Beverly Stickle v. County of Jefferson, Colorado

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
July 21, 2022
2022COA79No. 21CA0439, Stickle v. County of Jefferson — Torts —
Premises Liability; Government — Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act — Immunity and Partial Waiver — Dangerous
Condition of a Public Building
The plaintiff fell and was injured in a county’s public parking
structure. She brought this premises liability claim against the
county based on the incident. The county moved to dismiss,
asserting immunity from the plaintiff’s claim under the Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Relatedly, the county asserted
that the CGIA’s waiver of immunity for a dangerous condition of a
public building does not apply here. The trial court disagreed and
denied the motion to dismiss.
Answering a novel question in Colorado, a division of the court
of appeals holds that a public parking structure can be a public
building under the CGIA and that the parking structure here
qualifies as such. The division also rejects the county’s contention
that the defect alleged here was not a dangerous condition because
it was solely attributable to the design of the parking structure.
Therefore, the division concludes that the county waived its
immunity, affirms the trial court’s order, and remands for further
proceedings.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA79Court of Appeals No. 21CA0439
Jefferson County District Court No. 20CV30105
Honorable Russell Klein, Judge
Beverly Stickle,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
County of Jefferson, Colorado,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur
Announced July 21, 2022
Silvern & Bulger, P.C., Thomas A. Bulger, Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee
Kimberly S. Sorrells, County Attorney, Eric Butler, Assistant County Attorney,
Rebecca Klymkowsky, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Beverly Stickle was injured in the Jefferson County Courts
and Administration Building’s north parking structure (the parking
structure) after she lost her balance and fell on a step down from a
walkway. As a result, she brought this premises liability claim
against Jefferson County (the County). The County moved to
dismiss, asserting immunity from Stickle’s claim under the
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Among other things,
the County argued that the CGIA’s waiver of immunity for a
dangerous condition of a public building does not apply here. See
§ 24-10-106(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021. The trial court disagreed and
denied the motion to dismiss.
¶2 Answering a novel question in Colorado, we hold that a public
parking structure can be a public building under the CGIA and that
the parking structure here qualifies as such. We also reject the
County’s contention that the defect alleged here was not a
dangerous condition because it was solely attributable to the design
of the parking structure. Therefore, we conclude that the County
waived its immunity, affirm the court’s order, and remand for
further proceedings.
1
I. Factual and Procedural History
¶3 The parking structure has two levels and is detached from the
Courts and Administration Building. A photograph of the parking
structure is reproduced below:1
¶4 On February 6, 2018, Stickle parked her car on the second
level of the parking structure and walked to the Courts and
1 The photograph depicts a roughly triangular, two-level parking
structure with vehicles parked on the second level and stairs
leading from the first level to the second level.
2
Administration Building. Later in the day, she returned to her car
to retrieve some paperwork.
¶5 To return to the second level of the parking structure, Stickle
walked up the stairs nearest to the Courts and Administration
Building, heading east. The top of the stairs is level with a walkway
that runs along the western edge of the parking structure, as shown
in the photograph reproduced below:
Separating the walkway from the parking surface, however, is a
raised curb requiring a step down. On the day of the incident, the
3
walkway and the parking surface were the same shade of charcoal
gray, except for the edge of the curb, which was painted yellow.
Photographs of the walkway and parking surface as they appeared
in February 2018 are reproduced below:
As the trial court aptly put it, while it is obvious coming from the
parking surface that there is a curb, “it is not obvious coming the
other way from the stairs and walkway that there is a step down,
even though the yellow line is bright and looked recently painted (in
the photographs).”
4
¶6 After Stickle climbed the stairs and began walking to her car,
she did not see the step down from the walkway to the parking
surface. She fell and suffered a compound fracture of her arm.
¶7 Based on this incident, Stickle sued the County under the
Colorado Premises Liability Act. See § 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2021.
The County moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). The County argued, among other
things, that Stickle could not show that it had waived its immunity
under the CGIA’s waiver provision for a dangerous condition of a
public building because (1) the parking structure is not a public
building and (2) the step down from the walkway was not a
“dangerous condition” under the CGIA because the matching color
of the walkway and the parking surface was a design choice for
which immunity is not waived. See § 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2021.
