M.G. Dyess v. MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
September 15, 2022
2022COA108No. 20CA1742, M.G. Dyess, Inc. v. MarkWest Liberty Midstream
& Resources, L.L.C. — Civil Procedure — Right to Trial by Jury
— Trial by Jury or By the Court — Findings by the Court —
Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent; Contracts — Quantum
Meruit
As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of
appeals considers whether quantum meruit claims are legal or
equitable for purposes of determining whether a party has a right to
a jury trial on such a claim. The division concludes that, where the
claimant has requested monetary damages, the quantum meruit
claim is legal, and the claimant is entitled to a jury trial under
C.R.C.P. 38(a).
The division further considers whether, pursuant to C.R.C.P.
52, a trial court may unilaterally reduce the amount of damages
awarded in a binding jury verdict. It concludes that C.R.C.P. 52
does not provide that authority. Because the trial court did so here,
it erred. Accordingly, the division reverses the judgment insofar as
the trial court reduced the damages, but it affirms the judgment
insofar as the court accepted the jury’s verdict on liability.
The division also rejects the appellant’s contention that the
trial court erred by denying its motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the appellee’s counterclaim,
concluding there was evidence upon which a verdict against the
appellant could be sustained.
It remands the case for entry of an amended judgment and an
award of pre- and post-judgment interest to both parties.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA108Court of Appeals No. 20CA1742
City and County of Denver District Court No. 18CV34745
Honorable Michael J. Vallejos, Judge
M.G. Dyess, Inc., a Mississippi corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN
Pawar and Brown, JJ., concur
Announced September 15, 2022
Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP, Edward C. Stewart, Frederick R. Yarger, Denver,
Colorado; Moore Williams PLLC, Marie E. Williams, Golden, Colorado;
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Adam H. Charnes, Dallas, Texas, for
Plaintiff-Appellant
Snell & Willmer L.L.P., Michael E. Lindsay, James Kilroy, Ellie Lockwood,
Denver, Colorado; Snell & Willmer L.L.P., Kelly H. Dove, Las Vegas, Nevada for
Defendant-Appellee
¶1 In this construction contract dispute, plaintiff, M.G. Dyess,
Inc. (Dyess), appeals post-trial orders reducing the amount of
damages awarded on its quantum meruit claim and denying its
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on
defendant’s counterclaim. Defendant, MarkWest Liberty Midstream
& Resources, L.L.C. (MarkWest), and Dyess both appeal the trial
court’s denial of their motions for pre- and post-judgment interest.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case with
directions.
I. Background
¶2 MarkWest, a corporation that processes and transports
natural gas, entered into three contracts with Dyess, a pipeline
construction company, to install thousands of feet of pipeline. Each
of the three contracts concerned a particular length of pipeline,
called a “spread,” and each spread was assigned a lump sum
payment amount and a “mechanical completion date” after which
liquidated damages would accrue if the spread remained
incomplete.
¶3 According to Dyess, MarkWest materially hindered its work,
increasing the costs and duration of the project. Dyess sued
1
MarkWest, asserting claims for breach of contract, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent nondisclosure, fraud, promissory
estoppel, and quantum meruit. MarkWest countered that it had
not hindered Dyess’s work, and Dyess failed to achieve mechanical
completion by the contractual deadlines. MarkWest brought
counterclaims for liquidated damages under the contract and
declaratory judgment. Per jury demands by both parties, the case
was set for a jury trial, which began on February 3, 2020.
¶4 During the trial, however, MarkWest asserted that Dyess’s
promissory estoppel and quantum meruit claims were not triable to
the jury because they are equitable claims. Dyess argued that its
claims were legal and contended that, in any case, MarkWest had
waived any objection to a jury trial.
¶5 The trial court concluded that Dyess had brought “a mix of
legal and equitable claims,” but the court did not specify which
claims were equitable. It stated an intention to submit all the
claims to the jury under C.R.C.P. 39(c), which permits courts to “try
any issue with an advisory jury” in “all actions not triable by a
jury.” The court also noted that, if the jury returned a verdict
2
awarding relief on an “arguably equitable claim,” it could permit
further briefing.
