In re the Marriage of Dean and Cook

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA51
Court of Appeals No. 15CA0878
El Paso County District Court No. 06DR65
Honorable Theresa M. Cisneros, Judge
Honorable Evelyn H. Sullivan, Magistrate
In re the Marriage of
Sylvia Dean, f/k/a Sylvia Cook,
Appellant,
and
Andre L. Cook,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE BOORAS
Terry, J., concurs
Berger, J., dissents
Announced April 20, 2017
Sylvia Dean, Pro Se
Beltz & West, P.C., Daniel A. West, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage proceeding, Sylvia
Cook (mother), now known as Sylvia Dean, appeals the district
court’s adoption of the magistrate’s finding of contempt and award
of attorney fees in favor of Andre L. Cook (father). We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and father divorced in 2006. At that time, the court
named mother the primary residential parent for the parties’ two
children but allowed the parties to determine their own “liberal
parenting time” schedule.
¶3 Six years later, mother moved to stop father’s parenting time,
asserting that he had not seen the children in more than two years
and had no interest in seeing them. Father responded that mother
had denied him parenting time, and he requested a more formal
parenting time schedule.
¶4 Eventually the parties stipulated to, and the court adopted, a
parenting time arrangement. As now relevant, the parties agreed
that father (1) would have parenting time every Wednesday from
after school until 7:00 p.m. and (2) “shall be entitled to have
Thanksgiving this year [2013] with the children from 10:00 a.m. on
1
Thursday until taking the children to school on the following
Monday morning.”
¶5 Father later filed a verified motion and affidavit for contempt,
requesting remedial contempt sanctions for mother’s
noncompliance with the two above-mentioned portions of their
stipulation.
The following reflects how the contempt motion proceeded:
 The advisement hearing occurred on March 3, 2014.
 The parties appeared for the contempt hearing on May 19,
2014, but agreed to set it over until September 22, 2014, so
that they could participate in a settlement meeting. The
parties also agreed that mother would contact a therapist,
and the court ordered her to start therapy within thirty
days.
 On September 22, the contempt hearing was set over to
October 6, 2014.
 The magistrate began the contempt hearing on October 6
and finished it on November 3, 2014, when she found
mother in remedial contempt and ordered her to pay
father’s attorney fees. The magistrate further ordered that
2
mother could purge the contempt by allowing father to have
the children during their 2014 Thanksgiving break.
 Sentencing occurred on January 28, 2015, at which time
the court ordered mother to pay father’s $4926.25 in
attorney fees.
¶6 Mother timely filed a C.R.M. 7 petition challenging the
magistrate’s orders. The district court adopted the magistrate’s
orders on review.
II. Applicable Legal Principles
¶7 C.R.C.P. 107 provides the authority under which courts are to
conduct contempt proceedings. See In re Marriage of Nussbeck, 974
P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1999). Remedial sanctions for contempt must
be supported by findings of fact establishing that the contemnor (1)
did not comply with a lawful order of the court; (2) knew of the
order; and (3) had the present ability to comply with the order. In re
Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 92 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶8 Like the district court, we must accept the magistrate’s factual
determinations as to contempt unless there is no support in the
record for those findings or the findings are clearly erroneous. See
C.R.M. 7(a); In re Marriage of Webb, 284 P.3d 107, 108-09 (Colo.
3
App. 2011); see also In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning
G.E.R., 264 P.3d 637, 638-39 (Colo. App. 2011) (reviewing court
engages in a second layer of appellate review of the magistrate’s
order, and must accept the magistrate’s findings unless they are
clearly erroneous). “A court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous
only if there is no support for them in the record.” Van Gundy v.
Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
III. Sua Sponte Reconsideration of Sanctions
¶9 Mother first contends that the magistrate improperly
reconsidered the May 19 order when, on November 3, she changed
the nature of the sanctions imposed. We reject this contention
because no sanctions were imposed until November 3, when the
magistrate found mother guilty of remedial contempt. See Wright v.
