v. City and County of Denver

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
April 2, 2020
2020COA59
No. 19CA0124, Huffman v. City and County of Denver — Public
Records — Criminal Justice Record Sealing — Municipal
Convictions
A division of the court of appeals interprets section 24-72-
708(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2018, and holds that the statute does not
preclude the sealing of all municipal convictions involving domestic
violence. Instead, the division concludes that the domestic violence
prohibition applies only to petitioning defendants who have
committed a new offense after the conviction they seek to seal.
Accordingly, the order is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA59
Court of Appeals No. 19CA0124
City and County of Denver District Court No. 18CV33472
Honorable Michael A. Martinez, Judge
Timothy Roy Huffman,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
City and County of Denver, Colorado,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Richman and Grove, JJ., concur
Announced April 2, 2020
The Law Offices of Joshua Johnson, LLC, Joshua Johnson, Denver, Colorado,
for Petitioner-Appellant
Kristin M. Bronson, City Attorney, Andrew Saliman, Assistant City Attorney,
Marley Bordovsky, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-
Appellee
¶1 In this record sealing case, we are asked to interpret, for the
first time, a provision of the municipal conviction record sealing
statute, section 24-72-708(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2018, that the General
Assembly added in 2017. Prior to this amendment, the statute
permitted a defendant to request sealing of a municipal conviction
if, among other requirements, at least three years had passed since
the conviction’s disposition or the defendant’s release from
supervision (whichever was later), and if the defendant had not
been charged with or convicted of a new felony, misdemeanor, or
misdemeanor traffic offenses since the conviction’s disposition or
the defendant’s release from supervision (no new offenses
requirement).1 § 24-72-708(1)(a)(I).
¶2 The provision at issue, section 24-72-708(1)(a)(II), reflects an
exception to the “no new offenses” requirement. It allows a
defendant who has committed a new offense to petition for sealing
of a municipal conviction, but only if (1) the municipal conviction to
1 The statute also prohibits the sealing, under any circumstances,
of municipal convictions for misdemeanor traffic offenses committed
either by the holder of a commercial learner’s permit or a
commercial driver’s license, or by the operator of a commercial
motor vehicle. § 24-72-708(1)(a)(I)(C), C.R.S. 2018.
1
be sealed did not involve domestic violence and (2) the new offense
did not involve domestic violence and is not a felony. The question
we must answer is whether the General Assembly, when it
expanded the reach of the municipal sealing statute, intended to
preclude the sealing of all municipal convictions involving domestic
violence when it added this subsection, as argued by the City and
County of Denver (City) and found by the district court, or whether
this domestic violence prohibition applies only to petitioning
defendants who have committed a new offense after the disposition
of the municipal conviction they seek to have sealed.2 Petitioner,
Timothy Roy Huffman makes the latter argument and appeals the
district court’s order denying his petition to seal his municipal
assault conviction. For the reasons described below, we agree with
Mr. Huffman. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order and
remand the case for a hearing on Mr. Huffman’s petition under
section 24-72-708(2)(b).
2This provision also includes an unlawful sexual conduct and child
abuse limitation not at issue.
2
I. Background
¶3 In 2007, Mr. Huffman pleaded guilty to a single count of
municipal assault where the underlying facts involved domestic
violence. The court sentenced Mr. Huffman to one year of
supervised probation, which he successfully completed in 2008. He
has incurred no additional charges or convictions since his release
from supervision.
¶4 In September 2018, and for reasons related to his
employment, Mr. Huffman petitioned the district court to seal his
municipal conviction under section 24-72-708. The City objected
and argued that subsection (1)(a)(II) categorically bars the district
court from sealing municipal convictions involving domestic
violence. It reasoned that because Mr. Huffman was convicted of a
municipal assault involving domestic violence, he is ineligible to
have the conviction sealed.
¶5 The district court agreed with the City’s interpretation of the
statute, found Mr. Huffman’s municipal conviction ineligible for
sealing, and denied the petition.
3
II. Sealing of Municipal Conviction Records Under
Section 24-72-708
¶6 Mr. Huffman contends that the district court misinterpreted
section 24-72-708(1)(a)(II) by applying its domestic violence
prohibition to all municipal convictions. He argues that the
statute’s plain language only applies this prohibition to defendants
who have committed a new offense and whose convictions would
not otherwise qualify for sealing under section 24-72-708(1)(a)(I).
We agree.
