DocketNumber: 17725
Citation Numbers: 300 P.2d 799, 134 Colo. 140, 1956 Colo. LEXIS 225, 38 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2696
Judges: Knauss, Sparks
Filed Date: 8/20/1956
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/3/2024
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court, where defendant in error was plaintiff and plaintiffs in error were defendants.
Plaintiff, operator of a coal mine in El Paso County, Colorado, filed its complaint in the district court alleging that no labor dispute existed at its coal mine; that sixteen of its employees had entered into a conspiracy with the United Mine Workers of America, hereinafter referred to as the Union, to violate certain sections of the Colorado Labor Peace Act. The complaint further alleged that the Union and the individual defendants had coerced and intimidated the other employees of the plaintiff and their families; had picketed their homes; destroyed property; injured persons, interfered with ingress and egress to plaintiffs property; completely blocked roads and highways adjacent to said mine and engaged in massed picketing of plaintiffs property in an attempt to stop production at the mine and to prevent other employees from working. It was alleged that as a
Findings of facts and conclusions of law were entered by the trial judge in May, 1955, and a Preliminary Injunction was issued. The decree for a preliminary injunction, from which the defendants have sued out a writ of error, contained several restraints which not only enjoined any further violations of the Colorado Labor Peace Act but which further ordered and commanded defendants to “refrain and desist from in any manner hindering or preventing the employees of the Plaintiff at the Pike View Mine from working at said mine by picketing, threats, intimidations, force or coercion of any kind, and to refrain and desist from in any manner engaging in an effort to interfere with production at the Pike View Coal Mine” and “Refrain and desist from in any manner hindering or preventing the normal operation of the Coal Mine and coal business of the Plaintiff.”
It is contended by counsel for defendants that the conduct involved is entirely governed by the federal acts and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that the trial court has only limited jurisdiction “where the Employer is subject to the Federal Labor Management Relations Act.” It is also contended that the terms of the injunction are beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court, and are not supported by evidence.
Briefly, from the findings of the trial court, amply supported by competent evidence, the following facts appear: That no labor dispute existed under the Colorado
Picketing may be lawful or unlawful depending upon the purpose of the picketing and the manner in which it is conducted.
There is ample evidence in the record that the conduct of the pickets here would tend to generate trouble. As we interpret Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 348 U.S. 468, and United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, the-U. S. Supreme Court held that state courts do have jurisdiction to enjoin threats of personal injury and property damage to employees and management.
In Allen-Bradley Local [No. 1111, United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of America] v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, the State was allowed to enjoin mass picketing; threats of bodily injury and property damage to employees, obstruction of streets and public roads, the blocking of entrance to and egress from a factory, and the picketing of the homes of employees. It was there held that such conduct was not subject to the federal board, either by prohibition or protection.
“It seems obvious that §8 (b) (1) was not to be the exclusive method of controlling violence even against employees, much less violence interfering with others approaching an area where a strike was in progress. (Citing United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., supra.) No one suggests that such violence is beyond state criminal power. The act does not have such regulatory pervasiveness. The state interest in law and order precludes such interpretation. * * *
“There is no reason to re-examine the opinions in which this Court has dealt with problems involving federal-state jurisdiction over industrial controversies. They have been adequately summarized in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 474-477. As a general matter we have held that a state may not, in the furtherance of its public policy, enjoin conduct ‘which has been made an ‘unfair labor practice’ under the federal statutes.’ * * * But our post • Taft-Hartley opinions have made it clear that this general rule does not take from the States power to prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of violence. The dominant interest of the State in preventing violence and property damage cannot be questioned. It is a matter of genuine local concern. Nor should the fact that a union commits a federal unfair labor practice while engaging in violent conduct prevent States from taking steps to stop the
“We hold that Wisconsin may enjoin the violent union conduct here involved.”
We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to enjoin mass picketing, threats of bodily injury and damage to property of employees and plaintiff company, the obstruction of entrance to and egress from plaintiff’s mine property and the picketing of employees’ homes, together with coercion, harassment, and threats to employees who desire to work. Such tortious conduct on the part of defendants is supported by competent evidence and the findings of the trial court. See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc. (Ark.), 288 S.W. 2d 589; Tollman Co. v. Latal (Mo.), 284 S.W. 2d 547.
Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the trial court with direction to modify the preliminary injunction as follows: To restrain and enjoin defendants from mass picketing of plaintiff’s property and of the roads and streets leading thereto; from acts of violence or threats of violence; destruction or damage to the property of plaintiff, or that of such of its employees as desire to work and the intimidation or coercion by acts or threats of violence to such employees. The trial court shall also designate a reasonable number of pickets to be allowed at the entrances to plaintiff’s property.
Judgment ordered modified and cause remanded with direction.