In re People in the Interest of T.T

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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
June 17, 2019
2019 CO 54
No. 18SA221, In re People in the Interest of T.T.—Mental Health—Court Records—
Public Access.
In this original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, the supreme court reviews whether
“Eclipse,” the user interface of the judicial branch’s computerized case management
system, is an “index of cases” as contemplated by section 27-65-107(7), C.R.S. (2018)
(requiring clerk to omit names of persons released from involuntary short-term mental
health treatment from the court’s “index of cases”). In People in the Interest of T.T.,
2017 COA 132, 410 P.3d 792, the court of appeals held that Eclipse is an “index of cases”
for purposes of section 27-65-107(7) and directed the district court to order that plaintiff’s
name be omitted from the Eclipse system and any lists generated from the system’s data.
Plaintiff sought C.A.R. 21 relief asking the supreme court to direct the district court to
comply with the court of appeals’ mandate.
The supreme court issued a rule to show cause but declines to grant plaintiff’s
requested relief. Plaintiff’s mental health case remains sealed and is not accessible to the
public. The court holds that neither the Eclipse user interface, nor its underlying
database, ICON, functions as an “index of cases” for purposes of section 27-65-107(7).
Moreover, to remove an individual’s name from this case management system would
thwart the court’s statutory obligations to link the record of a short-term mental health
case with subsequent cases involving that individual and to share certain information
with the federal government. Because the district court’s compliance with the court of
appeals’ mandate is neither warranted nor feasible, the supreme court discharges the rule
to show cause and disapproves of the court of appeals’ opinion in T.T.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
2019 CO 54
Supreme Court Case No. 18SA221
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 14MH13
Honorable Theresa M. Slade, Judge
In Re
Petitioner:
The People of the State of Colorado,
In the Interest of
Respondent:
T.T.
Rule Discharged
en banc
June 17, 2019
Attorney for Respondent:
James C. Recht
Castle Rock, Colorado
Attorneys for Christopher Ryan, State Court Administrator; Shana Kloek, Clerk of
the Arapahoe County Court; and the Honorable Theresa Slade:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Emily B. Buckley, Assistant Attorney General
Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE SAMOUR does not participate.
¶1 Under section 27-65-107(7), C.R.S. (2018), when a person is released from
short-term treatment for a mental health condition, the clerk of the district court shall seal
the record in the case and omit the name of the person from the court’s “index of cases.”
The key question in this original proceeding is whether “Eclipse,” the user interface of
the judicial branch’s computerized case management system, is an “index of cases” as
contemplated by section 27-65-107(7).
¶2 This case comes before us in a rather complicated procedural posture. T.T. seeks
to ensure that his name is not linked to the record of his earlier short-term commitment
for treatment of a mental health condition. In a published, split decision issued in 2017,
the court of appeals held that Eclipse is an “index of cases” for purposes of
section 27-65-107(7) and directed the district court to order that T.T.’s name be omitted
from the Eclipse system and any lists generated from the system’s data. People in the
Interest of T.T., 2017 COA 132, ¶¶ 23, 26, 410 P.3d 792, 797–98. T.T. later attempted to
enforce the court of appeals’ decision by petitioning the district court for an order
certifying that it had complied with the court of appeals’ directive. The district court
declined to issue such an order and instead invited T.T. to set the issue for a hearing at
which testimony could be taken about the feasibility of compliance with the court of
appeals’ mandate. T.T. instead filed a motion to enforce the mandate with the court of
appeals, which denied relief for lack of jurisdiction. T.T. then sought C.A.R. 21 relief in
this court, asking us to direct the district court to comply with the court of appeals’
mandate.
2
¶3 We issued a rule to show cause but decline to grant T.T.’s requested relief. As
discussed in this opinion, the reference to “index of cases” in section 27-65-107(7)
contemplates a list of matters before the court that can be used to locate the actual court
records for those matters. But the Eclipse user interface itself contains no data, and
neither Eclipse nor its underlying database, ICON, functions as an “index” or list of cases.
