People in re T.T

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA132
Court of Appeals No. 16CA1542
Arapahoe County District Court No. 14MH13
Honorable Theresa M. Slade, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of T.T.,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Richman, J., concurs
Bernard, J., dissents
Announced October 19, 2017
Ronald A. Carl, County Attorney, Virginia Byrnes Horton, Assistant County
Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Combs & Recht, LLC, James C. Recht, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Respondent-
Appellant
¶1 After respondent, T.T., was released from involuntary mental
health treatment pursuant to section 27-65-110, C.R.S. 2017, he
unsuccessfully attempted to have his name removed from the
district court’s index of cases, invoking section 27-65-107(7), C.R.S.
2017. T.T. appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to
omit his name from the district court’s index of cases. We reverse
the district court’s order and remand with directions.
I. Background
A. Involuntary Treatment and First Order Denying T.T.’s Motion
¶2 According to T.T.’s then treating physician, T.T. suffered from
“severe symptoms . . . that lead to [the] development of [a] grave
disability.” Although T.T. had accepted voluntary treatment, the
physician believed that T.T. would “not remain in a voluntary
program,” so he filed a certification for the short-term treatment of
T.T. pursuant to section 27-65-107. The district court then issued
a notice of certification for short-term treatment and appointed
counsel to represent T.T. Six days later, the physician filed a notice
of termination of involuntary treatment in accordance with section
27-65-110, noting that T.T. “has had significant improvement” and
“is no longer gravely disabled.”
1
¶3 About two years after he was released from involuntary
treatment, T.T. went to the district court and learned that his name
still appeared on the court’s index of cases. He asked the clerk to
remove his name from the index, but the clerk refused. About two
months later, T.T. filed a pro se motion with the district court
requesting that his name be omitted from the court’s index in
accordance with section 27-65-107(7). The district court denied
T.T.’s motion without making any factual findings or legal
conclusions, and T.T. appealed.
B. Limited Remand and Second Order Denying T.T.’s Motion
¶4 A division of this court issued an order remanding the case for
the district court to hold a hearing on the matter and to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
¶5 At the hearing, in describing “the life of a mental health case”
in general, the district court judge discussed applicable law and a
“Best Practices policy for mental health cases.” The judge also
discussed conversations she initiated with her staff and the clerk’s
office staff about record-keeping procedures for mental health
cases. The judge stated that, according to an unidentified staff
member, there is a “computer name index” (the Eclipse system)
2
used for case materials; mental health records are included but are
kept separately in a secure location accessible only by court order,
and they remain “indexed only for the purposes of maintaining
order to the file[.]” According to the staff member, the judge stated
that it may be possible to electronically search for a name in the
Eclipse system and discover that a related mental health case
exists, but “it would be clear that the case was sealed” and that the
person searching was “not permitted to view it.” The judge further
explained that the staff member claimed that she could not delete a
name from the Eclipse system even if ordered to do so. After
generally discussing mental health record-keeping procedures, the
district court judge discussed the procedures that were supposedly
followed in the underlying case.
¶6 T.T. objected and moved to strike the court’s references to
what it learned “from other clerks” because T.T. had no opportunity
to confront those people. The district court judge denied the
motion, explaining that, as the then presiding judge over the mental
health division, she was concerned that T.T. may allege that proper
procedures were not followed and that she “needed to — and
arguably as the presiding judge should already know, the
3
procedures and whether we’re following them.” The judge explained
that she did not speak with staff about this particular case, but
rather about record-keeping procedures generally.
¶7 T.T.’s attorney later attempted to admit two exhibits into
evidence. The first exhibit consisted of excerpts from Office of State
Court Administrator v. Background Info. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d 420,
423 (Colo. 1999). The second exhibit was a series of stipulated
facts, initially filed before the hearing, admitting that (1) T.T.’s then
treating physician filed a notice of certification and certification of
short-term treatment pursuant to section 27-65-107; (2) the
physician later filed a notice of termination of involuntary treatment
pursuant to section 27-65-110; and (3) T.T.’s name “has never been
omitted from the index of cases of the court under [section]
27-65-107(7).” The stipulation further provided that T.T. would not
object if opposing counsel makes an offer of proof that “since the
enactment of [section] 27-65-107(7), the Arapahoe County District
Court has never omitted the name of any respondent from the index
of cases of the court.” Concerning the first exhibit, the district
court noted that it was “more of an argument” and that the cases
the exhibit referenced were previously cited in filings in the
4
underlying case. The court explained that, while it would consider
the cases in making its final determination, it would not admit the
case into evidence. Regarding the second exhibit, the district court
explained that the stipulation was a “pleading” previously filed in,
and considered by, the court, and it did not need to be admitted
into the court file as an evidentiary exhibit.
