Julius Garcia v. Krysta Bialozor

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
May 26, 2022
2022COA58
No. 21CA0263, Estate of Garcia — Jurisdiction of Courts —
Standing; Probate — Effect of Homicide on Intestate
Succession, Wills, Trusts, Joint Assets, Life Insurance, and
Beneficiary Designations — Slayer Statute
This opinion answers the unresolved questions of whether a
person who has no legal relationship with a decedent’s heirs has
standing to assert a slayer statute claim in the name of the heirs, or
whether a person who could not obtain a financial benefit from the
forfeiture or revocation sections of the statute may assert a slayer
statute claim solely to obtain a judicial determination that the
defendant feloniously killed the decedent. A division of the court of
appeals concludes that a person who has no legal relationship with
the decedent’s heirs lacks standing to assert a claim under the
slayer statute for the heirs’ financial benefit and that a party who
cannot gain financially from the forfeiture or revocation sections of
the slayer statute may not bring a claim solely to obtain a judicial
determination that the defendant feloniously killed the decedent.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA58
Court of Appeals No. 21CA0263
Alamosa County District Court No. 16PR30038
Honorable Martin A. Gonzales, Judge
In re the Estate of Deborah Gene Garcia, deceased.
Julius Garcia,
Appellant,
v.
Krysta Bialozor, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Deborah Gene
Garcia, and Diana Strong,
Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART
AND REVERSED IN PART
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Gomez and Davidson*, JJ., concur
Announced May 26, 2022
Erich Schwiesow, P.C., Erich Schwiesow, Alamosa, Colorado, for Appellant
Staggs Morris, P.C., Ernest Staggs, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee Krysta
Bialozor
Hutchinson Black & Cook, LLC, John C. Clune, Meghan C. Hungate, Boulder,
Colorado, for Appellee Diana Strong
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2021.
¶1 Nearly a century ago, Colorado enacted a “slayer statute” to
bar felonious killers from gaining a financial benefit from the killing.
Yet, until today, no published Colorado case has considered
whether a person who has no legal relationship with a decedent’s
heirs has standing to assert a slayer statute claim in the name of
the heirs, or whether a person who could not obtain a financial
benefit from the forfeiture or revocation sections of the statute may
assert a slayer statute claim solely to obtain a judicial
determination that the defendant feloniously killed the decedent.
¶2 We hold that a person who has no legal relationship with the
decedent’s heirs lacks standing to assert a claim under the slayer
statute for the heirs’ financial benefit. We further hold that a party
who cannot gain financially from the forfeiture or revocation
sections of the slayer statute may not bring a claim solely to obtain
a judicial determination that the defendant feloniously killed the
decedent.
I. Background
¶3 Deborah Gene Garcia (the decedent) was thirty-four years old
at the time of her death. Her husband, Julius Garcia (father),
reported that he found the decedent “face down” in bed and
1
unresponsive several hours after they had engaged in “kinky sex,”
during which her hands were tied to the bed.
¶4 The decedent did not leave a will. She was survived by father
and their children, Krysta Bialozor and A.G. (the children). (We
refer to A.G. by his initials because, unlike Bialozor, he was a minor
when this case was filed.) Father was the decedent’s sole heir. The
children lived with father following their mother’s death.
¶5 The report of an autopsy performed the day after the
decedent’s death noted evidence supporting a conclusion that she
had died of terminal cardiac arrhythmia resulting from an existing
heart condition.
¶6 Twelve years later, the decedent’s sister, Diana Strong,
obtained a second opinion regarding the cause of the decedent’s
death. After analyzing tissue samples from the decedent’s body and
reviewing other information, a pathologist concluded that the
decedent’s death was not the result of cardiac arrhythmia but,
rather, of pulmonary edema. The pathologist said that causes of
pulmonary edema include “intoxication, mechanical asphyxiation,
smothering, cho[]king, neck compression using ligature, . . . and
2
hyper/hypothermia.” The pathologist reported that these causes of
pulmonary edema needed to be “further examined and considered.”
¶7 Armed with the pathologist’s report, Pete DeHerrera, the
decedent’s father, sued father under the slayer statute. DeHerrera
sought a court order that included
(1) a determination under the slayer statute that father
feloniously caused the decedent’s death;
(2) a determination under the slayer statute that the
children are the decedent’s sole heirs; and
(3) a judgment directing father to “forfeit his rights to all
assets belonging to or in which Decedent had an interest,
and in which he was named as a beneficiary or received
benefits under the statutes and governing instruments,”
and to “account for and disgorge to the [children] all
proceeds from their sale and transfer.”