Dist. Court, 192 Colo. 553, 555, 561 P.2d 15, 17 (1977) (finding of
contempt must precede imposition of sanctions).
¶ 10 We acknowledge that the magistrate entered an order on May
19 requiring mother to engage in therapy. However, the record
reveals that the magistrate simply adopted the parties’ stipulation
concerning the same; the order was not imposed to force mother’s
4
compliance with the parenting time stipulation. See C.R.C.P.
107(a)(5) (defining remedial sanctions).
IV. Evidence and Findings
¶ 11 Mother’s second, third, and fifth contentions challenge the
evidence presented at the contempt and sentencing hearings, the
weight placed on that evidence by the magistrate, and the findings
and inferences the magistrate made in her orders. We do not
disturb the orders.
¶ 12 A party seeking review of a magistrate’s order has the burden
to provide the reviewing court with a record justifying the rejection
or modification of that order. In re Marriage of Rivera, 91 P.3d 464,
466 (Colo. App. 2004); see also Yadon v. Southward, 64 P.3d 909,
912 (Colo. App. 2002) (pro se litigants must adhere to the same
rules of procedure applicable to attorneys).
¶ 13 If an appellant argues “that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence
relevant to such finding or conclusion.” C.A.R. 10(b). Where the
appellant fails to provide such a transcript, the reviewing court
5
must presume that the record supports the judgment. See C.R.M.
7(a)(9); In re Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 10.
¶ 14 Here, the transcripts from the contempt and sentencing
hearings are in the appellate record. However, mother did not
provide them to the district court when she sought review of the
magistrate’s orders under C.R.M. 7(a). Consequently, we confine
our review of mother’s arguments to the record considered by the
district court, which did not include any transcripts. See Rivera, 91
P.3d at 466.
¶ 15 Without reviewing the transcripts, we are unable to evaluate
the evidence to determine whether it sufficiently supports the
magistrate’s orders. See C.R.M. 7(a)(9); G.E.R., 264 P.3d at 639. To
the contrary, we must presume that the record supports the
magistrate’s orders that mother failed to comply with the parties’
stipulation and was, therefore, in remedial contempt. See C.R.M.
7(a)(9); Beatty, ¶ 10; see also People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386, 390
(Colo. 1989) (reviewing court cannot conclude that district court’s
judgment is erroneous when the record is insufficient).
¶ 16 Mother’s related argument that she cannot be held in
contempt because she did not “willfully” violate the order is
6
misplaced. Willfulness is not a requirement for finding remedial
contempt. See Cyr, 186 P.3d at 91-92.
V. Order as to Compliance with Parenting Time
¶ 17 We agree with mother’s fourth contention that the magistrate
exceeded her authority when she ordered mother
to remove all privileges for up to a month for
the children if they do not comply with her
instruction to go to [father]’s home. This
means no TV, no cable, no music, no friends,
no cell phone, no I-pads, no computers, unless
the parenting time is exercised with the
[father]. Each violation of failure to attend
parenting time will result in a one month
restriction of these items for the children by
[m]other.
We therefore strike these three sentences from paragraph 9 of the
magistrate’s order.
¶ 18 Contrary to father’s assertion, mother properly preserved this
claim in her petition for district court review. Hence, we may
consider the issue on appeal. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148
P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 19 To resolve disputes concerning parenting time, courts have
broad authority to make or modify parenting time orders that are in
the best interests of the children. See §§ 14-10-129(1)(a),
7
-129.5(2)(h), C.R.S. 2016. But there is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000); In Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO
72, ¶ 23.
