure and does not meaningfully
defend that choice, we conclude that the equities do not favor
allowing Target’s nonparty appeal.[ ]
Finally, it is undisputed that Target has another, statutorily
prescribed, path to redress its grievance without resort
to a nonparty appeal. Target has, in fact, followed that path.
Upon reliquidation of the subject entries, Target protested
Customs’ actions pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514. Target’s
Opening Br. 20. If Customs denies Target’s protest, Target
will be able to commence an action in the CIT challenging that
decision. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a), 2637(a). And, if the CIT
resolves that case adversely to Target, Target, as a party
to the CIT action, will be able to seek review in this court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
Target contends that requiring it to continue down that path
will be a waste of resources, given the amount of time
the proceeding will take and the fact that it “is inevitable a new
case will land right back with this Court.” Target's Suppl. Br. 8.
While we recognize some inefficiency in that process, it is
a problem of Target’s own creation. Target, although
a nonparty, chose to involve itself at the tail-end of this CIT
proceeding. Its involvement resulted in an additional
Court No. 21-00162 Page 9
two years of litigation before the CIT and over a year pending
appeal in this court. Had Target chosen to follow
the procedure prescribed by statute, such that reliquidation
would have occurred in November 2017, Target may well
have reached the point of appeal in its own case. Target’s
choice to risk a dead-end road, rather than follow the clear
path laid out by statute, does not create an exceptional
circumstance warranting nonparty appeal.
Id. at 895 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). As a consequence, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Target’s appeal in its entirety, thereby concluding the Home Products litigation.
Customs then proceeded to consider, and ultimately deny, Target’s protest. Compl. ¶ 27;
Protest. Target then commenced this action seeking judicial review of the denial of its
protest.
II. Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is appropriate when
a plaintiff’s allegations do not entitle it to a remedy. See United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United
States, 464 F.3d 1325, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The motion “tests
the legal sufficiency of a complaint,” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.
2002), which must be dismissed if it fails to present a legally cognizable right of action.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff’s factual allegations
must be “enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. Dismissal
is required when a complaint fails to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “In deciding a motion to dismiss,
the court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and must draw
Court No. 21-00162 Page 10
all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant,” Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v.
United States, 728 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013), but it need not accept legal
conclusions contained in the same allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. Discussion
A. Dispositional Path
As an initial matter, the court addresses the issue of the proper procedural vehicle
for disposing of this action. Defendant argues that Target’s claims reappear under
the jurisdictional guise of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) without altering any of Target’s arguments
raised in the supplemental post-judgment proceeding in Court No. 07-00123. Def.’s Mot.
at 1. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s complaint “consists of legal arguments,
all of which have been considered and rejected by the [c]ourt in Home Products[ I].” Id.
Therefore, in Defendant’s view, “Target’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. Target disagrees, contending that it
is entitled to relief, and that the merits can be resolved by treating Defendant’s
Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment or a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. See Pl.’s Resp. at 2 n.1 (“While a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a
motion for summary judgment should be filed after answer, an answer to the factual
allegations of the complaint in this case would be unnecessary. … [Plaintiff] submit[s] that
the Court should treat the instant motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings or for
summary judgment, proceed to decide the case on the merits, and waive the defects in
the filing of the dispositive motion nunc pro tunc. Under Rule 1 of the Rules of the Court,
the ‘rules should be construed, administered and employed by the court and the parties
Court No. 21-00162 Page 11
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.’”). Target also maintains that filing of an answer is unnecessary because
Defendant’s motion does not contest the factual allegations of the complaint. Id.
For the court to convert a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into
a summary judgment motion, certain circumstances must exist—namely whether a party
presented matters outside the pleading that were not excluded by the court.
USCIT R. 12(b)(6); see also Wright & Miller, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1366 (3d ed.
2023). When those circumstances are present, the court is to convert the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to a motion for summary judgment. Id. As neither party refers to matters outside
of the complaint, those circumstances are not present. Similarly, the pleadings are not
closed as Defendant has yet to file an answer. Accordingly, circumstances are not
present that call for the conversion of Defendant’s motion to a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. USCIT R. 12(c); 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1366.
As the parties acknowledge, this action presents a unique set of facts and
circumstances. The parties further agree that the complaint presents no dispute about
the material facts of this action, but merely a pure question of law, i.e., the legal
conclusions to be drawn from the governing legal authorities. These questions of law—
the authority of the Court of International Trade to order reliquidation considered in
conjunction with certain statutory provisions, including 19 U.S.C. § 1501 (reliquidation),
as well as finality and the applicability of Cemex—are resolvable under Rule 12(b)(6).
