People v. Alaniz

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA101
Court of Appeals No. 15CA0159
Logan County District Court No. 13CR284
Honorable Charles M. Hobbs, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Antero Alaniz,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN
Graham and Booras, JJ., concur
Announced June 30, 2016
Brittny B. Lewton, District Attorney, Sterling, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Jud Lohnes, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 The People appeal the district court’s order dismissing charges
of second degree murder and first degree assault against defendant,
Antero Alaniz, an inmate at Sterling Correctional Facility. The court
dismissed the charges pursuant to section 18-1-704.5, C.R.S. 2015,
known as Colorado’s “make-my-day” statute1, which provides that
under certain circumstances an occupant of a dwelling who uses
any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force,
against an intruder shall be immune from prosecution.
¶2 We conclude that Alaniz’s prison cell constituted a dwelling for
purposes of section 18-1-704.5 and the district court did not err in
finding that Alaniz established the requirements for immunity.
Therefore, we affirm the order of dismissal.
I. Background
¶3 Alaniz is an inmate in the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole imposed in a separate case. The People filed
1 The statute’s nickname comes from the film Sudden Impact,
starring Clint Eastwood in the role of Dirty Harry, in which he uses
the catch phrase “go ahead, make my day” before dispatching
various bad guys. Dirk Johnson, Colorado Journal; ‘Make My Day’:
More Than a Threat, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1990,
https://perma.cc/HAQ9-S76F.
1
the charges in this case after another inmate, Cleveland Flood, was
found dead in a cell shared by Alaniz and Aaron Bernal at Sterling
Correctional Facility in 2011.
¶4 Alaniz moved to dismiss the charges pursuant to section
18-1-704.5, and the People filed a written response opposing the
motion. The court held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony
from Alaniz, several other inmates, and a CDOC investigator. The
court also admitted surveillance video from outside the cell and
photographs taken during the investigation.
¶5 According to the testimony at the hearing, and as the trial
court found in its lengthy written order, Alaniz and Bernal shared a
cell in a housing unit where inmates could control the locks on
their own cell doors unless the unit was on lockdown. Alaniz and
Bernal were described as close friends who generally kept to
themselves and did not cause trouble for prison staff or other
inmates.
¶6 Flood lived in a different cell in the same housing unit. Both
the CDOC investigator and the other inmates described Flood as a
bully who had a reputation for extorting other inmates, particularly
those who were either mentally or physically weaker than he was.
2
He was larger than Alaniz and Bernal, and he was not a friend of
either of them.
¶7 Alaniz testified that on the evening of February 12, 2011, he
and Bernal were in their cell watching a movie while the unit was
on lockdown for the nightly count. When the lockdown ended,
Bernal unlocked the cell door from the inside, and it popped open a
few inches. According to Alaniz’s testimony, a short time later,
Flood entered the cell uninvited, closed the door behind him,
brandished a shank, and demanded commissary items. Alaniz did
not testify about what followed. A surveillance video from outside
the cell, admitted into evidence, showed Flood entering the cell, but
it did not show what happened inside.
¶8 Alaniz and Bernal emerged from the cell a few minutes later
and contacted prison authorities. Flood was found dead inside the
cell with approximately ninety puncture wounds and ligature marks
around his neck. Investigators also found two shanks in the cell.
Bernal had abrasions and puncture wounds, and Alaniz had marks
on his body consistent with a struggle.
¶9 In their written response to Alaniz’s motion to dismiss and at
the hearing, the People argued that Alaniz failed to prove two
3
requirements for immunity under section 18-1-704.5. First, they
argued that Flood did not make an unlawful entry into the cell.
Second, they argued that Alaniz did not have a reasonable belief
that Flood intended to commit a crime in the cell and might use
force against an occupant.
¶ 10 The court issued a written order dismissing the charges. The
court stated that the People had conceded that a prison cell was a
dwelling for purposes of “make-my-day” immunity under section
18-1-704.5:
[T]he prosecution does not challenge perhaps
the most novel theory of this motion: that an
inmate in the Department of Corrections is
even entitled to invoke this legal protection.