¶8 T.T.’s attorney also requested that T.T. be allowed to testify,
but the district court declined the request, explaining that T.T.’s
expected testimony was not relevant to the central issue of what
“index of cases” meant as used in section 27-65-107(7).
¶9 On May 30, 2017, the district court granted in part T.T.’s
motion to omit his name from the index, directing the Arapahoe
County Clerk to omit T.T.’s name from “any list generated or
produced, even for the purposes of storage.” The court also denied
the motion in part, stating that T.T.’s name shall “remain in the
[Eclipse] database for the purposes of the Clerk of Court’s
maintenance of records and to comply with Section 27-65-107(7).”
II. Name Omission Requirement
¶ 10 T.T. argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
because, based on the pertinent statutes’ plain language and the
5
stipulated facts, the court clerk should have omitted T.T.’s name
from the Eclipse system when T.T. was released from treatment.
T.T. further asserts that refusing to omit his name from the Eclipse
system is contrary to the legislature’s express intent to provide the
fullest possible measure of privacy to people receiving treatment for
a mental health disorder. We agree.
A. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 11 The parties agree that this issue has been properly preserved.
¶ 12 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo. Kyle W. Larson Enters., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2012 COA
160M, ¶ 9. “We read words and phrases in context and construe
them literally according to common usage unless they have
acquired a technical meaning by legislative definition.” People
v. Yascavage, 101 P.3d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 2004). We consider the
statute as a whole, interpreting it in a manner giving “consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts,” and we “should not
interpret the statute so as to render any part of it either
meaningless or absurd.” Lujan v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 222 P.3d
970, 973 (Colo. App. 2009).
6
¶ 13 In construing legislation, we look first to the plain language of
the statute; then, if the language is ambiguous, we “construe the
statute in light of the General Assembly’s objective.” Anderson
v. Vail Corp., 251 P.3d 1125, 1127-28 (Colo. App. 2010). “A statute
is ambiguous only if it is fairly susceptible of more than one
interpretation.” Kyle W. Larson Enters., Inc., ¶ 11. “The plainness
or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used,
and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” People v. Nance,
221 P.3d 428, 430 (Colo. App. 2009) (citation omitted).
B. Applicable Law
1. Public Records
¶ 14 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to
inspect and copy public records.” Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley Sch.
Dist. RE-1J, 981 P.2d 600, 605 (Colo. 1999) (quoting Nixon
v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). The public
policy of Colorado similarly favors making official records accessible
to the public. See § 24-72-201, C.R.S. 2017; see also Chief Justice
Directive 05-01, Public Access to Court Records, § 1.00(a)(1)
(amended Oct. 18, 2016) (CJD 05-01). This right, however, is not
7
absolute. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; see also CJD 05-01 § 4.60(b)
(noting the types of case records, including indices in mental health
cases, that are not accessible to the public). Public access to official
records is meant to advance “citizens’ right to be informed about
‘what their government is up to,’” not merely to disclose
“information about private citizens that is accumulated in various
governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an
agency’s own conduct.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For
Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) (citation omitted).
¶ 15 Specifically regarding judicial records, the Colorado legislature
did not intend court records to be open to public inspection for all
purposes under the Public Records Act. Background Info. Servs.,
Inc., 994 P.2d at 426. When the legislature chooses to address and
resolve the balance between the public’s interest in accessing
records and a private individual’s interest in privacy, “its specific
intent clearly governs,” as evidenced in statutes such as section
27-65-107. Id. at 429.
