O'Neil v. Conejos County Board of Commissioners

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA30
Court of Appeals No. 16CA0066
Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals Nos. 65665 & 65666
James E. O’Neil, Mary Ellen O’Neil, Shay Patrick O’Neil, and Shaun Michael
O’Neil,
Petitioners-Appellees,
v.
Conejos County Board of Commissioners,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
Board of Assessment Appeals,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division II
Opinion by JUDGE DAILEY
J. Jones and Berger, JJ., concur
Announced March 9, 2017
Benjamin F. Gibbons, P.C., Benjamin F. Gibbons, Monte Vista, Colorado, for
Petitioners-Appellees
Nicolas Sarmiento, County Attorney, Conejos, Colorado; Stephane Walter
Atencio (on the briefs), Alamosa, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this property tax case, respondent, the Conejos County
Board of County Commissioners (the County), appeals an order of
the Board of Assessment Appeals (the Board) classifying property
owned by the petitioners, the O’Neil family, as residential for tax
purposes. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2010, James E. and Mary Ellen O’Neil purchased the
subject property and built a log house on it, to be used as a
vacation home and an inheritance for their two sons, Shay and
Shaun.1 The house was initially classified for tax purposes as
residential.
¶3 The O’Neils, who primarily live in New Mexico, periodically
visited the home, but it remained unoccupied much of the time.
Starting in August 2011, the O’Neils listed the property as available
for short-term, overnight rental on the website Vacation Rentals By
Owner (VRBO). In order to rent the property, they obtained from
1 After purchasing the property, James and Mary Ellen purportedly
quitclaimed it to Shay and Shaun. In the quitclaim deed, James
and Mary Ellen (1) reserved the right to the use, occupation, and
benefit of the property for the duration of their lives; (2) retained full
financial responsibility for debts associated with the property; and
(3) reserved the right to, at their option, render the deed null and
void.
1
the County a special use permit, which required payment of sales
and lodging tax; the permit did not reclassify the property or change
the zoning from residential.
¶4 In 2012, the Conejos County Assessor (the Assessor) re-
classified the property, for ad valorem tax purposes, from
residential to commercial. Because the reclassification worked to
the O’Neils’ detriment,2 James O’Neil filed a petition for abatement
with the County regarding the 2012 and 2013 tax years. After the
County denied the petition, the O’Neils filed an appeal with the
Board, which, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, overturned
the Assessor’s action and returned the property’s classification to
residential for those years.
¶5 The County appeals the Board’s decision to this court,
pursuant to sections 13-4-102(2)(x) and 39-8-108(2), C.R.S. 2016.
2 In Colorado, tax rates apply to the “assessed value” of the
property, meaning they are applied to a fraction of the value that is
determined by the assessment rate. “Residential” property is
assessed at 7.96% of its actual value, adjusted biennially; whereas
“commercial” property is assessed at a rate of 29% of the actual
value. §§ 39-1-104(1),-104.2(3), C.R.S. 2016; 2 Div. of Prop.
Taxation, Dep’t of Local Affairs, Assessors’ Reference Library § 6, at
6.1 (rev. Jan. 2017).
2
II. The Property’s Classification
¶6 The County contends that the Board improperly classified the
O’Neils’ property as residential. We are not persuaded.
A. A Procedural Issue: Addressing the Presumption
Afforded the Assessor’s Classification
¶7 The County contends that the Board failed to apply the
presumption in favor of the Assessor’s classification of the property.
We disagree.
¶8 In the Board proceedings, the O’Neils, as the taxpayers, bore
the burden of rebutting the presumption that the Assessor’s
classification was correct. Gyurman v. Weld Cty. Bd. of
Equalization, 851 P.2d 307, 310 (Colo. App. 1993). While the Board
did not specifically cite this presumption, it began its analysis by
thoroughly addressing the County’s position. It analyzed the
commercial classification statutes, as well as the definitions of
“commercial property” and “mixed use property” in related
materials. It considered the Assessor’s testimony, and the meaning
of “overnight lodging” offered to the public.
