People v. Sheldon M. Ryan

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
December 1, 2022
2022COA136No. 19CA0172, Peo v Ryan — Crimes — Domestic Violence —
Habitual Domestic Violence Offenders; Criminal Law —
Sentencing — Penalty Enhancers — Prior Convictions
As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of
appeals interprets the language of the habitual domestic violence
offender (HDVO) statute, § 18-6-801(7), C.R.S. 2022, to require that
a jury determine whether a defendant has been previously convicted
of a domestic violence offense, unless the defendant previously
admitted the domestic violence finding as part of a plea agreement,
or a jury previously made the domestic violence finding. Because
the trial court erroneously made the domestic violence finding for
two of the defendant’s four prior convictions, we reverse the
judgment and remand the case for entry of a misdemeanor
conviction and sentence or for retrial under the HDVO statute, at
the prosecution’s discretion. We reject the defendant’s unanimity
contention, but we agree that he is entitled to a restitution hearing
on remand.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA136Court of Appeals No. 19CA0172
City and County of Denver District Court No. 18CR3097
Honorable A. Bruce Jones, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Sheldon M. Ryan,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER REVERSED
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Lipinsky and Casebolt*, JJ., concur
Announced December 1, 2022
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Elyse Maranjian, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2022.
¶1 Sheldon M. Ryan, the defendant, appeals his misdemeanor
convictions for third degree assault and criminal mischief and their
enhancement to felonies under the habitual domestic violence
offender (HDVO) statute, § 18-6-801(7), C.R.S. 2022. He contends
that the trial court erroneously (1) instructed the jury on unanimity;
(2) denied his right to have a jury decide the HDVO counts; and (3)
denied his request for a restitution hearing. As a matter of first
impression, we conclude that the HDVO statute requires the merits
fact-finder (here the jury) to determine whether a defendant has
been previously convicted of a domestic violence offense, unless the
defendant previously admitted the domestic violence finding as part
of a plea, or a jury previously made the domestic violence finding.
Because the trial court denied Ryan’s request for a jury
determination of his HDVO status, we reverse his conviction and
remand the case for resentencing on the misdemeanor conviction or
retrial under the HDVO statute, at the prosecution’s discretion. We
reject Ryan’s unanimity argument, but we agree that he is entitled
to a restitution hearing on remand.
¶2 The State charged Ryan with misdemeanor third degree
assault, obstruction of telephone services, and criminal mischief. It
1
also charged him with three corresponding HDVO sentence
enhancers which, if proved, would increase each misdemeanor
conviction to a class 5 felony.
¶3 The jury found Ryan guilty of third degree assault as an act of
domestic violence and criminal mischief as an act of domestic
violence, and the trial court subsequently adjudicated him an
HDVO and enhanced his sentence accordingly.1 Ryan appeals his
third degree assault conviction and criminal mischief convictions
and HDVO adjudication. He also appeals the court’s order
imposing restitution.
¶4 We first consider and reject Ryan’s unanimity challenge to his
third degree assault conviction. Second, concerning his HDVO
enhancements, we agree with his contention that the language of
the HDVO statute required a jury to determine whether his prior
convictions included an act of domestic violence when the prior
convictions did not involve a jury finding or admission by him. In
light of these conclusions, we need not consider Ryan’s remaining
assertions that, consistent with Linnebur v. People, 2020 CO 79M,
1 The jury acquitted him of obstruction of telephone services.
2
the prior convictions constitute an element of the offense that must
be tried to a jury, or that, under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004), the “fact” that increased his punishment (the prior
convictions) had to be found by a jury, not a judge. See People v.
Curtis, 2014 COA 100, ¶ 12 (“[T]he cardinal principle of judicial
restraint — if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not
to decide more.” (quoting PDK Lab’ys Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment))). Thus, we conclude that the trial
court erred when, following the guilt phase of the trial, it
determined that the HDVO counts had been proven. We therefore
reverse the HDVO adjudication and felony convictions and remand
the case for further proceedings.
¶5 Finally, because Ryan was entitled to a hearing on the issue of
restitution, we reverse the restitution order and remand the case for
a hearing.
I. Background
¶6 According to the trial evidence, on March 9, 2018, Ryan and
the victim argued and ended their domestic relationship. The
victim testified that Ryan struck her during their argument.
