v. Donald

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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
April 13, 2020
2020 CO 24
No. 18SC684, People v. Donald—Criminal Law—Evidence—Sufficiency of the
Evidence.
This case requires the supreme court to determine (1) what role, if any, the
prohibition on inference stacking set out in Tate v. People, 247 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1952),
should play in sufficiency of the evidence challenges in criminal cases and
(2) whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for violation
of bail bond conditions. The supreme court concludes, contrary to the apparent
understanding of the division below, that the presence of stacked inferences is not
alone dispositive of a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Rather, it is one factor that
a court may consider in determining whether the evidence presented satisfied the
prevailing substantial evidence test for evidence sufficiency. The supreme court
further concludes that the prosecution here presented sufficient evidence to
support the defendant’s conviction for violating the bail bond condition
prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission.
Accordingly, the supreme court reverses the judgment of the division below
and remands this case for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
2020 CO 24
Supreme Court Case No. 18SC684
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 15CA633
Petitioner:
The People of the State of Colorado,
v.
Respondent:
Laron Antonio Donald.
Judgment Reversed
en banc
April 13, 2020
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Lisa K. Michaels, Assistant Attorney General
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender
Jessica K. Pitts, Deputy State Public Defender
Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 This case requires us to determine (1) what role, if any, the prohibition on
inference stacking set out in Tate v. People, 247 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1952), should play
in sufficiency of the evidence challenges in criminal cases and (2) whether
sufficient evidence supported Laron Antonio Donald’s conviction for violation of
bail bond conditions.1 We conclude, contrary to the apparent understanding of
the division below, that the presence of stacked inferences is not alone dispositive
of a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Rather, it is one factor that a court may
consider in determining whether the evidence presented satisfied the prevailing
substantial evidence test for evidence sufficiency. We further conclude that the
prosecution here presented sufficient evidence to support Donald’s conviction for
1 Specifically, we granted certiorari to review the following issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in vacating the defendant’s
conviction based on its conclusion that the jury could have found
the defendant guilty of violating the conditions of his bail bond
only by stacking inference upon inference as prohibited in Tate v.
People, 247 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1952).
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the
testimony as to the bail bond release process did not give rise to an
inference that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the
bond paperwork.
3. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury’s
finding that the defendant had knowledge of the bond paperwork.
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violating the bail bond condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without
permission.
¶2 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand
this case for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶3 After Donald was arrested and charged with a felony, the district court set
bond and announced the next court date. Donald subsequently posted bond and
was released from jail. The one-page bond provided that as a condition of his
release, Donald was prohibited from leaving the state of Colorado without
approval of the court and the surety.
¶4 Donald failed to appear at his next scheduled court date, and the court
issued a warrant for his arrest.
¶5 Five weeks later, Donald was driving in Mississippi when a police officer
pulled him over for a traffic violation. The officer ran Donald’s name and
discovered that he had warrants out of Colorado. The officer thus arrested him.
¶6 Donald was subsequently extradited to Colorado and charged with several
counts of violation of bail bond conditions under section 18-8-212(1), C.R.S. (2019).
One count charged that Donald had “knowingly violated a condition of bond by
leaving the State of Colorado.” Another charged that he had “knowingly failed to
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appear for trial or other proceedings.” Donald pleaded not guilty to these counts,
and the matter proceeded to trial.
¶7 At trial, the bondsperson testified on direct examination that (1) she had
signed Donald’s appearance bond; (2) one of the conditions set forth in that bond
was that Donald could not leave the state without the approval of the court and
the surety; and (3) “only on an accident from . . . the jail” would someone be
released from custody without signing the bond paperwork and accidents like that
happened “[v]ery, very seldom.” On cross-examination, the bondsperson added
that if Donald signed the paperwork, he would not have done so in her presence.
Rather, he would have signed it with the deputies at the jail. Thus, the
bondsperson could not say whether the party’s signature on the paperwork was
Donald’s.
¶8 The arresting officer from Mississippi then testified that when he
approached Donald after pulling him over, Donald appeared “very nervous” and
was shaking and sweating.