2. Court Indices and Mental Health Cases
¶ 16 Section 27-65-107(7) states the following:
8
Records and papers in proceedings under this
section and section 27-65-108 shall be
maintained separately by the clerks of the
several courts. Upon the release of any
respondent in accordance with the provisions
of section 27-65-110, the facility shall notify
the clerk of the court within five days of the
release, and the clerk shall forthwith seal the
record in the case and omit the name of the
respondent from the index of cases in such
court until and unless the respondent becomes
subject to an order of long-term care and
treatment pursuant to section 27-65-109 or
until and unless the court orders them opened
for good cause shown. In the event a petition
is filed pursuant to section 27-65-109, such
certification record may be opened and become
a part of the record in the long-term care and
treatment case and the name of the
respondent indexed.
¶ 17 The legislative declaration found in section 27-65-101(1)(c),
C.R.S. 2017, states that one of “the purposes of this article [is]
. . . [t]o provide the fullest possible measure of privacy, dignity, and
other rights to persons undergoing care and treatment for a mental
health disorder.” This section also provides that, in order to “carry
out these purposes, . . . the provisions of this article shall be
liberally construed.” § 27-65-101(2).
¶ 18 Although no Colorado statute defines the term “index of
cases,” section 13-1-101, C.R.S. 2017, requires clerks of Colorado’s
9
“courts of record” — including district courts — to “keep in their
respective offices suitable books for indexing the records of their
said offices, one to be known as the direct index and one as the
inverse index.” Section 13-1-102, C.R.S. 2017, further provides
that, “[i]n said indexes, the clerks shall properly enter the title of
each cause . . . and the case number references to the various
[filings] and other proceedings of the court in such cause.”
¶ 19 While the Colorado Supreme Court has detailed various
historical uses of electronic databases for storing case records, see
Background Info. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d at 423, neither party cites to,
and we are unaware of, any Colorado precedent explaining how
clerks are to keep an “index of cases” in any given court, including
computerized indices.
C. Analysis
¶ 20 As a preliminary matter, court records for mental health cases,
including indices, are not open to public access. See id. at 429; see
also CJD 05-01 §§ 3.03(a)(3), 4.60(b)(5). Although the district court
did not conclude whether and to what extent T.T. was able to
access his case file at the district court clerk’s office, the alleged
public disclosure by the district court clerk of T.T.’s case records
10
was clearly prohibited. See § 27-65-121(1), C.R.S. 2017 (Subject to
limited exceptions, “all information obtained and records prepared
in the course of providing any services pursuant to this article
65 . . . are confidential and privileged matter.”); see also CJD 05-01
§§ 3.03(a)(3), 4.60(b)(5).
¶ 21 The plain language of section 27-65-107(7) requires that,
subject to exceptions not applicable here, “the clerk shall . . . omit
the name of the respondent from the index of cases in such court”
after the clerk is notified of the respondent’s release from
involuntary treatment pursuant to section 27-65-110. See
Yascavage, 101 P.3d at 1093. One of the definitions of “index”
provided by Merriam-Webster is “a list (as of bibliographical
information or citations to a body of literature) arranged usually in
alphabetical order of some specified datum (such as author,
subject, or keyword).” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://perma.cc/H9NZ-QV5R. In section 27-65-107(7), the term
“index” refers to a single “index of cases,” is not used again in the
statute, and is not defined by this or any other Colorado statute.1
1Montana’s parallel statutory provision also does not define or
explain the term “index.” See Mont. Code Ann. § 53-21-103 (2017)
11
See Anderson, 251 P.3d at 1127-28; Nance, 221 P.3d at 430.
Because of the language’s statutory context and the various paper
and electronic methods available to district court clerks to keep
records of case names and numbers, as mentioned by the parties
and the district court, we determine that the phrase “omit the name
of the respondent from the index of cases in such court” is
ambiguous. See Kyle W. Larson Enters., Inc., ¶ 11.
¶ 22 We therefore construe the language at issue liberally and in
light of the General Assembly’s objective: to “provide the fullest
possible measure of privacy, dignity, and other rights to persons
undergoing care and treatment for a mental health disorder.”
§ 27-65-101(1)(c); § 27-65-101(2) (“[T]he provisions of this article
shall be liberally construed.”); see also Anderson, 251 P.3d at
1127-28.
¶ 23 The record indicates that the district court clerk records case
names and numbers in the Eclipse system, and the Eclipse system
is then used to generate other lists of case names and numbers —
(requiring the clerk to “seal the record in the case and omit” the
affected person’s name “from the index or indexes of cases”); see
also T.L.S. v. Mont. Advocacy Program, 144 P.3d 818, 823 (Mont.
