of Gallegos

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
August 26, 2021
2021COA115
No. 20CA0721, Estate of Gallegos — Probate — Intestate
Succession — Individual Adopted by Relative of Genetic Parent
As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of
appeals concludes that intestate succession for a child who was
adopted by certain relatives of the child’s genetic parents is
governed by Probate Code section 15-11-119(3), C.R.S. 2020, rather
than a conflicting provision of the Children’s Code, section 19-3-
608, C.R.S. 2020, which terminates an adopted child’s status as an
heir at law upon a final decree of adoption.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA115
Court of Appeals No. 20CA0721
Costilla County District Court No. 17PR30006
Honorable Crista Newmyer-Olsen, Judge
In re the Estate of Joseph Celestino Gallegos, deceased.
Shennae Finan, f/k/a Shennae Jaramillo and Corpus A. Gallegos Ranches,
LLLP, a Colorado limited liability limited partnership,
Appellants,
v.
Patricia Vialpando,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
J. Jones and Graham*, JJ., concur
Announced August 26, 2021
Dill Dill Carr Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C., David R. Struthers, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellant Shennae Finan
The Overton Law Firm, Thomas J. Overton, Steven R. Schumacher, Golden,
Colorado, for Appellant Corpus A. Gallegos Ranches, LLLP
Law Office of Karl Kuenhold LLC, Karl Kuenhold, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020.
¶1 In this probate case, appellants Shennae Finan, formerly
known as Shennae Jaramillo, and Corpus A. Gallegos Ranches,
LLLP, appeal the district court’s ruling that appellee Patricia
Vialpando is an heir of Joseph Celestino Gallegos, who died
intestate. Applying section 15-11-119(3), C.R.S. 2020, we conclude
that, for the purpose of intestate succession, the parent-child
relationship between Gallegos and Vialpando was not terminated
when Vialpando was adopted in 1991. Therefore, we affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Gallegos died in December 2016. He had two biological
children: Vialpando and Finan. Vialpando was born in 1990 and
was adopted by her maternal grandparents in 1991. However, she
maintained a relationship with Gallegos throughout his life and he
named her as the beneficiary of his savings and retirement
accounts. Finan, who was born in 1989 and who otherwise had no
relationship with Gallegos, learned that Gallegos was her father
nearly two years after his death. Both biological daughters now
seek a share of his estate, and Finan’s heirship is not in dispute.
¶3 Gallegos died without a spouse or a will, meaning that his
children are entitled to inherit the estate’s assets in equal shares.
1
See § 15-11-103(2), C.R.S. 2020. The district court named
Vialpando his sole heir and appointed her as personal
representative for his estate. Once Finan learned that Gallegos was
her biological father, however, she moved to modify the court’s
determination of heirship. Finan’s motion claimed that she was
Gallegos’s sole heir because Vialpando’s adoption cut off
Vialpando’s relationship with Gallegos for the purpose of intestate
succession. Gallegos Ranches, a family partnership owned by the
late Gallegos and his two brothers, joined Finan’s argument.
¶4 The district court ruled that both Vialpando and Finan are
heirs to Gallegos’s estate. Although Vialpando was adopted by her
maternal grandparents — thereby terminating her parent-child
relationship with Gallegos — the court concluded that a 2010
amendment to the Probate Code, which allowed children adopted by
relatives to inherit from their genetic parents, revived that
relationship for the purpose of intestate succession. Finan and
Gallegos Ranches now jointly appeal, contending that the district
court erred by applying the amended Probate Code provision
because it was passed nearly twenty years after Vialpando’s
adoption was finalized.
2
II. Standard of Review
¶5 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo. See, e.g., Neher v. Neher, 2015 COA 103, ¶ 19. We first
examine the statute’s plain language within the context of the
statute as a whole. Id. We give words and phrases effect based on
their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. If a statute is clear and
unambiguous on its face, we apply it and do not resort to other
canons of statutory interpretation. Hassler v. Acct. Brokers of
Larimer Cnty., Inc., 2012 CO 24, ¶ 15.
