In Re Maribel Ronquillo and Martin Cerda v. EcoClean Home Services, Inc. and Jessie Williams

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<div class="ldml-decision"><div class="ldml-decision"><div href="/vid/889353539" data-vids="889353539" class="ldml-header header ldml-header content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Header"><p class="ldml-metadata"><span class="ldml-cite"><b class="ldml-bold">2021 CO 82</b></span></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><b class="ldml-bold"> <span class="ldml-party">In Re <span class="ldml-name">Maribel Ronquillo</span></span> and <span class="ldml-party"><span class="ldml-name">Martin Cerda</span>, <span class="ldml-role">Plaintiffs</span></span> </b><b class="ldml-bold"> v. </b><b class="ldml-bold"> <span class="ldml-party"><span class="ldml-name">EcoClean Home Services, Inc.</span></span> and <span class="ldml-party"><span class="ldml-name">Jessie Williams</span>, <span class="ldml-role">Defendants</span></span> </b></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><span class="ldml-cite"><b class="ldml-bold">No. 21SA55</b></span></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><b class="ldml-bold"><span class="ldml-court">Supreme Court of Colorado</span>, En Banc</b></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><span class="ldml-date"><b class="ldml-bold">December 20, 2021</b></span></p></div>
<h2 class="ldml-opinionheading"><div class="ldml-casehistory"><span data-paragraph-id="192" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="192" data-sentence-id="205" class="ldml-sentence">Original Proceeding Pursuant to <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_205"><span class="ldml-refname">C.A.R. 21 Broomfield County
District Court</span> <span class="ldml-cite">Case No. 19CV30332</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-entity">Honorable Robert W.
Kiesnowski, Jr.</span>, Judge</span>
</span></div></h2><div class="ldml-counsel header ldml-header content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Counsel"><p data-paragraph-id="344" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2">
<span data-paragraph-id="344" data-sentence-id="357" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-role">Plaintiffs</span></span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Bendinelli Law Firm, P.C.</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Jared J.
Mazzei</span> Westminster, Colorado</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="448" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2">
<span data-paragraph-id="448" data-sentence-id="461" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-role">Defendant</span></span> <span class="ldml-entity">EcoClean Home Services, Inc.</span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Bayer
& Carey, P.C.</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Matthew J. Weeber</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Peter M. Spiessbach
Denver</span>, Colorado</span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_592" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="1"></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="592" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2">
<span data-paragraph-id="592" data-sentence-id="605" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-role">Defendant</span></span> <span class="ldml-entity">Jessie Williams</span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Pearl Schneider
Young, LLC</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Jason R. Young Lakewood</span>, Colorado</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="708" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2">
<span data-paragraph-id="708" data-sentence-id="721" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyerrole">Amici Curiae</span> Colorado Defense Lawyers
Association</span> Colorado Civil Justice League</span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Messner Reeves LLP</span>
<span class="ldml-entity">Caleb Meyer</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Adam Royval Denver</span>, Colorado</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="877" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2">
<span data-paragraph-id="877" data-sentence-id="890" class="ldml-sentence">Attorney for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyerrole">Amicus Curiae</span> Colorado Trial Lawyers
Association</span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Sawaya, Rose, McClure & Wilhite, P.C.</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Robert
E. Caldwell, Jr.</span> Denver, Colorado</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="1034" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2">
<span data-paragraph-id="1034" data-sentence-id="1047" class="ldml-sentence">Attorney for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyerrole">Amici Curiae</span> Injury Finance, LLC</span> and <span class="ldml-entity">Marrick
Medical Finance LLC</span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Perkins Coie LLP</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Michael A. Sink Denver</span>,
Colorado</span>
</p></div><div class="ldml-opinion"><h2 class="ldml-opinionheading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Opinion (MÁRQUEZ, GABRIEL)"><span data-paragraph-id="1178" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="1178" data-sentence-id="1191" class="ldml-sentence"><b class="ldml-bold">OPINION</b></span>
</span></h2><p data-paragraph-id="1199" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span class="ldml-opinionauthor"><span data-paragraph-id="1199" data-sentence-id="1212" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-judge">MÁRQUEZ</span></span>, JUSTICE</span></span>
</span><span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_1229" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="2"></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="1229" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="1229" data-sentence-id="1240" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_1240"><span class="ldml-cite">¶1</span></a></span>
This interlocutory appeal brought under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.A.R. 21</span></a></span> raises the
narrow question of whether a medical finance company is a
collateral source for purposes of the pre-verdict evidentiary
component of Colorado's collateral source rule.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="1229" data-sentence-id="1476" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">Plaintiffs</span>, <span class="ldml-entity">Maribel Ronquillo</span> and her husband <span class="ldml-entity">Martin Cerda</span>,
challenge <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span>'s order finding that <span class="ldml-entity">Injury
Finance, LLC</span>, a medical finance company with whom <span class="ldml-entity">Plaintiffs</span>
have a lien agreement, is not a collateral source, and that
therefore, <span class="ldml-entity">Defendants</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Jessie Williams</span> and EcoClean Home
Services may offer evidence at trial of Ronquillo's and
her healthcare providers' relationship with Injury
Finance, as well as evidence of the amounts billed and paid
for Ronquillo's medical treatment.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="1980" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="1991" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_1991"><span class="ldml-cite">¶2</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-entity">We</span> agree with <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> that Injury Finance is not a
collateral source.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="2076" class="ldml-sentence">Collateral sources must confer a
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"benefit,"</span> as defined in <span class="ldml-entity">section</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span>,
C.R.S.</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2021</span>)</span></a></span>, onto the injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="2199" class="ldml-sentence">Under the terms of the
lien agreement here, Injury Finance purchased Ronquillo's
accounts receivable from her healthcare providers, thereby
allowing Ronquillo to receive prompt medical care for
injuries sustained in an automobile collision with Williams.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="2458" class="ldml-sentence">In return, Injury Finance received the right to collect the
full amount billed by Ronquillo's healthcare providers
and a lien on any settlement or verdict <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> obtains through
litigation regarding the accident.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="2671" class="ldml-sentence">Importantly, Ronquillo
remains individually liable to Injury Finance for the full
amounts billed by her healthcare providers whether or
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_2811" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="3"></span>
not <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> obtains a favorable verdict.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="2850" class="ldml-sentence">Thus, Ronquillo has not
received a benefit from Injury Finance for purposes of the
collateral source rule because her arrangement with Injury
Finance does not reduce her financial obligations.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="3046" class="ldml-sentence">Our
conclusion is unaffected by the recently enacted House <span class="ldml-entity">Bill</span>
21-1300, codified at <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_3046"><span class="ldml-cite">section 38-27.5-101</span></a></span> to -108, C.R.S.
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-entity">2021</span>)</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="3178" class="ldml-sentence">Although <span class="ldml-entity">this statute</span> precludes discovery of certain
evidence pertaining to medical finance companies,
<span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal"><em class="ldml-emphasis">see</em></span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 38-27.5-103<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span>, C.R.S.</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2021</span>)</span></a></span></span>, it also
fundamentally changes the nature of these agreements going
forward by requiring companies like Injury Finance, before
creating a lien, to notify the injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span> that
<span class="ldml-entity">they</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical"><sup class="ldml-superscript">[<a href="#note-ftn.FN1" class="ldml-noteanchor" id="note-ref-ftn.FN1">1</a>]</sup></span>
will not be liable to the lien holder for any portion of the
lien beyond any judgment or settlement obtained, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal"><em class="ldml-emphasis">see</em></span>
<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 37-27.5-104<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(c)</span>, C.R.S.</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2021</span>)</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1980" data-sentence-id="3659" class="ldml-sentence">Because
Ronquillo's financial obligation to Injury Finance will
not necessarily be discharged upon the resolution of the
underlying litigation, the lien agreement here falls outside
the scope of the new <span class="ldml-entity">statute</span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="3875" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="3875" data-sentence-id="3886" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_3886"><span class="ldml-cite">¶3</span></a></span>
Accordingly, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> discharge the rule to show cause and remand
<span class="ldml-entity">the case</span> for further proceedings.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="3875" data-sentence-id="3985" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> express no opinion on
whether the disputed evidence may be excluded under other
evidentiary rules such as <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">CRE 401 and 403</span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span></span> <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> hold
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_4123" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="4"></span>
only that <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> correctly concluded, as a matter
of statutory interpretation, that the medical finance company
here is not a collateral source.</span>
</p><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-id="heading_4284" data-value="I.