¶ 20 However, the magistrate’s order disregards that presumption
by concluding that mother should be disciplining her children if
they choose not to visit with father and specifying the disciplinary
actions that mother must take.1 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73-74(noting that a court cannot interfere with a fit parent’s decisions
simply because it believes a “better” decision could be made). We
do not suggest that mother may violate the parenting time order by
allowing her children to refuse to visit with father. We simply
conclude that by specifying the methods that she must employ in
1 Similarly, in Violette v. Violette, 120 A.3d 667 (Me. 2015), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine disapproved of a trial court order
requiring the parties to enforce visitation by requiring the refusing
child to stay in his or her bedroom without access to the Internet, a
telephone, text messaging, a television, or video games during such
time. Although the court did not reach the constitutional issue
under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the court concluded
that requiring the parents to discipline their children in “such a
very specific and inflexible fashion” with “no discretion left to the
parents” was an abuse of discretion. Violette, 120 A.3d at 676.
8
order to obtain the children’s compliance, the order improperly
ignores the fit parent presumption. Accordingly, we conclude that
the magistrate exceeded her authority in entering paragraph 9 of
her order, and we therefore strike it. Insofar as the district court
adopted that portion of the magistrate’s order, we reverse the
district court’s order.
¶ 21 The dissent contends that the district court was precluded
from requiring mother to take even unspecified measures to require
the children to submit to the parenting time order, and that it had
no authority to impose contempt sanctions absent mother taking
actions that would “thwart” enforcement of the parenting time
order. However, a district court has inherent authority to enforce
obedience to its orders through contempt sanctions. People v.
McGlotten, 134 P.3d 487, 489-90 (Colo. App. 2005). Additionally,
under section 14-10-129.5(2)(e), a court may hold a parent in
contempt of court and impose a fine or jail sentence where the
parent does not comply with a parenting time schedule.
¶ 22 Although it might be difficult to compel a child, particularly a
teenager, to comply with a court-ordered parenting plan, this does
not excuse a parent from making reasonable good faith efforts to
9
secure the child’s compliance. See In re Marriage of Marez, 340
P.3d 520, 527 (Mont. 2014) (“[W]here a parent fails to make
reasonable efforts to require a recalcitrant child to attend visitation
as provided for in a parenting plan, the parent has not made a good
faith effort to comply with the parenting plan, and a contempt order
may be appropriate.”). As the Supreme Court of Montana noted in
Marez, “[a] parent is not a ‘powerless bystander’ in the decisions
and actions of a child, and has ‘an obligation to attempt to
overcome the child’s resistance’ to visitation.” Id. (quoting In re
Marriage of Rideout, 77 P.3d 1174, 1182 (Wash. 2003)).2 In other
words, a parent is expected to do more than refrain from
discouraging visitation; a parent is expected to take affirmative
action to encourage visitation. Although the dissent views a
“reasonable good faith efforts” standard as vague, good faith efforts
may be considered in contempt proceedings to determine
compliance with a court order. See Arevalo v. Colo. Dep’t of Human
2 In our view, reasonable good faith efforts would not require that
the parent take actions that would harm a child. The magistrate
specifically stated that the required discipline of the children would
not include physical punishment. And although the magistrate
used the term “discipline,” a parent might, in his or her discretion,
elect to employ a reward as an incentive to obtain compliance with
the court’s visitation order.
10
Servs., 72 P.3d 436, 440 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that
department’s failure to make good faith efforts supported trial
court’s conclusion that department intentionally failed to comply
with court’s order); In re Marriage of Hartt, 43 Colo. App. 335, 336,
603 P.2d 970, 971 (1979) (considering case wherein trial court
deferred contempt sentence for two months to consider contemnor’s
good faith efforts to pay support and arrears payments).
¶ 23 Because a parent should make reasonable good faith efforts to
comply with a court’s visitation order, and the magistrate found
with record support that the mother had not made such efforts, the
contempt finding was not an abuse of discretion.
VI. Bias
¶ 24 We disagree with mother’s sixth contention that the magistrate
demonstrated a bias against her and should have been disqualified.