Thus, contrary to the court of appeals’ ruling, section 27-65-107(7) does not require the
court clerk to remove T.T.’s name from the ICON/Eclipse case management system.
Moreover, to remove an individual’s name from this case management system would
thwart the court’s statutory obligations to link the record of a short-term mental health
case with subsequent cases involving that individual and to share certain information
with the federal government. Because the district court’s compliance with the court of
appeals’ mandate is neither warranted nor feasible, we discharge the rule to show cause,
and disapprove of the court of appeals’ opinion in T.T.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶4 In January 2014, T.T. was placed in involuntary short-term mental health
treatment. His case was sealed at filing and, under sections 3.07 and 4.60(b)(5) of Chief
Justice Directive (CJD) 05-01, was accessible only to judges, court staff, and other
authorized department staff unless otherwise directed by court order. T.T. was released
seven days later.
¶5 A little over two years after his release, T.T. visited the Arapahoe County Justice
Center and asked the clerk if his name had been omitted from the index. Although it is
3
unclear from the record and previous rulings in this case exactly what information was
conveyed to T.T., it appears that, at a minimum, someone in the clerk’s office confirmed
that the case existed.1 T.T. was upset that his name was still linked to his mental health
case and requested that the clerk remove it from the court’s index of cases. When the
clerk declined to do so, T.T. filed a motion with the district court seeking an order
requiring the clerk to remove his name.
¶6 T.T. argued that Eclipse is an “index of cases” for purposes of section 27-65-107(7)
and therefore, once T.T.’s mental health case was closed, the clerk was required to seal
the record in the case and remove T.T.’s name from Eclipse. The district court denied the
motion. T.T. appealed, and the court of appeals ordered a limited remand directing the
district court to conduct a hearing and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. On
remand, the county attorney argued that the “index of cases” contemplated by
section 27-65-107(7) is the list of open and closed cases that can be generated using
Eclipse, but not Eclipse itself. Following remand, the district court issued an order
granting T.T.’s motion in part and denying it in part.
1 Although the record before us sheds no light on this point, it is possible that the clerk
did not consider T.T. to be a member of the “public” because he was a primary party to
the case. See CJD 05-01, § 2.00(b)(4) (providing that the “public” does not include “the
primary parties to a case as defined by the custodian, their lawyers, other authorized
representative, or persons appointed by the court regarding access to the court record in
their specific case”).
4
¶7 First, the district court observed that mental health cases are sealed at filing, and
that such files are accessible only to judges and authorized staff unless the court orders
otherwise. In this case, the file was also accessible by T.T.’s appointed counsel and the
county attorney. The district court explained that the court clerk had properly sealed and
closed T.T.’s case, that the file was physically removed from the mental health case file
room and taken to a locked storage facility, and that it is not accessible to anyone except
certain supervisors without a court order. The court acknowledged that there exists an
“index” of names and case numbers that is used only to search the locked storage facility.
But it noted that section 4.60 of CJD 05-01 specifically states that mental health cases are
not accessible to the public unless the court orders otherwise.
¶8 Next, the district court found that Eclipse is not an “index of cases” for purposes
of section 27-65-107(7), but rather a “searchable database” that can be used to generate
open and closed case reports, daily dockets, and other reports. The court rejected T.T.’s
argument that the statute required his name to be “deleted” from any database
altogether. It reasoned that section 27-65-107(7) does not require the clerk to omit the
respondent’s name from “all court record[s],” but only from the “index of cases.” The
court concluded that the “index” meant any list of cases generated by the Eclipse system.
It also noted that if Eclipse were deemed the “index of cases,” removing T.T.’s name from
the system would prevent compliance with section 27-65-107(7)’s requirement that the
respondent’s short-term treatment record be re-opened and made part of the record in a
subsequent long-term care and treatment case. Thus, the district court granted the
5
motion in part and ordered that T.T.’s name be omitted from any list generated or
produced by Eclipse (even for purposes of storage), but denied the motion to the extent
T.T. requested his name be removed from Eclipse. T.T. appealed.