3
¶7 The next day, Ryan returned to the victim’s home in the
afternoon to collect his things. He entered the home and confronted
the victim in her bedroom. While the victim was on the phone with
Ryan’s mother, Ryan grabbed and broke the victim’s phone and
slapped her. Ryan’s mother called 911, and an officer responded to
the residence. The officer left after the victim assured him that
everything was fine.
¶8 Ryan then began threatening the victim, and she ran to a
neighbor’s house and used the neighbor’s phone to call 911. Ryan
followed the victim to the neighbor’s house. The victim agreed to
return with him to her house so he could collect a necklace and
leave.
¶9 Ryan kicked and pushed the victim while walking back to the
house. He then pushed the victim inside the house and continued
kicking her. Ryan also slapped the victim in the head, which
knocked off her glasses and broke them, and then pulled out some
of the victim’s hair. As Ryan collected his remaining belongings,
the victim ran from the house and encountered the returning
officer.
4
II. Unanimity
¶ 10 Ryan contends that, because the prosecution presented
evidence of multiple acts that could have supported his third degree
assault conviction, the trial court erred by failing to require the
prosecution to elect the act supporting that count or by failing to
give the jury a modified unanimity instruction informing the jury
that it had to agree on the same act to convict him of third degree
assault. We perceive no reversible error.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 11 A jury verdict must be unanimous. § 16-10-108, C.R.S. 2022.
“Unanimity means only that each juror agrees that each element of
the crime charged has been proved to that juror’s satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d
1130, 1134 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 12 “When evidence of many acts is presented, any one of which
could constitute the offense charged, and there is a reasonable
likelihood that jurors may disagree on the act the defendant
committed, the trial court must take one of two actions to ensure
jury unanimity.” People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155, 1159-60 (Colo.
App. 2002).
5
¶ 13 First, the court may require the prosecution to elect the acts
or series of acts on which it relies for a conviction. Melina v. People,
161 P.3d 635, 639 (Colo. 2007). Or, if “the prosecution does not
elect to stand upon a specific incident, jurors should be instructed
that they must unanimously agree as to a specific act or agree that
the defendant committed all the acts alleged.” People v. Manier, 197
P.3d 254, 258 (Colo. App. 2008). “The requirement of an election or
a modified unanimity instruction assures that a conviction does not
result from some members of the jury finding the defendant guilty
of one act, while others convict based on a different act.” Rivera, 56
P.3d at 1160.
¶ 14 But “when a defendant is charged with crimes occurring in a
single transaction, the prosecutor need not elect among the acts,
and the trial court need not give a modified unanimity instruction.”
People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 925 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 15 We review de novo whether a court erred by failing to require
an election or give a unanimity instruction. People v. Wagner, 2018
COA 68, ¶ 38.
¶ 16 The parties agree that Ryan did not ask for an election or a
modified unanimity instruction, so we review for plain error. See
6
Manier, 197 P.3d at 258. “An error is plain if it is obvious and
substantial and so undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial
itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of
conviction.” People v. Wester-Gravelle, 2020 CO 64, ¶ 28 (quoting
People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 48). “Reversal under a plain error
standard requires a defendant to demonstrate not only that the
absence of an instruction affected a substantial right, but also that
the record reveals a reasonable possibility that the error contributed
to the conviction.” People v. Devine, 74 P.3d 440, 443 (Colo. App.
2003).
B. Analysis
¶ 17 Ryan identifies four separate acts that could have supported
the third degree assault conviction: (1) the March 9 strike on the
victim; (2) the March 10 slap in the victim’s bedroom before Ryan’s
mother called 911; (3) the March 10 kicking and pushing of the
victim while Ryan and the victim returned to the victim’s home after
the victim’s 911 call; and (4) the March 10 kicking, slapping, and
pulling of the victim’s hair after they entered the victim’s home. He
asserts that, because “[t]hese acts were not a single transaction of
criminal conduct,” the trial court reversibly erred by not requiring
7
the prosecution to elect which act would support the assault count
or by not instructing the jury that they must agree on which act
constituted the assault.
¶ 18 We are not persuaded because our supreme court recently
reiterated that “a jury need not unanimously decide ‘which of
several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular
element’ or ‘which of several possible means the defendant used to
commit an element of the crime.’” Wester-Gravelle, ¶ 30 (quoting
People v. Archuleta, 2020 CO 63M, ¶ 20); see also Manier, 197 P.3d
at 258-59.