Mother’s allegations are based only on the magistrate’s legal rulings
and the resolution of conflicting evidence, which are not bases for
disqualification. See Smith v. Dist. Court, 629 P.2d 1055, 1057
(Colo. 1981) (holding that it is proper for a judge to use what has
been learned in his or her judicial capacity in making observations
about a matter); see also People in Interest of S.G., 91 P.3d 443, 447
11
(Colo. App. 2004) (noting that a judge’s ruling on a legal issue or the
opinions formed against a party are not bases for disqualification);
In re Marriage of Nussbeck, 899 P.2d 347, 350 (Colo. App. 1995)
(adverse rulings do not constitute grounds for claiming bias or
prejudice).
¶ 25 Further, the record reveals that mother did not seek the
magistrate’s disqualification under C.R.C.P. 97. See In re Marriage
of Zebedee, 778 P.2d 694, 699 (Colo. App. 1988) (declining to
consider bias argument when the matter was not raised in a
C.R.C.P. 97 motion for disqualification). While mother argues in
her reply brief that she previously requested the magistrate’s
recusal, we note that her prior request was legally insufficient
because it was unsupported by an affidavit. See C.R.C.P. 97
(requiring that motion for disqualification be supported by an
affidavit).
VII. Rules of Professional Conduct
¶ 26 We decline to consider mother’s seventh and final contention
that father’s attorney violated the rules of professional conduct.
This court has no jurisdiction over allegations that an attorney has
violated the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. That
12
jurisdiction lies in the supreme court and with the presiding
disciplinary judge. See C.R.C.P. 251.1(b).
VIII. Attorney Fees
¶ 27 Mother argues that the magistrate should have held a hearing
on the reasonableness of father’s attorney fee affidavit. We agree.
¶ 28 Mother objected to father’s fee affidavit on the basis that it was
ambiguous and lacked clarity, and she requested a hearing on the
issue of reasonableness. Once she raised these assertions, the
magistrate should have held a hearing on this issue.
¶ 29 While C.R.C.P. 107 does not impose an express requirement of
a hearing on the amount of an attorney fee award, we nevertheless
conclude that, upon request of a party, an evidentiary hearing must
be held to determine the issue of reasonableness. See Pedlow v.
Stamp, 776 P.2d 382, 386 (Colo. 1989) (construing sections
13-17-101 to -203, C.R.S. 2016, as requiring an evidentiary
hearing).
¶ 30 We thus remand for the district court to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of reasonableness of the award imposed as a
contempt sanction.
13
IX. Issues Raised in Reply Brief
¶ 31 We do not consider the arguments mother makes for the first
time in her reply brief or those that seek to expand upon the
contentions she raised in her opening brief. See In re Marriage of
Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 24.
X. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 32 We decline to award mother her requested “[a]ttorney’s fees,
fines and damages.” Not only is mother not entitled to attorney fees
as a pro se party, see Smith v. Furlong, 976 P.2d 889, 890 (Colo.
App. 1999) (holding that there is no basis to award “attorney fees”
to a pro se litigant, because no “attorney fees” exist in such
situations), but she has failed to cite any legal basis for her request.
See C.A.R. 39.1 (requiring that party requesting attorney fees
explain the legal and factual basis therefor).
¶ 33 Father requests an award of his appellate attorney fees under
C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2). Because father has incurred attorney fees “in
connection with the contempt proceeding,” id., we remand the case
for the district court to determine his entitlement to and the
amount of attorney fees, if any, incurred on appeal. See C.A.R.
14
39.1; Madison Capital Co. v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557, 562
(Colo. App. 2009).
XI. Conclusion
¶ 34 We reverse that portion of paragraph 9 of the magistrate’s
order that mandates mother to discipline her children. The district
court’s order is reversed to the extent it adopts that portion of the
magistrate’s order.
¶ 35 In all other respects the orders are affirmed, and the case is
remanded for the court to consider the reasonableness of the
attorney fee award to father and father’s request for appellate
attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2).
JUDGE TERRY concurs.
JUDGE BERGER dissents.
15
JUDGE BERGER, dissenting.
¶ 36 This case presents an important issue of first impression:
what must a custodial parent do to ensure that her teenaged
children visit with their non-custodial parent, as prescribed by a
parenting time order?