2006) (interpreting section 53-21-103 to allow the disclosure of
certain redacted sealed documents).
12
such as lists of open cases, closed cases, and mental health and
juvenile cases (to later find the separately kept records and
materials). The record contains no evidence of a paper list or
volume or an electronic record apart from the Eclipse system kept
by the district court clerk to index all cases in that court in
compliance with sections 13-1-101 and -102. Moreover, the People
specifically stipulated that T.T.’s name was not “omitted from the
index of cases of the court under [section] 27-65-107(7).” We
therefore conclude that, on the facts of this case, the term “the
index of cases” in section 27-65-107(7) (emphasis added) refers to
the Eclipse system, not merely the various sub-indices generated
from the Eclipse system’s data. To conclude otherwise would
render the statute’s reference to a single index meaningless and
would fail to fulfill the statute’s stated purpose of maximizing the
privacy of the mental health treatment recipients referenced in the
statute. See Lujan, 222 P.3d at 973; see also § 27-65-101(1)(c).
¶ 24 While the General Assembly obligates court clerks to keep
records and index cases, see §§ 13-1-101, -102, identifying
information (including names) is often omitted from court records
and case names as required in the interest of privacy; for example,
13
the full names of victims of sexual assault and children are omitted
in various contexts and replaced with initials or some other
reference excluding identifiable information. See, e.g., In re People
in Interest of A.A., 2013 CO 65, ¶ 3 (referring to a juvenile defendant
accused of sexual assault on a child by the defendant’s initials and
referring to the victim as “one of [the defendant’s] neighbors”);
People in Interest of C.S., 2017 COA 96, ¶¶ 1-3 (referring to the child
involved in a dependency and neglect proceeding by the child’s
initials or as “child” only).
¶ 25 Consequently, we disagree with the People’s contentions that
omitting T.T.’s name from the Eclipse system would cause the court
record of the case to be “obliterated” and would make it impossible
for the clerk to re-index T.T.’s name as required by statute should
T.T. become subject to an order of long-term care pursuant to
section 27-65-109, C.R.S. 2017, or should the court order T.T.’s
case records opened for good cause. See § 27-65-107(7). Based on
the regular, orderly handling of cases in other contexts where party
names are omitted from case names, there is no reasonable basis to
conclude that omitting T.T.’s name from the Eclipse system by
using his initials or another similar method would destroy the
14
entire case record or prevent the district court clerk from
re-indexing T.T.’s full name should the need arise.
¶ 26 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s May 30, 2017,
order and remand for the district court to order that T.T.’s name be
omitted from the Eclipse system and lists generated from the
Eclipse system’s data by use of T.T.’s initials or any other method
omitting identifying information that the district court chooses to
employ in accordance with this opinion.
¶ 27 Because we reverse the challenged order on these grounds, we
need not address T.T.’s other arguments for reversal. See In re
Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 10 (declining to address a party’s
remaining claims of error where one was sufficient to reverse the
trial court’s ruling).2
2 The district court was understandably proactive in learning about
the filing systems at issue. However, an evidentiary hearing with
counsel for any relevant witnesses would have created a more
useful record for this court to review, allowing the trial court to
remain as an impartial decision-maker. See Colo. Attorney Gen.’s
Office, State Services, https://perma.cc/CF4Y-3QCU (“The Public
Officials Unit [of the Colorado Attorney General’s Office] represents
the statewide elected officials as well as the Judicial Department
. . . [and] primarily handles litigation and appeals[.]”); Barber v.
Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 241 (Colo. 2008) (deciding a case where
attorneys in the Public Officials Unit represented the Colorado
Governor and State Treasurer); Coffman v. Colo. Common Cause,
15
III. Conclusion
¶ 28 The district court’s order is reversed, and the case is
remanded with directions to omit T.T.’s name from the Eclipse
system and lists generated from the Eclipse system’s data by use of
T.T.’s initials or any other method omitting identifying information
that the district court chooses to employ consistent with this
opinion.
JUDGE RICHMAN concurs.
JUDGE BERNARD dissents.