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law
¶7 We review the district court’s interpretation of section 24-72-
708 de novo. See Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365, 367 (Colo. 2009)
(noting “[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de
novo review”). In doing so, we apply basic principles of statutory
construction.
¶8 We begin with the plain language of the statute, and if the
statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, we need not look any
further. Id. We read words and phrases in context and construe
them “according to grammar and common usage.” Jefferson Cty.
Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010); see
4
also § 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2019. “We apply the plain meaning of the
statutory language, give consistent effect to all parts of a statute,
and construe each provision in harmony with the overall statutory
design.” Associated Gov’ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
2012 CO 28, ¶ 11. We avoid interpretations that “defeat the
obvious intent of the legislature,” Klinger v. Adams Cty. Sch. Dist.
No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo. 2006), as well as interpretations
that lead to illogical or absurd results, Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d
807, 811 (Colo. 2004).
¶9 Only when a statute is ambiguous may we look beyond its
plain language to other sources of legislative intent. Associated
Gov’ts of Nw. Colo., ¶ 11. A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably
susceptible of multiple interpretations. Hunsaker v. People, 2015
CO 46, ¶ 11. “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context
in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.” People v. Yoder, 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17 (citation
omitted).
¶ 10 Section 24-72-708 authorizes a district court to seal a
defendant’s municipal criminal conviction records.
5
(1) Sealing of convictions records. (a)(I) A
defendant may petition the district court of the
district in which any conviction records
pertaining to the defendant for a petty offense
or municipal violation are located for the
sealing of the conviction records, except basic
identifying information, if:
(A) The petition is filed three or more years
after the date of the final disposition of all
criminal proceedings against the defendant or
the release of the defendant from supervision
concerning a criminal conviction, whichever is
later; and
(B) The defendant has not been charged or
convicted for a felony, misdemeanor, or
misdemeanor traffic offense in the three or
more years since the date of the final
disposition of all criminal proceedings against
him or her or the date of the defendant’s
release from supervision, whichever is later;
and
(C) The conviction records to be sealed are not
for a misdemeanor traffic offense committed
either by a holder of a commercial learner’s
permit or a commercial driver’s license, . . . or
by the operator of a commercial motor vehicle.
§ 24-72-708(1)(a)(I). We refer to the second requirement for sealing
explained in subsection (1)(a)(I)(B) as the “no new offense”
requirement.
¶ 11 The 2017 amendment, which added subsection (1)(a)(II), sets
forth additional sealing requirements and provides, in relevant part,
6
(II) Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsection (1)(a)(I)(B) of this section, a
defendant may petition the district court of the
district in which any conviction records
pertaining to the defendant for a municipal
violation, except a municipal assault or battery
offense in which the underlying factual basis
involves domestic violence, as defined in
section 18-6-800.3(1), or any other municipal
violation in which the underlying factual basis
involves domestic violence, as defined in
section 18-6-800.3(1), or petty offense are
located for the sealing of the conviction
records, except basic identification
information, if:
(A) The defendant was convicted of a single
offense that was not a felony and did not
involve domestic violence as defined in section
18-6-800.3(1) . . . ;
....
(B) That offense occurred within three years of
the date of the final disposition of all criminal
proceedings against him or her related to the
conviction that the defendant is seeking to
have sealed or within three years of the date of
defendant’s release from supervision related to
the conviction that the defendant is seeking to
have sealed; whichever is later; and
(C) The defendant has not been convicted for a
felony, misdemeanor, or misdemeanor traffic
offense in the ten or more years since the date
of the final disposition of all criminal
proceedings against him or her for the
subsequent criminal case or in the ten or more
years since the date of the defendant’s release
7
from supervision for the subsequent case,
whichever is later.
§ 24-72-708(1)(a)(II).
B. Statutory Analysis
¶ 12 We begin our analysis with a brief overview of the sealing
statute’s history. See Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 24 (noting
that a “statute’s history can ‘inform[] our understanding of
legislative intent’”) (citation omitted). Initially, the Criminal Justice
Act of 1977 permitted courts to seal all criminal records, including
convictions, upon petition and hearing. People v. Bushu, 876 P.2d
106, 108 (Colo. App. 1994) (citing Ch. 340, sec. 1, § 24-72-308,
1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1249). But, in 1988, the General Assembly
repealed and re-enacted this statute. Id. (citing Ch. 190, sec. 3,
§ 24-72-308, 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 979). In doing so, it
substantially narrowed the class of persons eligible to have criminal
records sealed to (1) persons investigated but not charged with a
crime; (2) persons whose charges were completely dismissed; and
(3) persons who were acquitted at trial. 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws at
979-80. Thus, a person convicted of a criminal offense could no
longer petition to seal criminal records. Bushu, 876 P.2d at 108.