See Yanko v. United States, 869 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (treating as “pure legal
issue of statutory interpretation” claim based on interpretation of statutory provision and
Court No. 21-00162 Page 12
related executive order). Thus, “the sufficiency of the complaint is the question on the
merits, and there is no real distinction in this context between the question presented on
a 12(b)(6) motion and a motion for summary judgment.” Marshall Cty. Health Care Auth.
v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the court agrees with
Defendant that Rule 12(b)(6) is the proper procedural vehicle for resolving this action.
B. Merits Analysis
Target claims the Final Order of Reliquidation is ultra vires, illegal, null and void,
as well as contrary to the guidance of the Court of Appeals in Cemex. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30.
It argues that the Court of International Trade “cannot use its equitable powers to ignore
a statutory prohibition” or “ignore the binding precedent of the CAFC in Cemex.”
Id. ¶¶ 37, 38. Target maintains that “[a]s in this action, there was no question in Cemex
that the entries were deemed liquidated improperly under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), and there
was no reliquidation of the deemed liquidation within the 90-day period permitted
under 19 U.S.C. § 1501.” Id. ¶ 35. “In Cemex, the CAFC unanimously affirmed
the decision of this [c]ourt denying the domestic producers’ motion to reliquidate and
holding that the liquidation became ‘final and conclusive upon all persons’ under
19 U.S.C. § 1514. 384 F.3d at 1315–316.” Id. ¶ 36.
Target argues that Cemex controls the result here, going so far as to declare that
“Cemex is on all fours with this case.” Pl.’s Resp. at 16. Target’s argument is unavailing
as the court has already made clear its view of Cemex regarding the facts that gave rise
to the supplemental post-judgment proceedings in Court No. 07-00123, and why Cemex
was distinguishable in that context. See Home Products I, 43 CIT at ___, 405 F. Supp. 3d
Court No. 21-00162 Page 13
at 1376–77. Beyond this general reliance on Cemex, Target appears to acknowledge
that its arguments here amount to little more than the “unenviable task of requesting
a judge to reverse his own decision.” Pl.’s Resp. at 2. For the reasons set forth in Home
Products I as well as this opinion, the court remains unpersuaded by Target’s arguments.
As the court previously observed, when considering “what most likely tips
the balance in one direction or the other is how quickly the party with an interest
in a judgment moved to assert their rights once they knew or should have known about
the error.” Home Products I, 43 CIT at ___, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 1374. The belated actions
of the domestic industry in Cemex are simply not comparable to those of the domestic
industry plaintiff in Home Products I. In Cemex, Customs did not liquidate pursuant
to Commerce’s instructions, which were issued in March 1998. Those instructions were
premature, and issued prior to the expiration of the 90-day certiorari period for appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which had the effect of lifting the court-ordered suspension
of liquidation. But that was immaterial, as the entries were “deemed liquidated”
in September 1998, a discovery the domestic industry did not pursue or learn of until
2002, some four years later. Critically, unlike the circumstances here, Cemex did not
involve a violation of an affirmative injunction or a judgment. There was “merely” a failure
by Customs to follow instructions from Commerce that went undiscovered for years,
rather than the passage of a few months addressed by the supplemental post-judgment
proceedings in Court No. 07-00123.
The court notes that Target often refers to the erroneous liquidations at issue here
as “deemed” liquidations under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). However, Home Products I only
Court No. 21-00162 Page 14
involved actual liquidations, not deemed liquidations as in Cemex. See Court No.
07-00123, Status Report, ECF No. 171 (explaining that “Customs recently realized that
… it misapplied the liquidation instructions. … [Specifically, Customs had liquidated
several entries in violation of this Court’s judgment], at the lower cash deposit rate,” and
further noting that “[u]nsurprisingly, no importers have filed protests against the erroneous
liquidations at a lower rate”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s arguments regarding deemed
liquidations under § 1504(d) are without merit.
In the end, Plaintiff’s reliance on Cemex is simply misplaced. Reading Cemex as
broadly as Plaintiff suggests would elevate the principle of finality found in § 1514 over
the inherent power of the Court of International Trade under Article III of the United States
Constitution. To do so would render this Court powerless to enforce its orders and
judgments. Home Products I, 43 CIT at ___, 403 F. Supp. 3d at 1377; see also Allegheny
Bradford Corp. v. United States, 28 CIT 603, 608 n.4, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1166 n.4
(2004) (“Section 1514(b), in relevant part, prevents certain determinations of Customs
from becoming final when an action is commenced with this Court. Section 1514(b) was
enacted in 1979, before the Court had power to enjoin liquidation pursuant to § 1516a(c).