102 P.3d 999, 1000 (Colo. 2004) (deciding a case where attorneys in
the Public Officials Unit represented the Colorado State Treasurer);
see also Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1011 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t
is ‘impermissible for a trial judge to deliberately set about gathering
facts outside the record.’”) (citation omitted); City of Manassa
v. Ruff, 235 P.3d 1051, 1056 (Colo. 2010) (“The due process
requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings entitles a
person to an impartial and disinterested decision-maker.”).
16
JUDGE BERNARD, dissenting.
¶ 29 T.T. might have a point. Section 27-65-107(7), C.R.S. 2017,
promised him that, after he had been released from short-term
treatment, the court’s clerk would “forthwith seal the record in the
case and omit [his] name . . . from the index of cases in such court.”
But that promise was apparently broken because a court clerk
apparently gave him access to his file, which should have been
sealed.
¶ 30 I purposefully used the word “apparently” twice in the previous
sentence because, after reviewing the record, I am left with more
questions than answers. What is an index of cases? Is the Eclipse
computer system such an index? If so, what does the phrase “omit
[his] name” from such an index mean? What does it take, in the
Information Age, to satisfy the statutory requirement that a clerk
omit someone’s name from the computerized index? If Eclipse is
not an index of cases, what is it? Can we tell that, in T.T.’s case,
the clerk did not omit his name from the index? And why did a
court employee give T.T. access to his file?
¶ 31 I hope that I can answer some of these questions — I cannot
answer all of them — and I will try to do so below. But the answers
17
that I can find, when combined with the mysteries that remain,
convince me that I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s
decisions (1) to reverse the trial court’s order; and (2) to remand the
case with directions that the trial court “omit T.T.’s name from the
Eclipse system and lists generated from the Eclipse system’s data
by use of T.T.’s initials or any other method omitting identifying
information that the [trial] court chooses to employ consistent with
this opinion.” Supra ¶ 26.
¶ 32 I begin my analysis by addressing the question of what an
index of cases is.
¶ 33 Section 13-1-101, C.R.S. 2017, requires clerks of court to keep
“suitable books for indexing the records of their said offices, one to
be known as the direct index and one as the inverse index.” Section
13-1-102, C.R.S. 2017, describes the information that clerks must
include in them, including “the title of each cause . . . and the case
number references to the various orders, rulings, judgments,
papers, and other proceedings of the court in such cause or
matter.” These two statutes have a lot of dust on them because
they were enacted in 1889, and appellate courts have not cited
them much since.
18
¶ 34 But section 13-1-119, C.R.S. 2017, which has been around
since 1887, was amended in a way that has helped me decide what
sections 13-1-101 and -102 mean. Section 13-1-119 states today
that “[t]he judgment record and register of actions shall be open at
all times during office hours for the inspection of the public without
charge,” and the court clerk is required “to arrange the several
records kept by him in such manner as to facilitate their
inspection.” (Emphasis added.) But this section assumed its
present form when it was amended in 1979. It previously read that
“[t]he judgment docket shall be open at all times during office hours
for the inspection of the public without charge,” and the court clerk
was required “to arrange the several dockets and books of record . . .
in such manner as to facilitate their inspection.” Ch. 125, sec. 3,
§ 13-1-119, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 596 (emphasis added).
¶ 35 I submit that the reference to “books of record” in the original
version of section 13-1-119 was to the “books” described in section
13-1-101. And the purpose of these books — which consisted of
the direct index and the inverse index — was, as the original
version of section 13-1-119 pointed out, to facilitate the public’s
inspection.
19
¶ 36 This supposition is supported by Office of State Court
Administrator v. Background Info. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d 420 (Colo.
1999). In that case, the supreme court stated that the General
Assembly has made a “general pronouncement[]” that “courts of
record shall maintain a registry of actions and a judgment record,
and shall provide that they be open to the public for inspection.”
Id. at 428. In support of this statement, the court cited sections 13-
1-101, -102, and -119.
¶ 37 I would therefore conclude that the index of cases mentioned
in section 27-65-107(7) consists of the direct index and the inverse
index described in section 13-1-101. So, when section 27-65-
107(7) required the clerk to omit T.T.’s name from the index of
cases, it meant that his name should be removed from an index of
cases that was open for public inspection.