¶8 Bialozor was an adult and A.G. was a minor when DeHerrera
filed the petition. At the time, the children were not parties to the
case.
¶9 Several weeks after DeHerrera filed the petition, Bialozor,
through counsel, filed an objection to the petition. In her objection,
3
Bialozor sought dismissal of the petition, including the claims that
DeHerrera asserted on her behalf.
¶ 10 Because A.G. was a minor at the time, the court appointed a
guardian ad litem (GAL) for him. The GAL recommended that the
court dismiss the case, “as dismissal of this action would be in
[A.G.]’s best interest.”
¶ 11 Strong later joined the case as co-petitioner, and after
DeHerrera was dismissed from the case, she became the sole
petitioner.
¶ 12 Early in the case, father filed several motions, including a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) DeHerrera and Strong
lacked standing to bring the slayer statute claims asserted in the
petition and (2) their claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. The court denied the motions.
¶ 13 After nearly four years of litigation, father made an offer of
settlement in the amount of $500,000 to the children and Strong
pursuant to section 13-17-202(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2021. The children
accepted the offer. Strong accepted the offer conditionally in
satisfaction of the “monetary claim” in the petition — the forfeiture
claim asserted in the children’s interest. But she said that father’s
4
offer did not address her “non-monetary claim” — her individual
claim for a determination that father had feloniously killed the
decedent.
¶ 14 After the children accepted father’s offer of settlement, father
moved for entry of final judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b). The
court denied the motion, however, reasoning that the children were
“not the proper offerees with respect to the settlement offer”
because, according to the court, “the heirs of the Decedent” are not
the “sole beneficiaries that can litigate a claim under the slayer
statute.” The court said that Strong’s individual claim “cannot be
unilaterally extinguished by an agreement to settlement between
[father] and [the children].”
¶ 15 Shortly before the scheduled trial date, father filed a
Contingent Admission of Liability and Motion in Limine in which he
said his “resources are exhausted,” he “intends to rely on appeal on
his defenses of standing and statute of limitations,” and he “admits
liability under § 15-11-803(7)(b) . . . to preserve his resources where
they can be most usefully applied, i.e. to appealing this Court’s
rulings on [his] standing and statute of limitations defenses.” He
said that the “only . . . issues remain[ing] for trial” were damages
5
and the “facts relating to” his argument that DeHerrera and
Strong’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
¶ 16 During a conference with the court conducted eighteen days
later, counsel for father said that, although he was confessing
liability under the slayer statute to effectuate his settlement with
the children, he was not confessing liability to Strong, and he
intended to pursue an appeal on “issues of standing and statute of
limitations.” He reiterated his position that Strong “has no financial
stake in this matter at all.” (In a later filing, however, father said
“no issues remain for the Court to determine.”)
¶ 17 The court accepted father’s admission and entered an
unconditional final judgment with two parts: (1) a judgment in favor
of Strong on her “felonious killing claim” that reflected father’s
“admission of liability” and (2) a judgment against father in the
amount of $500,000 “to be apportioned equally” between the
children. In addition, the court awarded costs to Strong under
C.R.C.P. 54(d).
II. Discussion
¶ 18 Father contends the district court erred by (1) determining
that DeHerrera and Strong had standing to assert claims under the
6
slayer statute; (2) deciding that DeHerrera and Strong’s claims were
not barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) awarding costs to
Strong as the prevailing party under C.R.C.P. 54(d).
¶ 19 We conclude that DeHerrera and Strong lacked standing to
seek relief under the slayer statute in the children’s interest or in
their individual capacities. Thus, we reverse the portion of the
judgment reflecting the entry of judgment in favor of Strong — the
court’s acknowledgment of father’s conditional admission of
liability. Given our disposition, we reverse the court’s award of
costs to Strong and do not reach father’s statute of limitations
argument.
A. DeHerrera and Strong’s Standing under the Slayer Statute
¶ 20 We analyze DeHerrera and Strong’s standing to bring
(1) claims under the slayer statute for the benefit of the children
and (2) their claim seeking a determination that father feloniously
killed the decedent.
¶ 21 We conclude that DeHerrera and Strong lacked standing to
bring claims in the interest of the children because they had no
legal relationship with the children, Bialozor was above the age of
majority, and the legal representatives of both children disavowed
7
DeHerrera’s and Strong’s efforts to seek relief on the children’s
behalf. Further, because neither DeHerrera nor Strong could have
obtained a financial benefit under the forfeiture or revocation
sections of the slayer statute, they lacked standing to assert a
slayer statute claim in their own names.