¶8 After conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Trinity
Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916(Colo. 1993), the trial court issued a written order rejecting the
County’s arguments, concluding that the County had waived
5
immunity under the CGIA’s public building provision, and thus
denying the motion to dismiss.2
II. Public Building
¶9 The County first contends that the trial court erred by
concluding that the parking structure is a “public building” under
the CGIA. We disagree.
A. Additional Facts and Procedural History
¶ 10 On the question of whether the parking structure is a public
building, the parties presented evidence of the following.
¶ 11 The parking structure was constructed between 1990 and
1991 and opened to the public in 1992. It is made of concrete and
intended to be permanent. The first level is completely covered, has
a fully enclosed utility room, has concrete or masonry pillars that
support the second level, and is surrounded by a “knee wall.”
Thus, although the first level is covered, it is not “completely closed
in.” The second level and the stairs leading to the second level are
uncovered.
2The trial court rejected Stickle’s arguments that the County had
waived immunity under other CGIA provisions, and she does not
appeal the court’s rulings as to those other provisions.
6
¶ 12 The parking structure is equipped with electricity for lighting
and vehicle charging, and it has a sprinkler system. It does not
have heating, air conditioning, or other temperature control
systems. Finally, the parking structure — including the step where
Stickle fell — had to comply with a “building code.”
¶ 13 Based on this evidence, and considering the analogous case of
Pierce v. City of Lansing, 694 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), the
trial court ruled as follows:
The Court finds the analysis by the Michigan
Court of Appeals to be persuasive and
consistent with traditional dictionary
definitions. Merriam-Webster defines a
building as “a usually roofed and walled
structure built for permanent use (as for a
dwelling).” See http://merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/building. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines a building as “[a] structure
with walls and a roof, esp. a permanent
structure.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019). Indeed, the definition of “building” in
Black’s Law Dictionary includes the additional
term of “accessory building” which is defined
as “[a] building separate from but
complementing the main structure on a lot,
such as a garage.” Id.The Court has considered the North Parking
Structure in light of the evidence presented at
the Hearing . . . . The structure is made of
concrete or masonry materials and is
permanent. While it is not fully closed-in, the
7
lower level is surrounded by walls and appears
to consist of permanent support columns. The
facility has electricity/lighting, and a fire
suppression system. While the North Parking
Structure lacks water or HVAC, not every
building has HVAC and/or water. Defendants
[sic] argue that the roof is just another parking
lot. However, decisions on how to utilize roof-
top space should not be determinative as to
whether a structure is a “building[,]” any more
than a roof-top deck or roof-top garden would
prevent a structure from being a building.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court
finds that the North Parking Structure is a
“public building” for the purposes of the CGIA.
B. Pertinent Principles
¶ 14 Whether the CGIA protects a government from suit is a
question of subject matter jurisdiction. Maphis v. City of Boulder,
2022 CO 10, ¶ 13. The plaintiff bears the burden to prove that the
government has waived its immunity, “but this burden is relatively
lenient, as the plaintiff is afforded the reasonable inferences from
her undisputed evidence.” City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018
CO 37, ¶ 11.
¶ 15 The application of sovereign immunity presents a mixed
question of law and fact. Maphis, ¶ 14. The trial court makes
“factual findings about its ability to hear the case,” Dennis, ¶ 9, and
8
resolves “[a]ny factual dispute upon which the existence of
jurisdiction may turn.” Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d
1380, 1384 (Colo. 1997). On review, we will defer to the trial court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Ackerman v. City
& Cnty. of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, ¶ 12. Once any questions of fact
are resolved, we review de novo the question of governmental
immunity, as the only remaining matter is one of statutory
interpretation. Maphis, ¶ 15.