¶ 38 Indeed, reading sections 13-1-101, -102, and -119 together
with Background Info. Servs., it is clear to me that such books or
paper indices were designed to be open for public inspection. (This
is not a unique concept. One useful analog is the grantee-grantor
indices, kept by the county clerk and recorder, that the public uses
20
when it researches real estate transactions. See § 30-10-408,
C.R.S. 2017.)
¶ 39 Next, what does omitting a name from an index of cases mean
when the name consists of electrons in a computer system instead
of ink or type on a page? The record in this case does not convince
me that the Eclipse system qualifies as an index of cases under
section 13-1-101 and section 27-65-107(7). It could be an index of
cases. Section 13-1-102 now states that an index may refer to
“computer record[s].” And section 13-1-119 states that such
records may “be presented on . . . computer terminal[s].”
¶ 40 But, as I concluded in the previous paragraph, this would
mean that the Eclipse system, at least in part, facilitates the
public’s inspection of certain information. And the record does not
tell us whether, in addition to court employees, the public has
access to the Eclipse system. I would doubt that the public has
access because the record indicates that the system also contains
confidential information. See, e.g., § 13-1-119.5(2), C.R.S. 2017
(“The supreme court may adopt rules regarding access to the name
index and register of actions, including rules identifying confidential
information maintained in the system and state requirements for
21
using the confidential information.”). It is the presence of this
confidential information on the system that leads to my surmise
that the Eclipse system is not an index of cases and that the public
should not be able to access it to look at confidential information.
¶ 41 There are rules governing access to confidential information.
According to section 4.60 of Chief Justice Directive 05-01, Public
Access to Court Records (amended Oct. 18, 2016), the public
cannot obtain access to mental health cases. According to section
3.07 of Chief Justice Directive 05-01, section 3.07, once the clerk
sealed T.T.’s case under section 27-65-107(7), it should have only
been accessible to “judges, court staff, and other authorized . . .
staff,” unless a court issued an order granting a person access to it.
Section 3.07 adds that “[j]udges and court staff should respond to
requests for a statutorily-sealed court record by stating that no
such court record exists.” According to the record, although sealed
cases remain in the database, there is a clear designation on the
computer screen that those cases are sealed, which means that a
court employee, let alone a member of the public, cannot view them.
¶ 42 So it would seem that T.T.’s request of a court employee about
his case should have been met with the statement that “no such
22
court record exists.” It was not — indeed, it seems that he obtained
access to a file that should have been sealed — and, as I have
recognized above, that means T.T. may have a point about the court
not following section 27-65-107(7).
¶ 43 But, based on what little we know, even if I were to assume
that the Eclipse system is or contains an “index of cases” for the
purposes of section 27-65-107(7), that index is already
appropriately cloaked to ensure that the public cannot gain access
to T.T.’s case or to the fact that his case was filed. So I would
conclude that T.T.’s name does not have to be removed from
confidential information in a database that is supposed to be
available only to judges and court staff, not to the public.
¶ 44 The record, although unclear, strongly suggests that the
Eclipse system was not the source of T.T.’s complaint. Rather, the
employee who provided him the confidential information apparently
was the source. (I again use the word “apparently” because the
record does not tell me much about how T.T. received the file. Did
he ask to see it before or after the court had sealed it? Did the
employee let him look at it because it was the file in his case? Did
he ask to see the index of cases?) I must therefore respectfully
23
disagree with the majority’s decision to remand the case to the trial
court so that it can alter the data in the Eclipse system because
that remedy does not seem to address the reason why T.T. appears
to have a complaint.
¶ 45 And the remand may be an empty act. The trial court quoted
a court employee as saying that court employees could not “delete
names [or] . . . [case] numbers” because they were “physically
unable to do it.” (I interpret the words “physically unable” to mean
that the computer system would not let court employees delete
such information. The record suggests that such authority rests
with the Office of the State Court Administrator.)
¶ 46 I recognize the importance of T.T.’s privacy interest in having
his record sealed and in omitting his name from any publicly
accessible databases. But I do not think that eliminating
information from a confidential database would serve that interest.
In other words, I respectfully submit that, although the remedy that
the majority has chosen may have been spot on in an era of books
and paper records, it is not well suited to our computerized world.
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