8
¶ 13 In 2008, the General Assembly enacted legislation permitting
certain criminal convictions involving controlled substances to be
sealed. See Ch. 393, sec. 2, § 24-72-308.5, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws
1938. In 2012, the General Assembly expanded sealing to include
offenses committed by victims of human trafficking. Ch. 174, sec.
7, § 24-72-308.7, 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 623. In 2013, the General
Assembly added a new provision to the sealing statute that set forth
separate requirements and a separate procedure for sealing petty
and municipal offenses. Ch. 289, sec. 10, § 24-72-308.9, 2013
Colo. Sess. Laws 1544. And in 2014, the General Assembly
expanded sealing to include offenses related to posting intimate
photographs of a person on the internet, Ch. 283, sec. 3,
§ 24-72-709, 2014 Colo. Sess. Laws 1166.3
¶ 14 As originally enacted, the municipal conviction sealing statute
required a petitioning defendant to satisfy the same three
requirements now set forth in section 24-72-708(1)(a)(I)(A)-(C) to
seal a municipal or petty offense conviction. 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws
3 In 2014, the statutes pertaining to sealing of criminal records were
recodified at sections 24-72-701 to -708. See Ch. 317, secs. 2-3,
§§ 24-72-701 to -708, 2014 Colo. Sess. Laws 1377-94.
9
at 1544. Importantly, the original statute did not permit any
defendant who had been charged with or convicted of a new offense
to request sealing of a municipal conviction. That changed in 2017
when the General Assembly added the provision at issue,
subsection (1)(a)(II), to section 24-72-708. With this history in
mind, we turn to the language of this provision.
¶ 15 We begin with the first phrase, “[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of subsection (1)(a)(I)(B),” and conclude that it plainly
concerns the “no new offense” sealing requirement in the first
subsection. See § 24-72-708(1)(a)(I)(B). The word
“notwithstanding” means “despite” or “in spite of.” Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/EQR4-9MN9; see Black’s
Law Dictionary 823 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “notwithstanding” as
“[d]espite” or “in spite of”); see Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc.,
929 P.2d 1332, 1339 n.9 (Colo. 1997) (noting that the terms
“despite” and “notwithstanding” are often used interchangeably);
see also Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 2017 CO 13, ¶ 11
(“When used in a statute, ‘notwithstanding’ is intended ‘to exclude
— not include — the operation of other statutes.’”) (citation
omitted). Giving this phrase its ordinary meaning, we conclude that
10
it signals an upcoming exception to the “no new offense”
requirement in subsection (1)(a)(I)(B). See Mendoza v. Pioneer Gen.
Ins. Co., 2014 COA 29, ¶ 24 (where the statute does not define a
term, courts may refer to dictionary definitions to determine the
plain and ordinary meaning of the word); see also Roup v.
Commercial Research, LLC, 2015 CO 38, ¶ 8 (courts prefer to apply
a commonly accepted meaning over a strained or forced
interpretation, and when a statute does not define a term, we
assume that the General Assembly intended to give the term its
usual and ordinary meaning).
¶ 16 Next, section 24-72-708(1)(a)(II) says that “a defendant may
petition the district court of the district in which any conviction
records pertaining to the defendant for a municipal violation, except
a municipal assault or battery offense in which the underlying
factual basis involves domestic violence . . ., are located for the
sealing of the conviction records, . . . .” Because the domestic
violence exception is set off by commas, we conclude that it relates
to the words “municipal violation” that precede it. See Pena v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 117 P.3d 84, 87 (Colo. App. 2004), as
modified on denial of reh’g (May 26, 2005) (a phrase set off from a
11
category by commas modifies one or more categories that precede
it). Thus, this language begins the exception to the “no new
offenses” requirement by first limiting its applicability to cases
where the petitioning defendant’s underlying municipal conviction
did not involve domestic violence.
¶ 17 Assuming a petitioning defendant’s municipal conviction
satisfies this condition, then subsection (1)(a)(II)(A)-(C) sets forth
additional requirements for sealing. As relevant here, (A) requires
that a defendant be convicted of a single, nonfelony offense that did
not involve domestic violence. The City argues that “single offense”
refers to the underlying municipal conviction sought to be sealed
because the word “subsequent” appears nowhere in this provision.