¶6 In probate cases, we must construe the statutory provisions
“liberally to promote a speedy and efficient system for settling a
decedent’s estate, and making distribution to his or her successors,
while promoting uniformity in the administration of estates among
different jurisdictions.” Oldham v. Pedrie, 2015 COA 95, ¶ 10.
III. Children’s Code
¶7 Under the Children’s Code, a final decree of adoption divests
the biological parents “of all legal rights and obligations with respect
to the child.” § 19-5-211(2), C.R.S. 2020. Relatedly, a “child’s
status as an heir at law . . . shall cease only upon a final decree of
adoption.” § 19-3-608(1), C.R.S. 2020. Under these provisions, as
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things stood in 1991, once Vialpando was adopted (by anyone), any
right to inherit property via Colorado’s laws of intestate succession
was terminated along with the parent-child relationship.
IV. Probate Code
¶8 In 2010, the General Assembly amended Colorado’s intestate
succession laws. As relevant here, those amendments included a
provision allowing children who are adopted by relatives of either
genetic parent to inherit from a genetic parent who dies without a
will.
A parent-child relationship exists between both
genetic parents and an individual who is
adopted by a relative of a genetic parent, or by
the spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of
a genetic parent, but only for the purpose of
the right of the adoptee or a descendant of the
adoptee to inherit from or through either
genetic parent.
§ 15-11-119(3). This language was in effect in 2016 at the time of
Gallegos’s death.
V. Analysis
¶9 The sole question before us is whether the 2010 amendment
applies to Vialpando. We hold that it does and as a result conclude
that Vialpando is Gallegos’s heir.
4
¶ 10 Appellants contend that upon Vialpando’s adoption in 1991,
Gallegos was permanently divested of “all legal rights and
obligations with respect to” Vialpando, and the parent-child
relationship was forever terminated. Because of the finality of the
adoption decree and the corresponding provisions of the Children’s
Code, which specify that “a child’s status as an heir at law” ceases
upon a final decree of adoption, § 19-3-608(1), appellants assert
that the 2010 amendment to the Probate Code had no effect on
Vialpando’s status as an heir.1 Because no parent-child
relationship existed in 2010, appellants contend, there was no
parent-child relationship to revive, even for the limited purpose of
intestate succession. We disagree.
1 Notably, appellants do not distinguish between an heir and an
heir apparent. It is settled law that heirs can only be determined
after a decedent’s death. Prior to his death, a decedent’s relative
can only be an heir apparent — someone with a mere expectation of
inheriting in the future. See Quintrall v. Goldsmith, 134 Colo. 410,
418, 306 P.2d 246, 250 (1957). It is upon the decedent’s death that
the legal title to estate property vests instantly in his heirs at law.
In re Estate of McQuade, 88 Colo. 341, 346, 296 P. 1023, 1025
(1931); see also Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505, 510 (Colo. App.
2008).
5
A. Conflict of Laws
¶ 11 Probate courts must consider the adoption and inheritance
laws in effect at the time of adoption, but the right of adopted
children to inherit is determined by the inheritance laws in effect
when the intestate died. Estate of David v. Snelson, 776 P.2d 813,
820, 815 (Colo. 1989). The Probate Code in effect at the time of
Gallegos’s death provided that a parent-child relationship existed
between “both genetic parents and an individual who is adopted by
a relative of a genetic parent . . . but only for the purpose of the
right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inherit from
. . . either genetic parent.” § 15-11-119(3) (emphasis added). The
statute does not clarify whether it is intended to have only
prospective effect, but because Vialpando was adopted by her
maternal grandparents, it applies unless the adoption irreversibly
severed the parent-child relationship between Vialpando and
Gallegos for all purposes.
¶ 12 Nothing in Vialpando’s adoption records addressed the effect
of the adoption on Vialpando’s status as Gallegos’s heir. However,
under the Children’s Code, Vialpando’s “status as an heir at law”
ceased “upon a final decree of adoption.” § 19-3-608(1). This
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provision conflicts with the 2010 amendment to the Probate Code.