¶9 At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, Donald moved for a judgment
of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show that he had signed
the bond paperwork and therefore the evidence was insufficient to show that he
had actual knowledge of the bail bond conditions listed therein. In support of this
argument, Donald pointed out that no witness had either identified Donald’s
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signature on the bond paperwork or testified that the witness went over the
paperwork with Donald and explained to him that he was not to leave the state.
¶10 After hearing the prosecution’s response, the trial court denied Donald’s
motion. In so ruling, the court acknowledged that the bondsperson did not
identify Donald’s signature on the bond paperwork and therefore the prosecution
was left to rely on the bondsperson’s description of the bond process. The court
then observed that although the testimony was limited, the bondsperson
described the process as “you can’t get out of jail unless you sign this paperwork,”
and the prosecution had introduced into evidence the paperwork, which was
signed and which contained the restriction at issue. Although the court viewed
the matter as “a close call,” it found this evidence, when viewed as a whole and in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient to meet the prosecution’s
burden.
¶11 Donald did not then call any witnesses in his defense, and the parties
proceeded to present their closing arguments. During his closing, Donald’s
counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to prove that Donald knew that as
a condition of his bond, he could not leave the state. Counsel noted the absence of
evidence that anyone had gone over the bond paperwork with Donald or that
Donald had read the paperwork. To the contrary, he said, the evidence suggested
that Donald was willing to sign whatever he needed to sign to get out of jail. And
5
as for Donald’s signature on the paperwork, counsel argued, “[W]e don’t even
know he signed it.” Nonetheless, counsel conceded that he did, stating, “[W]e’ll
spot him [i.e., the prosecutor] that, that‘s his signature, sure.”
¶12 The jury ultimately convicted Donald of the two bail bond violation counts,
and the court sentenced him to consecutive eighteen-month terms in the
Department of Corrections.
¶13 Donald appealed and, among other things, renewed his argument that the
prosecution had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had
knowingly violated the bond condition preventing him from leaving the state
without permission. People v. Donald, 2018 COA 103, ¶ 1, __ P.3d __. In a
unanimous, published opinion, the division agreed and vacated Donald’s
conviction for violation of that bail bond condition. Id. at ¶ 29.
¶14 In so ruling, the division began by concluding that the bondsperson’s
testimony regarding the jail’s regular practice of having prisoners sign bond
paperwork before they are released supported an inference that Donald had, in
fact, signed the paperwork. Id. at ¶ 22. The division stated, however, that the act
of signing the paperwork did not establish actual knowledge of the bond
conditions set forth therein. Id. Rather, to infer that Donald had actual knowledge
of those conditions, additional inferences were required, such as, for example, that
Donald was afforded and took the opportunity to read the bond paperwork with
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sufficient care to learn of the bond conditions or that he was given a copy of the
paperwork to review later and did so. Id. at ¶¶ 22–23. The division noted,
however, that the prosecution had presented no evidence regarding the
circumstances surrounding the signing of the bond paperwork. Id. at ¶ 23. Nor
did the prosecution present any evidence that a released inmate is given a copy of
the paperwork that he or she signed. Id. As a result, to find that Donald had actual
knowledge of the conditions, the jury would have had to make inferences (e.g.,
that Donald was afforded the opportunity to read the bond paperwork and did so
either when he signed it or thereafter) that rested on another inference (i.e., that
Donald had signed the bond paperwork consistent with the jail’s routine practice).
Id. at ¶ 24. The division opined, “It is the necessity of this inference stacking
without any additional evidence to support it that renders the evidence
insufficient to support Donald’s conviction of [violation of the bail bond condition
at issue].” Id. at ¶ 22. The division so concluded because under Tate, a
“presumption may not rest on presumption or inference on inference.” Donald,
¶ 24 (quoting Tate, 247 P.2d at 672).
¶15 In reaching this conclusion, the division was unpersuaded by the People’s
argument that Donald’s demeanor during the traffic stop in Mississippi provided
additional evidence that he knew of the bond condition prohibiting out-of-state
travel. Id. at ¶ 27. The division observed that the officer’s testimony provided no
7
indication beyond mere speculation that Donald’s nervousness was related to his
awareness that he was in violation of his bond conditions. Id.
¶16 The People then petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we granted
that petition.