¶ 16 Our task in construing a statute is to give effect to the General
Assembly’s intent. In re Estate of Colby, 2021 COA 31, ¶ 13. To do
so, we begin with the statute’s plain language, reading the words
and phrases in context and construing them according to their
common usages. Id. If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, we apply it as written without resorting to other
means of discerning legislative intent. Id.; Coyle v. State, 2021 COA
54, ¶ 10. Further, “[b]ecause the CGIA derogates the common law,
we construe its immunity provisions strictly but waiver provisions
broadly.” Maphis, ¶ 17.
¶ 17 The CGIA provides that “[a] public entity shall be immune
from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in
9
tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form
of relief chosen by the claimant.” § 24-10-106(1); see also
Hernandez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2018 COA 151, ¶ 5.
“Sovereign immunity is waived,” however, in an action for injuries
resulting from “[a] dangerous condition of any public building.”
§ 24-10-106(1)(c). The waiver of immunity in section 24-10-
106(1)(c) relates to a physical condition of the building, not to uses
of the building or activities conducted therein. See Jenks v.
Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825, 827 (Colo. 1992), overruled on other grounds
by Bertrand v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994).
C. Application
¶ 18 The County does not dispute that the parking structure is
“public.” Rather, the County contends that it is not a “building.”
¶ 19 The CGIA does not define “public building” or “building.” We
have not found any published case in Colorado analyzing the
meaning of “building” in the CGIA. Still, relying on the plain
meaning of the statutory language, and with the aid of well-
recognized dictionaries, we conclude that the parking structure is a
“public building” under section 24-10-106(1)(c) of the CGIA. See
Dennis, ¶ 23 (construing the CGIA and advising that “[t]o determine
10
the plain and ordinary meaning of words, we may look to the
dictionary for assistance”).
¶ 20 “Building” means
1: a thing built: a: a constructed edifice
designed to stand more or less permanently,
covering a space of land, usu. covered by a
roof and more or less completely enclosed by
walls, and serving as a dwelling, storehouse,
factory, shelter for animals, or other useful
structure — distinguished from structures not
designed for occupancy (as fences or
monuments) and from structures not intended
for use in one place (as boats or trailers) even
though subject to occupancy.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 292 (2002).3
“Building” has also been defined as a “structure with walls and a
roof, esp. a permanent structure.” Black’s Law Dictionary 242
(11th ed. 2019). In fact, a garage is a type of “accessory building,” a
building “separate from but complementing the main structure on a
lot.” Id.3 We note that the Delaware Supreme Court has used this definition
of “building” in construing Delaware’s statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity for a public building. See Moore v. Wilmington Hous.
Auth., 619 A.2d 1166, 1174 (Del. 1993) (“The proper construction of
the noun ‘building’ is driven primarily, if not exclusively, by the
ordinary dictionary meaning of the term . . . .”).
11
¶ 21 This ordinary understanding of “building” is hardly new. Long
ago, our supreme court addressed the legislature’s decision to add
the term “building” to the burglary statute. Relying in part on a
dictionary definition of the term, the court explained as follows:
[A] building is generally considered to be an
edifice, erected by art, and fixed upon or over
the soil . . . . Thus, now all stationary
structures within Colorado, no matter of what
substance they may be constructed, are within
the term building, so long as they are designed
for use in the position in which they are
fixed. . . . [W]e believe it was the legislative
intent that a building is “a structure which has
a capacity to contain, and is designed for the
habitation of man or animals, or the sheltering
of property.”
Sanchez v. People, 142 Colo. 58, 59-60, 349 P.2d 561, 561-62
(1960) (citations omitted).4
¶ 22 Turning back to this case, we conclude that the parking
structure falls within the ordinary meaning of “building.” The
parking structure is constructed and designed to be permanent.
4The County argues that this definition is inapposite because
Sanchez involved the meaning of “building” in the context of the
criminal code. But the Sanchez court did not interpret a statutory
definition of “building” unique to the criminal code. Instead, the
court considered the ordinary meaning of the term, with the aid of a
dictionary and cases from other states. See Sanchez v. People, 142
Colo. 58, 59-60, 349 P.2d 561, 561-62 (1960).