¶9 Only after analyzing the County’s position did the Board
consider whether the O’Neils had presented sufficient evidence to
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prove that the Assessor’s classification of the property as
“commercial” was incorrect. The Board found that, although the
Assessor had classified the property as commercial “[b]ased on her
research and conviction that the subject’s primary use was
“lodging,” the O’Neils nevertheless presented sufficient evidence to
prove that the primary use of the house was residential. In our
view, the Board’s order demonstrates that it implicitly applied the
presumption in favor of the County, and then found that the O’Neils
had met their burden of proof. See id. (“[T]he determination
whether that burden of proof has been met by competent evidence
by the taxpayer is a question of fact for the [Board] to decide.”); see
also Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Sampson, 105 P.3d 198, 205,
207 (Colo. 2005) (“A taxpayer who met [its] burden of proof also
successfully rebutted the presumption of correctness. . . . [A]
taxpayer is entitled to relief by demonstrating that the classification
is incorrect.”).
B. The Merits of the Board’s Decision
¶ 10 The Board has authority to review county tax assessments and
decisions of boards of county commissioners. Gilpin Cty. Bd. of
Equalization v. Russell, 941 P.2d 257, 261 (Colo. 1997); see §§ 39-2-
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125(1), 39-8-108(1), C.R.S. 2016. Because the Board acts de novo
in these proceedings, we review the propriety of the Board’s
classification determination, and not that of the Assessor or the
County. Johnston v. Park Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 979 P.2d 578,
581 (Colo. App. 1999).
¶ 11 Because the Board’s property classification involves mixed
questions of law and fact, it will be upheld on appeal if it (1) has a
reasonable basis in law and (2) is supported by substantial evidence
in the record. Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
50 P.3d 916, 920 (Colo. App. 2002).
¶ 12 At issue here is whether the O’Neils’ property should be
classified as “residential” or “commercial.”3
3 Although the County, in its brief, refers to several cases involving
a third type (i.e., “mixed use”) of classification, it does not argue
that the O’Neils’ property should be so classified. Such a
classification appears to have been reserved for properties that,
unlike the O’Neils’, have discrete or separate areas that can be
simultaneously occupied or used for both commercial and
residential purposes. See, e.g., 2 Assessors’ Reference Library § 6,
at 6.27 (“Hotels and motels are classified, valued, and assessed as
commercial property unless documentation exists to support a
classification as mixed-use property. To be classified as a mixed-
use property, the hotel or motel property owner and/or operator
must be able to document the use of any portion of the property as
residential property. Specifically, evidence of overnight
accommodation that is leased or rented for thirty consecutive days
5
1. Reasonable Basis in Law
¶ 13 Section 39-1-102(14.5), C.R.S. 2016, defines “[r]esidential real
property” as meaning “residential land and residential
improvements.” Sections 39-1-102(14.4)(a) and 39-1-102(14.3), in
turn, define “[r]esidential land” and “[r]esidential improvement,”
respectively, as “a parcel or contiguous parcels of land under
common ownership upon which residential improvements are
located,” and “a building, or that portion of a building, designed for
use predominantly as a place of residency by a person, a family, or
families.”
¶ 14 The applicable statute does not define “commercial property.”
The State Property Tax Administrator’s Assessors’ Reference Library
(ARL) manuals — which are binding on all county assessors4 —
define “[c]ommercial property” as “includ[ing] all lands,
improvements, and personal property used as a commercial
or longer by the same person or business entity must be
provided.”); see also E.R. Southtech, Ltd. v. Arapahoe Cty. Bd. of
Equalization, 972 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998) (classifying as
mixed-use a rental complex “consisting of 10 separate buildings,
each containing 12 housing units,” and taxing half used as a hotel
as commercial, and half rented as apartments as residential).
4 See Huddleston v. Grand Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 913 P.2d 15, 17
(Colo. 1996).
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enterprise.” 2 Div. of Prop. Taxation, Dep’t of Local Affairs,
Assessors’ Reference Library § 6, at 6.27 (rev. Jan. 2017). Although
the manuals do not define the term “commercial,” a division of this
court has recognized that “[t]he ordinary meaning of ‘commerce’
includes both activities ‘having profit as a primary aim’ and other
‘dealings between individuals or groups in society.’” Mission Viejo
Co. v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 881 P.2d 462, 466 (Colo.