¶9 In a published, split opinion, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the
Eclipse system is the “index of cases” contemplated by section 27-65-107(7).
T.T., ¶¶ 23, 26, 410 P.3d at 797. The division majority rejected the county attorney’s
argument that omitting T.T.’s name from Eclipse would “obliterate” the record in the case
and make it impossible to re-index T.T.’s name as required by statute should T.T. become
subject to an order of long-term care. Id. at ¶ 25, 410 P.3d at 797. The majority reasoned
that mental health cases could be managed without including the names of those
committed, noting that the names of sexual assault victims are omitted from records in
criminal cases and that juvenile defendants’ names are typically replaced with initials in
case captions and opinions. Id. at ¶¶ 24–25, 410 P.3d at 797.
¶10 In dissent, Judge Bernard concluded that the “index of cases” contemplated by
section 27-65-107(7) means a list of matters before the court that is available for public
inspection. Id. at ¶¶ 33–37, 410 P.3d at 798 (Bernard, J., dissenting). He reasoned that
Eclipse is not an “index” as contemplated by section 27-65-107(7) because he surmised
that the Eclipse system is not accessible to the public, given that it contains confidential
information. Id. at ¶¶ 38–40, 410 P.3d at 798.
¶11 The court of appeals remanded with directions to “omit T.T.’s name from the
Eclipse system and lists generated from the Eclipse system’s data by use of T.T.’s initials
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or any other method omitting identifying information that the district court chooses to
employ consistent with this opinion.” Id. at ¶ 28, 410 P.3d at 798. The county attorney
did not seek certiorari review of the court of appeals’ ruling.
¶12 T.T. later filed a request in the district court, asking it to certify that it had removed
his name from Eclipse. In a written order, the district court declined to do so, stating that
it could not both be a fact finder and provide the facts. Instead, it offered to hold a
testimonial hearing to allow T.T. to call witnesses to answer questions about compliance
with the court of appeals’ order.2 Instead of requesting a hearing, T.T. filed a motion to
enforce the mandate with the court of appeals, which denied relief for lack of jurisdiction.
T.T. then filed this petition under C.A.R. 21, seeking enforcement of the court of appeals’
mandate. We issued a rule to show cause, naming the state court administrator, the clerk
of the Arapahoe County Court, and the district court judge as respondents.
II. Analysis
¶13 T.T. effectively seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to omit his
name from the Eclipse system in compliance with the court of appeals’ mandate.
See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Cty. Road Users Ass’n, 11 P.3d 432, 437 (Colo. 2000) (“Mandamus
lies to compel the performance of a purely ministerial duty involving no discretionary
right and not requiring the exercise of judgment.”). He argues that based on the plain
2The district court’s invitation to hold a hearing appears to be in response to the court of
appeals’ suggestion in a footnote of its opinion that an evidentiary hearing would have
created a more useful record for the court to review. T.T., ¶ 27 n.2, 410 P.3d at 798 n.2.
7
language of section 27-65-107(7), his name should have been removed from Eclipse when
he was released from treatment. Because a court clerk confirmed the existence of his
mental health case, he concludes that his name has not been removed from the “index of
cases” and asks this court to compel the district court to remove it from Eclipse.
¶14 Respondents contend that Eclipse is not an “index of cases” as contemplated by
section 27-65-107(7), and therefore removal of T.T.’s name from Eclipse is not required.
Moreover, Respondents contend, removal of T.T.’s name from the ICON/Eclipse case
management system is not feasible without causing significant disruption of judicial
records management and the ability of the judicial branch to comply with federal and
state statutes.