¶ 19 Furthermore, the trial record shows that the prosecutor
consistently relied on Ryan’s actions after the 911 call from the
neighbor’s house on March 10 as the basis for his third degree
assault conviction. During her opening statement, the prosecutor
described the assault as follows:
[Ryan] tells [the victim] . . . that he still wants
to get back a necklace, so they leave the
neighbor’s house, and they go back to her
house. This is when the physical assault takes
place. You will see surveillance from a
neighbor’s home, and [the victim] will describe
to you that as she’s walking back into her
house to try to comply with his request for
property, that he kicks her, he forces her to go
8
inside, and then on the stairs, assaults her,
knocking her glasses off . . . .
(Emphasis added.) Ryan’s opening statement also addressed this
conduct.
¶ 20 Consistent with her opening statement, the prosecutor’s
witness examinations focused on Ryan’s conduct after the victim’s
911 call at the neighbor’s house. The victim testified about the pain
she suffered when “Mr. Ryan[] was kicking and pushing [her] as
[they] were making [their] way back into the house,” and the police
officer testified that the victim reported suffering an ankle injury
“[w]hen Mr. Ryan had kicked her prior to entering the house.” See
§ 18-3-204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2022 (a person commits third degree
assault if the person knowingly or recklessly causes “bodily injury”
to another person); § 18-1-901(3)(c), C.R.S. 2022 (“‘Bodily injury’
means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or
mental condition.”).
¶ 21 The prosecutor also introduced the following evidence to prove
Ryan’s conduct after leaving the neighbor’s house: (1) a recording of
the victim’s 911 call, during which the neighbor said “he’s hitting
her” while observing Ryan and the victim walk back to the victim’s
9
house; (2) the neighbor’s home surveillance video showing Ryan
kicking the victim while returning to the victim’s house after the
911 call; and (3) photographs of the victim’s broken eyeglasses and
pulled-out hair.
¶ 22 During closing argument, the prosecutor relied on the above
evidence to argue that she had proven third degree assault. She
also argued that, at the time the victim called 911, “she realized she
was in danger, and she was scared, and she was right because
that’s exactly when it turned physical.”
¶ 23 Finally, we note that the trial court provided the jury with the
model unanimity instruction, which stated that “[t]he verdict for
each charge must represent the considered judgment of each juror,
and it must be unanimous” and that “[i]n other words, all of [the
jurors] must agree to all parts of it.” See Wester-Gravelle, ¶ 38; see
also Carter, ¶ 59.
¶ 24 Although Ryan asserts that his conduct while outside after the
victim’s 911 call is separate from his conduct inside the victim’s
house, he does not explain why those multiple acts are not part of a
single criminal transaction. See People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293,
296 (Colo. 1986) (an election was not required where the
10
defendant’s multiple physical acts against the victim constituted
one transaction); People v. Vigil, 2015 COA 88M, ¶ 42 (same), aff’d,
2019 CO 105; Greer, 262 P.3d at 925; see also Archuleta, ¶ 31; cf.
People v. Torres, 224 P.3d 268, 278 (Colo. App. 2009) (A unanimity
instruction was not required because “[the defendant’s] conduct
and acts supporting the offense occurred during a single criminal
episode — the twenty-seven-mile police chase.”). And while Ryan
asserts that some of his conduct was separated by intervening
events, he does not identify any intervening events that occurred
between his conduct inside and his conduct outside the victim’s
house after her 911 call. Accordingly, we conclude that any error in
not requiring an election or giving a modified unanimity instruction
was not obvious. See Wester-Gravelle, ¶¶ 36-38, 42.
¶ 25 Finally, based on our review of the record, we are not
convinced that the omission of an election or a modified unanimity
instruction so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as
to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of
conviction. See Devine, 74 P.3d at 443; Rivera, 56 P.3d at 1159; cf.
Roelker v. People, 804 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Colo. 1991) (The trial
court’s failure to require the prosecution to make an election or to
11
provide a unanimity instruction was harmless “because the
evidence of sexual abuse was restricted to a narrow time frame and
was limited to events surrounding a single transaction.”). As noted
above, the prosecutor consistently argued Ryan’s conduct following
the 911 call from the neighbor’s house as the basis for the third
degree assault charge. Therefore, we also affirm his conviction on
this basis.