Facts and Procedural History" data-types="background" data-specifier="I" data-confidences="very_high" data-ordinal_end="1" data-ordinal_start="1" data-parsed="true" id="heading_4284" data-content-heading-label="
I.
Facts and Procedural History
" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral"><span data-paragraph-id="4284" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="4284" data-sentence-id="4295" class="ldml-sentence">I.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="4284" data-sentence-id="4298" class="ldml-sentence">Facts and Procedural History</span></b>
</span></section><p data-paragraph-id="4327" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="4327" data-sentence-id="4338" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_4338"><span class="ldml-cite">¶4</span></a></span>
In <span class="ldml-entity">August 2016</span>, Ronquillo was in an automobile collision.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="4327" data-sentence-id="4400" class="ldml-sentence">According to her complaint, Ronquillo was rear-ended by
Williams, who was operating a vehicle owned by an EcoClean
employee and towing an EcoClean trailer.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="4327" data-sentence-id="4558" class="ldml-sentence">Ronquillo suffered
serious physical injuries and incurred around $250, 000 in
medical expenses.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="4656" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="4656" data-sentence-id="4667" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_4667"><span class="ldml-cite">¶5</span></a></span>
At the time of the accident, Ronquillo did not have health
insurance, so <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> entered into a medical finance lien
agreement with Injury Finance.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="4656" data-sentence-id="4817" class="ldml-sentence">Under the terms of that
agreement, Injury Finance purchased Ronquillo's accounts
receivable from her healthcare providers at a predetermined,
discounted contractual rate, which allowed Ronquillo to
receive prompt medical care.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="4656" data-sentence-id="5048" class="ldml-sentence">Injury Finance received a lien
and security interest in the proceeds of <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"any settlement
or verdict in <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[Ronquillo's]</span> favor until such sums owed .
. . are paid in full."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="4656" data-sentence-id="5219" class="ldml-sentence">However, Ronquillo remains
contractually obligated to repay Injury Finance for <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"all
charges billed by the <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[medical]</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[p]</span>roviders"</span>-not merely
the discounted rate Injury Finance received-regardless of the
result of any litigation.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="5451" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="5451" data-sentence-id="5462" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_5462"><span class="ldml-cite">¶6</span></a></span>
Ronquillo and her husband filed suit in <span class="ldml-entity">Broomfield County
District Court</span>, alleging negligence and loss of consortium
against Williams and asserting a
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_5620" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="5"></span>
respondeat superior claim against EcoClean.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="5451" data-sentence-id="5666" class="ldml-sentence">As part of
discovery, <span class="ldml-entity">Defendants</span> subpoenaed Injury Finance, seeking
information and documents pertaining to Injury Finance's
accounts receivable purchase rates, provider contracts, and
business operations and methodologies.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="5451" data-sentence-id="5894" class="ldml-sentence">When Injury Finance
did not respond to the subpoena, <span class="ldml-entity">Defendants</span> filed a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to
compel production</span>, which <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> granted.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="5451" data-sentence-id="6031" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">Defendants</span> also filed a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"<span class="ldml-entity">motion for determination</span> of a
question of law pursuant to <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 56<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(h)</span></span></a></span> that Injury
Finance . . . is not a collateral source<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[]</span>"</span> subject to
the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral
source rule.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="6269" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="6269" data-sentence-id="6280" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_6280"><span class="ldml-cite">¶7</span></a></span>
Injury Finance moved to intervene for the limited purpose of
litigating <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity">Defendants</span>' <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_6280"><span class="ldml-cite">Rule 56<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(h)</span></span></a></span></span> motion.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="6269" data-sentence-id="6388" class="ldml-sentence">It also moved
to quash the subpoena and sought a protective order.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="6269" data-sentence-id="6456" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The
court</span> granted the <span class="ldml-entity">motion to intervene</span> and issued a temporary
stay on Injury Finance's discovery obligations pending a
hearing on whether Injury Finance qualified as a collateral
source.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="6650" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="6650" data-sentence-id="6661" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_6661"><span class="ldml-cite">¶8</span></a></span>
After briefing and oral argument, <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span>
determined that <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"Injury Finance is not a collateral
source as defined under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.S. § 13-21-111.6</span></a></span>."</span></span>
<span data-paragraph-id="6650" data-sentence-id="6819" class="ldml-sentence">Consequently, <span class="ldml-entity">the court</span> ruled that <span class="ldml-entity">Defendants</span> could offer at
trial <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"evidence of the amounts billed and amounts
paid."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="6650" data-sentence-id="6939" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The court</span> further ruled that it would <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"admit
evidence of the relationship, if any, between Injury Finance
and <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span>'s medical providers as this evidence may be
relevant to the issues of bias, motive, or interest and the
reasonable value of the medical services rendered."</span></span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_7219" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="6"></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="7219" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="7219" data-sentence-id="7230" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_7230"><span class="ldml-cite">¶9</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-entity">Plaintiffs</span> brought this interlocutory appeal under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.A.R. 21</span></a></span>,
challenging <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span>'s order.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="7219" data-sentence-id="7336" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">They</span> contend that
<span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span> erred in determining that Injury
Finance is not a collateral source, and <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span> <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"abused its
discretion by construing the post-verdict contract exception
to <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_7336"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 13-21-111.6</span></a></span> and the Made Whole Doctrine to mean a
third-<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> payor's subrogation rights determine that
third-<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> payor's collateral source status."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="7219" data-sentence-id="7689" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span>
issued a rule to show cause.</span>
</p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-ordinal_start="2" data-value="II.
Original Jurisdiction" data-specifier="II" data-id="heading_7722" data-ordinal_end="2" data-parsed="true" id="heading_7722" data-content-heading-label="
II.
Original Jurisdiction
" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral"><span data-paragraph-id="7722" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="7722" data-sentence-id="7733" class="ldml-sentence">II.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="7722" data-sentence-id="7737" class="ldml-sentence">Original Jurisdiction</span></b>
</span></section><p data-paragraph-id="7759" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="7759" data-sentence-id="7770" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_7770"><span class="ldml-cite">¶10</span></a></span>
Whether to exercise our original jurisdiction pursuant to
<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.A.R. 21</span></a></span> is within our sole discretion.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="7759" data-sentence-id="7875" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_7770"><span class="ldml-cite">C.A.R. 21<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="7759" data-sentence-id="7892" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span>
generally elect to exercise our discretion in <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"C.A.R. 21
<span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> that raise issues of first impression . . . that are of
significant public importance."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="7759" data-sentence-id="8049" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012" data-prop-ids="sentence_7892"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Smith v.
Jeppsen</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2012 CO 32</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_7892"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 6</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012"><span class="ldml-cite">277 P.3d 224, 226</span></a></span>.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="7759" data-sentence-id="8104" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-quotation quote">"<span class="ldml-entity">We</span> have previously exercised our original jurisdiction
to review questions of statutory interpretation."</span></span>
<span data-paragraph-id="7759" data-sentence-id="8211" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012" data-prop-ids="sentence_8104"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span></span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="8215" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="8215" data-sentence-id="8226" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8226"><span class="ldml-cite">¶11</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-entity">We</span> exercise our original jurisdiction in <span class="ldml-entity">this case</span> because
<span class="ldml-entity">this court</span> has not yet determined whether medical finance
companies are collateral sources under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8226"><span class="ldml-cite">section
10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>, and this is an issue of significant public
importance.</span>
</p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-id="heading_8470" data-value="III.
