In Re People v. Rowell

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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
December 9, 2019
2019 CO 104
No. 19SA180, In Re People v. Rowell—Preliminary Hearing Demand Following
Bond Revocation—“Within a Reasonable Time.”
In this original proceeding brought pursuant to C.A.R. 21, the supreme court
holds that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a
preliminary hearing without first determining whether the request was advanced
within a reasonable time after the bonds in his cases were revoked and he was
taken into custody. The relevant charges are class 4, 5, and 6 felonies that do not
carry mandatory sentencing, are not crimes of violence pursuant to section
18-1.3-406, C.R.S. (2019), and are not sexual offenses. It is undisputed that while
the defendant was on bond, he was not eligible to receive a preliminary hearing
on those charges. But the court rules that when his bonds were later revoked, he
was entitled to demand and receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable
time.
Accordingly, the court reverses the district court’s ruling. The case is
remanded so that the district court may determine whether the defendant’s
demand was made within a reasonable time after he became eligible to advance it.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
2019 CO 104
Supreme Court Case No. 19SA180
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
Larimer County District Court Case Nos. 18CR1611 & 19CR15
Honorable Gregory M. Lammons, Judge
________________________________________________________________________
In Re
Plaintiff:
The People of the State of Colorado,
v.
Defendant:
James Rowell.
________________________________________________________________________
Rule Made Absolute
en banc
December 9, 2019
________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Clifford E. Riedel, District Attorney, Eighth Judicial District
Joshua D. Ritter, Deputy District Attorney
Fort Collins, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant:
Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Erin Crowgey, Deputy Public Defender
Fort Collins, Colorado
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In this original proceeding brought pursuant to C.A.R. 21, we must
determine whether the district court erred in denying James Rowell’s request for
a preliminary hearing on one of the two felony charges in case number 18CR1611
and on all five felony charges in case number 19CR15 (collectively, “the relevant
charges”). The relevant charges are class 4, 5, and 6 felonies that do not carry
mandatory sentencing, are not crimes of violence pursuant to section 18-1.3-406,
C.R.S. (2019), and are not sexual offenses. It is undisputed that Rowell was initially
ineligible to receive a preliminary hearing on the relevant charges because he
posted bond in both cases. The issue we confront is whether Rowell was entitled
to demand and receive a preliminary hearing on the relevant charges when he
later found himself in custody in both cases because his bonds were revoked. The
district court ruled that he was not, and we subsequently granted his petition for
a rule to show cause. We now make the rule absolute.
¶2 Because Rowell was taken into custody on the relevant charges when his
bonds were revoked, he was entitled to demand a preliminary hearing on those
charges “within a reasonable time.” The question that naturally flows from this
determination is: What does “within a reasonable time” mean? The legislature
asked this court to establish, through rule, the precise timeframe within which a
demand for a preliminary hearing must be made. See § 16-5-301(1)(a), C.R.S.
(2019). Although Crim. P. 7(h)(1) requires that a preliminary hearing request in
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district court be made “within 7 days after the defendant is brought before the
court for or following the filing of the information,” it does not address Rowell’s
situation—Rowell did not become eligible to demand a preliminary hearing on the
relevant charges until months after he was brought before the court for the filing
of the information. Inasmuch as Rule 7(h)(1) is silent on the timeframe within
which Rowell was required to demand a preliminary hearing on the relevant
charges after his bonds were revoked, we remand the case to the district court to
determine whether his demand was made “within a reasonable time” after he
became statutorily eligible to advance it.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶3 In June 2018, Rowell was charged in Larimer County case number 18CR1611
with multiple crimes, including two felonies: count one, second degree assault
(peace officer), a class 4 felony; and count two, second degree assault (serious
bodily injury), a class 4 felony. Rowell posted bond and was released the next
day—before the information was filed and prior to any court appearance for the
filing of the information.
¶4 Approximately six months later, on January 1, 2019, Rowell was accused of
committing additional crimes in Larimer County case number 19CR15. He was
charged in that case with a misdemeanor and the following five felonies: three
counts of second degree assault (peace officer), all class 4 felonies; one count of
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attempted second degree assault (peace officer), a class 5 felony; and one count of
violation of bail bond conditions, a class 6 felony. Again, Rowell posted bond
before the information was filed and prior to any court appearance for the filing
of the information.