1. Standard of Review
¶ 22 “We . . . review de novo a trial court’s interpretation and
application of a statute.” May v. Petersen, 2020 COA 75, ¶ 11,
465 P.3d 589, 592. “Our goal in interpreting a statute is to give
effect to the legislature’s intent. We read statutory words and
phrases in context, interpret them according to their plain meaning,
and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common
usage.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 23 We also review issues of standing de novo. Aurora Urb.
Renewal Auth. v. Kaiser, 2022 COA 5, ¶ 13, ___ P.3d ___, ___.
2. The Law of Standing
¶ 24 “In order for a court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the
plaintiff must have standing to bring the case. Standing is a
threshold issue that must be satisfied in order to decide a case on
the merits.” Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004).
8
“[A] plaintiff must satisfy two criteria in order to establish standing.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact, and second,
this harm must have been to a legally protected interest.” Id.(citation omitted).
¶ 25 “We have interpreted the first prong of Colorado’s test for
standing to require ‘a concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts.’” Id. at 856
(quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of
Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)). The injury may be
tangible or intangible. Id. The second prong “requires that the
plaintiff have a legal interest protecting against the alleged injury.
This is a question of whether the plaintiff has a claim for relief
under the constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or
regulation.” Id. (citation omitted).
3. The Claims that DeHerrera and Strong Asserted
in the Children’s Interest
a. DeHerrera and Strong Lacked Standing to Assert Claims
on Behalf of Bialozor Because She Was an Adult
¶ 26 Generally, “an adult must sue and be sued in his or her own
name.” Harmatz v. Harmatz, 457 A.2d 399, 401 (D.C. 1983); see
C.R.C.P. 17(a) (“Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
9
real party in interest . . . .”). A person has no right to assert a claim
on behalf of another adult unless that individual “has been formally
divested of the legal capacity to sue and be sued, by being
adjudicated incompetent or by having been placed under
guardianship as to person and property.” Harmatz, 457 A.2d at
401.
¶ 27 Here, it is undisputed that Bialozor was never adjudicated
incompetent or placed under guardianship. She was not a
“protected person” who was incapable of protecting her own
interests in litigation. Strong does not explain why DeHerrera or
she possessed the authority to assert a claim under the slayer
statute in the name of another adult, much less an adult who told
the court she opposed the relief DeHerrera and Strong were seeking
on her behalf.
¶ 28 Accordingly, we hold that DeHerrera and Strong lacked
standing to assert claims on behalf of Bialozor. Cf. Vandiver v.
Hardin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting
that an adult may have the right to represent a child’s interest in a
case until the child reaches the age of majority and can represent
himself or herself).
10
b. DeHerrera and Strong Lacked Standing to Assert Claims
on Behalf of A.G. After His Guardian ad Litem
Disavowed Those Claims
¶ 29 In certain instances, an adult may bring an action on behalf of
a child. See C.R.C.P. 17(c) (“Whenever an infant or incompetent
person has a representative, such as a general guardian,
conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or
defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person.”). Neither
DeHerrera nor Strong was A.G.’s legal representative or was
otherwise authorized to bring an action in his interest, however.
Moreover, neither sought judicial appointment of a guardian for the
children pursuant to § 15-14-204, C.R.S. 2021.
¶ 30 We consider DeHerrera and Strong’s standing to assert claims
on behalf of A.G. by reviewing the relevant provisions of the Probate
Code, in which the slayer statute appears. Under the Probate Code,
“a court may appoint a [GAL for a minor] if the court determines
that representation of the [minor’s] interest otherwise would be
inadequate.” § 15-14-115, C.R.S. 2021; see also C.R.C.P. 17(c)
(“The court shall appoint a [GAL] for an infant or incompetent
person not otherwise represented in an action . . . .”). Based on this
authority, the court appointed a GAL for A.G. Once the court made
11
that appointment, DeHerrera and Strong had no standing to pursue
claims on behalf of A.G.
¶ 31 Because neither DeHerrera nor Strong had standing to bring
claims on behalf of the children, the district court erred by denying
father’s motion to dismiss those claims.
4. DeHerrera and Strong Lacked Standing to Assert Claims
Under the Slayer Statute in an Individual Capacity
¶ 32 We next determine whether DeHerrera and Strong had
standing to assert a claim under the slayer statute in their own
names to obtain a determination that father had feloniously killed
the decedent. (As noted, DeHerrera’s and Strong’s petitions claimed
the children were the sole heirs of the decedent’s estate. Thus,
DeHerrera and Strong conceded that they were not heirs and,
therefore, had no legal right to any portion of the decedent’s estate
so long as the children were living. See § 15-11-103(2), C.R.S. 2021
(statute governing intestate succession); see also In re Estate of
Elliott, 993 P.2d 474, 475 (Colo. 2000).) We conclude that
DeHerrera and Strong lacked standing to assert their individual
claim under the slayer statute.