III. HDVO Adjudication
¶ 26 Ryan next contends that the trial court reversibly erred when
it found that his prior convictions included an act of domestic
violence because (1) the HDVO statute required that this finding be
made by the jury that determined his guilt on the charged offenses;
(2) the alleged existence of three prior convictions that included an
act of domestic violence was an element of the charged offenses and
should have been submitted to the jury; and (3) the trial court’s
finding that his prior convictions included an act of domestic
violence violated the requirements of Blakely. Ryan also asserts
that, assuming the trial court properly made the domestic violence
findings related to his prior convictions, the evidence was
12
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had three
prior convictions that included an act of domestic violence.
¶ 27 The People address only Ryan’s statutory argument and
concede that the HDVO statute required the jury to determine
whether some of Ryan’s prior convictions included an act of
domestic violence. The People claim, however, that the error does
not require reversal.
¶ 28 We agree with the parties that, under the circumstances, the
HDVO statute required the jury to determine whether Ryan’s prior
convictions included an act of domestic violence and that the trial
court erred by making that domestic violence finding for some of the
prior convictions. We also conclude that the error requires reversal
of Ryan’s felony convictions and HDVO adjudication.
Consequently, we need not address Ryan’s remaining claims.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 29 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo. People v. Gallegos, 2013 CO 45, ¶ 7.
¶ 30 When interpreting a statute, our primary purpose is to
ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Cowen v.
People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12. “To do so, we look first to the language
13
of the statute, giving its words and phrases their plain and ordinary
meanings.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37. “We read statutory
words and phrases in context, and we construe them according to
the rules of grammar and common usage.” Id.¶ 31 Our interpretation of a statute “must also endeavor to
effectuate the purpose of the legislative scheme.” Id. at ¶ 38. We
must “read that scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious,
and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we must avoid
constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous
or lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id.
¶ 32 “[I]f the language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we
give effect to its plain meaning and look no further.” Cowen, ¶ 12.
“Only if the statutory language is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation and is therefore ambiguous may we resort
to extrinsic aids of construction to address the ambiguity and
decide which reasonable interpretation to accept based on the
legislature’s intent.” Id.
B. Interpretation of the HDVO Statute
¶ 33 Under the HDVO statute, a misdemeanor conviction that
includes an act of domestic violence is enhanced to “a class 5 felony
14
if the defendant at the time of sentencing has been previously
convicted of three or more prior offenses that included an act of
domestic violence and that were separately brought and tried and
arising out of separate criminal episodes.” § 18-6-801(7)(a).
¶ 34 The HDVO statute provides the following procedure for
litigating and resolving an allegation that a defendant should be
adjudged an HDVO:
(c) Trials in cases alleging that the defendant is
an habitual domestic violence offender
pursuant to this subsection (7) must be
conducted in accordance with the rules of
criminal procedure for felonies. The trier of
fact shall determine whether an offense
charged includes an act of domestic violence.
(d) Following a conviction for an offense which
underlying factual basis includes an act of
domestic violence:
(I) If any prior conviction included a
determination by a jury or was admitted by the
defendant that the offense included an act of
domestic violence, the court shall proceed to
sentencing without further findings as to that
prior conviction by the jury or by the court, if
no jury trial is had;
(II) For any prior conviction in which the
factual basis was found by the court to include
an act of domestic violence, but did not
include a finding of domestic violence by a jury
or that was not admitted by the defendant, the
15
trial court shall proceed to a sentencing stage
of the proceedings. The prosecution shall
present evidence to the trier of fact that the prior
conviction included an act of domestic violence.
The prosecution has the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(III) At the sentencing stage, the following
applies:
(A) A finding of domestic violence made by a
court at the time of the prior conviction
constitutes prima facie evidence that the crime
involved domestic violence;
(B) Evidence of the prior conviction is
admissible through the use of certified
documents under seal, or the court may take
judicial notice of a prior conviction;
(C) Evidence admitted in the guilt stage of the
trial, including testimony of the defendant and
other acts admitted pursuant to section 18-6-
801.5, [C.R.S. 2022,] may be considered by the
finder of fact.
§ 18-6-801(7)(c)-(d) (emphasis added).