The defense argues that a jail cell qualifies as a
dwelling pursuant to People v. Nichols, 920
P.2d 901 (Colo. 1996). In that case the Court
found that for purposes of the burglary statute
an inmate’s cell constituted a dwelling. Here
the prosecution does not challenge that
analysis. In this case the testimony is that the
inmates had keys to their cells that they could
control whether or not other inmates were
allowed to enter into their cell, and that they
kept their personal and confidential items in
their cell. Because the prosecution concedes
that a prison cell is a dwelling for purposes of
this statute, they are essentially conceding
that an inmate is entitled to invoke the
protections of the castle doctrine.
4
¶ 11 Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the court
concluded that the other requirements of “make-my-day” immunity
were met. It found that the victim made an uninvited, unlawful,
and “highly provocative” entry into the cell while brandishing a
weapon. It also found that Alaniz reasonably believed that the
victim intended to commit a crime in the cell and might use
physical force against an occupant. The court concluded that
Alaniz met his burden in showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was entitled to immunity under section
18-1-704.5, and it dismissed the charges against him.
¶ 12 On appeal, the People contend that the district court erred in
dismissing the charges pursuant to section 18-1-704.5 because a
prison cell is not a dwelling for purposes of that statute, and
because permitting “make-my-day” immunity in a prison setting
would be contrary to public policy. They also contend that Alaniz
was not entitled to dismissal because he failed to prove that he
used any force against the victim. We reject these contentions and
therefore affirm the order of dismissal.
II. Section 18-1-704.5 Immunity
¶ 13 Section 18-1-704.5 provides:
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(1) The general assembly hereby recognizes
that the citizens of Colorado have a right to
expect absolute safety within their own homes.
(2) . . . [A]ny occupant of a dwelling is justified
in using any degree of physical force, including
deadly physical force, against another person
when that other person has made an unlawful
entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant
has a reasonable belief that such other person
has committed a crime in the dwelling in
addition to the uninvited entry, or is
committing or intends to commit a crime
against a person or property in addition to the
uninvited entry, and when the occupant
reasonably believes that such other person
might use any physical force, no matter how
slight, against any occupant.
(3) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical
force, including deadly physical force, in
accordance with the provisions of
subsection (2) of this section shall be immune
from criminal prosecution for the use of such
force.
§ 18-1-704.5(1)-(3) (emphasis added).
¶ 14 When a defendant moves to dismiss the charges pursuant to
section 18-1-704.5 before trial, the defendant bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the elements of
statutory immunity are met. People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971,
980-81 (Colo. 1987). The defendant must prove that
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(1) another person made an unlawful entry
into the defendant’s dwelling; (2) the defendant
had a reasonable belief that such other person
had committed a crime in the dwelling in
addition to the uninvited entry, or was
committing or intended to commit a crime
against a person or property in addition to the
uninvited entry; (3) the defendant reasonably
believed that such other person might use
physical force, no matter how slight, against
any occupant of the dwelling; and (4) the
defendant used force against the person who
actually made the unlawful entry into the
dwelling.
Id. at 981.2
¶ 15 If the pretrial motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant may
raise the statutory conditions set forth in section 18-1-704.5 as an
affirmative defense at trial. Id.
2 The ethical origin of this legal concept, also known as the “castle
doctrine,” may be traced to a verse in the Book of Exodus, chapter
22, verse 1, which provides: “If a thief be found tunneling in, and be
smitten so that he dies, there shall be no bloodguiltiness for him.”
The Babylonian Talmud in Tractate Sanhedrin, chapter 8,
expounds upon this situation, known as “Ba BaMachteret,”
explaining that the verse holds the occupant of the dwelling not
liable for murder because it presumes a person will not stand idly
by while someone takes his property. If the occupant does try to
defend his property, knowing the thief had expended the effort to
break in to the dwelling, the occupant may presume the thief
intends to use deadly force to take the property, and thus the
occupant may use deadly force to defend himself. Sanhedrin 72a.