¶5 In February 2019, Rowell requested a preliminary hearing in each case. The
district court granted the request as to count two in 18CR1611, finding that second
degree assault (serious bodily injury) requires mandatory sentencing and is also a
crime of violence pursuant to section 18-1.3-406 (“crime of violence”).1 See
§ 16-5-301(1)(b)(I) (“No person accused of a class 4, 5, or 6 felony . . . except those
which require mandatory sentencing or which are crimes of violence . . . or which
are sexual offenses . . . shall have the right to demand or receive a preliminary
hearing.”). But it denied the request as to the relevant charges—i.e., the remaining
felony charge in 18CR1611 and all five felony charges in 19CR15—reasoning that
Rowell was on bond and those charges do not require mandatory sentencing, are
not crimes of violence, and are not sexual offenses.2 See § 16-5-301(1)(b)(II) (“Any
1Whether Rowell’s request for a preliminary hearing on count two in 18CR1611
was timely made in February 2019 is not an issue before us.
2Neither party contests the district court’s conclusion that the relevant charges do
not require mandatory sentencing and are not crimes of violence or sexual
offenses. And we have not been asked to review that determination. Therefore,
we assume, without deciding, that it was correct.
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defendant accused of a class 4, 5, or 6 felony . . . who is not otherwise entitled to a
preliminary hearing . . . may demand and shall receive a preliminary hearing
within a reasonable time . . . if the defendant is in custody for the offense for which
the preliminary hearing is requested.”). Following a preliminary hearing on count
two in 18CR1611 in March, the court found that probable cause existed to believe
that Rowell committed that crime.
¶6 On May 2, 2019, Rowell was charged in a third case, Larimer County case
number 19CR1086, with three additional felonies: second degree assault
(strangulation), a class 4 felony; and two counts of violation of bail bond
conditions, both class 6 felonies. Less than two weeks later, the district court
granted the People’s request to increase the bond amounts in 18CR1611 and
19CR15. Rowell posted the bond in the most recent case, 19CR1086, but could not
post the increased bonds in the two older cases. Consequently, he was taken into
custody in 18CR1611 and 19CR15 on May 13.
¶7 On July 25, seventy-three days after his bonds were revoked in 18CR1611
and 19CR15, Rowell demanded a preliminary hearing on the relevant charges. He
did so before entering a plea in either case. The district court denied the request,
ruling that a defendant charged with class 4, 5, and 6 felonies, which do not require
mandatory sentencing and are not crimes of violence or sexual offenses, “does not
have a right to a preliminary hearing if [he is] out of custody.” Moreover,
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continued the court, when a defendant “violates [his] bond . . . [and] get[s]
remanded into custody, that right does not come back” because “[o]nce it is gone,
it is gone.”
¶8 Rowell then filed a petition for a rule to show cause. And we granted his
petition.
II. Jurisdiction
¶9 The exercise of original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 rests solely within our
discretion. People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195. We have made
clear, however, that relief under C.A.R. 21 is “an extraordinary remedy that is
limited in both purpose and availability.” People in Interest of T.T., 2019 CO 54,
¶ 16, 442 P.3d 851, 855–56 (quoting Villas at Highland Park Homeowners Ass’n v.
Villas at Highland Park, LLC, 2017 CO 53, ¶ 22, 394 P.3d 1144, 1151). Our
jurisprudence reflects that we have exercised our jurisdiction pursuant to
C.A.R. 21 when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, Fognani v. Young,
115 P.3d 1268, 1271 (Colo. 2005), when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable
harm, Hoffman v. Brookfield Republic, Inc., 87 P.3d 858, 861 (Colo. 2004), or when a
petition raises “issues of significant public importance that we have not yet
considered,” Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 194 (Colo. 2001).
¶10 Here, in invoking our original jurisdiction, Rowell argues that there is no
other adequate remedy available, that he will suffer irreparable harm if we do not
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intervene, and that his petition presents an issue of significant public importance
we have not yet addressed. We agree with him on all three fronts.
¶11 First, the district court’s alleged error implicates Rowell’s right to a
preliminary hearing, and that right will be rendered moot after trial. Tafoya, ¶ 15,
434 P.3d at 1195. A preliminary hearing is a pretrial screening device. Hunter v.
Dist. Court, 543 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Colo. 1975). Therefore, forcing Rowell to wait to
advance his claim until his direct appeal (in the event of a conviction) is not an
adequate remedy. And we are aware of no other suitable remedy.