12
The first level has a roof and is more or less enclosed. The entire
structure is designed to store and shelter property (vehicles). On
this last point, we disagree with the County that the parking
structure does not shelter property, at least in part. As the trial
court found, “if it rains and the rains falls straight down, the
vehicles . . . in the lower level will stay mostly dry.” It is also clear
from the photos that such vehicles would enjoy some shelter from
the sun. In any event, a plain purpose of the parking structure is
to store property, a common feature of a building. Hence,
consistent with any of the definitions we have mentioned, the
parking structure is a building. See also Pierce, 694 N.W.2d at 68-
69 (concluding that a public parking structure fell within the plain
and ordinary meaning of the term “building” as used in a public
building exception to governmental immunity).
¶ 23 Moreover, evidence presented at the Trinity hearing indicated
that the parking structure had to comply with the “building code.”
Both the County and the City of Golden, where the parking
structure sits, have adopted the International Code Council’s 2018
International Building Code (IBC). See Jefferson County
Supplement to the 2018 International Building Code 2 (effective
13
July 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/UFY8-DQE3; Golden Municipal
Code § 15.08.010, https://perma.cc/4GZS-JF35. The IBC defines
a “building” as “[a]ny structure utilized or intended for supporting
or sheltering any occupancy.” IBC § 202, https://perma.cc/2ZV7-
M5CA. The IBC makes clear that occupancy includes “motor-
vehicle-related occupancies” generally and “public parking garages”
specifically. See IBC §§ 311.3, 406.4-.6; see also IBC § 406.5
(repeatedly referring to a public “open parking garage” as a
“building”). So the parking structure is a “building” under the
applicable building code, consistent with the plain meaning of the
term used in the CGIA.
¶ 24 We are not persuaded to reach a different conclusion by the
County’s focus on the waiver provision in section 24-10-106(1)(e).
Under section 24-10-106(1)(e), sovereign immunity is waived for a
dangerous condition of “any public hospital, jail, public facility
located in any park or recreation area maintained by a public
entity, or public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power, or
swimming facility.” The County’s argument about this provision, as
we understand it, goes like this:
14
(1) before a 1986 amendment, “‘public parking facilities’
were included in the waiver of immunity under section
24-10-106(1)(e)”;
(2) the 1986 amendment removed “public parking
facilities” from this waiver provision and instead
waived immunity for a “public facility” located in a
park or recreation area;
(3) courts have construed “public facility” in section 24-
10-106(1)(e) to include a public parking lot if it is
located in a park or recreation area;
(4) like a public parking lot, the parking structure here is
a “public facility,” but it is not located in a park or
recreation area and, thus, immunity was not waived
under section 24-10-106(1)(e); and
(5) to construe a parking structure to also be a “public
building” under section 24-10-106(1)(c) would
“virtually eliminate any distinction between the words
‘building’ and ‘facility,’” contrary to the legislature’s
intent.
15
¶ 25 As an initial matter, we disagree with the County’s
understanding of the pre-1986 version of section 24-10-106(1)(e)
and the effect of the 1986 amendment. Before the amendment,
“public parking facilities” were excluded from the waiver of
immunity for a dangerous condition of a public facility. See Ch.
166, sec. 5, § 24-10-106, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 876; Daniel v. City
of Colorado Springs, 2014 CO 34, ¶ 19. That is, the prior version of
section 24-10-106(1)(e) expressly retained immunity for public
parking facilities. See Daniel, ¶ 19 (“[U]nder the prior version of the
recreation area waiver, public entities waived immunity for injuries
resulting from a dangerous condition of ‘any’ public facility (i.e., all
public facilities), but retained their immunity under the exception if
injuries occurred in a public parking facility.”). By removing the
exception for public parking facilities, the 1986 amendment waived
immunity for certain facilities that had previously been subject to it,
including a public parking lot located in a park or recreation area.
Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. As a result, the 1986 amendment lessened
immunity for public parking facilities under section 24-10-106(1)(e).