¶15 Examining the plain language of section 27-65-107(7) and associated statutes
referencing an “index of cases,” we conclude that this term contemplates a list of matters
before the court that can be used to locate the actual court records for those matters. But
the Eclipse user interface itself contains no data, and neither Eclipse nor its underlying
database, ICON, functions as an “index” or the kind of master list of cases contemplated
by section 27-65-107(7). Thus, contrary to the court of appeals’ ruling, section 27-65-107(7)
does not require the court clerk to remove T.T.’s name from the ICON/Eclipse case
management system. Moreover, the removal of names from the ICON/Eclipse case
management system would thwart the court’s statutory obligations to link the record of
a short-term mental health case with subsequent cases concerning the long-term
treatment of that individual and to share certain information with the federal
8
government. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018); §§ 13-9-123 to -124, C.R.S. (2018);
§ 24-33.5-424, C.R.S. (2018). Because the district court’s compliance with the court of
appeals’ mandate is neither warranted nor feasible, we discharge the rule to show cause,
and disapprove of the court of appeals’ opinion in T.T.
A. Jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21
¶16 The exercise of original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 lies within this court’s sole
discretion. Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1271 (Colo. 2005). Relief under C.A.R. 21 is
“an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability.” Villas at
Highland Park Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Villas at Highland Park, LLC, 2017 CO 53, ¶ 22,
394 P.3d 1144, 1151. We may exercise our original jurisdiction when the normal appellate
process provides an inadequate remedy. Fognani, 115 P.3d at 1271. We may also grant
relief under C.A.R. 21 in the exercise of our general superintending authority over all
courts as provided in article VI, section 2 of the Colorado Constitution. C.A.R. 21(a)(1).
Here, T.T. seeks compliance with the court of appeals’ mandate. The district court has
instead invited T.T. to hold a hearing to take testimony on the feasibility of compliance
and the court of appeals has denied T.T.’s request to enforce the mandate for lack of
jurisdiction. Given the unique circumstances, we conclude that exercise of our original
jurisdiction is appropriate, both as a matter of our general superintending authority over
all courts and because no other adequate remedy is available.
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B. Court Records in Mental Health Cases Are Not Accessible to
the Public
¶17 As a preliminary matter, we note that under both statute and court rule, mental
health records held by the court are not accessible to the public.
¶18 The care and treatment of persons with mental health disorders is addressed in
article 65 of title 27. The legislature has declared that the purposes of article 65 include,
as relevant here, providing “the fullest possible measure of privacy, dignity, and other
rights to persons undergoing care and treatment for a mental health disorder.”
§ 27-65-101(1)(c), C.R.S. (2018). Under section 27-65-121(1), C.R.S. (2018), all information
obtained and records prepared in the course of providing services under article 65 are
“confidential and privileged matter” and may be disclosed only to certain individuals or
agencies listed under that provision.
¶19 Relevant here, section 27-65-107 addresses certification for short-term treatment of
persons who, as a result of a mental health disorder, present a danger to themselves or
others or are gravely disabled. § 27-65-107(1). Subsection (7) of the statute requires that
records and papers in proceedings under section 27-65-107 “shall be maintained
separately” by court clerks. § 27-65-107(7). This provision further mandates that when
an individual is released from short-term treatment, the facility shall notify the court clerk
within five days, and the clerk shall “seal the record in the case and omit the name of the
respondent from the index of cases” unless and until the individual “becomes subject to
an order of long-term care and treatment pursuant to section 27-65-109 or . . . the court
10
orders [the record in the short term-involuntary hold case] opened for good cause
shown.” Id.
¶20 In addition to these statutory provisions, court rule also makes clear that mental
health records are not publicly accessible. Pursuant to its independent constitutional
authority to “make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts,”
Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21, this court has adopted rules governing public access to court
records and administrative records of the judicial branch. See Public Access to
Information and Records Rules (P.A.I.R.R.) 1–2. P.A.I.R.R. 1 authorizes the Chief Justice
to issue directives regarding public access to documents and materials made, received,
or maintained by the court, and refers specifically to CJD 05-01, which addresses public
access to court records. Under CJD 05-01, court records in mental health cases are not
accessible to the public unless the court orders otherwise. CJD 05-01, § 4.60(b)(5).