Analysis" data-types="analysis" data-specifier="III" data-confidences="very_high" data-ordinal_end="3" data-ordinal_start="3" data-parsed="true" id="heading_8470" data-content-heading-label="
III.
Analysis
" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral"><span data-paragraph-id="8470" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="8470" data-sentence-id="8481" class="ldml-sentence">III.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="8470" data-sentence-id="8486" class="ldml-sentence">Analysis</span></b>
</span></section><p data-paragraph-id="8495" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="8495" data-sentence-id="8506" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8506"><span class="ldml-cite">¶12</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-entity">This court</span> reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="8495" data-sentence-id="8575" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8506"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove</em></span>,
<span class="ldml-cite">2012 CO 31</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8506"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 7</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d 562, 564</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="8495" data-sentence-id="8649" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">"A <span class="ldml-entity">trial court</span>
necessarily abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on
an incorrect legal standard.</span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_8755" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="7"></span>
<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">Whether <span class="ldml-entity">the trial court</span> applied the correct legal standard is
a question of law <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> review de novo."</span></span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="8495" data-sentence-id="8857" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8649"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-referencenote">citation omitted</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="8495" data-sentence-id="8881" class="ldml-sentence">Questions of statutory interpretation are
likewise reviewed de novo.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="8495" data-sentence-id="8951" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890326998" data-vids="890326998" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8881"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">McCoy v. People</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2019 CO
44</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8881"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 37</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890326998" data-vids="890326998" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">442 P.3d 379, 389</span></a></span>.</span>
</p><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth2" data-ordinal_start="1" data-value="A.
Colorado's Collateral
Source Rule" data-specifier="A" data-id="heading_9006" data-ordinal_end="1" data-parsed="true" id="heading_9006" data-content-heading-label="
A.
Colorado's Collateral
Source Rule
" data-format="upper_case_letters"><span data-paragraph-id="9006" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="9006" data-sentence-id="9017" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><b class="ldml-bold">A.
<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">Colorado</span></b></span><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><b class="ldml-bold">'s</b> <b class="ldml-bold">Collateral</b>
<b class="ldml-bold">Source</b> <b class="ldml-bold">Rule</b></span></span>
</span></section><p data-paragraph-id="9055" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="9055" data-sentence-id="9066" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9066"><span class="ldml-cite">¶13</span></a></span>
Under Colorado's common law collateral source rule,
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[c]</span>ompensation or indemnity received by an injured
<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> from a collateral source, wholly independent of the
wrongdoer and to which <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[the wrongdoer]</span> has not contributed,
will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the
wrongdoer."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="9055" data-sentence-id="9371" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/887323085" data-vids="887323085" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9066"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Colo. Permanente Med. Grp., P.C. v.
Evans</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">926 P.2d 1218, 1230</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">1996</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span>
<span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/895727296" data-vids="895727296" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9066"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Kistler v. Halsey</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">481 P.2d 722, 724</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">1971</span>)</span></a></span>)</span></span>.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="9055" data-sentence-id="9509" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-quotation quote">"The policy underlying this rule was that a tortfeasor
should not benefit, in the form of reduced damages liability,
from an injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>'s receipt of collateral source
benefits."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="9055" data-sentence-id="9693" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9509"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Crossgrove</em></span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9509"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 10</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d at
565</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="9055" data-sentence-id="9729" class="ldml-sentence">In other words, because it is solely the
tortfeasor's responsibility to make the injured <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span>
whole, any benefits or gifts obtained from third-<span class="ldml-entity">party</span>
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"collateral"</span> sources accrue solely to the benefit
of the injured <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span> and are irrelevant in fixing the
amount of the tortfeasor's liability.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="9055" data-sentence-id="10033" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> </em><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888614883" data-vids="888614883" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9729"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Volunteers
of Am. Colo. Branch v. Gardenswartz</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">242 P.3d 1080,
1082-83</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2010</span>)</span></a></span></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="10124" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="10124" data-sentence-id="10135" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10135"><span class="ldml-cite">¶14</span></a></span>
Colorado's collateral source rule has two components: <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span>
a post-verdict setoff rule, now codified at <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10135"><span class="ldml-cite">section
13-21-111.6</span></a></span>, C.R.S. <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-entity">2021</span>)</span>, and <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span> a pre-verdict evidentiary
component, now codified at <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10135"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>.</span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_10367" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="8"></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="10367" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="10367" data-sentence-id="10378" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10378"><span class="ldml-cite">¶15</span></a></span>
Under the common law, the collateral source rule applied
post-verdict to prevent <span class="ldml-entity">a trial court</span> from reducing a
successful <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span>'s damages where <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span>
received a collateral source benefit.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="10367" data-sentence-id="10586" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888385521" data-vids="888385521" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10378"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Van Waters &
Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">840 P.2d 1070, 1074-75</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span>
<span class="ldml-date">1992</span>)</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="10367" data-sentence-id="10661" class="ldml-sentence">Although the common law rule thus allowed a successful
<span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span> to receive a double recovery from both the
tortfeasor and the benefits provider, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> determined that
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[i]</span>f either <span class="ldml-entity">party</span> is to receive a windfall, the rule
awards it to the injured <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span> . . . and not to the
tortfeasor, who has done nothing to provide the compensation
and seeks only to take advantage of third-<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> benefits
obtained by <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span>."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="10367" data-sentence-id="11089" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888614883" data-vids="888614883" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10661"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Gardenswartz</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">242
P.3d at 1083</span></a></span><em class="ldml-emphasis">.</em></span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="11122" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="11122" data-sentence-id="11133" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11133"><span class="ldml-cite">¶16</span></a></span>
In <span class="ldml-entity">1986</span>, the General Assembly partially abrogated the
post-verdict setoff component of the common law collateral
source rule by enacting <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11133"><span class="ldml-cite">section 13-21-111.6</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="11122" data-sentence-id="11298" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11133"><span class="ldml-refname">Crossgrove</span></a></span>,
</em><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11133"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 18</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d at 566</span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">see also</span>
</em><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888614883" data-vids="888614883" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Gardenswartz</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">242 P.3d at 1084</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="11122" data-sentence-id="11375" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11375"><span class="ldml-cite">Section 13-21-111.6</span></a></span>
prevents double recoveries that were permissible under the
common law rule by requiring <span class="ldml-entity">the trial court</span> to reduce a
successful <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span>'s verdict by the amount <span class="ldml-entity">the
plaintiff</span> <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"has been or will be wholly or partially
indemnified or compensated for his loss by any other person,
corporation, insurance company or fund."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="11122" data-sentence-id="11719" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The statute</span>
does, however, preserve the common law rule to a limited
extent through a contract exception that prohibits <span class="ldml-entity">trial
courts</span> from reducing <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span>'s verdict <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"by the
amount of indemnification or compensation that <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span>
has received, or will receive in
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_11997" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="9"></span>
the future, from a 'benefit paid as a result of a
contract entered into and paid for by or on behalf of <span class="ldml-entity">the
plaintiff</span>."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="11122" data-sentence-id="12121" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11719"><span class="ldml-refname">Crossgrove</span></a></span>, </em><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11719"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 15</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d at
566</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 13-21-111.6</span></a></span>)</span></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="12181" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="12181" data-sentence-id="12192" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12192"><span class="ldml-cite">¶17</span></a></span>
The contract exception, like the common law rule, prevents a
tortfeasor from benefitting from <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiffs</span> purchase of
insurance, but does not necessarily result in <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span>
receiving a double recovery because <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> must often
subrogate <span class="ldml-entity">the party</span> with whom <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> contracted.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="12181" data-sentence-id="12488" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12488"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span>
at <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12488"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 16</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12488"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d at 566</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="12181" data-sentence-id="12519" class="ldml-sentence">In a typical subrogation