¶12 Second, the district court’s denial of Rowell’s request for a preliminary
hearing on the relevant charges, if incorrect, deprives him of a statutory right and
may require him to improperly remain in custody until trial. As we explained in
Hunter, a preliminary hearing seeks to “protect[] the accused” by ensuring “that
the prosecution can at least sustain the burden of proving probable cause.” Id.; see
also Tafoya, ¶ 14, 434 P.3d at 1195 (“A preliminary hearing is designed to provide
a judicial determination as to whether probable cause exists to believe that the
charged offense was committed by the defendant.”). Thus, absent relief under
C.A.R. 21, Rowell may suffer irreparable harm.
¶13 Finally, Rowell’s petition raises an issue of first impression that has
significant public importance. We have never been called upon to decide whether
a defendant in Rowell’s situation is entitled to demand a preliminary hearing and,
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if so, what deadline applies to such a demand. Yet, we are convinced that this is a
situation that comes up with some frequency in our trial courts. Hence, we feel
compelled to shed light on the matter.
III. Standard of Review
¶14 Whether Rowell is entitled to a preliminary hearing on the relevant charges
is a question of law. Indeed, the district court’s ruling was grounded in its
interpretation of section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II). We review de novo questions of law
generally, People v. Chavez-Torres, 2019 CO 59, ¶ 11, 442 P.3d 843, 847, and
questions of statutory interpretation specifically, McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,
¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389.
IV. Analysis
¶15 Section 16-5-301 governs preliminary hearings.3 It provides in pertinent
part that no defendant charged with “a class 4, 5, or 6 felony . . . except those which
require mandatory sentencing or which are crimes of violence . . . or which are
sexual offenses . . . shall have the right to demand or receive a preliminary
hearing.” § 16-5-301(1)(b)(I). Because neither party asserts that the relevant
3 Section 18-1-404, C.R.S. (2019), is similar to section 16-5-301. Both are titled
“Preliminary hearing or waiver—dispositional hearing.” Because any differences
are not material to our resolution of this appeal, we limit our discussion to section
16-5-301.
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charges require mandatory sentencing or are crimes of violence or sexual offenses,
Rowell is clearly not entitled to request or receive a preliminary hearing on the
relevant charges under section 16-5-301(1)(b)(I). But the statute doesn’t end at
subsection (1)(b)(I). In the very next subsection, subsection (1)(b)(II), it provides
that a defendant charged with “a class 4, 5, or 6 felony . . . who is not otherwise
entitled to a preliminary hearing pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this
paragraph (b), may demand and shall receive a preliminary hearing within a
reasonable time” if he is in custody for the offense for which he requests a
preliminary hearing. § 16-5-301(1)(b)(II). We must interpret this provision to
resolve Rowell’s appeal.
¶16 In construing a statute, our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the
legislature’s intent. McCoy, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d at 389. Our jumping off point in this
process is to give the statute’s words their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We
may not add, subtract, or change the words in the statute. See id. Instead, we must
read the words as written, in context, and in accordance with the rules of grammar
and common usage. Id.
¶17 Consistent with the district court’s ruling, the People contend that
subsection (1)(b)(II) does not contemplate preliminary hearings “at a time other
than the outset of a criminal prosecution.” However, subsection (1)(b)(II) does not
contain such a limitation. Nowhere does it say that a preliminary hearing may
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only be requested and held at “the outset of a criminal prosecution.” And it would
be improper for us to engraft such a restriction onto subsection (1)(b)(II). Instead,
giving the statutory words their plain and ordinary meaning, and construing them
in context and in line with the rules of grammar and common usage, we conclude
that when a defendant is in custody for the offenses for which a preliminary
hearing is requested and those offenses fit the criteria specified in subsection
(1)(b)(II), he may demand and must receive a preliminary hearing within a
reasonable time.
¶18 But what specifically does “within a reasonable time” mean? In section
16-5-301(1)(a), the legislature asked this court to establish, through its rules, “the
time within which demand” for a preliminary hearing must be made. See
§ 16-5-301(1)(a). Rule 7(h) sets forth district court procedures related to
preliminary hearings.4 It provides that, “[e]xcept upon a finding of good cause,
the request for a preliminary hearing must be made within 7 days after the
defendant is brought before the court for or following the filing of the information
in that court and prior to a plea.” Crim. P. 7(h)(1).