II. Analysis
¶17 We begin by addressing the applicable standard of review in this case. We
then consider whether the division erred in relying on the Tate court’s prohibition
on inference stacking to vacate Donald’s conviction for violation of the bail bond
condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission. We
conclude, contrary to the apparent understanding of the division below, that the
presence of stacked inferences is not alone dispositive of a sufficiency of the
evidence claim. Rather, it is one factor that a court may consider in determining
whether the evidence presented satisfied the prevailing substantial evidence test
for evidence sufficiency. Finally, we address whether the evidence presented at
trial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
was substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that
Donald knowingly violated the bail bond condition prohibiting him from leaving
the state without permission. We conclude that it was.
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A. Standard of Review
¶18 We review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. Clark v. People,
232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). To determine whether the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we ask “whether the relevant evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion
by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (Colo. 1973)).
¶19 This test requires us to give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that might fairly be drawn from the evidence. People v. Perez, 2016 CO
12, ¶ 25, 367 P.3d 695, 701. Such inferences, however, must be supported by a
“logical and convincing connection between the facts established and the
conclusion inferred.” Id. (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 666 P.2d 123, 128 (Colo.
1983)). Thus, “[a] verdict cannot be supported by guessing, speculation,
conjecture, or a mere modicum of relevant evidence.” Id.; see also People v. Serra,
2015 COA 130, ¶¶ 38–39, 361 P.3d 1122, 1131 (determining that insufficient
evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for harassment when any
conclusion that the division could draw about the defendant’s requisite intent
would be “purely speculative”).
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B. Inference Stacking
¶20 In Tate, 247 P.2d at 671–72, we addressed a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence underlying a second degree murder conviction. The defendant was
the former wife of the victim. Id. at 667. Although the couple had divorced, they
continued living together in the family home, and it was undisputed that there
was no difficulty between them and that the defendant had provided constant care
to the victim, who had suffered from medical problems. Id.
¶21 One day, the defendant returned home and found the victim tied to a chair,
having been shot in the head with an automatic pistol nested in a nearby
“contraption.” Id. at 668. Notably, the record indicated that the victim had
experienced suicidal thoughts in the past and, in fact, had attempted suicide
before. Id. at 667. Allegedly panic stricken, the defendant took the body out, dug
a shallow grave and buried it, poured fuel oil all over the body and the dirt,
covered the grave with a sheet of corrugated iron, and then piled pieces of lumber,
posts, and other such material on the grave and placed a chicken coop on top of it.
Id. at 668. The defendant then thoroughly cleaned the room in which she had
found the victim’s body. Id.
¶22 The defendant was subsequently charged with and tried for the victim’s
murder. Id. at 666. At trial, the defendant denied killing the victim and argued
that he had committed suicide. Id. at 670. This position was supported by the
10
testimony of the autopsy physician, who testified that the wounds causing death
could have been self-inflicted and therefore the case could have been one of
suicide. Id. The jury nonetheless convicted the defendant, and she appealed,
arguing, among other things, that no evidence supported her conviction. Id. at
666–67.
¶23 At the time Tate was decided, the applicable law allowed proof by
circumstantial evidence, but if all of the evidence was circumstantial, then the
evidence had to “exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt.” Id. at 670.
After reviewing the record in light of these standards, we perceived no evidence
to support a jury finding of willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation, deeming
the record “wholly barren of the slightest indication of these essential elements of
the crime charged.” Id. at 671. We further opined that any finding in this case of
deliberation, premeditation, willfulness, or any of the other elements of either first
or second degree murder could only have been based on an initial suspicion-based
presumption followed by a further presumption. Id. at 672. We concluded that
such evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction because
“[p]resumption and inferences may be drawn only from facts established, and
presumption may not rest on presumption or inference on inference.” Id.
¶24 Two years later, in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139–40 (1954), the
Supreme Court considered the proper standards to be applied in determining
11
sufficiency of the evidence claims. As pertinent here, the Court concluded that
(1) circumstantial evidence is “intrinsically no different from testimonial
evidence” and (2) when only circumstantial evidence is presented, to sustain a
conviction, the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than
guilt. Id. Instead, in the case of both testimonial and circumstantial evidence, the
jury must use its experience with people and events to weigh the possibilities. Id.
at 140. The Court then opined, “If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt, we can require no more.” Id.