framework, an insurer pays for the injured <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiffs</span> medical
costs up front, <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> collects the cost of the
treatment from the tortfeasor under the contract exception in
<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12519"><span class="ldml-cite">section 13-21-111.6</span></a></span>, and <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> then reimburses the
insurer for the cost of the treatment.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="12181" data-sentence-id="12826" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12519"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="12181" data-sentence-id="12830" class="ldml-sentence">So
although the contract exception prevents <span class="ldml-entity">the trial court</span> from
deducting from <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiffs</span> damages the amount paid by <span class="ldml-entity">a
party</span> with whom <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> has contracted, <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiffs</span>
subrogation obligation will generally prevent double
recovery.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="12181" data-sentence-id="13083" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12830"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span></span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="13087" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="13087" data-sentence-id="13098" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13098"><span class="ldml-cite">¶18</span></a></span>
The pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral
source rule requires <span class="ldml-entity">trial courts</span> to exclude evidence of
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"compensation or indemnity"</span> received from a
collateral source.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="13087" data-sentence-id="13282" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13282"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span> at <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13282"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 10</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13282"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d at 565</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/887323085" data-vids="887323085" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13282"><em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-refname">Evans</span>,</em> <span class="ldml-cite">926 P.2d at 1230</span></a></span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="13087" data-sentence-id="13346" class="ldml-sentence">This component of
the rule recognizes that evidence of collateral source
benefits may lead a jury to <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"improperly reduce <span class="ldml-entity">the
plaintiffs</span> damages award on the grounds that <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span>
already recovered his loss from the collateral source."</span></span>
<span data-paragraph-id="13087" data-sentence-id="13589" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13589"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span> at <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13589"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 12</span></a></span>,
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_13604" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="10"></span>
<span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13589"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d at 565</span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> </em><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888614883" data-vids="888614883" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13589"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Gardenswartz</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">242 P.3d at
1083</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">citing</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888981318" data-vids="888981318" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13589"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Carr v. Boyd</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">229 P.3d 659, 662-63</span>
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">1951</span>)</span></a></span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"To ensure that a jury will not be misled
by evidence regarding the benefits that <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> received
from sources collateral to the tortfeasor, such evidence is
inadmissible at trial."</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="13087" data-sentence-id="13913" class="ldml-sentence">By excluding collateral source
information entirely, the rule ensures that tortfeasors will
not escape liability simply because the injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span> had the
foresight to obtain a benefits provider to offset the risk of
unexpected medical expenses.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="14162" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="14162" data-sentence-id="14173" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_14173"><span class="ldml-cite">¶19</span></a></span>
In <span class="ldml-entity">2010</span>, the General Assembly codified the pre-verdict
evidentiary component of the common law collateral source
rule by enacting <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_14173"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>, which provides that
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[t]</span>he fact or amount of any collateral source payment
or benefits shall not be admitted as evidence in any action
against an alleged third-<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> tortfeasor."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="14162" data-sentence-id="14517" class="ldml-sentence"><em class="ldml-emphasis">See
Jeppsen</em>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_14517"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 19</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012" data-prop-ids="sentence_14517"><span class="ldml-cite">277 P.3d at 228</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-relatingauthority">observing</span> that
<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_14554"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"unambiguously codifies"</span>
the common law pre-verdict evidentiary component of the
collateral source rule</span>)</span></span>.</span>
</p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth2" data-ordinal_start="2" data-value="B.
Application" data-specifier="B" data-id="heading_14702" data-ordinal_end="2" data-parsed="true" id="heading_14702" data-content-heading-label="
B.
Application
" data-format="upper_case_letters"><span data-paragraph-id="14702" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="14702" data-sentence-id="14713" class="ldml-sentence">B.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="14702" data-sentence-id="14716" class="ldml-sentence">Application</span></b>
</span></section><p data-paragraph-id="14728" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="14728" data-sentence-id="14739" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_14739"><span class="ldml-cite">¶20</span></a></span>
The narrow question before <span class="ldml-entity">us</span> is whether Injury Finance
qualifies as a collateral source for purposes of the
pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source
rule codified at <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_14739"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="14728" data-sentence-id="14957" class="ldml-sentence">As relevant here,
that <span class="ldml-entity">section</span> provides: <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"The fact or amount of <em class="ldml-emphasis">any
collateral source payment or benefits</em> shall not be
admitted as evidence in any action against an alleged
third-<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> tortfeasor
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_15159" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="11"></span>
or in an action to recover benefits under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_14957"><span class="ldml-cite">section
10-4-609</span></a></span>."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="14728" data-sentence-id="15223" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_14957"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-referencenote">emphasis added</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="14728" data-sentence-id="15259" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The
parties</span>' disagreement centers on whether Injury Finance
provided Ronquillo with a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"collateral source
payment"</span> or <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"benefit"</span> under this
provision.</span><span data-paragraph-id="14728" data-sentence-id="15411" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical"><sup class="ldml-superscript">[<a href="#note-ftn.FN2" class="ldml-noteanchor" id="note-ref-ftn.FN2">2</a>]</sup></span></span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="15414" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="15414" data-sentence-id="15425" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_15425"><span class="ldml-cite">¶21</span></a></span>
Ronquillo contends that Injury Finance provided a benefit by
paying for her medical expenses <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(albeit at a discounted
rate)</span>, thereby allowing her to receive immediate access to
medical care that <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> otherwise would not have been able to
afford.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="15414" data-sentence-id="15678" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">Defendants</span>, by contrast, contend that Ronquillo
received no true benefit because <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> remains liable to Injury
Finance for the full amount billed by her healthcare
providers regardless of the result of any litigation
concerning the car accident.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="15414" data-sentence-id="15927" class="ldml-sentence">For the following reasons, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span>
agree with <span class="ldml-entity">Defendants</span> and hold that Injury Finance is not a
collateral source.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="16038" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="16038" data-sentence-id="16049" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16049"><span class="ldml-cite">¶22</span></a></span>
Whether medical finance companies, like Injury Finance, are
collateral sources under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16049"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span> is a
statutory interpretation issue of first
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_16212" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="12"></span>
impression.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="16038" data-sentence-id="16226" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-quotation quote">"When interpreting <span class="ldml-entity">a statute</span>, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> strive to
give effect to the legislative purposes by adopting an
interpretation that best effectuates those purposes."</span></span>
<span data-paragraph-id="16038" data-sentence-id="16380" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012" data-prop-ids="sentence_16226"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Jeppsen</em></span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16226"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 14</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012"><span class="ldml-cite">277 P.3d at 227</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span>
<span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/894757111" data-vids="894757111" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc.</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">230 P.3d 1186,
1189</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2010</span>)</span></a></span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="16038" data-sentence-id="16491" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-quotation quote">"In order to ascertain <span class="ldml-entity">the
legislative intent</span>, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> first look to the plain language of
<span class="ldml-entity">the statute</span>, giving the language its commonly accepted and
understood meaning."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="16038" data-sentence-id="16660" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012" data-prop-ids="sentence_16491"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="16038" data-sentence-id="16664" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> construe <span class="ldml-entity">a statute</span>
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"as a whole to give <span class="ldml-quotation quote">'consistent, harmonious and
sensible effect to all its parts.'</span>"</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="16038" data-sentence-id="16771" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/891159163" data-vids="891159163" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16664"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs v.</em> <em class="ldml-emphasis">Costilla Cnty. Conservancy
Dist.</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">88 P.3d 1188, 1192</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2004</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span>
<span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893459716" data-vids="893459716" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16664"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">People v.</em> <em class="ldml-emphasis">Luther</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">58 P.3d 1013, 1015</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span>
<span class="ldml-date">2002</span>)</span></a></span>)</span></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="16924" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="16924" data-sentence-id="16935" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16935"><span class="ldml-cite">¶23</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16935"><span class="ldml-cite">Section 10-1-135</span></a></span> defines <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"benefit<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[]</span>"</span> as the
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"payment or reimbursement of health care expenses . . .