Simply put, if section 15-11-119(3) controls, Vialpando became
Gallegos’s heir upon his death. On the other hand, if adoption
irrevocably severed Vialpando’s relationship with Gallegos for all
purposes, then she did not. To resolve this conflict, we apply
principles of statutory construction to determine which provision
controls.
B. Principles of Statutory Construction
¶ 13 The overriding goal of statutory construction is to effectuate
the legislature’s intent. Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 19. We
interpret the statute within the context of its broader scheme to give
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Curtis v.
Hyland Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 179 P.3d 81, 83 (Colo. App.
2007). When we conclude, as we do here, that two applicable
provisions are irreconcilable, we look to both specificity and recency
to resolve the conflict. Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212, 214 (Colo.
1994).
¶ 14 First, the more specific statute prevails over the more general
one. § 2-4-205, C.R.S. 2020 (explaining that if a conflict between a
special provision and a general provision is irreconcilable, “the
7
special . . . provision prevails as an exception to the general
provision”). “Interpreting a specific provision as prevailing over a
general one still allows for both provisions to exist,” People v.
Cooper, 27 P.3d 348, 355 (Colo. 2001), an approach that is
consistent with the goal of giving full and sensible effect to the
entire statutory scheme, see Smith v. Colo. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd.,
200 P.3d 1115, 1118 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 15 Second, the more recent statute prevails over the older one.
Jenkins v. Panama Canal Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238, 241 (Colo. 2009).
This is true even if the General Assembly did not clearly intend the
more recent statute to supplant an existing statute. See City of
Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d 654, 657, 660 (Colo. 2006). We
assume the legislature is aware of its enactments, and, therefore,
we conclude that by passing an irreconcilable statute at a later
date, it “intended to alter the prior statute.” Jenkins, 208 P.3d at
242.
¶ 16 Applying these principles here, we conclude that because the
probate statute is both more specific and more recent, it prevails
over the conflicting provisions of the Children’s Code.
8
¶ 17 At the outset, we recognize that the conflict between section
15-11-119(3) and section 19-3-608(1) is quite limited. It only
applies to children who have been adopted by certain relatives of
their biological parents; section 19-3-608(1) continues to apply to
nonrelative adoptions. Because we aim to give full and sensible
effect to the entire statutory scheme, we interpret section 15-11-
119(3) as carving out a limited exception to the general rule
outlined in section 19-3-608(1).
¶ 18 The timing of section 15-11-119(3)’s passage lends support to
our conclusion that the General Assembly intended to alter the
scope of section 19-3-608. To be sure, we assume that the
legislature is familiar with its previous enactments. Jenkins, 208
P.3d at 242. But it is also clear that the amendment to the Probate
Code would not make sense unless the General Assembly
understood the general rule established in the Children’s Code.
Therefore, we are confident that the legislature “intended to alter”
the Children’s Code when it passed the more recent amendment to
the Probate Code. See id.
¶ 19 But this does not end our inquiry. Having concluded that the
2010 amendments to the Probate Code govern our review of
9
Gallegos’s intestate succession, we next evaluate our application of
the statute to ensure that it does not run afoul of the state
constitution.
C. Retroactivity and Retrospectivity
¶ 20 Appellants contend that designating Vialpando as Gallegos’s
heir under section 15-11-119(3) is an impermissible retroactive and
retrospective application of that provision, contrary to legislative
intent and in violation of the Colorado Constitution. As they point
out, the General Assembly has specifically provided that “[n]o
provision of this [probate] code or of any amendment to this code
shall apply retroactively if the court determines that such
application would cause the provisions to be retrospective in its
operation in violation of section 11 of article II of the state
constitution.” § 15-17-101(2)(f), C.R.S. 2020.