Additionally, any sealed record is not accessible to the public and, absent a court order,
may be accessed only by judges, court staff, and authorized judicial department staff.
Id. §§ 3.07, 4.60(c).3
3The CJD notes that the release of court records sealed under part 7 of article 72 of title
24 is governed by those statutory provisions rather than by the CJD, and that judges and
court staff should respond to requests for a statutorily sealed court record by stating that
no such record exists. CJD 05-01, § 3.07.
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C. Eclipse Is Not an Index for Purposes of Section 27-65-107(7)
¶21 The critical question here is whether Eclipse is, as the court of appeals concluded,
an “index of cases” as contemplated by section 27-65-107(7). We conclude that it is not.
¶22 As described above, section 27-65-107(7) requires the clerk to do two things:
(1) “seal the record in the case,” and (2) “omit the name of the respondent from the index
of cases.” These separate commands make clear that the court’s “record” of the case itself
is distinct from the court’s “index of cases.” The question then becomes, what is the
“index” contemplated by the statute?
¶23 As the court of appeals recognized, several other statutory provisions governing
the administration of the courts help shed light on the meaning of the term “index.” First,
section 13-1-101, C.R.S. (2018), mandates that clerks of court “keep in their respective
offices suitable books for indexing the records of their said offices, one to be known as
the direct index and one as the inverse index.” This provision was enacted in 1889,
see 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 107, and has remained essentially unchanged over the last 130
years. Section 13-1-102, C.R.S. (2018), also enacted in 1889, see id., describes the
information to be included “in said indexes,” namely, the title and case number of each
cause or matter instituted in that court. § 13-1-102. Taken together, these nineteenth
century provisions contemplated a physical book, kept in the office of the clerk of court,
containing a master list of cases in that court. The index was to contain information that
allowed the clerk to locate a particular record kept at the court but did not contain the
12
record itself. Today, section 13-1-102 provides that a case number reference in the index
may be to a physical file or a computer record. § 13-1-102.
¶24 Although technology has advanced significantly since these provisions were
enacted 130 years ago, the purpose of the index was to facilitate the location of the records
of the cases before the court. As we explain below, ICON/Eclipse is not such a list of
cases and therefore does not constitute an “index” for purposes of section 27-65-107(7).
D. Compliance with the Court of Appeals’ Mandate to Remove
T.T. from Eclipse Is Neither Warranted nor Feasible
¶25 Based on the limited record before it, the court of appeals mistakenly concluded
that the Eclipse system is an index of cases for purposes of section 27-65-107(7). But
Eclipse is not an “index” akin to a list of cases, nor does Eclipse itself even contain any
data. Rather, Eclipse is a user interface used to access the judicial department’s master
database of court records, called ICON.4 Eclipse allows authorized employees to search
for, compile, and review information from the ICON database in an understandable
format. It is a search tool used by court staff and is not available to the general public.
T.T.’s name and its link to his mental health case are contained in the underlying ICON
4 We may take judicial notice of facts “capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” CRE 201(b)(2).
Given the unusual circumstances and posture of this case, we choose to take judicial
notice of the recordkeeping system used by the Colorado courts as presented in
Respondents’ offer of proof in their brief to this court, which T.T. does not contest. To
remand for a hearing to present the same information by testimony would be an
unnecessary waste of judicial resources. For purposes of resolving this C.A.R. 21 petition,
we accept the facts presented in Respondents’ offer of proof as true.
13
database, not in Eclipse itself. To the extent that the ICON/Eclipse case management
system can be used to generate a list of cases, the district court properly ordered that
T.T.’s name be omitted from any such list. But as a practical matter, the district court
cannot “omit T.T.’s name from the Eclipse system” in compliance with the court of
appeals’ mandate because Eclipse itself is simply the user interface of the case
management system; it is not an “index” or list of cases generated by that system used to
locate court records.