provided to or on behalf of an injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span> under a policy
of insurance, contract, or benefit plan."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="16924" data-sentence-id="17144" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16935"><span class="ldml-cite">§
10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="16924" data-sentence-id="17163" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The statute</span> does not explicitly define
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"collateral source payment."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="16924" data-sentence-id="17232" class="ldml-sentence">However, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_17232"><span class="ldml-cite">section
13-21-111.6</span></a></span>, which codified the post-verdict setoff rule and
is referenced in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_17232"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>, indicates that a
collateral source payment must actually indemnify or
compensate the injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>:</span>
</p><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_17456" class="ldml-blockquote">
<span data-sentence-id="17457" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">[The injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>'s]</span> verdict shall not be reduced by the
amount by which such person, his estate, or his personal
representative has been or will be <em class="ldml-emphasis">wholly or partially
indemnified or compensated by a benefit paid</em> as a result
of a contract entered into and paid for by or on behalf of
such person.</span> <span data-sentence-id="17761" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The court</span> shall enter judgment on such reduced
amount.</span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_17817" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="13"></span></blockquote><p data-paragraph-id="17817" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="17817" data-sentence-id="17818" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-referencenote">Emphasis added</span>.)</span></span><span data-paragraph-id="17817" data-sentence-id="17835" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical"><sup class="ldml-superscript">[<a href="#note-ftn.FN3" class="ldml-noteanchor" id="note-ref-ftn.FN3">3</a>]</sup></span></span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="17838" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="17838" data-sentence-id="17849" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_17849"><span class="ldml-cite">¶24</span></a></span>
In sum, to qualify as a collateral source, a medical finance
company must provide a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"benefit"</span> or a
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"collateral source payment."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="17838" data-sentence-id="17984" class="ldml-sentence">Benefits and
collateral source payments must <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"indemnif<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[y]</span>,"</span>
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"compensate<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[]</span>,"</span> <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"reimburse"</span> or be a
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"payment"</span> for an injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>'s medical
expenses.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="17838" data-sentence-id="18134" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_17984"><span class="ldml-cite">§§ 13-21-111.6</span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">,</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_17984"><span class="ldml-cite">10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">see
also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012" data-prop-ids="sentence_17984"><span class="ldml-refname">Jeppsen</span></a></span></em>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_17984"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 21</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:inresmithvmichaeldjeppsen,defendantandstatefarmmutualautomobileinsuranceno11sa51277p3d224,2012co32april30,2012" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_18208"><span class="ldml-cite">277 P.3d at 228</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">"A
collateral source is a person or company, wholly independent
of an alleged tortfeasor, that compensates an injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>
for that person's injuries."</span></span>)</span></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="18366" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="18366" data-sentence-id="18377" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_18377"><span class="ldml-cite">¶25</span></a></span>
As an initial matter, Injury Finance did not indemnify,
compensate, or reimburse Ronquillo for her medical expenses.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="18366" data-sentence-id="18500" class="ldml-sentence">The plain meaning of each of these terms requires that Injury
Finance offset at least some of Ronquillo's medical debt.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="18366" data-sentence-id="18621" class="ldml-sentence"><em class="ldml-emphasis">See</em> <em class="ldml-emphasis">Indemnify,</em> Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
<em class="ldml-emphasis">https://www.merriam-</em>
webster.com/dictionary/indemnify <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[https://perma.cc/8PHD-L58K]</span>
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"to make compensation to for incurred hurt, loss, or
damage"</span>)</span>; <em class="ldml-emphasis">Compensate,</em> Black's Law
Dictionary <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">11th ed. 2019</span></a></span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"To make an amendatory
payment to; to recompense <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(for an injury)</span>"</span>)</span>;
<em class="ldml-emphasis">Reimburse</em>, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
<em class="ldml-emphasis">https://www.merriam-</em>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_18998" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="14"></span>
webster.com/dictionary/reimburse
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[<em class="ldml-emphasis">http://perma.cc/PR43-KT77</em>]</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"to pay back to
someone"</span>)</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="18366" data-sentence-id="19091" class="ldml-sentence">Here, Injury Finance paid the healthcare
providers so Ronquillo could receive prompt medical care.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="18366" data-sentence-id="19191" class="ldml-sentence">However, under the terms of their contract, Ronquillo remains
liable to Injury Finance for the full amount billed by her
medical providers.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="18366" data-sentence-id="19333" class="ldml-sentence">Because Injury Finance did not actually
offset any of her medical debt, Ronquillo has in no way been
indemnified, compensated, or reimbursed.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="19477" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="19477" data-sentence-id="19488" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19488"><span class="ldml-cite">¶26</span></a></span>
True, the plain meaning of the term <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"payment,"</span> as
used in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19488"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>, is arguably broader than
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"indemnif<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[y]</span>,"</span> <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"compensate<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[]</span>,"</span> or
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"reimburse."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="19477" data-sentence-id="19650" class="ldml-sentence">Still, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> cannot conclude that Injury
Finance paid for Ronquillo's medical expenses simply by
purchasing her accounts receivable from her healthcare
providers at a discounted rate.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="19477" data-sentence-id="19834" class="ldml-sentence">Unlike insurance companies or
other traditional benefits providers, which actually pay for
the injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>'s medical expenses and thereby reduce
<span class="ldml-entity">the party</span>'s financial obligations, Injury Finance
operates like a creditor.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="19477" data-sentence-id="20061" class="ldml-sentence">After purchasing the injured
<span class="ldml-entity">party</span>'s accounts receivable from a healthcare provider,
Injury Finance stands in the shoes of the healthcare provider
and seeks to recover the <em class="ldml-emphasis">full billed</em> amount from the
injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span> without first fully compensating the injured
<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> for their injuries.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="19477" data-sentence-id="20351" class="ldml-sentence">In so doing, Injury Finance
contravenes the express purpose of <span class="ldml-entity">the statute</span> at issue,
which requires that injured <span class="ldml-entity">parties</span> be <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"fully
compensated for <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[their]</span> injuries and damages before the payer
of benefits may seek repayment."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="19477" data-sentence-id="20581" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_20351"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 10-1-135<span class="ldml-headnoteanchor"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(d)</span></span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span>
<span class="ldml-signal"><em class="ldml-emphasis">see also</em></span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_20608" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="15"></span>
<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_20627,sentence_20351"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">"Reimbursement or repayment of
benefits should not be permitted when the injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span> would
not be fully compensated . . . ."</span></span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="19477" data-sentence-id="20758" class="ldml-sentence">Because Injury
Finance's right to reimbursement is not contingent on
Ronquillo first being made whole, as mandated by <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_20758"><span class="ldml-cite">section
10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span>-<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(d)</span></span></a></span>, and Injury Finance did not reduce
Ronquillo's payment obligations, Injury Finance did not
pay for Ronquillo's medical expenses for the purposes of
<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_20758"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="21081" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="21081" data-sentence-id="21092" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_21092"><span class="ldml-cite">¶27</span></a></span>
Our interpretation is supported by the purpose of the
pre-verdict component of the common law collateral source
rule.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="21081" data-sentence-id="21217" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">Cf.</span> </em><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888614883" data-vids="888614883" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_21253,sentence_21092"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Gardenswartz</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">242 P.3d at 1082</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">"An
understanding of the common law collateral source rule is
essential in <span class="ldml-relatingauthority">interpreting</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_21092"><span class="ldml-cite">section 13-21-111.6</span></a></span>, which codifies
the collateral source rule."</span></span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="21081" data-sentence-id="21411" class="ldml-sentence">As noted, the pre-verdict
component of the rule excluded evidence of collateral sources
on the grounds that such evidence may cause jurors to
improperly lower damage awards because the injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span> has