¶ 37 We all agree that the custodial parent may not do anything,
expressly or impliedly, to thwart the court’s parenting order.
§ 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2016; In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 91
(Colo. App. 2008). Any express or implied suggestion or
encouragement to the child (who, by the terms of a parenting order,
is not compelled to do anything) by the custodial parent that the
child not engage in the court-ordered parenting time violates the
order and subjects the custodial parent to the court’s coercive and
punitive contempt powers. Cyr, 186 P.3d at 91.
¶ 38 But the majority goes much further: it adopts a vague,
undefined standard, the violation of which subjects the custodial
parent to sanctions, including imprisonment. It holds that the
custodial parent must make “reasonable good faith efforts to secure
[a] child’s compliance” with the parenting order.
16
¶ 39 There is a multitude of problems with this standard. I begin
with due process requirements. Just as vague laws offend the Due
Process Clause because they fail to “give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,”
People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 414 (Colo. 1998) (quoting High
Gear & Toke Shop v. Beacom, 689 P.2d 624, 630 (Colo. 1984)), so
too do vague court orders that may subject a custodial parent to
incarceration for violation of its terms. See Colo. Springs Bd. of
Realtors, Inc. v. State, 780 P.2d 494, 499 (Colo. 1989) (“[A]n
injunction prohibiting conduct must be sufficiently precise to
enable the party subject to the equitable decree to conform its
conduct to the requirements thereof.”); Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City
of Aurora, 93 P.3d 633, 639 (Colo. App. 2004) (same).
¶ 40 I do not understand how a custodial parent, acting entirely in
good faith, can know with any level of confidence what are
“reasonable good faith efforts to secure [a] child’s compliance” with
a parenting order.
¶ 41 The majority tells us that the district court may not specify
what disciplinary action mother must take to meet the court-
imposed standard, but gives neither mother nor any other custodial
17
parent any guidance as to what is actually required to conform her
conduct to the law. Notably, the majority affirms paragraph seven
of the contempt order, which orders mother to “prove that she is
actually supporting [father’s] parenting time by doing things like
withholding electronics and other privileges to make clear to these
children that they are expected to spend Thanksgiving Break with
Father.”
¶ 42 I take it that the majority is holding that some level of
discipline is required to compel the child to spend time with the
non-custodial parent, no matter what the child thinks. But what
are the limits of that discipline? Must mother prohibit her children
from participating in school athletics or other extracurricular
activities? Or, visiting with their friends? How is the custodial
parent supposed to determine what those limits are in any
particular situation?1
1 In re Marriage of Marez, 340 P.3d 520 (Mont. 2014), relied on by
the majority, is factually distinguishable. There, the trial court
found that the wife “likely influenced [the child] in her purported
decision not to visit her father.” Id. at 526. Such a finding would
support a contempt finding under the standard I advocate. The
balance of the opinion ― the parts that the majority specifically
relies upon ― is dictum because it is unnecessary to the court’s
18
¶ 43 Because parents’ views on discipline of children vary
enormously, and may depend on a particular parent’s upbringing,
culture, religion, and numerous other factors, this standard is, in
reality, nothing less than an invitation for judges to impose their
own beliefs on parents.
¶ 44 That is precisely what Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000),
prohibits. “[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision
could be made.” Id. at 72-73. “[T]his fundamental right of parents
encompasses the presumption that a fit parent will act in the best
interests of his or her child.” In Interest of C.T.G., 179 P.3d 213,
223 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 45 There is no evidence here that the mother’s failure to punish
her teenaged children for apparently refusing to spend time with
their father is against the children’s best interests.
¶ 46 Aside from due process notice problems and Troxel, there is
another fundamental problem with the majority’s standard: the lack
decision. And, for the reasons that I discuss, the dictum is
unsound and should not be followed.