¶25 Based on Holland and its progeny in the federal courts, we ultimately
adopted the substantial evidence test as the proper means for addressing
sufficiency of the evidence claims on appellate review. Bennett, 515 P.2d at 469.
As noted above, this test requires us to determine “whether the relevant evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion
by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. In adopting this test, we noted that it “affords the same
status to both direct and circumstantial evidence.” Id. We thus “cast aside as
outmoded and as confusing” the requirement that when the prosecution’s
evidence is wholly circumstantial, the prosecution must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than that of guilt. Id.
12
¶26 In light of this evolution of our test for sufficiency of the evidence claims,
the question becomes what role, if any, inference stacking plays in deciding such
a claim. For several reasons, we conclude that it is one factor that a court may
consider in determining whether the evidence satisfied the prevailing substantial
evidence test for evidence sufficiency.
¶27 First, concluding that stacked inferences are absolutely prohibited, as the
division below seemed to suggest, is inconsistent with our substantial evidence
test and with the above-described development of our law. As noted above, the
inference-upon-inference prohibition was premised on now-outdated law
requiring the prosecution to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt
in cases premised solely on circumstantial evidence. See Tate, 247 P.2d at 670. Our
substantial evidence test, however, does not distinguish between direct and
circumstantial evidence. Bennett, 515 P.2d at 469. Rather, it allows jurors to draw
reasonable inferences from both direct and circumstantial evidence. See Perez,
¶ 24, 367 P.3d at 700; Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291; Bennett, 515 P.2d at 469.
¶28 Second, following the modern trend signaled in Holland, 348 U.S. at 139–40,
numerous courts have rejected an absolute prohibition on stacked inferences,
concluding instead that the question is simply whether the direct and
circumstantial evidence, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, together warrant a jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
13
See, e.g., United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173, 1177–78 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejecting
the view that stacked inferences are necessarily invalid or impermissible and
concluding that the proper question is whether the evidence was sufficient to
convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74,
89 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The rule is not that an inference, no matter how reasonable, is
to be rejected if it in turn, depends upon another reasonable inference; rather, the
question is merely whether the total evidence, including reasonable inferences,
when put together is sufficient to warrant a jury to conclude that defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (quoting DeVore v. United States, 368 F.2d 396,
399 (9th Cir. 1966)).
¶29 This is not to say, however, that the reliance on stacked inferences is
irrelevant to the analysis of a sufficiency of the evidence claim. As the Tenth
Circuit observed in United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1295 (10th Cir. 2005),
“The rule that prohibits the stacking of inference upon inference merely indicates
that at some point along a rational continuum, inferences may become so
attenuated from underlying evidence as to cast doubt on the trier of fact’s ultimate
conclusion.” Accordingly, the court opined that the inference-upon-inference
principle “serves as an appropriate signpost, cautioning reviewing courts to
measure the ‘gap’ between fact and conclusion before acquiescing in the jury’s
leap.” Id.
14
¶30 In accordance with such reasoning, numerous federal and state appellate
courts have concluded that although inference stacking is not absolutely
prohibited, the reliance on stacked inferences is pertinent to the analysis of a
sufficiency of the evidence claim because a chain of inferences can become so
attenuated that reliance on it to sustain a conviction would be unreasonable and
would amount to speculation. See, e.g., Shahane, 517 F.2d at 1178 (noting that the
chance of a jury’s error or speculation in drawing conclusions from proved facts
“increases in proportion to the width of the gap between the underlying fact and
ultimate conclusion where the gap is bridged by a succession of inferences, each
based upon the preceding one,” but nonetheless rejecting an outright ban on
inference stacking because it is “too much to say . . . that an inference is necessarily
invalid or impermissible” merely because it is based on a fact established by a prior
inference); Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 163 P.2d 470, 476–77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945)
(noting that “[t]he only fallacy that may occur in . . . reasoning [based on stacked
inferences] is where a deduced fact is based upon circumstantial evidence that is
unreliable, is too remote or is too conjectural”); Southworth v. Commonwealth,
435 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Ky. 2014) (noting that the modern trend is to abandon rules
limiting the use of circumstantial evidence, including the
inference-upon-inference rule, and that Kentucky had replaced such an absolute
rule with a principle that condemns only inferences that build on inferences in an
15
unreasonable manner); cf. United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1204 n.10 (2d Cir.