Because the injunction power allows the Court to protect an importer from liquidations
that might otherwise become final and unreviewable, Ԥ 1514(b) seems somewhat
redundant.’ The court finds it unreasonable to construe § 1514(b)–a statutory provision
with an ambiguous purpose–to preclude review of the improper liquidations and thereby
frustrate the intent of an injunction order granted pursuant to § 1516a(c), a provision with
Court No. 21-00162 Page 15
the clear purpose of providing temporary protection to parties who contest agency
determinations.” (internal citations omitted)).
Target also contends that 19 U.S.C. § 1501, 4 the 90-day voluntary reliquidation
provision, “foreclosed” reliquidation by order of the court. The court again disagrees.
That provision merely limits the time within which Customs may act to voluntarily correct
its own mistake. Plaintiff points to no language in the statute or its legislative history
to support its argument. The statute on its face does not govern the authority of the Court
of International Trade to grant relief from an unlawful liquidation derived from
its jurisdiction over the entries underlying an action, as well as its inherent powers as an
Article III court. See Home Products I, 43 CIT at ___, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1373–74, 1376-77;
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1585; 28 U.S.C. § 2643; Allegheny Bradford Corp., 28 CIT
at 614-15, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (“To remedy liquidations that violate a valid court
order, the Court ‘possesses all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute
upon, a district court of the United States.’ This includes the power to grant ‘any other
form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action.’” (internal citations omitted)); AK Steel
Corp v. United States, 27 CIT 1382, 1388, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (2003) (“Where
liquidation occurs through an illegal act of Customs and in the absence of a protestable
event, the doctrine of finality cannot be said to attach. To reach any other result would
be absurd.”).
4 “A liquidation made in accordance with section 1500 or 1504 of this title or any
reliquidation thereof made in accordance with this section may be reliquidated in any
respect by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, notwithstanding the filing of a protest,
within ninety days from the date of the original liquidation.” 19 U.S.C. § 1501.
Court No. 21-00162 Page 16
As the court stated in Home Products I, it was facing “a simple and straightforward
issue … whether to enforce its judgment through an affirmative injunction, which the court
decides by balancing the proper assessment of antidumping duties with the finality of
liquidation.” Home Products I, 43 CIT at ___, 403 F. Supp. 3d at 1373 (citing SSAB v.
United States, 32 CIT 795, 803, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (2008)). Given the facts,
the court concluded that “justice require[d] correction of the erroneously liquidated subject
entries.” Id., 43 CIT at ___, 403 F. Supp. 3d at 1378. Once again, the court reaches the
same conclusion. It is a matter of basic logic and common sense that Court of
International Trade (and the Court of Appeals), not Customs, has the “final” say about
entries in a trade action. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e); Home Products I, 43 CIT at ___,
403 F. Supp. 3d at 1373 (“When Customs liquidates an entry, the finality considerations
of § 1514 always lurk in the background except when the Court of International Trade
takes jurisdiction over the entries in an action under § 1516a. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(b).
This is a logical and necessary carve-out from § 1514 because such entries need to be
liquidated in accordance with ‘the final court decision’ pursuant to § 1516a(e), meaning
the court, not Customs, necessarily has the final say over the entries.”).
Target also relies on certain language from the dissent in In re Section 301 Cases,
45 CIT ___, ___, 524 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1374 (2021) for support. See Pl.’s Resp.
at 19, 21. To the extent Target attempts to use that discussion as another attack on the
court’s prior decision in Court No. 07-00123, the discussion taken as a whole does not
undermine, but rather supports, the analysis set forth in Home Products I. It is consistent
with this Court’s view of its duty and statutory authority when confronting enforcement of
Court No. 21-00162 Page 17
its own judgments. See In re Section 301 Cases, 45 CIT at ___, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 1382
(“In light of the CIT’s broad remedial authority, the court asked the Parties to identify any
cases in which ‘the Federal Circuit found that the CIT erred in its exercise of discretion as
to appropriate relief.’ . . . None of the identified cases suggest that the court would
overstep its authority to order reliquidation to prevailing Plaintiffs in this case.”).
The statutory scheme states plainly and unequivocally that this Court has all
powers in law and equity that are conferred on all Article III courts under the Constitution.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1585; 28 U.S.C. § 2643. Were Target to prevail—namely, have this
Court hold that it lacks the power to enforce its own judgment—such a conclusion would
turn the clock back over 40 years to before the passage of the Customs Courts Act of
1980, and again call into question whether a party before the Court could obtain full and
complete relief. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, at 19–20 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3730–31 (explaining one purpose of Customs Courts Act of 1980 as
providing U.S. Court of International Trade with “all the necessary remedial powers in law
and equity possessed by other federal courts established under Article III of the
Constitution.” (emphasis added)). This the court cannot and will not do.
Court No. 21-00162 Page 18
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
/s/ Leo M. Gordon
Judge Leo M. Gordon
Dated: July 20, 2023
New York, New York