19
of any statutory authorization. In Colorado, parenting orders are
comprehensively governed by the Colorado Uniform Dissolution of
Marriage Act, sections 14-10-101 to -133, C.R.S. 2016, but the
majority does not cite and I am unaware of any statutory authority
supporting the proposition that a custodial parent has a legal
obligation to discipline her child in order to ensure that the child
complies with a parenting order in favor of the non-custodial
parent.
¶ 47 Recognizing that enforcement of parenting time orders may
require a variety of tools, the General Assembly enacted section 14-
10-129.5. After finding that a parent has violated a parenting time
order, the statute authorizes the court to do any of the following:
 modify the existing order concerning the allocation of
parental responsibilities, § 14-10-129.5(2)(b);
 require either or both parents to attend a parental
education program at the expense of the non-complying
parent, § 14-10-129.5(2)(b.3);
 require the parties to participate in family counseling at
the expense of the non-complying parent, § 14-10-
129.5(2)(b.7);
20
 require the violator to post bond or security to ensure
future compliance, § 14-10-129.5(2)(c);
 require make-up time, § 14-10-129.5(2)(d);
 impose a fine or jail sentence, § 14-10-129.5(2)(e); or
 enter “[a]ny other order that may promote the best
interests of the child or children involved,” § 14-10-
129.5(2)(h).
¶ 48 But nowhere does the statute expressly (or in my view,
implicitly) authorize a court to order a parent to impose specific
discipline on her child to force the child to engage in unwanted
parenting time with the non-custodial parent. Nor does allowing
the parent, rather than the court, to choose the specific discipline
solve the problems, for the reasons I discussed above.
¶ 49 To the extent that the majority relies on the “catch-all”
provision of section 14-10-129.5(2)(h) to support its assumption
that mother may be required to impose discipline, that reliance
runs squarely into, and in my view violates, Troxel. Despite any
attendant inconvenience, courts must abide by Troxel’s
fundamental principle that parents, not judges, make child rearing
decisions. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73.
21
¶ 50 The magistrate and the district court did not abide by this
principle, and the majority’s judgment allows this constitutional
violation to continue.
¶ 51 The problems I identify are particularly acute in this case
because the children are teenagers. If the children were young
children, who presumably always do what their parents tell them to
do, the analysis and result might be different. But not with
teenaged children who, unlike young children, are of an age and
maturity to have a will of their own.
¶ 52 Though no Colorado appellate court has addressed this
precise question, the North Dakota Supreme Court has. In Votava
v. Votava, 865 N.W.2d 821, 824 (N.D. 2015), the court affirmed a
district court’s decision declining to hold the mother in contempt
when her twelve- and fourteen-year-old children refused to visit
their father. The trial court found, with record support, that “[i]t is
almost impossible, at their age, to force them to make the visit.
That’s possible with younger children but with older children it’s
22
not without some kind of physical altercation.” Id. at 823.2 The
North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with that analysis.3
¶ 53 For these reasons, I would vacate the contempt order and I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance (with
modifications) of the contempt order. If any similar contempt
motions are brought by father, I would instruct the magistrate and
the district court that mother may only be held in contempt for
violation of the parenting order if the court finds that mother has
thwarted the order by suggesting or encouraging, directly or
indirectly, the children not to spend the court-ordered time with
their father. I recognize this is a delicate inquiry, but it is not much
2 I recognize that the appellate court in Votava v. Votava, 865
N.W.2d 821, 824 (N.D. 2015), was reviewing a lower court order
that declined to find that the parent was in contempt for not forcing
the teenaged and pre-teen children to have visitation with their
father, while here, the magistrate made a finding that the mother
had substantial control over her children. But Votava nevertheless
recognizes the obvious ― that the ages of the children matter in this
context.
3 At a bare minimum, if I am wrong and the standard adopted by
the majority passes muster, the parenting order should advise the
custodial parent of this legal obligation. Otherwise, not only does
the custodial parent have to guess what coercive measures must be
employed against a recalcitrant child, but the custodial parent must
also guess whether there is such an obligation to discipline in the
first instance.
23
different than other difficult factual determinations that a domestic
relations court often is required to make.
24