App. 1994) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
456 (1986)). The “commercial” nature of property does not depend
on its profitability. Id.; see also Manor Vail Condo. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Equalization, 956 P.2d 654, 657 (Colo. App. 1998) (in determining
whether property should be classified as “commercial,” “the
profitability of the property is not controlling”).
¶ 15 Whether property is classified “residential” or “commercial,”
then, depends, respectively, on whether it was “designed for use
predominantly as a place of residency” or whether it was used for
activities “having profit as a primary aim” or “other dealings
between individuals or groups in society.”
¶ 16 In making this determination, we consider several factors — to
wit, the use for which the property was originally designed; the
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current, actual use of the property; zoning and any other applicable
use restrictions; and the reasonable future use of the property. See
Mission Viejo, 881 P.2d at 465 (listing the last three factors); see
also 3 Div. of Prop. Taxation, Dep’t of Local Affairs, Assessors’
Reference Library § 2, at 2.3 (rev. Jan. 2017) (listing the “primary
criteria for classification” including current use, zoning and use
restrictions, probable use, and future use); 2 Assessors’ Reference
Library § 6, at 6.1 (stating that “the use for which improvements
were constructed” can also be considered in classifying property).
¶ 17 In this case, the Board determined that the proper
classification of the property was “residential” because its
“predominant and actual use was as a second home.” The Board
based this conclusion on the following circumstances:
 The property was designed for use predominantly as a
residence.
 The site was purchased and the home was built for personal
use.
 The O’Neils’ intent was to use the property as a second home
and as an inheritance for their sons.
8
 The decision to allow short-term rentals was made to offset
expenses and to share the outdoor experience with visitors.
 Even though the property was made available much of the
year, most of the rental activity occurred in the summer
months.
 The O’Neil family itself used the property when possible.
¶ 18 In our view, the Board’s determination has a “reasonable basis
in law,” inasmuch as it is based on the relevant factors of original
intended use of the property, its actual current use, and its
reasonable future use.
2. Substantial Evidence in the Record
¶ 19 The Board’s decision is also supported by substantial evidence
— the testimony of James E. O’Neil. “Substantial evidence is that
which is probative, credible, and competent, such that it warrants a
reasonable belief in the existence of a particular fact without regard
to contradictory testimony or inference.” City of Loveland Police
Dep’t v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 141 P.3d 943, 950 (Colo. App.
2006).5
5 We evaluate the “substantial evidence” issue in this manner
largely because the evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and
9
¶ 20 In the Board hearing, O’Neil testified that the property was
built as a vacation home for the family and to pass on to its sons.
The O’Neil family went there “as much as possible,” which included
“two or three dozen times . . . for a long weekend, or a week” in
2012, and two weeks in 2013. O’Neil testified that “we would go up
there with our family, our dogs, whatever, and just enjoy it, even
during the winter months.” Even though the property was
advertised most of the year as available for rent on VRBO, O’Neil
described the property as “rented only during the summer months”
and vacant most of the time.
¶ 21 O’Neil further testified that when the house was listed for rent
on VRBO, the primary intended use of the property did not change
to generating income. He explained that the money earned from
renting was “to provide upkeep to the house . . . while we shared it
with other people” and that “it might help supplement some of the
things, such as upkeep and maintenance.” He stated that “it was
nice that people would pay to use, so that we could provide cleaning
the weight, probative value, and sufficiency of all the evidence are
matters solely within the factfinding province of the Board.
Gyurman v. Weld Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 851 P.2d 307, 310 (Colo.
App. 1993).
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services, and upkeep on the home, and all the necessary things.
But, as you can easily see, we showed quite a loss on every year
that we rented.”
¶ 22 Finally, O’Neil related that the property is located in a
“Residential Zone District” and subject to a restrictive covenant
prohibiting it from being used for “commercial” purposes.