¶6 The jury rejected all of Dyess’s claims except its quantum
meruit claim, for which it awarded $26,039,641 in damages. It also
awarded MarkWest $4,500,000 in liquidated damages based on its
breach of contract counterclaim. When the verdict was read,
MarkWest immediately made an oral motion to treat the jury’s
quantum meruit verdict as advisory, asking the court to “decide this
issue.” The court ordered additional briefing.
¶7 In response, MarkWest filed a motion, captioned as a motion
under C.R.C.P. 52, asking the court to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the quantum meruit claim. It urged
the court to conclude that MarkWest was not liable to Dyess for the
quantum meruit claim, and in the alternative, that Dyess could
only recover $934,436, the approximate amount Dyess claimed for
the items listed in Instruction 60 (the quantum meruit jury
instruction). Dyess countered that its expert had testified to overall
losses equal to or greater than the amount awarded and, therefore,
the $26,039,641 verdict was supported by evidence.
3
¶8 The trial court concluded, in a written order titled “Order
Regarding Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion Pursuant to
C.R.C.P. 52,” that (1) MarkWest did not waive its objection to a jury
trial; and (2) quantum meruit is “an equitable theory of recovery . . .
triable by the court and not by a jury, subject to the right of the
court to impanel an advisory jury under C.R.C.P. 39(c).” It accepted
the jury’s “advisory verdict” insofar as the jury found that MarkWest
was liable under a quantum meruit theory, but the court concluded
that the amount awarded was not supported by the evidence. It
reduced the amount of damages to $934,436. On the same day, it
entered judgment on the jury verdict as modified by its C.R.C.P. 52
order.
¶9 Dyess subsequently filed a motion for JNOV on MarkWest’s
breach of contract counterclaim, asserting that it had achieved
mechanical completion before the final mechanical completion
dates, which it claimed MarkWest had extended. The trial court did
not rule on the motion, and it was therefore deemed denied by rule.
See C.R.C.P. 59(j).
¶ 10 Dyess did not file any other post-trial motions challenging the
jury’s verdict, although the jury had denied Dyess’s other claims.
4
MarkWest did not seek post-trial relief on any claim. However, both
parties filed C.R.C.P. 59(c)(4) motions to amend the judgment to
include pre- and post-judgment interest. These motions were also
deemed denied. See C.R.C.P. 59(j).
¶ 11 Dyess now appeals (1) the order treating the verdict in its favor
as advisory and reducing the damages award; (2) the denial of its
motion for JNOV with respect to MarkWest’s counterclaim; and (3)
the denial of its motion for pre- and post-judgment interest.
MarkWest cross-appeals the denial of its motion for pre- and post-
judgment interest.
II. Quantum Meruit Claim
A. Standard of Review and Law
¶ 12 Dyess asks us to decide whether the trial court erred when it
partially rejected the jury’s verdict under C.R.C.P. 52, ultimately
reducing the amount of damages awarded. This question turns, in
part, on whether Dyess had a right to a jury trial because, as
relevant here, Rule 52 only applies in “actions tried . . . with an
advisory jury.”
¶ 13 We review a party’s right to a jury trial in a civil case de novo.
People v. Shifrin, 2014 COA 14, ¶ 14. To the extent the issues
5
raised require us to construe the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure,
we also employ a de novo standard of review. See Mason v. Farm
Credit of S. Colo., 2018 CO 46, ¶ 7.
¶ 14 There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases in
Colorado. Id. at ¶ 9. To the extent the right exists, it is derived
from C.R.C.P. 38(a). Rule 38(a) provides for a jury trial only in
“proceedings that are legal in nature, not equitable.” Mason, ¶ 10.
¶ 15 There are two methods for determining whether an action is
legal or equitable. Id. at ¶ 27. The first method is to examine the
nature of the remedy sought. Id. Actions seeking an award of
monetary damages are generally legal, while actions seeking to
employ the coercive powers of the court are generally equitable. Id.
The second method is to look to the historical nature of the right to
be enforced. Id. “If the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a right
historically decided by equity courts, the claim is equitable. If the
right was historically enforced by a court of law, the claim is legal.”
Id. (citation omitted). Of the two methods, the remedial method is
generally preferred. Peterson v. McMahon, 99 P.3d 594, 598-99
(Colo. 2004) (noting that because the plaintiff in this trust action
sought the immediate and unconditional payment of money, the
6
action was legal despite the “overwhelmingly equitable history of
trusts”).