¶ 26 More fundamentally, while we accept the County’s position
that a public parking structure — like a public parking lot — can be
16
a “public facility” under section 24-10-106(1)(e), we reject the notion
that a public parking structure cannot also be a “public building”
within the meaning of section 24-10-106(1)(c). Our supreme court
has explained that “facility” can include a “building”:
Under section 24-10-106, the term “facility” is
used both in the recreation area waiver
(subsection (1)(e)) and in a waiver that is
applicable to injuries resulting from the
operation and maintenance of certain public
facilities (subsection (1)(f)). Importantly, the
term “building” is used in a waiver applicable
to injuries resulting from a “dangerous
condition of any public building” (subsection
(1)(c)). The legislature’s use of “facility” in two
waivers and “building” in a third indicates that
it did not intend the term “facility” to be
limited to a “building.”
Because we assume that the General Assembly
made intentional distinctions in the language
it chose when crafting the CGIA, we conclude
that the term “facility” has a different meaning
than the term “building.” As ordinary usage
suggests, “building” has a more specific
meaning than “facility”; indeed, a “building”
can be a type of “facility.”
St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, ¶¶ 23-24.
Hence, the terms “facility” and “building,” though they mean
different things, are not mutually exclusive. Because a “building”
can be a type of “facility,” a structure can be both. See id. at ¶ 24
17
(“[T]he term ‘facility’ can be interpreted to include both a
prototypical bricks-and-mortar structure, as well as a collection of
items that serve a greater purpose . . . .”).
¶ 27 Consequently, a public parking facility that is a public
building falls within the waiver provision of section 24-10-106(1)(c).
A public parking facility that is not a public building (i.e., a public
parking lot) falls within the waiver provision of section 24-10-
106(1)(e) if it is located in a park or recreation area (or otherwise
satisfies that provision).
¶ 28 Given all this, we agree with the trial court that the parking
structure is a public building under section 24-10-106(1)(c). Our
conclusion gives effect to “‘one of the basic but often overlooked’
purposes of the CGIA” — to allow people “to seek redress for
injuries caused by a public entity.” Daniel, ¶ 13 (citation omitted).
III. Dangerous Condition
¶ 29 The County next contends that, even if the parking structure
is a public building, the County nonetheless retains immunity from
Stickle’s claim because her injury did not result from a “dangerous
condition” as defined in the CGIA. Specifically, the County argues
that the alleged defect that caused her injury could not be a
18
dangerous condition because it was solely attributable to the
parking structure’s design. We are not convinced.
A. Additional Facts and Procedural History
¶ 30 The County is responsible for the parking structure’s
maintenance. To fulfill this responsibility, the County adopted a
five-year overarching plan called the “Major Maintenance Repair
and Replacement” Plan (the Maintenance Plan).
¶ 31 Per the Maintenance Plan, the County undertook a
“resurfacing project” or “topping project” in 2017 that involved
adding a new, more durable topping to the walkway, curb, and
parking surface to prevent corrosive substances from seeping into
the concrete. That is, the new topping material, which was charcoal
gray, was different from what had existed before.
¶ 32 In its motion to dismiss, the County argued that the color of
the walkway and the parking surface, which allegedly caused
Stickle’s injuries, was not related to the construction or
maintenance of the parking structure but was instead a design
choice for which its immunity is retained.
¶ 33 The trial court disagreed and decided that a dangerous
condition existed that “stems from the decision to finish both the
19
walkway and the drive surface with the same color,” which created
a “curb-illusion.” Although the court believed that this condition
was not attributable to a “failure of maintenance” (i.e., a negligent
omission in maintaining the facility), the court did not specify
whether this condition resulted from a negligent act in constructing
or maintaining the facility. Nor did the court address whether the
condition was the result of the design of the facility.
B. Law and Analysis
¶ 34 To reiterate, when the underlying facts are undisputed, we
review de novo questions of governmental immunity. Smokebrush
Found. v. City of Colorado Springs, 2018 CO 10, ¶ 17. In particular,
we review de novo whether the facts show a “dangerous condition”
under the CGIA. Maphis, ¶ 16.