We disagree because such a reading would be nonsensical. If the
General Assembly meant “single offense” to be the underlying
municipal offense, then there would be no need for the “not a
felony” language that follows it, because a municipal offense can
never be a felony. We may not read language out of a statute,
People v. Coleman, 2018 COA 67, ¶ 51 (citing Turbyne v. People, 151
P.3d 563, 567 (Colo. 2007)), nor may we interpret a statute in a way
that would render any of its language superfluous or absurd, Am.
12
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barriga, 2018 CO 42, ¶ 8. Hence, the “not a
felony” phrase reveals that subsection (1)(a)(II)(A) pertains to the
new offense, and not the underlying municipal conviction to be
sealed.
¶ 18 This interpretation is bolstered by the language of section 24-
72-708(1)(a)(II)(B), which begins, “[t]hat offense . . .,” which plainly
refers back to the offense referenced in subsection (1)(a)(II)(A). It
goes on to require that “[t]hat offense” have occurred “within three
years of the date of the final disposition of all criminal proceedings
against him or her related to the conviction that the defendant is
seeking to have sealed . . . ,” id. (emphasis added), which confirms
that “that offense” can only mean a new offense and not the
underlying municipal conviction.
¶ 19 Finally, subsection (C) sets forth a time requirement not found
in subsection (1)(a)(I). It requires that a petitioning defendant not
be convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or misdemeanor traffic
offense within ten years of the disposition of all proceedings or
release from supervision in the “subsequent criminal case.” § 24-
72-708(1)(a)(I)(C). Thus, this provision requires a defendant who
commits a new offense within three years of the municipal violation
13
to wait at least ten years from the disposition of that new offense to
file a petition to seal the underlying municipal offense. And if
another new offense is committed within that ten-year time period,
then the defendant can never petition for sealing of the underlying
municipal offense. That subsection (1)(a)(I) permits a defendant to
petition for sealing three years after the completion of the municipal
offense, in contrast to the ten years required by subsection
(1)(a)(II)(C) further supports our conclusion that subsection (1)(a)(II)
unambiguously provides an exception to the “no new offense”
requirement of subsection (1)(a)(I)(B), and that it does not
categorically bar the sealing of all municipal convictions that involve
domestic violence. See Associated Gov’ts of Nw. Colo., ¶ 11 (Courts
“give consistent effect to all parts of a statute, and construe each
provision in harmony with the overall statutory design.”).
¶ 20 We are not persuaded that this statute is reasonably
susceptible of any other interpretation.4 Subsection (1)(a)(II)
specifically references the “no new offense” requirement in
(1)(a)(I)(B) and provides a domestic violence prohibition that does
4Both parties argue that the plain language supports their position
and that we need not consider the statute’s legislative history.
14
not appear in subsection (1)(a)(I). When read together, this
difference demonstrates that the General Assembly intended to
expand sealing to municipal defendants who incurred new charges
or convictions, but only in limited circumstances. See People v.
Owens, 219 P.3d 379, 382 (Colo. App. 2009) (reading statutes in
their entirety to discern meaning). As well, if, as Mr. Huffman
argues, the General Assembly had intended to categorically prohibit
the sealing of all municipal convictions involving domestic violence,
then it could simply have added this category of offenses to
subsection (1)(a)(I)(C), which lists the convictions and records not
eligible for sealing. See Zamarripa, 929 P.2d at 1339 (legislative
omissions must be viewed as intentional and must be given effect).
¶ 21 Based on the plain language and structure of section 24-72-
708(1)(a)(II), we hold that subsection (1)(a)(II) applies only to
petitioning defendants who have been charged with or convicted of
a new offense following their original municipal conviction, and that
it does not categorically bar the sealing of all municipal convictions
involving domestic violence.
15
C. Application
¶ 22 The undisputed record shows that Mr. Huffman successfully
completed probation on his municipal assault conviction in 2008
and that he has not incurred any additional charges or convictions
since that time. Because he has satisfied all of the criteria under
subsection (1)(a)(I), he was eligible to file a petition to seal the
municipal conviction in the district court as early as 2013 when the
municipal conviction sealing statute first became effective. And
because he has committed no new offenses, the “no new offense”
prohibitions of subsection (1)(a)(II) do not apply to his case.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erroneously found
that Mr. Huffman is ineligible to have his municipal conviction
sealed because it involved domestic violence.
III. Conclusion
¶ 23 We reverse the district court’s order and remand the case for a
hearing on the petition.
JUDGE RICHMAN and JUDGE GROVE concur.
16