7
III. Whether a Prison Cell Is a Dwelling
Under Section 18-1-704.5
¶ 16 The People first contend that Alaniz was not entitled to
immunity under section 18-1-704.5 because a prison cell is not a
dwelling for purposes of that statute. We disagree.
A. Preservation
¶ 17 As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether this issue was
preserved for appeal. Alaniz asserts that this issue is unpreserved
and unreviewable because, as the district court stated in its order,
the People conceded that a prison cell is a dwelling under section
18-1-704.5.3 The People contend that the issue was preserved.
¶ 18 In their written response to Alaniz’s motion to dismiss, the
People stated that “[a] prison cell can be considered a dwelling as it
is used for habitation. The normal sense in which this is seen is in
burglary prosecutions.” The People cited People v. Nichols, 920 P.2d
3 Alaniz also requests that we strike the People’s opening brief
because it does not address preservation of the issues or include “a
citation to the precise location in the record where the issue was
raised and ruled on,” as required under the appellate rules in effect
at the time the brief was filed. See C.A.R. 28(k) (2015). Although
the brief does not comply with the appellate rules, we exercise our
discretion to consider it. See People v. Perry, 252 P.3d 45, 46 (Colo.
App. 2010) (accepting briefs as filed despite noncompliance with
appellate rules).
8
901, 902 (Colo. App. 1996), which held that a jail cell was a
dwelling for purposes of second degree burglary. The meaning of
the term “dwelling” was not addressed anywhere else in the motion.
¶ 19 At the hearing, the defense argued that Alaniz’s cell was a
dwelling for purposes of “make-my-day” immunity and stated that
the prosecution had conceded the issue. Later, during the
prosecutor’s arguments, the court stated, “[T]he way I understand
your motion[,] you have conceded it’s a dwelling.” The prosecutor
responded:
I think the Court needs to make a further
finding because all the case law does go to
burglaries[.] I was unable to find any case law
that comes to “Make My Day” defense[.] I
think it’s fairly settled these are considered
dwellings and that’s going to be a finding made
by the. [sic]
The parties did not address the issue again during the remainder of
the hearing.
¶ 20 As the court noted in its order, the prosecutor did not
challenge the interpretation of “dwelling” set forth in the burglary
cases, nor did he argue that that term should be interpreted
differently in the context of “make-my-day” immunity.
Nevertheless, the People argue that the prosecutor preserved the
9
issue by stating that there was no case law directly on point and
requesting that the court make a “further finding.”
¶ 21 Assuming that the prosecutor’s statement adequately
preserved the issue for appeal, we conclude that the People’s
argument fails on the merits.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 22 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo. People v. Turecek, 2012 COA 59, ¶ 9. Our primary purpose
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.
Id. We first look to the language of the statute, giving words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. The General
Assembly may furnish its own definitions of words and phrases in
order to guide and direct judicial determination of the intent of the
legislation although such definitions may differ from ordinary
usage. People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426, 429 (Colo. 1998). If the
General Assembly has defined a statutory term, we must apply that
definition. Id.
¶ 23 If the statute is unambiguous, we apply it as written. Turecek,
¶ 11. If the statute is ambiguous, however, “then we may consider
prior law, legislative history, the consequences of a given
10
construction, and the underlying purpose or policy of the statute.”
Id.
C. Applicable Law
¶ 24 Section 18-1-704.5(2)-(3) grants immunity to “[a]ny occupant
of a dwelling” for using force under the circumstances set forth in
the statute. “Dwelling” is not defined in the current version of
section 18-1-704.5, which was in effect at the time of the charged
offenses.4 However, the criminal code’s definitional section states
that a dwelling is “a building which is used, intended to be used, or
usually used by a person for habitation.” § 18-1-901(3)(g), C.R.S.
2015.