already been compensated by their benefits provider.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="21081" data-sentence-id="21671" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_21411"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Crossgrove</em></span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_21411"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 12</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d at 565</span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span>
<span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888614883" data-vids="888614883" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Gardenswartz</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">242 P.3d at 1083</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="21081" data-sentence-id="21738" class="ldml-sentence">Ronquillo's
contract with Injury Finance does not raise the same risk.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="21081" data-sentence-id="21810" class="ldml-sentence">The contract specifically provides that Ronquillo remains
liable to Injury Finance for the full amount billed by her
healthcare providers regardless of the results of any
litigation.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="21081" data-sentence-id="21996" class="ldml-sentence">Thus, assuming the jury is made aware of the
terms of the agreement with Injury Finance, there is no
reason to suspect that the jury will reduce
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_22145" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="16"></span>
Ronquillo's damage award on the grounds that Ronquillo
has already been compensated, her debt has been paid, or that
<span class="ldml-entity">she</span> will receive a windfall.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="22295" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="22295" data-sentence-id="22306" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_22306"><span class="ldml-cite">¶28</span></a></span>
Ronquillo contends that even though her financial obligations
have not been reduced, Injury Finance still provided her with
the benefit of receiving prompt medical attention.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="22295" data-sentence-id="22488" class="ldml-sentence">While this
is certainly a benefit in the broad sense of the term, it is
not a benefit as defined in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_22488"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span> or for the
purposes of the collateral source rule.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="22295" data-sentence-id="22665" class="ldml-sentence">As reasoned above, a
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"benefit"</span> must in some way reduce the injured
<span class="ldml-entity">party</span>'s payment obligation.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="22295" data-sentence-id="22762" class="ldml-sentence">Because it is undisputed that
Ronquillo remains liable to Injury Finance regardless of
whether <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> obtains a judgment in her favor, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> conclude that
Ronquillo has not been provided with a benefit and that
Injury Finance is not a collateral source.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="23014" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="23014" data-sentence-id="23025" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23025"><span class="ldml-cite">¶29</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-entity">We</span> take no position on whether evidence of amounts paid by a
collateral source for medical expenses is relevant to the
reasonable value of those expenses-a question <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> left open in
<span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23025"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Crossgrove</em></span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23025"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 13</span></a></span></span> n.4, <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23025"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d at 565 n.4</span></a></span>-or
whether the disputed evidence may be excluded under other
evidentiary rules such as <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">CRE 401</span></a></span> or 403.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="23014" data-sentence-id="23360" class="ldml-sentence">Those issues were
not raised in <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname">Ronquillo's</span> <span class="ldml-cite">C.A.R. 21</span></a></span> petition</span>, nor argued
in her briefing, and therefore are not properly before <span class="ldml-entity">us</span>.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="23014" data-sentence-id="23496" class="ldml-sentence">Ronquillo remains free to pursue such arguments on remand.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="23555" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="23555" data-sentence-id="23566" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23566"><span class="ldml-cite">¶30</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-entity">We</span> are also cognizant of the concerns expressed by Ronquillo
and amici that our ruling risks unfairly treating individuals
who can afford health insurance
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_23729" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="17"></span>
differently from individuals who rely on medical finance
liens.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="23555" data-sentence-id="23796" class="ldml-sentence">However, these concerns are immaterial to whether
Injury Finance is a collateral source.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="23555" data-sentence-id="23886" class="ldml-sentence">Additionally, as
explained in more detail in the next <span class="ldml-entity">section</span>, the General
Assembly recently passed <span class="ldml-entity">a bill</span> that changes the structure of
medical finance liens and precludes the discovery or
admission of certain evidence pertaining to such liens.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="23555" data-sentence-id="24136" class="ldml-sentence">Thus,
the risk of unfair and differential treatment is unlikely to
arise going forward.</span>
</p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth2" data-ordinal_start="3" data-value="C.
House Bill 21-1300" data-specifier="C" data-id="heading_24226" data-ordinal_end="3" data-parsed="true" id="heading_24226" data-content-heading-label="
C.
House Bill 21-1300
" data-format="upper_case_letters"><span data-paragraph-id="24226" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="24226" data-sentence-id="24237" class="ldml-sentence">C.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="24226" data-sentence-id="24240" class="ldml-sentence">House <span class="ldml-entity">Bill</span> 21-1300</span></b>
</span></section><p data-paragraph-id="24259" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="24259" data-sentence-id="24270" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_24270"><span class="ldml-cite">¶31</span></a></span>
Following our grant of <span class="ldml-entity">this <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.A.R. 21</span></a></span> petition</span>, the General
Assembly enacted House <span class="ldml-entity">Bill</span> 21-1300, now codified at <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_24270"><span class="ldml-cite">section
38-27.5-101</span></a></span> to -108.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="24259" data-sentence-id="24419" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The statute</span> precludes the discovery or
admission of certain evidence pertaining to medical finance
liens:</span>
</p><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_24527" class="ldml-blockquote">
<span data-sentence-id="24528" class="ldml-sentence">any amount paid by an assignee of a health-care provider lien
for the assignment, the fact of the assignment, and the terms
of the assignment are not discoverable or admissible as
evidence in any civil action or claim that the injured person
asserts against third <span class="ldml-entity">parties</span> . . . for any purpose,
including as evidence of the reasonable value of a
health-care provider's services.</span>
</blockquote><p data-paragraph-id="24913" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="24913" data-sentence-id="24914" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 38-27.5-103<span class="ldml-headnoteanchor"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></span></a></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="24932" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="24932" data-sentence-id="24943" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_24943"><span class="ldml-cite">¶32</span></a></span>
Ronquillo contends that <span class="ldml-entity">this statute</span> reflects the General
Assembly's judgment that medical finance liens
categorically provide benefits to injured <span class="ldml-entity">parties</span> and fall
under the pre-evidentiary component of the collateral source
rule.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="24932" data-sentence-id="25183" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> are unpersuaded.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="24932" data-sentence-id="25203" class="ldml-sentence">While <span class="ldml-entity">this statute</span> certainly
changes the legal landscape in
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_25266" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="18"></span>
<span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> involving medical finance liens going forward, it is
inapplicable to <span class="ldml-entity">this case</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="24932" data-sentence-id="25354" class="ldml-sentence">Contrary to the express terms of
Ronquillo's agreement with Injury Finance, House <span class="ldml-entity">Bill</span>
21-1300 also states that before a health care provider lien
is created, the injured person must be notified that
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[i]</span>f the injured person does not receive a judgment,
settlement, or payment on the injured person's claim
against third <span class="ldml-entity">parties</span> . . . the injured person is not liable
to the holder of the health-care provider lien for any
portion of the health-care provider lien."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="24932" data-sentence-id="25828" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_25354"><span class="ldml-cite">§
38-27.5-104<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(c)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(I)</span></span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="24932" data-sentence-id="25850" class="ldml-sentence">It continues, <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[i]</span>f the injured
person receives a net judgment, settlement, or payment that
is less than the full amount of the health-care provider
lien, the injured person is not liable to the holder of the
health-care provider lien for any amount beyond the net
judgment, settlement, or payment."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="24932" data-sentence-id="26155" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_26155"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span> at
-104<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(c)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(II)</span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="26176" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="26176" data-sentence-id="26187" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_26187"><span class="ldml-cite">¶33</span></a></span>
In short, medical finance liens under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_26187"><span class="ldml-cite">section 38-27.5-103<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span>
are treated similarly to traditional insurance arrangements
for purposes of the collateral source rule.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="26176" data-sentence-id="26359" class="ldml-sentence">Unlike Injury
Finance's contract with Ronquillo, liens created under
the new <span class="ldml-entity">statute</span> necessarily provide a benefit to the injured
<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> because, regardless of the outcome of subsequent
litigation, the injured <span class="ldml-entity">party</span> is compensated for their
medical expenses.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="26176" data-sentence-id="26622" class="ldml-sentence">Because Injury Finance does not provide
Ronquillo such a benefit under the lien agreement here, <span class="ldml-entity">the
statute</span> does not support concluding that Injury Finance is a
collateral source.</span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_26805" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="19"></span></p></div></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-id="heading_26805" data-value="IV.