¶ 35 In pertinent part, the CGIA defines a “dangerous condition” as
a physical condition of a facility or the use
thereof that constitutes an unreasonable risk
to the health or safety of the public, which is
known to exist or which in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been known to
exist and which condition is proximately
caused by the negligent act or omission of the
public entity or public employee in constructing
or maintaining such facility. . . . A dangerous
condition shall not exist solely because the
design of any facility is inadequate.”
20
§ 24-10-103(1.3) (emphasis added). In its only challenge to whether
a dangerous condition existed here, the County argues that the
condition was not the result of an act or omission in constructing or
maintaining the parking structure but was solely the result of a
“design choice” — “the County’s decision to use the same colored
material for the walking and parking surfaces” of the parking
structure.
¶ 36 “‘Maintenance’ means the act or omission of a public entity or
public employee in keeping a facility in the same general state of
repair or efficiency as initially constructed or in preserving a facility
from decline or failure.” § 24-10-103(2.5). “‘Maintenance’ does not
include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the
design or construction of a facility.” Id.
¶ 37 The CGIA does not define “constructing” and “design,” but our
supreme court has shed light on their meanings. “Constructing”
means “to form, make or create by combining parts or elements,”
which includes facilities “as originally constructed but also
encompasses permanent or temporary alterations to the facility
made during its ensuing lifetime in service to the public.” Padilla v.
21
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 25 P.3d 1176, 1182 & n.5 (Colo. 2001) (quoting
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 489 (1993)). “Design”
means “to conceive or plan out in the mind.” Swieckowski, 934
P.2d at 1386.
¶ 38 Relying on these definitions, Stickle says the dangerous
condition that led to her fall was caused by negligent maintenance,
whereas the County claims it was the result of inadequate design.
¶ 39 We conclude that the dangerous condition resulted from
maintenance, at least in part. The use of the same topping material
to resurface the walkway, curb, and parking surface was an act in
maintaining the parking structure (i.e., an act done for the purpose
of maintenance). The undisputed facts establish that this topping
material was added as part of the Maintenance Plan for the parking
structure. One purpose of applying this material was “to prevent
water, mag chloride and salt from infiltrating into the concrete
because those substances will degrade the rebar and the concrete
itself.” In other words, the new topping material helped preserve
the facility from decline or failure, which falls within the CGIA’s
definition of maintenance. See § 24-10-103(2.5). And while the
County refers to its decision to use the same topping material on
22
the walkway, curb, and parking surface as a “choice of color” and a
“decision to use the same color” on all these surfaces, little evidence
suggested that the County chose the material because of its color.5
Rather, the evidence showed that County chose the topping
material primarily because of its ability to preserve the facility from
decline or failure (i.e., for maintenance purposes).
¶ 40 Moreover, although we appreciate that a public entity must
make intentional decisions as part of its plan to maintain a facility,
we decline to endorse the view that every such decision relates to
the “design of [the] facility.” § 24-10-103(1.3). Still, even if, as the
County argues, the topping material choice and “the use of the
same color topping for the walkway and driving surfaces . . . were
contemplated design details” of the 2017 resurfacing project, the
evidence shows that this decision was also made to preserve the
parking structure from decline or failure, an act of maintenance
under the CGIA’s definition. Consequently, we cannot say that the
dangerous condition created by the decision to apply the same
5When asked about the color of the new topping material, a county
witness speculated that the “new one may have been darker, darker
aggregate to help the snow melt, etc.”
23
topping material to the walkway, curb, and parking surface was
solely attributable to design. See id.; Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443,
459 (Colo. 2001) (“The design of a public roadway will often
contribute to injury, but it is only when the dangerous condition is
solely attributable to design that the state is immune.”).6
¶ 41 Accordingly, we affirm, on somewhat different grounds, the
trial court’s conclusion that Stickle’s injury was caused by a
dangerous condition and, consequently, the County waived its
immunity from Stickle’s claims.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 42 The order is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.
6 We find Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 459 (Colo. 2001), useful on
this point because the same definition of “dangerous condition”
applies to the “public building” and the “public highway” waiver
provisions of the CGIA. See § 24-10-106(1)(c), (d)(I), C.R.S. 2021.
24