¶ 23 Based on this evidence, the Board in our view reasonably
determined that the intended and actual use of the property was
predominantly residential rather than commercial in nature. See
Houston v. Wilson Mesa Ranch Homeowners Ass’n, 2015 COA 113,
¶¶ 19, 24 (finding that, for purposes of a restrictive covenant on a
home listed on VRBO, “mere temporary or short-term use of a
residence [by vacation renters] does not preclude that use from
being ‘residential’ . . . [and] that receipt of income does not
transform residential use of property into commercial use”).6
6The County’s reliance on Farny v. Board of Equalization, 985 P.2d
106 (Colo. App. 1999), and E.R. Southtech, 972 P.2d 1057, for a
different conclusion, is misplaced.
In Farny, a division of this court upheld a Board ruling that a
mountain cabin qualified for residential classification when the
owners actually used it as a place of residence approximately
twenty-five days every year and it was at least “minimally suitable”
11
3. The County’s Contrary Assertions
¶ 24 We reject the County’s assertion that the Board misapplied the
law in determining the current, actual use of the property. In its
view, this factor must be determined by comparing the number of
days the property was actually rented out (or available for rental) to
the number of days it was actually occupied by the O’Neils as a
second or vacation home. The O’Neils, the County points out,
rented out the home more than they occupied it themselves,7 and
they made the house available for rent for most of the year.
for such residential purposes, despite lacking electricity and
plumbing. 985 P.2d at 108, 110. The cabin in Farny, like the
O’Neils’ home, was designed and intended for residential use.
In Southtech, the tax classification related to a rental complex
“consisting of 10 separate buildings, each containing 12 housing
units” that were rented for both short-term and long-term
accommodations. 972 P.2d at 1058. Over the Board of
Equalization’s objection, the Board of Assessment Appeals ordered
the mixed-use property to be classified as 50% residential and 50%
commercial. Id. Unlike the O’Neils’ property, however, the property
in Southtech was a large complex operating partially as a hotel and
partially as apartment rentals, not a single-family residence used by
its owners for vacations and rented occasionally.
7 James O’Neil estimated that the home was rented to others for 70
to 75 days in 2012 and for “most of the summer” in 2013. He
estimated that his family used the home “approximately 30 to 40
days” in 2012 and 14 days in 2013. Although the County asserts
that evidence of “estimated approximate use” cannot be considered
12
¶ 25 The County cites us to no authority, nor have we found any,
equating “actual use” simply to the number of days “actually”
occupied for one purpose or another. Indeed, the law would appear
to be otherwise. See Farny v. Bd. of Equalization, 985 P.2d 106,
108, 110 (Colo. App. 1999) (classifying cabin as “residential” when
only used by the owners twenty-five days of the year because it was
“devoted to or intended for” use as a residence). As to the
“availability” of the property, when the property is not actually
occupied, it is essentially available for either rental or residential
purposes. The Board recognized this when it found, for example,
that, although the property was made available for rental most of
the time, it was only actually rented for 70 to 75 days in 2012,
which “means that the property was a residence for approximately
290-295 days whether or not it was occupied during this time.”
¶ 26 We perceive no unreasonable application of the law in the
Board’s refusal to characterize the property’s use as “commercial”
instead of “residential” during the time the property was
unoccupied. In the first instance, “homes which stand empty for a
competent evidence of “actual use,” it cites no authority in support
of that proposition.
13
period of time would not lose their residential classification simply
because they were not ‘actually’ being used as a residence.” Mission
Viejo, 881 P.2d at 465. In the second instance, to classify a
vacation home as commercial for days it was empty, but listed as
available for rent on the Internet, would undermine the purpose of
the “residential” tax classification — which is to “grant homeowners
a modicum of tax relief.” Vail Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, 765 P.2d 593, 594-95 (Colo. App. 1988).
¶ 27 Thus, we conclude that it was reasonable for the Board to
count the days the property was empty as “residential” use,
regardless of its availability as a rental.