Conclusion" data-types="conclusion" data-specifier="IV" data-confidences="very_high" data-ordinal_end="4" data-ordinal_start="4" data-parsed="true" id="heading_26805" data-content-heading-label="
IV.
Conclusion
" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral"><span data-paragraph-id="26805" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="26805" data-sentence-id="26816" class="ldml-sentence">IV.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="26805" data-sentence-id="26820" class="ldml-sentence">Conclusion</span></b>
</span></section><p data-paragraph-id="26831" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="26831" data-sentence-id="26842" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_26842"><span class="ldml-cite">¶34</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-entity">The district court</span> correctly determined that Injury Finance
is not a collateral source under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_26842"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>
because it did not provide Ronquillo with a benefit.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="26831" data-sentence-id="27017" class="ldml-sentence">In so
doing, it properly looked to <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_27017"><span class="ldml-cite">section 13-21-111.6</span></a></span> to bolster
its conclusion.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="26831" data-sentence-id="27101" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> therefore discharge the rule and remand
<span class="ldml-entity">the case</span> for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="27209" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span class="ldml-opinionauthor"><span data-paragraph-id="27209" data-sentence-id="27222" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-judge">GABRIEL</span></span> concurs in part and <span class="ldml-opiniontype">dissents in part</span></span>, and
<span class="ldml-entity">JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity">SAMOUR</span> and JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity">BERKENKOTTER</span> join in the
concurrence in part and dissent in part</span>.</span></span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_27375" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="20"></span></p></div></div><div class="ldml-opinion"><p data-paragraph-id="27375" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-4">
<span class="ldml-opinionauthor content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Concurring,dissenting Opinion (GABRIEL)"><span data-paragraph-id="27375" data-sentence-id="27388" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-judge">GABRIEL</span></span>, <span class="ldml-opiniontype">concurring in part</span> and <span class="ldml-opiniontype">dissenting in part</span></span>.</span></span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="27448" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="27448" data-sentence-id="27459" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_27459"><span class="ldml-cite">¶35</span></a></span>
I agree with much of the majority's <span class="ldml-entity">analysis in <span class="ldml-entity">this
case</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="27448" data-sentence-id="27524" class="ldml-sentence">In particular, for the reasons that the majority
articulates, I agree that <span class="ldml-entity">Injury Finance, LLC</span>, which is a
medical finance company, does not meet the definition of a
collateral source.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="27448" data-sentence-id="27712" class="ldml-sentence">I part company with my colleagues in the
majority, however, to the extent that <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> allow to stand <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(by
expressing no opinion on)</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span>'s ruling</span>
that because the collateral source rule does not apply, <span class="ldml-entity">the
defendants</span> will be permitted to introduce at trial evidence
of <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span> the amounts billed and paid for <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Maribel
Ronquillo</span>'s medical treatment and <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span> the nature of
Ronquillo's relationship with Injury Finance.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="27448" data-sentence-id="28151" class="ldml-sentence">For several
reasons, I cannot agree with this conclusion.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="28210" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="28210" data-sentence-id="28221" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_28221"><span class="ldml-cite">¶36</span></a></span>
First, I cannot subscribe to the majority's decision to
acquiesce in <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span>'s relevance ruling based
on the majority's determination that that issue is not
properly before <span class="ldml-entity">us</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="28210" data-sentence-id="28417" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_28221"><span class="ldml-cite">Maj. op. ¶ 29</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="28210" data-sentence-id="28432" class="ldml-sentence">Ronquillo asked <span class="ldml-entity">the
district court</span> to exclude the evidence now at issue under the
pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source
rule, <span class="ldml-entity">section</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span>, C.R.S.</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2021</span>)</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="28210" data-sentence-id="28622" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The court</span>
rejected this argument, however, concluding, albeit without
substantial analysis, that the evidence was relevant and
therefore admissible, and Ronquillo sought an order to show
cause why that ruling should not be vacated, expressly
arguing that the evidence at issue was irrelevant.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="28210" data-sentence-id="28920" class="ldml-sentence">In <span class="ldml-entity">these
circumstances</span>, and particularly given that <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span>
expressly ruled on the relevance question, I would conclude
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_29055" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="21"></span>
that the issue is properly before <span class="ldml-entity">us</span>, and I would require <span class="ldml-entity">the
district court</span> to reconsider its ruling and to assess
specifically whether the evidence at issue should be admitted
under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">CRE 401-403</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="28210" data-sentence-id="29257" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> </em><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:brownvamstandardinscoofwis,2019coa11" data-prop-ids="sentence_28920"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Brown v. Am. Standard Ins.
Co.</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2019 COA 11</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_28920"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 23</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/891825612" data-vids="891825612" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">436 P.3d 597, 600</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(concluding that because <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> had ruled on the
issue that <span class="ldml-entity">the appellant</span> sought to raise on appeal, the issue
was preserved for review)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:battlenorth,llcvsensiblehousingco,2015coa83"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Battle N., LLC v. Sensible
Hous. Co.</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2015 COA 83</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 13</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893502829" data-vids="893502829" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">370 P.3d 238, 244</span></a></span>
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(concluding that an issue was properly preserved for appeal
when, despite ambiguity in the request to <span class="ldml-entity">the trial court</span>,
<span class="ldml-entity">the trial court</span> had ruled on the issue)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">cf.</span> </em><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:thecommitteeforbetterhealthcareforallcoloradocitizens,byrobertwschriervmeyerno90sa440830p2d884april20,1992" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_29821"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Comm. for
Better Health Care for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">830
P.2d 884, 888</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">1992</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">"It is axiomatic that in any
appellate proceeding <span class="ldml-entity">this court</span> may consider only issues that
have actually been determined by another <span class="ldml-entity">court</span> or agency and
have been properly presented for our consideration."</span></span>)</span></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="30031" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="30031" data-sentence-id="30042" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_30042"><span class="ldml-cite">¶37</span></a></span>
I am not persuaded otherwise by the majority's suggestion
that Ronquillo is free to pursue her relevance arguments on
remand.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="30031" data-sentence-id="30175" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_30042"><span class="ldml-cite">Maj. op. ¶ 29</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="30031" data-sentence-id="30190" class="ldml-sentence">In so stating, the majority
appears to overlook the fact that Ronquillo has already
pursued these arguments, and <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> squarely
rejected them, albeit with limited analysis.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="30031" data-sentence-id="30379" class="ldml-sentence">It is unclear to
me why the majority believes that <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> would
perceive any reason to reconsider arguments that it has
already contemplated and rejected.</span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_30549" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="22"></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="30549" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="30549" data-sentence-id="30560" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_30560"><span class="ldml-cite">¶38</span></a></span>
Second, on the merits, it is not at all clear to me that the
evidence at issue can properly be admitted under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">CRE 401-403</span></a></span>.</span>
<span data-paragraph-id="30549" data-sentence-id="30689" class="ldml-sentence">Specifically, without more, I am not persuaded that the
discounted amounts billed by Ronquillo's treatment
providers and paid by Injury Finance evince the reasonable
value of the services provided.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="30549" data-sentence-id="30890" class="ldml-sentence">Indeed, in <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_30890"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2012 CO 31</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_30890"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 13</span></a></span></span> n.4,
<span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893947926" data-vids="893947926" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_30890"><span class="ldml-cite">276 P.3d 562, 565 n.4</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> expressly left open the related
question of whether evidence of amounts paid by a collateral
source for medical expenses is relevant to the issue of the
reasonable value of those expenses.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="30549" data-sentence-id="31180" class="ldml-sentence">Unlike the majority, I do
not believe that <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> should allow such evidence to be admitted
without adequate consideration of this unresolved and
significant question of Colorado law.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="31363" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="31363" data-sentence-id="31374" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_31374"><span class="ldml-cite">¶39</span></a></span>