B. Analysis
¶ 16 In its complaint, Dyess sought to recover, under a quantum
meruit theory, the reasonable market value of labor and materials it
provided on an extracontractual basis. In other words, Dyess asked
for a simple money judgment. See Mason, ¶ 11 (stating that
whether an action is legal or equitable is dictated only by the claims
in a plaintiff’s complaint). Given our supreme court’s preference for
the remedial method of deciding this issue, the remedy that Dyess
sought strongly favors the conclusion that the claim is legal. Stuart
v. N. Shore Water & Sanitation Dist., 211 P.3d 59, 62 (Colo. App.
2009) (noting that actions for money damages are legal).
Nonetheless, the fact that a plaintiff sought monetary relief does
not, by itself, necessarily determine if a claim is legal or equitable.
State ex rel. Weiser v. Ctr. for Excellence in Higher Educ., Inc., 2021
COA 117, ¶ 65; Shifrin, ¶ 17 (stating that, even if a plaintiff seeks
money damages, a jury trial is not required if the action is
equitable). We must therefore examine the nature and history of
quantum meruit claims.
7
¶ 17 In Colorado, a plaintiff may bring a quantum meruit claim
when substantial changes have occurred that are “not covered by
the contract and are not within the contemplation of the parties,”
and those changes have required extra work or caused substantial
loss to one party. Specialized Grading Enters., Inc. v. Goodland
Constr., Inc., 181 P.3d 352, 354 (Colo. App. 2007). The purpose of
the claim is to avoid unjust enrichment despite the absence of an
express agreement to pay. Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v.
Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 19.
¶ 18 Because a quantum meruit claim is grounded on principles of
fairness, our supreme court and some divisions of this court have
called it, or its related claims, an “equitable doctrine,” an “equitable
theory,” or an “equitable remedy.” Id. (“equitable theory of
recovery”); Dudding v. Norton Frickey & Assocs., 11 P.3d 441, 445
(Colo. 2000) (“equitable doctrine”); Jorgensen v. Colo. Rural Props.,
LLC, 226 P.3d 1255, 1259 (Colo. App. 2010) (unjust enrichment
claim an “equitable remedy”); see also Jones v. Crestview S. Baptist
Church, 192 P.3d 571, 573 (Colo. App. 2008) (unjust enrichment
and quantum meruit are “equitable claims”); 26 Richard A. Lord,
Williston on Contracts § 68:1, Westlaw (4th ed. database updated
8
May 2022) (“It has also been said that quantum meruit, quasi-
contract, and an implied at law contract are equivalent terms for an
equitable remedy.”). Even so, we have found no Colorado case, and
MarkWest has cited none, holding that quantum meruit claims are
equitable for purposes of determining whether a party is entitled to
a jury trial. The “equitable doctrine” language cited above, while
correctly describing the fairness concerns central to the claim, does
not address whether quantum meruit claims have historically been
enforced by courts of equity. 26 Lord, § 68:1 (noting that, although
equitable considerations influence whether recovery is warranted,
the quantum meruit claim “was developed as part of the common
law of contracts”).
¶ 19 Our review of the history and theoretical underpinnings of
quantum meruit claims in Colorado reveals that these actions were
traditionally enforced by courts of law, based on the existence of an
implied contract to pay. See Hansen v. Jones, 115 Colo. 1, 7, 168
P.2d 263, 265 (1946) (noting that a plaintiff who had no express
contract with the defendant could sue on a theory of implied
contract or quantum meruit). Such payments were historically
sought through a writ of assumpsit, a legal writ. See, e.g., Schleier
9
v. Bonella, 77 Colo. 603, 604-06, 237 P. 1113, 1113-14 (1925)
(seeking recovery in quantum meruit based on an implied promise
to pay for services); Snowden v. Clemons, 5 Colo. App. 251, 255, 38
P. 475, 477 (1894) (finding a valid “assumpsit upon a quantum
meruit” claim for services rendered under an implied contract); cf.
Cree v. Lewis, 49 Colo. 186, 189-92, 112 P. 326, 327-28 (1910)
(noting that although the plaintiff could have brought an action in
assumpsit in a court of law to recover money, he instead brought
an equitable suit asking the court to declare that certain real estate
was held in trust for him); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§ 4.1(3), at 565 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that restitution in money was
afforded at law through quasi-contract actions).
