Judges: J.D. MacFARLANE, Attorney General
Filed Date: 6/7/1977
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Mr. Bill Marshall The State Historical Society of Colorado Colorado State Museum 200 East 14th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203
Dear Mr. Marshall:
QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION
After receiving an initial opinion from this office, you have inquired regarding the propriety of the inclusion of the position of state archaeologist within the State Personnel System.
After considerable analysis, I have determined that the position is in fact exempt from the State Personnel System.
ANALYSIS
The statutory language relevant to the appointment of the state archaeologist reads as follows:
The board of directors of the society (the "society" being the State Historical Society, an educational institution of the State of Colorado, within which the state archaeologist is a "section") is hereby authorized to and shall appoint a state archaeologist pursuant to the provisions of section 13 of article XII of the state constitution.
C.R.S. 1973,
Article
The former interpretation seems the more comprehensive as a matter of logic and statutory construction; the latter interpretation finds support in prior use by the legislature of similar language which has been interpreted to establish positions within the personnel system. In an April 3, 1975 informal letter, Lou Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, concluded that the position of state archaeologist was properly included within the State Personnel System. That opinion was based on an analogy to the statutes creating the positions of assistant state solicitors, the director of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, and state director of housing, which contain similar language. The positions created by those statutes have actually been filled through the State Personnel System. Yet, the historical pattern of use of such language by the legislature and the filling of other positions through the State Personnel System is not dispositive, since compelling reasons for a different result arise in this particular case.
First, there is nothing in the statutes referred to in the Kelley letter which suggests, as the law herein discussed does, that the positions created there are constitutionally exempt. Second, the legislative history of the instant statute suggests that the language referring to article XII, section 13 appears here because the legislature, by oversight, failed to remove it rather than because the legislature intended to include it. The language first appeared in a bill, H.B. 1187, which would have created a division of archaeology within the department of natural resources. This bill was assigned to the Natural Resources Committee but was postponed indefinitely. Meanwhile, after discussion between archaeologists, the State Historical Society, and the Natural Resources Committee, a different version of the bill, H.B. 1569, placing the office of the state archaeologist as a section within the State Historical Society, was reported out of the committee and passed by the legislature. Clearly, the legislature thought better of the original placement and substantially altered the bill to assign the office of the educational institution to which it closely related. However, while the legislature created this substantive change, it apparently overlooked the housekeeping change of removing the reference to article XII, section 13. For, having rewritten the bill and relocated the office in an educational agency, the legislature nonetheless passed a bill containing appointment language previously used to create State Personnel System positions in non-educational agencies.
As the bill was originally written, the inclusion of such language was wholly consistent with similar usage in prior bills. Given the subsequent substantive legislative changes, however, to view inclusion of this language as intentional renders the bill as a whole inconsistent.
Where, as here, the very nature of the position created suggests an exempt classification, to assume that the appointment language refers to State Personnel System procedures potentially brings different provisions of the same statute into conflict — the statute on the one hand apparently creates an exempt position and, on the other, provides that the position is to be filled with State Personnel System procedures. Such an interpretation belies a rational legislative intent; the more likely interpretation, therefore, is that the legislature inadvertently failed to remove that language. If the statute can be construed as a whole to create a more harmonious effect, well-settled rules of statutory construction require that such an interpretation be adopted. Massey v. District Court In and ForTenth Judicial Dist.,
Turning, then, to a consideration of whether the statute creates a position which is within a constitutionally exempt category, first noted is the fact that the statute establishes the position as a section of an educational institution, the State Historical Society. See C.R.S. 1973,
(A)ll officers, curators, assistant curators, and teachers of the society, so designated by the board of directors, are . . . declared, as a matter of legislative determination, to be officers and teachers in an educational institution and therefore not under the state personnel system.
C.R.S. 1973,
Second, the constitutional reference to "administrators exempt by law" is critical since a provision of the State Personnel System legislation expressly exempts, inter alia, "heads of administrative units directly responsible to officers of an educational institution" and"heads of administrative units . . . who relate directly to the educational function of an educational institution and whose qualifications include training and experience comparable to that required for a faculty member." See C.R.S. 1973,
Finally, the statutorily-enumerated duties of the position appear to be fully consonant with the educational nature and status of the parent educational institution, see C.R.S. 1973,
Similarity of function to other educationally-exempt positions can be the basis for a finding of exemption. SeeBoard of Education v. Spurlin,
Given the legislative placement of the office of the state archaeologist within an educational institution, the qualifications for and the nature of the duties of the office, and the extensive administrative integration of the position with the activities of the appointing educational institution, the statute thus appears to create a position exempt by law from the State Personnel System.
Though the better practice would be for the legislature expressly to provide that a particular position is exempt, the absence of such language does not necessarily bar a finding of exemption under the constitution. The constitution merely specifies that a position such as the one under consideration is exempt if exempt by law; presumably, such an exemption may be express or implied. Given the legislative history discussed above, there is no reason not to imply such an exemption in this case.
SUMMARY
In view of all of the foregoing factors, it is my opinion that, in this case, the statutory language should be interpreted as creating a constitutionally exempt administrative position within an educational institution.
Very truly yours,
J.D. MacFARLANE Attorney General
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICERS
C.R.S. 1973,
Colo. Const. art.
HIGHER EDUCATION, DEPT. OF St Historical Soc of Colo
The position of state archaeologist is an administrative position within an educational institution and thus exempt from the state personnel system by constitution and statute.