12
a. Applicable Law
¶ 33 The key sections of the slayer statute deprive a person of the
benefits of a decedent’s estate or other governing instruments upon
a judicial determination that the person feloniously killed the
decedent. See § 15-11-803(2), C.R.S. 2021. (Although the General
Assembly amended the slayer statute in 2022, see Ch. 60, sec. 11,
§ 15-11-803, 2022 Colo. Sess. Laws 277-78, those amendments do
not apply here.)
¶ 34 “An individual who feloniously kills the decedent forfeits all
benefits with respect to the decedent’s estate . . . .” § 15-11-803(2).
“If the decedent died intestate, the decedent’s intestate estate
passes as if the killer disclaimed his or her intestate share.” Id. A
determination of a felonious killing also revokes the killer’s benefits
under certain instruments, § 15-11-803(3)(a), and “[s]evers the
interests of the decedent and killer in property held by them at the
time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship or
as community property with the right of survivorship,”
§ 15-11-803(3)(b). Further, under section 15-11-803(6), “[a]
wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered
13
by this section shall be treated in accordance with the principle that
a killer cannot profit from his or her wrong.”
¶ 35 A felonious killing under the slayer statute can be established
in one of two ways: (1) a “judgment of conviction establishing
criminal accountability for the felonious killing of the decedent,”
§ 15-11-803(7)(a); or (2) a judicial determination, by a
preponderance of the evidence, of each of the elements of felonious
killing, § 15-11-803(7)(b).
¶ 36 Only an “interested person” may bring an action under the
slayer statute. § 15-11-803(7)(b).
“Interested person” includes heirs, devisees,
children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries,
trust directors, and any others having a
property right in or claim against a trust estate
or the estate of a decedent . . . , which may be
affected by the proceeding. . . . The meaning
as it relates to particular persons may vary
from time to time and is determined according
to the particular purposes of, and matter
involved in, any proceeding.
§ 15-10-201(27), C.R.S. 2021 (emphasis added).
b. DeHerrera and Strong Are Not “Interested Persons”
for Purposes of the Slayer Statute
¶ 37 Strong asserted that she and DeHerrera had standing to
pursue their claims under the slayer statute based on three
14
interests: (1) “the welfare” of the children; (2) “a property right in
Decedent’s estate that may be affected by the proceeding”; and
(3) “determining the cause of the Decedent’s homicide and
. . . preventing her killer from profiting from his crime.”
¶ 38 We have already established that Strong and DeHerrera lacked
standing under the slayer statute to assert claims in the children’s
interest. As noted, DeHerrera and Strong admitted in the petition
that they were not heirs. In addition, counsel for Strong conceded
at oral argument that Strong had no financial interest in the
decedent’s estate. (Strong does not contend that DeHerrera had a
financial interest in the estate.)
¶ 39 Thus, our standing analysis focuses on whether Strong and
DeHerrera were authorized to assert claims under the slayer statute
to further the “intangible interest” of “seeking justice.”
¶ 40 In its order denying father’s motion to dismiss, the district
court concluded such an “intangible interest” is a legally protected
interest under the slayer statute. The court pointed to the last
sentence of the definition of “interested person,” which says the
term “may vary from time to time and is determined according to
the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.”
15
§ 15-10-201(27). It concluded that, because the slayer statute
“does not have any limiting language that requires a pecuniary
interest,” and the “origin” of the slayer statute “stems from common
law principles of equity,” Strong established standing through her
intangible interest in obtaining a determination that father had
killed her sister.
¶ 41 The court’s reasoning, however, is inconsistent with the
structure and language of the slayer statute for at least three
reasons.
¶ 42 First, under the principle of construction known as
ejusdem generis, “when a general term follows a list of specific
things, the general term applies only to things of the same general
class as those specifically mentioned.” Cap. One, N.A. v. Colo. Dep’t
of Revenue, 2022 COA 16, ¶ 19, ___ P.3d ___, ___. Although Strong
is correct that the use of the word “includes” immediately before
“heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, [and] beneficiaries” in
section 15-10-201(27) indicates that those terms are not
exhaustive, see Colo. Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153,
163-64 (Colo. 1988), the terms are illustrative of the type of person
who may be an “interested person.” Further, the specific list is
16
followed by the limiting phrases “any others having a property right
in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent . . .” and
“persons having priority for an appointment as a personal
representative and other fiduciaries representing the interested
person.” § 15-10-201(27) (emphases added).