¶ 20 Because quantum meruit, quasi-contract, and assumpsit
claims were generally enforced by courts of law, numerous federal
and state courts have concluded that such claims are legal, not
equitable. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 717 (1999) (noting that an action
premised on the existence of a quasi-contract is an action at law);
Austin v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1170, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Because
general assumpsit was a legal action at common law, a suit in
10
quasi-contract requires a jury trial.”); Jogani v. Superior Ct., 81 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 503, 508 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that quantum
meruit was recognized as a form of the common law writ of
assumpsit . . . and that the parties to a quantum meruit action
consequently have a right to a jury trial.”); Nehi Beverage Co. of
Indianapolis v. Petri, 537 N.E.2d 78, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that quantum meruit claims are triable to a jury because they are
based on “legal fictions created by courts of law”).
¶ 21 Here, Dyess asked for simple money damages via a quantum
meruit claim, which courts of law have historically enforced. We
conclude that, under applicable Colorado precedent and persuasive
precedent from other jurisdictions, Dyess’s claim was legal, not
equitable. The trial court erred by deeming the claim equitable and
treating the jury’s verdict as advisory.
C. Reversal
¶ 22 The denial of a party’s right to a jury trial in a civil case is
reversible error where, as here, the error is preserved and the trial
court has made a ruling that affects a substantial right of a party.
C.R.C.P. 61; see also Mason, ¶¶ 1, 32 (reversing where the court
erroneously denied a civil defendant a jury trial, finding him liable).
11
However, in this case, the trial court did not deny Dyess the right to
a jury trial; rather, it treated the jury verdict as advisory. Under
these circumstances, a new jury trial is not required because the
jury rendered a verdict in favor of Dyess on its quantum meruit
claim. We can affirm the judgment insofar as the trial court
accepted the jury’s verdict that MarkWest is liable for quantum
meruit damages. In that regard, Dyess was not denied the benefit
of its jury demand, and any error is harmless.1
¶ 23 Nonetheless, we must examine whether the trial court’s
reduction of damages under C.R.C.P. 52 is supportable. We
conclude it is not. A trial court may not alter the substance of a
binding jury verdict pursuant to Rule 52, which grants such powers
only with respect to bench trials or advisory verdicts. See Leo
Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 365, 497 P.2d 997,
1 We note that, after the trial court entered judgment, MarkWest did
not file a C.R.C.P. 59 motion for a new trial asking the court to alter
the conclusion that it was liable to Dyess. It also did not cross-
appeal the jury’s liability finding or the court’s entry of judgment in
favor of Dyess on its quantum meruit claim. Moreover, at oral
arguments, MarkWest conceded that it was bound on the issue of
liability. Therefore, no new trial on MarkWest’s liability for Dyess’s
quantum meruit claim is available.
12
998-99 (1972) (noting that the trial court erred when it reduced
damages on its own motion after a binding jury verdict). The court
did so here, and in doing so, it erred. Further, the court’s error was
not harmless because Dyess was deprived of the right to have a
judgment in the amount of $26,039,641 entered in its favor.
¶ 24 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment insofar as the trial court
reduced the amount of damages awarded from $26,039,641 to
$934,436. We remand with directions to enter an amended
judgment in favor of Dyess on the quantum meruit claim in the
amount of $26,039,641 and to permit the parties to file post-trial
motions regarding the amended judgment. Such motions, however,
may only address the amount of quantum meruit damages. They
may not challenge the liability verdict.2
2 A court may order a new trial solely on the issue of damages if
liability and damages are distinct issues. See Gerrity Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 934 (Colo. 1997) (“Whenever a new
trial must be held on one issue, a new trial must also be held with
respect to other issues unless ‘the issue to be retried is entirely
distinct and separable from the other issues involved in the case
and . . . a partial retrial can be had without injustice to any party.’”
(quoting Bassett v. O’Dell, 178 Colo. 425, 427, 498 P.2d 1134, 1135
(1972))). Where, as here, liability has been clearly established,
“partial retrial may be held solely on the issue of damages.” Id.13
¶ 25 Moreover, since no other post-trial motions were timely filed as
to any of Dyess’s claims, and Dyess did not appeal the judgment
with respect to those claims, such motions may not be filed on
remand.