¶ 28 Nor was the Board’s determination fatally undermined by two
other, uncontested, circumstances in the record — to wit, (1) the
O’Neils’ primary residence was in New Mexico and (2) the O’Neils
paid sales and lodging taxes and obtained a special use permit for
the VRBO rental.
¶ 29 The criteria for classifying property for tax purposes concern
the characteristics and use of the property, not where the owner
lives or works. See 3 Assessors’ Reference Library § 2, at 2.3. A
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second home does not cease to be residential for property tax
purposes because it is unoccupied more than it is used.
¶ 30 Further, the O’Neils’ payment of sales and lodging taxes, and
acquisition of a special permit allowing short-term rentals, did not
dictate that the property be classified “commercial” because those
payments, in and of themselves, say nothing about the
predominant intent or usage of property.8
¶ 31 Finally, we reject, as unpersuasive, the County’s attempt to
analogize the O’Neils’ use of their property to that of owners of
hotels, motels, and bed and breakfasts (B&Bs), all of which have
been classified in the ARL or county ordinance as “commercial”
properties.9 The O’Neils’ offering of their house for occasional rent,
8 We disagree with the County’s assertion that the Board dismissed
these matters as irrelevant to its decision. Although the Board said
they did not “affect the classification” of the property, we read this
remark as intimating only that they did not undermine the Board’s
conclusion that the O’Neils predominantly used the property for
residential, not commercial, purposes.
9 See 2 Assessors’ Reference Library § 6, at 6.27-6.28 (“Hotels and
motels are classified, valued, and assessed as commercial property
. . . . Bed and breakfast properties are unique mixed-use
properties . . .[with] [c]ommercial lodging area[s] . . . defined as . . .
guest room[s] . . . offered for the exclusive use of paying guests on a
nightly or weekly basis.”); see also Conejos County Land Use Code
§ 2.100 (defining “overnight lodging” as “[a] facility or structure
15
while retaining the right to use it as a second home themselves, is
distinctly different than running a hotel, motel, or B&B.
¶ 32 “Hotels and motels” are defined in the statute as
“improvements . . . that are used by a business establishment
primarily to provide lodging, camping, or personal care or health
facilities to the general public and that are predominantly used on
an overnight or weekly basis.” § 39-1-102(5.5)(a). Unlike hotels
and motels, the O’Neils’ intent was not profit, but to cover the costs
of maintaining the property. And, unlike hotels or motels, the
O’Neils did not make their home available to the “general public”:
they would not simply rent to someone who was willing to pay the
fee; instead, they “screen[ed]” potential renters to make sure they
were the type to be trusted with the house. Additionally, the O’Neils
visited the property for their own vacations when they wished, and
they could at any time decline to rent, which is more consistent
with sharing their home as opposed to transforming it into a hotel.
offering lodging accommodations on a daily basis to the general
public . . . includ[ing] such uses as hotel or motel, resort lodge,
conference center, guest ranch, bed and breakfast or a commercial
boarding house”).
16
¶ 33 Finally, the O’Neils’ property is not like a B&B, which,
according to the ARL, has “unique mixed-use properties” and must
meet the following criteria: (1) the innkeeper must reside in the
establishment or directly next to it; (2) at least one meal must be
provided at no additional charge; and (3) the establishment has no
more than thirteen sleeping rooms available for guests. See 2
Assessors’ Reference Library § 6, at 6.27-6.28. The O’Neils did not
use their property in this fashion.
III. Conclusion
¶ 34 In sum, we perceive no legal error on the part of the Board in
classifying the O’Neils’ property as residential for the 2012 and
2013 tax years. Cf. Slaby v. Mountain River Estates Residential
Ass’n, 100 So. 3d 569, 579-80 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (restrictive
covenant case) (“[N]either [the] financial benefit nor the
advertisement of the property or the remittance of a lodging tax
transforms the nature of the use of the property from residential to
commercial . . . .”); Russell v. Donaldson, 731 S.E.2d 535, 538 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2012) (holding that restrictive covenants for residential
development stating “[n]o lots shall be used for business or
commercial purposes” did not prohibit short-term vacation rentals).
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¶ 35 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE BERGER concur.
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