¶ 43 The restrictive language in the first two sentences of the
definition of “interested person” would be rendered meaningless if
the statement that the scope of “interested person” may “vary from
time to time and is determined according to the particular purposes
of, and matter involved in, any proceeding” encompassed persons
who lacked “a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the
estate of a decedent” or were not acting on behalf of such persons.
The last sentence of the definition of “interested person” cannot
swallow up and render meaningless the rest of the definition.
¶ 44 Second, a determination of who has standing to bring a slayer
statute claim must also consider the purpose of the statute. “The
sole purpose of a ‘slayer statute’ is to prevent the slayer from
benefitting from the death of the victim or profiting from the
wrongdoing.” In re Estate of Miller, 02-CA-00231-SCT (¶ 5) (Miss.
2003), 840 So. 2d 703, 706 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 26B C.J.S.
17
Descent and Distribution § 57, at 362-63 (2001)); see Wilkins v.
Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 695 P.2d 391, 393 (Idaho 1985)
(“The sole purpose of [the Idaho slayer statute] is to prevent a
wrongdoer from profiting from his or her own wrong.”). (Although
the Mississippi and Idaho slayer statutes are worded differently
from the Colorado statute, all three statutes are premised on the
same policy goal: no person should gain a financial benefit by
killing another. Compare § 15-11-803, C.R.S. 2021, with Miss.
Code Ann. § 91-1-25 (West 2021), and Idaho Code Ann. § 15-2-803(West 2021).) This goal cannot be achieved if persons who could
not benefit from the financial provisions of the slayer statute
nonetheless asserted claims under the statute.
¶ 45 Third, limiting standing in slayer statute claims to those
persons with a property interest in or claim against the decedent’s
estate is consistent with other types of claims permitted under the
Colorado Probate Code. For example, “[u]nless the contestant will
take or may take by an adjudication that the will in question i[s]
invalid he had not sufficient interest to give him legal standing to
contest its validity.” In re Stoiber’s Est., 101 Colo. 192, 197,
72 P.2d 276, 278 (1937); see In re Estate of Bonfils, 190 Colo. 70,
18
75, 543 P.2d 701, 705 (1975) (holding that a decedent’s ex-spouse
lacks standing to assert a claim against the decedent’s estate);
Foster v. Kragh, 107 Colo. 389, 397, 113 P.2d 666, 670 (1941)
(noting that heirs who would be entitled to the estate’s real estate
located in Colorado have the right to contest the decedent’s foreign
will). We are aware of no Colorado probate case holding that a
person lacking a financial interest in a decedent’s estate may
challenge the decedent’s will.
¶ 46 For these reasons, we conclude that the court erred by ruling
that Strong’s asserted interest in “justice” provided her and
DeHerrera with standing to assert individual claims under the
slayer statute.
¶ 47 We reverse the portion of the court’s judgment incorporating
father’s conditional admission of liability, which he made as part of
his offer to settle Strong’s “non-monetary” claim. We do not disturb
the portion of the judgment entered to enforce the settlement
between father and the children because Strong concedes the
children have standing as heirs under the slayer statute and
because the children accepted father’s offer of settlement. We will
19
not interfere with an unconditional settlement entered into by
consenting parties.
B. The Award of Costs to Strong
¶ 48 The district court awarded costs to Strong under C.R.C.P.
54(d): “[R]easonable costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party considering any relevant factors which may include
the needs and complexity of the case and the amount in
controversy.”
¶ 49 Because Strong lacked standing to assert claims under the
slayer statute, she cannot be a “prevailing party.” Generally, a
party cannot “prevail” on a claim she lacked standing to litigate.
“Prevail” means “[t]o obtain the relief sought in an action” or “to win
a lawsuit.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1438 (11th ed. 2019). A party
who lacked standing to prosecute a claim cannot “obtain the relief
sought” or “win a lawsuit.”
¶ 50 Strong cannot be a prevailing party even though, through her
pursuit of the claims on behalf of the children, she obtained a
financial benefit for them — the $500,000 father agreed to pay in
settlement. The determination of “prevailing party” rests on
whether Strong had standing to assert a claim under the slayer
20
statute and not on whether she successfully but gratuitously
negotiated a settlement for the children. Because no party argues
that any party other than Strong prevailed, we do not address who
is the prevailing party following our resolution of this appeal.
¶ 51 Thus, we reverse the court’s award of costs to Strong. In light
of this holding, we need not address father’s argument concerning
the amount of costs awardable to Strong.
III. Conclusion
¶ 52 The portion of the judgment determining that father
feloniously killed the decedent and the order awarding costs to
Strong are reversed.
JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE DAVIDSON concur.
21