Lastly, I am not convinced that the nature of the contractual
relationships between and among Ronquillo, her treatment
providers, and Injury Finance establish bias, as amicus
<span class="ldml-entity">Colorado Defense Lawyers Association</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">"CDLA"</span>)</span>
suggests and as <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> appears to have
determined.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31363" data-sentence-id="31668" class="ldml-sentence">The CDLA contends that a treatment provider's
relationship with a medical finance company like Injury
Finance creates a clear financial incentive for the provider
to testify favorably for an injured <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span> and to maximize
medical billings with an extended and inflated course of
treatment.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31363" data-sentence-id="31966" class="ldml-sentence">The CDLA thus asserts that a factfinder must be
permitted to explore such biases.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31363" data-sentence-id="32049" class="ldml-sentence">Although, to be sure, the
issue of bias is ordinarily a relevant consideration at
trial, the admissibility of bias evidence,
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_32178" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="23"></span>
like the admissibility of other forms of evidence, is subject
to <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">CRE 403</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31363" data-sentence-id="32255" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> </em><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/885587219" data-vids="885587219" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_32049"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">United States v. Wilson</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">605 F.3d
985, 1006</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">D.C. Cir.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2010</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-relatingauthority">construing</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_32049"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed.R.Evid. 403</span></a></span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span>
<span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888722874" data-vids="888722874" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_32049"><span class="ldml-refname"><em class="ldml-emphasis">United States v. Skelton</em></span>, <span class="ldml-cite">514 F.3d 433, 442</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">5th
Cir.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2008</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(same)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31363" data-sentence-id="32420" class="ldml-sentence">Thus, evidence of bias may be excluded if
the probative value of such evidence is substantially
outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31363" data-sentence-id="32615" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_32420"><span class="ldml-cite">CRE 403</span></a></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="32624" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="32624" data-sentence-id="32635" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_32635"><span class="ldml-cite">¶40</span></a></span>
Here, I am unwilling to presume, at least at this stage of
the proceedings, that Ronquillo's treatment providers
harbor the biases that the CDLA attributes to them.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="32624" data-sentence-id="32807" class="ldml-sentence">At a
minimum, the issue deserves detailed consideration, based on
the specific <span class="ldml-entity">facts presented</span>, before <span class="ldml-entity">the court</span> should allow
the factfinder to hear evidence regarding <span class="ldml-entity">the parties</span>'
relationships with one another and with Injury Finance.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="33048" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="33048" data-sentence-id="33059" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_33059"><span class="ldml-cite">¶41</span></a></span>
In my view, further review of these relevance questions is
particularly appropriate here, given the General
Assembly's recent <span class="ldml-entity">amendments</span> to <span class="ldml-entity">section</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">38-27.5-103<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span>,
C.R.S.</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2021</span>)</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="33048" data-sentence-id="33246" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">Those amendments</span>, which became effective on
<span class="ldml-entity">September 7, 2021</span> and which presumably would apply as of the
time of the trial in <span class="ldml-entity">this case</span>, make clear that the very
evidence that <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> has deemed admissible is now
inadmissible as a matter of law.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="33048" data-sentence-id="33507" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><em class="ldml-emphasis"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_33246"><span class="ldml-cite">id.</span></a></span></em></span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="33048" data-sentence-id="33515" class="ldml-sentence">Although
the majority states that <span class="ldml-entity">this statute</span> is inapplicable here,
maj. <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">op. ¶ 32</span></a></span>, I do not perceive why that is so.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="33048" data-sentence-id="33635" class="ldml-sentence">Nor do
I think that <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> can turn a blind eye to this significant
<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(and, I believe,
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_33720" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="24"></span>
applicable)</span> recent <span class="ldml-entity">legislation</span>, which, as the majority
states, <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"changes the legal landscape in <span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> involving
medical finance liens going forward."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="33048" data-sentence-id="33873" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_33635"><span class="ldml-cite"><em class="ldml-emphasis">Id.</em></span></a></span></span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="33877" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="33877" data-sentence-id="33888" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_33888"><span class="ldml-cite">¶42</span></a></span>
For all of these reasons, I agree that Injury Finance does
not satisfy the definition of a collateral source, and I
would discharge the rule to show cause to that extent.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="33877" data-sentence-id="34066" class="ldml-sentence">I
would make the rule absolute, however, as to the portion of
<span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span>'s order admitting the evidence at
issue without a complete analysis under the applicable rules
of evidence.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="34259" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="34259" data-sentence-id="34270" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_34270"><span class="ldml-cite">¶43</span></a></span>
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part in and dissent in
part from the majority's <span class="ldml-entity">opinion in <span class="ldml-entity">this case</span></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="34384" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="34384" data-sentence-id="34395" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_34395"><span class="ldml-cite">¶44</span></a></span>
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE SAMOUR and JUSTICE
BERKENKOTTER join in this concurrence in part and dissent in
part.</span>
<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-id="pagenumber_34526" data-page_type="bare_number" data-val="25"></span>
<span data-paragraph-id="34384" data-sentence-id="34527" class="ldml-sentence">---------</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="34537" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="34537" data-sentence-id="34538" class="ldml-sentence">Notes:</span>
</p></div><div class="ldml-notes content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Footnotes"><div class="ldml-note ldml-note"><p data-paragraph-id="34545" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="34545" data-sentence-id="34546" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical"><sup class="ldml-superscript">[<a href="#note-ref-ftn.FN1" class="ldml-notemarker" id="note-ftn.FN1">1</a>]</sup></span> <span class="ldml-entity">We</span> are intentionally using the
singular <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"<span class="ldml-entity">they</span>"</span> in this opinion.</span>
</p></div><div class="ldml-note ldml-note"><p data-paragraph-id="34614" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="34614" data-sentence-id="34615" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical"><sup class="ldml-superscript">[<a href="#note-ref-ftn.FN2" class="ldml-notemarker" id="note-ftn.FN2">2</a>]</sup></span> <span class="ldml-entity">We</span> note that though Injury Finance now
contends that it provided Ronquillo a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"benefit"</span>
under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_34615"><span class="ldml-cite">section 10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(10)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>, its lien agreement with
Ronquillo expressly states that <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"Injury Finance is not a
<span class="ldml-quotation quote">'Payer of Benefits'</span> as defined by <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_34615"><span class="ldml-cite">Section
10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(c)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span>"</span> and that because <span class="ldml-quotation quote">"Injury Finance
does not provide . . . insurance or health benefits . . . <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[it
is not]</span> subject to any provisions set forth in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_34615"><span class="ldml-cite">Section
10-1-135</span></a></span>."</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="34614" data-sentence-id="35047" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> nevertheless choose to address the
questions of statutory interpretation presented by
Ronquillo's petition.</span>
</p></div><div class="ldml-note ldml-note"><p data-paragraph-id="35160" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="35160" data-sentence-id="35161" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical"><sup class="ldml-superscript">[<a href="#note-ref-ftn.FN3" class="ldml-notemarker" id="note-ftn.FN3">3</a>]</sup></span> Ronquillo contends that <span class="ldml-entity">the district
court</span> construed <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_35161"><span class="ldml-cite">section 13-21-111.6</span></a></span> to mean that a
third-<span class="ldml-entity">party</span> payor's subrogation rights determine its
collateral source status.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="35160" data-sentence-id="35334" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> disagree with <span class="ldml-entity">this
interpretation of <span class="ldml-entity">the court</span></span>'s analysis.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="35160" data-sentence-id="35397" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The district
court</span> simply looked to this provision for insight into
whether Ronquillo received a benefit, as defined in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_35397"><span class="ldml-cite">section
10-1-135<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span>.</span>
</p><p data-paragraph-id="35544" class="ldml-paragraph ">
<span data-paragraph-id="35544" data-sentence-id="35545" class="ldml-sentence">---------</span>
</p></div></div></div></div>
</div>
</div>