¶ 35 Reading the statute as a whole, we conclude that the General
Assembly intended that when a defendant is alleged to fall within
the definition of an HDVO, at the guilt phase of the misdemeanor
trial, the trier of fact must determine whether the triggering charge
included an act of domestic violence, see § 18-6-801(7)(c), and then,
if necessary, further determines whether a prior conviction included
16
an act of domestic violence, see § 18-6-801(7)(d)(II). See also
COLJI-Crim. 6-8:01.INT, 6-8:01.5.INT (2021).
¶ 36 Section 18-6-801(7)(d)(I) provides that, if a defendant’s prior
conviction included an act of domestic violence based on a jury
finding or the defendant’s admission, then no “further findings [are
required] as to that prior conviction by the jury or by the court, if no
jury trial is had.” (Emphasis added.) In such a case, the trial court
“shall proceed to sentencing.” Id.
¶ 37 However, when a defendant’s prior conviction does not include
a jury finding of or a defendant’s admission to an act of domestic
violence, then section 18-6-801(7)(d)(II) requires the trial court to
proceed to the sentencing phase of the proceedings where the
prosecution must then prove to the trier of fact, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the prior conviction included an act of
domestic violence.
¶ 38 When read together, we conclude the General Assembly
intended that a domestic violence finding associated with a
defendant’s prior conviction must be (1) previously determined by a
jury; (2) previously admitted by the defendant; or (3) proved to the
trier of fact at sentencing in the current proceeding. See People v.
17
Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 26 (“We must take equal care to construe a
statute ‘as a whole,’ with an eye toward giving consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” (quoting Whitaker
v. People, 48 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2002))); People v. Sheth, 2013
COA 33, ¶ 6 (“We read the statute as a whole and construe each
provision consistently and harmoniously with the overall statutory
design.”).
¶ 39 Additionally, we note that the General Assembly used the
phrase, “the trier of fact” when describing to whom the prosecution
would need to prove that the prior conviction included an act of
domestic violence. § 18-6-801(7)(d)(II) (emphasis added); see
Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 954, 965 (2019)
(“[G]rammar and usage establish that ‘the’ is ‘a function word . . .
indicat[ing] that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or
has been previously specified by context.’”) (emphasis added)
(quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed.
2005)); Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, 269, 450 P.2d 653, 655
(1969) (“It is a rule of law well established that the definite article
‘the’ particularizes the subject which it precedes. It is a word of
limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or
18
‘an.’”). And we must give full effect to the words chosen by the
General Assembly and presume that it meant what it clearly said.
State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 500 (Colo. 2000).
¶ 40 Accordingly, we hold that, when a defendant has a jury trial
on a triggering misdemeanor charge and the prosecution seeks to
adjudicate the defendant an HDVO based on prior convictions in
which a trial court made the domestic violence finding, the HDVO
statute requires the jury to also determine whether those prior
convictions included an act of domestic violence unless the
exceptions set forth in section 18-6-801(7)(d)(I) apply.
C. Application
¶ 41 Ryan contends, the People concede, and we agree that the trial
court erred by finding that Ryan had three or more prior convictions
that included an act of domestic violence because, under section
18-6-801(7)(d)(II), the jury should have made that determination on
at least two of Ryan’s four prior convictions. The other two
convictions were, arguably, exempt from additional jury findings
under section 18-6-801(7)(d)(I).
¶ 42 We turn next to whether this error was preserved and the
appropriate remedy.
19
¶ 43 Ryan claims that his pretrial motion requesting a bifurcated
proceeding and a jury trial on the HDVO counts, combined with the
court’s grant of his requests, sufficiently preserved this issue for
our review. He argues that his felony convictions should be
reversed and the case should be remanded for entry of
misdemeanor convictions.
¶ 44 The People respond that, despite Ryan’s pretrial motion and
the court’s grant of it, Ryan failed to preserve this issue for our
review when he did not lodge another objection at the sentencing
hearing to the court’s contrary decision to conduct a bench trial on
the HDVO counts. The People ask us to review this issue for plain
error and argue that the court’s failure to submit the HDVO counts
to the jury did not rise to the level of plain error because Ryan was
not prejudiced by the omission.
¶ 45 We need not resolve this dispute because we conclude that
reversal is required even under the plain error standard. See People
v. Kadell, 2017 COA 124, ¶¶ 6, 25.