III. Counterclaim for Breach of Contract
¶ 26 We next address whether the trial court erred by denying
Dyess’s motion for JNOV on MarkWest’s counterclaim for breach of
contract. The crux of Dyess’s argument is that there was no
reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that Dyess did not achieve
mechanical completion on all three spreads by the final mechanical
completion dates, which Dyess alleges MarkWest extended.
A. Standard of Review and Law
¶ 27 We review de novo a trial court’s rulings on motions for
directed verdicts and for JNOV. Vaccaro v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 2012
COA 9M, ¶ 40. Where, as here, the motion is based on a factual
dispute, we view the evidence in “the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence in that party’s favor.” Int’l Network, Inc. v. Woodard, 2017
COA 44, ¶ 8. Motions for JNOV should only be granted when, from
the standpoint of a reasonable juror, there was no evidence, or
14
inference therefrom, upon which a verdict against the movant could
be sustained. Id. If the facts are sufficiently in dispute such that
reasonable people could reach different conclusions, it is the
function of the jury to resolve those disputes. Cox v. Johnston, 139
Colo. 376, 380, 339 P.2d 989, 991 (1959). As stated in Thorpe v.
Durango School District No. 9-R, 41 Colo. App. 473, 475, 591 P.2d
1329, 1331 (1978), aff’d, 200 Colo. 268, 614 P.2d 880 (1980),
“[w]here there exists two inferences that the trier of fact can draw
from the evidence, it is error for the trial court to select one not
chosen by the jury.”
B. Analysis
¶ 28 These facts were not disputed at trial:
• The spread 1A contract set a mechanical completion date
of January 15, 2018, and provided for “late completion
payments” of $30,000 per day, up to $3,000,000.
• The spread 1B contract set a mechanical completion date
of October 1, 2017 (using slightly different parameters),
and provided for “late completion payments” of $10,000
per day, up to $500,000.
15
• The spread 2 contract set a mechanical completion date
of January 15, 2018, and provided for “late completion
payments” of $10,000 per day, up to $1,000,000.
• In December 2017, the parties signed written agreements
extending the mechanical completion dates for spreads
1A and 2 to March 22, 2018.3
• Dyess did not achieve mechanical completion on spread
1B until February 2018, and it did not achieve
mechanical completion on spreads 1A and 2 until, at the
earliest, July 13, 2018.
¶ 29 Thus, if the liquidated damages clauses applied as originally
written or as extended in writing, Dyess was liable for the full
amount of the liquidated damages available.
¶ 30 However at trial, Patrick Rudy, MarkWest’s director of pipeline
construction, testified that he had authority to extend, and did
orally extend, the mechanical completion dates to July 15, 2018, for
3 MarkWest argues that any additional extension was required to be
in writing. Dyess claims that no writing was necessary. We need
not decide this issue because the jury verdict indicates the jury
concluded no additional binding extensions were given, whether
oral or written.
16
spreads 1A and 2. He also testified he was “just fine” with the date
that Dyess completed spread 1B. Dyess argues that this testimony
was not contradicted or limited by any other evidence. Thus, the
jury had no reasonable basis for its conclusion that Dyess missed
the final mechanical completion dates. We disagree.
¶ 31 Dyess’s project manager, Bryan McRaney, testified that the
mechanical completion dates for spreads 1A and 2 were extended to
March 28, 2018,4 but Dyess did not achieve mechanical completion
by that date. He further testified that the mechanical completion
date for spread 1B “never changed.” McRaney did not testify, as
Rudy did, that MarkWest extended the final mechanical completion
dates for spreads 1A and 2 to July 15, 2018, or that the late
completion of spread 1B was acceptable to MarkWest.
¶ 32 Dyess argues that these omissions are meaningless because
McRaney was only testifying about the initial extension of the
mechanical completion dates, and he wasn’t directly asked about
4Although the parties did not dispute there was a written
agreement extending the mechanical completion dates for spreads
1A and 2 to March 22, 2018, it is not clear both parties agreed that
a subsequent extension to March 28, 2018, was granted.
