DocketNumber: No. 16,470
Citation Numbers: 123 Colo. 175, 226 P.2d 562
Judges: Stone
Filed Date: 12/26/1950
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/7/2022
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action in the nature of quo warranto, wherein the relator, as a resident taxpayer and elector of Denver, challenges the right of defendant in error Cavender to hold office as a member of the board of councilmen of said city and county, on the ground that he “held other public office or employment, to-wit, status as an official member of the Area Rent Advisory Board, a public agency of the United States, pursuant to the Housing and Rent Act of 1949 of the United States of America, the said office or employment being repugnant to the said office of membership in the Council of the said City and County of Denver.” Cavender by answer interposed seven defenses. After numerous motions the case came on for hearing and, so far as appears from the record, without the introduction of any evidence by either side the case was argued by counsel and judgment entered in favor of Cavender.
The action is based on section 209A of the charter of the City and County of Denver, the pertinent part of which provides with reference to the Council that: “No member shall hold any other public office or employment.”
The substance of the action is of course dependent on the nature of the federal position subsequently accepted by Cavender and the duties required therein, and the nature and duties of the position depend on the
Again, said Rule 115 provides that the brief shall contain “A concise statement of the case containing all that is material to the consideration of the questions presented,” and that the argument shall exhibit “clearly the points of fact and law being presented.” It is argued negatively in the brief that the federal position held by Cavender is not prevented from being a public office or employment by the fact that it provides for no monetary compensation, or by the fact that its tenure is dependent on the nonexercise of local authority to terminate the office, or by the fact that it endures only during an emergency, and it is further stated that the powers and functions of the board are more than advisory and that it is “the keystone of the congressional policy of decontrol,” and exercises administrative or quasi-legislative powers, but in what respect it is more than advisory or as to what powers are possessed by the board, we are not advised. Nor are we advised as to the respects in
Even though we may take judicial notice of federal statutes, we think we should not be zealous to search them through in an effort to seek out grounds of technical disability in order to remove from municipal office those who apparently are attempting, without compensation, to give service at the behest of federal authorities in a time of national emergency, where no repugnancy or divided allegiance is disclosed.
Numerous questions are raised in the argument, including the question of the repeal of Section 209A upon which this action is based, but we think it unnecessary to consider them here.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard concurs in the result.