¶ 46 Plain error is error that is obvious and substantial. Hagos v.
People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. While the obviousness of the error here
is not in dispute, its substantiality is. See People v. Glover, 2015
20
COA 16, ¶ 48 (An error is substantial if it is “seriously prejudicial.”
(quoting People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 43)).
¶ 47 An error is substantial and requires reversal “only if [it] ‘so
undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast
serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.’”
Hagos, ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo.
2005)); see also People v. Maloy, 2020 COA 71, ¶ 11; Glover, ¶ 48;
Ujaama, ¶ 43.
¶ 48 At the HDVO trial, the prosecution presented only the certified
documents from Ryan’s four prior convictions. The trial court
reviewed the documents with the prosecutor and located the prior
courts’ domestic violence findings in each case. At the conclusion
of that review, and without seeking input from Ryan, the court
found that “the People ha[d] tendered certified copies showing
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Ryan] ha[d] been convicted of at
least four prior convictions pursuant to guilty pleas in cases that
included [a] domestic violence factual basis.”
¶ 49 We acknowledge that a prior court’s finding that a previous
conviction included an act of domestic violence constitutes prima
facie evidence that the crime involved domestic violence. See § 18-
21
6-801(7)(d)(III)(A). However, the record shows that Ryan was never
afforded the opportunity to rebut this prima facie evidence. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 701 (11th ed. 2019) (Prima facie evidence is
“[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless
contradictory evidence is produced.”); see also Williams v. People,
2019 CO 101, ¶¶ 42-43; People in Interest of Z.T.T., 2017 CO 48, ¶
11; People v. Porterfield, 772 P.2d 638, 639 (Colo. App. 1988).
¶ 50 For that reason, we conclude that the trial court’s erroneous
resolution of the domestic violence question so undermined the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding as to cast serious doubt on
the reliability of the HDVO adjudication.
¶ 51 Accordingly, we reverse Ryan’s HDVO adjudication and the
resulting felony convictions. However, contrary to Ryan’s
contention, we conclude that the case should be remanded for the
prosecution to decide whether it wishes to accept misdemeanor
convictions on the jury’s findings of guilt on the charged offenses or
retry Ryan on the HDVO counts. See People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34,
¶¶ 26-30; Kadell, ¶ 31; cf. People v. Viburg, 2021 CO 81M, ¶ 17 (A
conviction reversed for legal error “signals that the defendant was
convicted through a defective judicial process,” and, “[a]s such, the
22
‘accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of
[their] guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern
for insuring that the guilty are punished’”; “[t]hus, where a legal
error occurs in the trial court, double jeopardy typically does not
bar retrial.” (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978))).
IV. Restitution
¶ 52 Ryan last contends, the People concede, and we agree that the
trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on Ryan’s objection to
the prosecution’s restitution request and that the case should be
remanded for such a hearing. See People v. Martinez-Chavez, 2020
COA 39, ¶¶ 15-31. Thus, we need not address Ryan’s alternative
argument that the court erred by imposing restitution in the
absence of sufficient evidence proving the amount of restitution
owed and proximate causation.
¶ 53 For the first time in his reply brief, though, Ryan challenges
the trial court’s restitution order on timeliness grounds, in light of
the recently announced opinion in Weeks. See Weeks, ¶ 5.
¶ 54 We decline to address this timeliness challenge because Ryan
did not raise it in either the proceedings below or in his opening
brief. See People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 507 (Colo. 1998); see
23
also People v. Grant, 174 P.3d 798, 803 (Colo. App. 2007).
Although Weeks was announced after Ryan filed his opening brief,
defendants in other cases published before Weeks raised the same
timeliness challenge addressed in Weeks in numerous opinions
from this court. See Weeks, ¶ 47 n.16. On remand, however, the
trial court may consider its authority to impose restitution in light
of Weeks.
V. Conclusion
¶ 55 The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is
remanded for the entry of misdemeanor convictions on the jury’s
verdicts or for the prosecution to retry Ryan on the HDVO counts in
accordance with section 18-6-801(7). The restitution order is also
reversed, and the case is remanded for the trial court to determine
restitution in accordance with section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. 2022, and
Weeks.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE CASEBOLT concur.
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