4Crim. P. 5(a)(4) contains similar provisions related to preliminary hearings in
county court proceedings. Because Rowell demanded a preliminary hearing in
district court, we confine our analysis to Rule 7(h).
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¶19 In our view, the seven-day deadline in Rule 7(h)(1) does not control Rowell’s
situation. Rowell became eligible for a preliminary hearing on the relevant
charges months after the seven-day deadline in Rule 7(h)(1) expired. Because he
was on bond in 18CR1611 and 19CR15 during the entirety of the seven-day
timeframe, he could not have meritoriously requested a preliminary hearing on
the relevant charges in a timely fashion. To attempt to apply the deadline in Rule
7(h)(1) here would be to attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole. The deadline
in Rule 7(h)(1) simply does not contemplate the particular scenario before us.
¶20 This is not to say that the seven-day deadline in Rule 7(h)(1) is meaningless.
Rather, the point is that while the deadline governs the timeliness of the vast
majority of preliminary hearing requests, it does not apply to the request on
review.
¶21 The People nevertheless maintain that Rule 7(h)(5) supports their position.
We are not persuaded.
¶22 As relevant here, Rule 7(h)(5) provides that: (1) a request for a preliminary
hearing submitted more than seven days after the information is filed or the
defendant appears in court for the filing of the information “shall not thereafter be
heard by the court”; and (2) the court may not “entertain successive requests for
preliminary hearing.” Crim. P. 7(h)(5). The first of these provisions does not create
a new seven-day deadline. Rather, Rule 7(h)(5) simply references the seven-day
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deadline that appears in Rule 7(h)(1) and addresses the demands that are governed
by that deadline. When such a demand fails to comply with the seven-day
deadline in Rule 7(h)(1), it is untimely and Rule 7(h)(5) precludes the court from
considering it. Stated differently, Rule 7(h)(5) prohibits the court from
entertaining demands that violate the seven-day deadline in Rule 7(h)(1); it does
not provide a separate seven-day deadline for demands like Rowell’s, which are
not covered by the seven-day deadline in Rule 7(h)(1). Because we have already
determined that Rowell’s demand for a preliminary hearing on the relevant
charges falls outside the ambit of the seven-day deadline in Rule 7(h)(1), we now
conclude that it also necessarily falls outside the scope of the provision at issue in
Rule 7(h)(5).
¶23 The other provision in Rule 7(h)(5) on which the People rely does not alter
our analysis either. Rowell’s demand for a preliminary hearing on the relevant
charges cannot be deemed successive because it is based on a new circumstance:
He is being held in custody on those charges. Indeed, it is this new circumstance
that may entitle Rowell, for the first time, to demand and receive a preliminary
hearing on the relevant charges pursuant to subsection (1)(b)(II). Inasmuch as
Rowell could not have advanced a meritorious demand for a preliminary hearing
on the relevant charges under subsection (1)(b)(II) before his bonds were revoked,
his most recent demand cannot be declared successive.
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¶24 Because we conclude that Rule 7(h) does not set a deadline for Rowell’s
demand for a preliminary hearing on the relevant charges, we remand the case to
the district court so that it may determine whether Rowell’s demand was made
“within a reasonable time,” as required by subsection (1)(b)(II). More specifically,
on remand, the court must decide whether Rowell’s demand for a preliminary
hearing on the relevant charges, which was filed seventy-three days after his
bonds were revoked and he was taken into custody, was made within a reasonable
time after he became eligible under subsection (1)(b)(II) to advance that demand.
¶25 In assessing the reasonableness of the timing of Rowell’s demand, the court
may draw guidance from the seven-day deadline in Rule 7(h)(1) and should
consider the reasons for the delay in making the demand and any other
circumstances that affected the timing of the demand. Given that this
determination will be, at least in part, factual in nature, we believe that the district
court is better suited to make it.
V. Conclusion
¶26 We conclude that the district court erred in denying Rowell’s request for a
preliminary hearing on the relevant charges without first determining whether the
request was advanced within a reasonable time after his bonds were revoked and
he was taken into custody. Therefore, we reverse the court’s order and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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