1970) (“[W]e reject as untenable the often urged claim that an inference may not
be grounded on an inference. The length of the chain of inferences necessary to
connect the evidence with the ultimate fact to be proved necessarily lessens the
probative value of the evidence, and may therefore render it more susceptible to
exclusion as unduly confusing, prejudicial, or time-consuming, but it does not
render the evidence irrelevant.”) (citations omitted).
¶31 We agree with the reasoning in these cases and follow that reasoning here.
¶32 Finally, if inference stacking were absolutely prohibited, “then the exercise
of logic, which frequently employs inference-derived inferences, would not be
allowed to the jury.” Southworth, 435 S.W.3d at 45. We perceive no basis for
unnecessarily restricting a jury’s ability to assess the evidence before it in this way.
C. Sufficient Evidence Supported Donald’s Conviction
¶33 Having thus determined that the substantial evidence test for sufficiency of
the evidence claims does not bar the stacking of inferences, we turn to the question
of whether substantial and sufficient evidence supported Donald’s conviction for
violation of the bail bond condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without
permission. We conclude that it did.
¶34 As noted above, we will affirm a conviction when the evidence, viewed as a
whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and
16
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of
the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291.
¶35 To establish a violation of bail bond conditions, the prosecution must prove,
as pertinent here, that the defendant “knowingly violat[ed] the conditions of the
bail bond.” § 18-8-212(1) (emphasis added).
¶36 The criminal code defines “knowingly” as follows:
A person acts “knowingly” . . . with respect to conduct or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is
aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance
exists. A person acts “knowingly”. . . with respect to a result of his
conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to
cause the result.
§ 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. (2019).
¶37 Accordingly, and as the parties here appear to agree, to establish a violation
of bail bond conditions, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the bond condition, not merely that he or she should have known of
the condition. See §§ 18-1-501(6); 18-8-212(1). Knowledge, however, may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence. Cf. People v. Phillips, 219 P.3d 798, 800
(Colo. App. 2009) (noting that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed from
which the jury could infer that the defendant formed the necessary intent to
commit the crime at issue).
¶38 Here, the bondsperson testified that (1) she filled out and signed Donald’s
appearance bond, and her employer posted the bond on Donald’s behalf; (2) if
17
Donald signed the paperwork, he would have done so with the deputies at the jail;
and (3) “[o]nly on an accident” by the jail would someone be released without
signing the paperwork.
¶39 In addition, the prosecution introduced into evidence a copy of Donald’s
signed bond paperwork. This document was only one page long, and it stated,
under the bolded text “Additional Conditions,” “Party may not leave the state
without approval of the Court and the surety.”
¶40 And, as noted above, defense counsel ultimately conceded that Donald had
signed the bond paperwork.
¶41 In light of the foregoing evidence and the requirement that we must view
the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude
that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Donald had, in fact, signed the
bond paperwork. In addition, given that the paperwork consisted of a single page
and that the condition at issue was the first condition listed under the bolded
heading, “Additional Conditions,” we further conclude that a reasonable jury
could have found that Donald saw the condition and therefore was aware of it.
The facts that the evidence was disputed (and may even have been thin on the
issue of Donald’s knowledge) and that reasonable alternative inferences were
possible do not alter our conclusions, given that we must construe the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution.
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¶42 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was substantial and sufficient
to support Donald’s conviction for violation of the bail bond condition prohibiting
him from leaving the state without permission. In light of our foregoing analysis,
we need not address whether the officer’s testimony that Donald seemed
“nervous” when he was pulled over in Mississippi provided further evidence of
Donald’s knowledge of the bail bond condition at issue.
III. Conclusion
¶43 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the presence of stacked
inferences is not alone dispositive of a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Rather, it
is one factor that a court may consider in determining whether the evidence
presented satisfied the prevailing substantial evidence test for evidence
sufficiency. We further conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient
evidence here to support Donald’s conviction for violation of the bail bond
condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission.
¶44 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand this case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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