17
additional extensions. This argument misconstrues the import of
McRaney’s testimony. While McRaney was never directly asked
about additional extensions, he unconditionally confirmed that
Dyess missed the March 2018 mechanical completion dates, and he
never clarified that further extensions were given with respect to
any of the spreads. This testimony, or lack thereof, along with his
additional testimony that, as late as July 13, 2018, he and Dyess’s
president were asking for a full release of liquidated damages as
part of settlement negotiations, is evidence from which the jury
could have reasonably inferred that any extension to July 15, 2018,
was conditional on the completion of settlement negotiations.
¶ 33 MarkWest’s project manager, Michael Hoy, testified that
MarkWest’s liquidated damages claim would have been waived if
settlement negotiations had yielded an effective agreement, but it
was not waived because no such agreement was made.
Documentary evidence created during the negotiations also
supported McRaney’s and Hoy’s testimony that the enforcement of
liquidated damages was still a possibility in July 2018, a fact that
militates against the conclusion that both parties understood the
relevant dates had been unconditionally extended to July 15, 2018.
18
Further, Dyess’s position at trial was that the parties never settled
their disputes, and the jury’s special verdict agreed there was no
settlement. Therefore, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that
MarkWest never extended the mechanical completion dates for
spreads 1A and 2 to July 15, 2018, that Dyess did not achieve
mechanical completion of any spread by the agreed-upon
mechanical completion dates, and that MarkWest did not waive
liquidated damages.
¶ 34 The jury was instructed on breach of contract, waiver, and the
proper measure of damages. We presume the jury followed the
instructions and rejected Dyess’s waiver defense. See Harris Grp.,
Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188, 1202 (Colo. App. 2009). Given the
conflicting evidence, we cannot conclude that no reasonable person
could have reached the same conclusion as the jury. We perceive
no error in the trial court’s denial of Dyess’s motion for JNOV.
IV. Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest
¶ 35 Both parties assert that the trial court erred by denying them
pre- and post-judgment interest. Because a party’s entitlement to
such interest is a question of statutory interpretation, we review de
19
novo. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Holmes, 193 P.3d 821, 825
(Colo. 2008) (prejudgment interest).
¶ 36 Section 5-12-102, C.R.S. 2021, controls an award of
prejudgment interest on claims that do not involve personal injury.
Beaver Creek Ranch, L.P. v. Gordman Leverich Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P’ship,
226 P.3d 1155, 1164 (Colo. App. 2009); Murdock v. Cohen, 762 P.2d
691, 693 (Colo. App. 1998) (quantum meruit claim). It permits
recovery of “eight percent per annum compounded annually for all
moneys . . . after they are wrongfully withheld or after they become
due to the date of payment or to the date judgment is entered,
whichever first occurs.” § 5-12-102(1)(b). Sections 5-12-102(4) and
5-12-106(1), C.R.S. 2021, permit recovery of postjudgment interest
of eight percent per annum on judgments that are appealed.
¶ 37 The parties agree that all monetary amounts awarded in this
case are subject to statutory pre- and post-judgment interest, and,
based on the plain language of the applicable statutes, we agree.
See Bainbridge, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 973 P.2d 684,
686 (Colo. App. 1998) (“A judgment creditor whose claim falls
within the clearly expressed wording of the above statutes is
entitled to [postjudgment] interest.”); Fasing v. LaFond, 944 P.2d
20608, 615 (Colo. App. 1997) (“Section 5-12-102 is to be liberally
construed to permit recovery of prejudgment interest on money . . .
wrongfully withheld.”). The parties disagree about when
prejudgment interest began accruing on MarkWest’s claim for
liquidated damages, but not about the date when prejudgment
interest began accruing on Dyess’s quantum meruit claim. We
remand this case to the trial court with directions to award pre- and
post-judgment interest to both parties and to determine when
prejudgment interest began to accrue on MarkWest’s breach of
contract claim. The court may do so when it is able to make a final
calculation.
V. Conclusion
¶ 38 We reverse the judgment insofar as the trial court reduced the
amount of damages awarded to Dyess on its quantum meruit claim
and failed to award pre- and post-judgment interest. We affirm the
judgment insofar as the trial court accepted the jury’s liability
verdict on the quantum meruit claim and denied Dyess’s motion for
JNOV as to MarkWest’s counterclaim. The case is remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE BROWN concur.
21