¶26 The court of appeals reasoned that “omitting T.T.’s name from the Eclipse system”
would not be problematic, noting that “identifying information . . . is often omitted from
court records and case names as required in the interest of privacy.” T.T., ¶¶ 24–25. But
this statement is only partly accurate.
¶27 It is true, for example, that section 24-72-304(4)(a), C.R.S. (2018), requires removal
of the names of sexual assault victims in certain criminal court records before such
records may be released to any individual or agency other than a criminal justice agency,
and that section 19-2-903, C.R.S. (2018), requires juveniles to be identified by initials in
the record on appeal. But provisions like these have no bearing on how the
ICON/Eclipse case management system is used to track information related to mental
health cases and do not support the relief that T.T. seeks here. The names of crime victims
(including sexual assault victims) cannot be searched for or otherwise retrieved using
Eclipse. The omission of a crime victim’s name from other criminal justice records has
no impact on how a case can be retrieved using Eclipse or connected to other cases stored
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in ICON. And although juveniles are identified by their initials in appellate captions,
their full names are maintained in the ICON database and can be retrieved by authorized
users of Eclipse. By contrast, T.T. effectively seeks removal of his name from the ICON
database itself. But section 27-65-107(7) does not require this.
¶28 The judicial branch’s ability to search for and track data in ICON using the Eclipse
interface is only as good as the information in that system. Removing T.T.’s name (or
even simply replacing it with initials) from the underlying database effectively prevents
authorized users of the Eclipse user interface from properly tracking cases involving him
in the future. Parties’ initials are not specific enough forms of identification to serve as
acceptable substitutes for full names in the underlying database, particularly given that
the ICON/Eclipse system is used to access tens of thousands of cases involving
short-term commitments that have been initiated over the last two decades under section
27-65-107.
¶29 Moreover, without the ability to link an order for short-term commitment for
mental health treatment to an order of long-term care and treatment, a court could not,
as required by section 27-65-107(7), open the short-term commitment record and make it
a part of the record in a subsequent long-term treatment case. Similarly, removing names
from the ICON database would hinder the State’s ability to share required information
with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) to ensure that
individuals with mental health issues who pose a danger to themselves or others cannot
purchase firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); §§ 13-9-123 to -124; § 24-33.5-424;
15
Ray v. People, 2019 COA 24, ¶ 2, __ P.2d. __ (explaining the complex interplay between
Colorado statutes and the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which
mandates that certain Colorado persons and entities provide names of those
involuntarily certified for short-term treatment of mental health disorders under
Colorado’s section 27-65-107 for inclusion in the NICS database). If the full names of
individuals who have been subject to short-term commitment for mental health treatment
are not contained in ICON, the court system cannot share them with NICS, frustrating
the purposes of applicable state and federal law.
¶30 In sum, we conclude that compliance with the court of appeals’ mandate to omit
T.T.’s name from Eclipse is neither warranted nor feasible. We emphasize, however, that
T.T.’s short-term mental health case is sealed and inaccessible to the public. See
CJD 05-01, §§ 3.07, 4.60(b)(5), (c).
III. Conclusion
¶31 We hold that neither Eclipse nor its underlying database, ICON, functions as an
“index of cases.” Thus, contrary to the court of appeals’ ruling in T.T.,
section 27-65-107(7) does not require the court clerk to remove T.T.’s name from the
ICON/Eclipse case management system. Because the district court cannot comply with
the relief directed by the court of appeals, we discharge the rule to show cause. Further,
because the lack of an adequate record led to the court of appeals’ mistaken
understanding about the nature of the ICON/Eclipse case management system, and
16
because the court of appeals’ opinion in T.T. may undermine administration of the
judicial branch’s recordkeeping system, we disapprove of that opinion.
JUSTICE SAMOUR does not participate.
17