¶ 21 A statute is retroactive if it operates on transactions that have
already occurred or on rights and obligations that existed before its
effective date. Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regul. Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 11
(Colo. 1993). Retroactive application of a statute is generally
disfavored by both the common law and statute. Id.; § 2-4-202,
C.R.S. 2020. But retroactive application of a civil statute is not
10
necessarily unconstitutional: it is permitted where the statute
effects a change that is procedural or remedial. People v. D.K.B.,
843 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Colo. 1993). Because some retroactively
applied legislation is constitutional while some is not, Colorado
courts mark this distinction with the term contained in the
constitutional provision — “retrospective” — to describe a statute
whose retroactive application is unconstitutional. In re Estate of
DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849, 854 (Colo. 2002); Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 12.
¶ 22 Contrary to appellants’ claims, the district court did not apply
section 15-11-119(3) either retroactively or retrospectively. Because
no child has a vested right in her father’s property before his death,
Quintrall v. Goldsmith, 134 Colo. 410, 419, 306 P.2d 246, 250-51
(1957), Vialpando could not have permanently lost any right to
Gallegos’s estate when she was adopted in 1991. As we have
already discussed, a decedent’s heirs are determined at the moment
of his death, based on the Probate Code in effect at the time of his
death.
¶ 23 When Gallegos died in 2016, the court appropriately applied
the existing Probate Code, which provides that a “parent-child
relationship exists” for purposes of intestate succession between
11
Gallegos and Vialpando. § 15-11-119(3). Had Gallegos died
between the date of Vialpando’s adoption and the day prior to the
enactment of the 2010 Probate Code amendment, Vialpando would
not be considered an heir. But that is not what happened.
Gallegos died after the 2010 Probate Code amendment was enacted,
so Vialpando appropriately inherits her share of his estate through
intestate succession. This means that applying the 2010
amendment to the Probate Code to the intestate succession of
Gallegos’s estate is not retroactive.
D. Vested Rights
¶ 24 We find the foregoing statutory analysis dispositive of the
issue of Vialpando’s heirship. However, we now briefly address
appellants’ alternative argument that upon Vialpando’s adoption in
1991, Gallegos had a vested right to be free from any future legal
obligations that would result from being her biological father, even
after his death. We find this unpersuasive.
¶ 25 Appellants contend that the focus should properly be on
Gallegos’s vested rights to be free of any obligations to Vialpando,
and not on Vialpando’s legal right to inherit. But “heirship is not a
parental obligation; it is a legal right which accrues automatically to
12
the child upon the decedent’s death.” In re Estate of Bomareto, 757
P.2d 1135, 1137 (Colo. App. 1988) (citing Quintrall, 134 Colo. 410,
306 P.2d 246), overruled on other grounds by Estate of David, 776
P.2d at 820. In their briefing, appellants did not cite any cases
supporting their contention that Gallegos’s right to be free of
parental obligations also applied to intestate succession by his
heirs, nor could they point us to any such cases during oral
argument.
¶ 26 Instead, appellants cite the statutory language of the 2010
Probate Code amendment in support of their contention that
Gallegos’s vested right is not affected by the revision to the statute.
Section 15-17-101(2)(d) of the Probate Code reads: “An act done . . .
before the effective date of an amendment to this code, in any
proceeding is not impaired by this code or by any amendment to
this code.” But appellants’ argument fails because the adoption of
Vialpando was not impaired or otherwise affected by the 2010
amendment to the Probate Code. Throughout his life, Gallegos
remained free of any legal rights or obligations with respect to
Vialpando.
13
¶ 27 If, as appellants contend, adoption means that a biological
parent has a vested right to have no legal connection to the child at
any point in the future, and this vested right supersedes statutory
changes, then this would render the General Assembly’s 2010
amendment to the Probate Code meaningless regardless of the date
of the adoption. Because a “statutory interpretation leading to an
illogical or absurd result will not be followed,” Frazier v. People, 90
P.3d 807, 811 (Colo. 2004), we decline to adopt this interpretation.
VI. Conclusion
¶ 28 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.
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