¶ 25 Colorado courts have broadly interpreted the term “dwelling”
as defined in section 18-1-901(3)(g). See People v. Jiminez, 651
P.2d 395, 396 (Colo. 1982) (burglary case holding that an attached
garage was a dwelling); People v. Germany, 41 Colo. App. 304, 308,
586 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1978) (burglary case holding that a hospital
4 The General Assembly recently enacted an amendment to the
statute, which has not yet taken effect, that provides, “[a]s used in
this section, unless the context otherwise requires, ‘dwelling’ does
not include any place of habitation in a detention facility, as defined
in section 18-8-211(4).” Ch. 87, sec. 1, § 18-1-704.5, 2016 Colo.
Sess. Laws 245 (effective Aug. 10, 2016).
11
room was a dwelling), rev’d on other grounds, 198 Colo. 337, 599
P.2d 904 (1979). Germany reasoned that the term “dwelling”
encompassed hotel rooms and hospital rooms, although they are
subunits of a larger building, because “those rooms are habitually
used as a place where persons sleep.” 41 Colo. App. at 308, 586
P.2d at 1009.
¶ 26 Citing Germany, the division in Nichols concluded that a jail
cell qualified as a dwelling for purposes of second degree burglary
because it was “used by persons for habitation.” 920 P.2d at 902.
The defendant in Nichols entered another inmate’s cell and stole his
personal commissary items. Id. The division stated:
Merely because the victim could not refuse
guards entry to his cell does not mean he had
no right or reasonable expectation that he
could exclude other inmates. Such right to
exclude other inmates is indicated by the fact
that the cells had doors that could be locked
from the inside.
Id. The division also cited two out-of-state cases applying the term
“dwelling” to detention facilities. See Sioux Falls Cable Television v.
South Dakota, 838 F.2d 249, 255 (8th Cir. 1988) (prison cell was a
dwelling for purposes of a cable television statute); Bousman v.
12
State, 338 N.E.2d 723, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (county jail was a
dwelling for purposes of burglary statute).
¶ 27 In People v. Cushinberry, a division of this court applied the
definition of dwelling from section 18-1-901(3)(g) to the “make-my-
day” statute. 855 P.2d 18, 19 (Colo. App. 1992). The division
concluded that the common areas of an apartment building were
not a dwelling for purposes of “make-my-day” immunity because
those areas were not part of the defendant’s apartment and were
used by other tenants and their guests. Id.
D. Analysis
¶ 28 For the same reasons set forth in Nichols, we conclude that
Alaniz’s prison cell meets the definition of dwelling in section
18-1-901(3)(g) because it was used by persons for habitation. See
Nichols, 920 P.2d at 901. Alaniz presented evidence at the hearing
that prisoners in his unit slept in their cells, stored personal
belongings there, and could lock or unlock their own cell doors.
See id. On this record, Alaniz’s prison cell constituted a dwelling as
that term is defined in section 18-1-901(3)(g).
¶ 29 We further conclude, as did the division in Cushinberry, that
the definition of dwelling in section 18-1-901(3)(g) applies to the
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immunity provisions of section 18-1-704.5. See Cushinberry, 855
P.2d at 19. Definitions set forth in the criminal code apply
“wherever the same term is used in the same sense in another
section of this title unless the definition is specifically limited or the
context indicates that it is inapplicable.” § 18-1-901(1). Section
18-1-704.5 does not specifically limit the term “dwelling” for
purposes of “make-my-day” immunity, and nothing in the language
of that statute suggests that that the definition set forth in section
18-1-901(3)(g) is inapplicable.
¶ 30 The People rely on subsection (1) of the immunity statute,
which states: “The general assembly hereby recognizes that the
citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within
their own homes.” § 18-1-704.5(1). Based on this provision, the
People argue that section 18-1-704.5 immunity is not available in
the prison context because incarcerated felons lose many of the
rights and privileges available to other Colorado citizens. We are
not persuaded.
¶ 31 Subsections (2) and (3), which set forth the scope and
requirements of “make-my-day” immunity, do not limit the
immunity to “citizens of Colorado . . . within their own homes.”
14
§ 18-1-704.5(1). Instead, those subsections extend immunity to
“[a]ny occupant of a dwelling” who uses force under the
circumstances described. § 18-1-704.5(2)-(3). We presume that the
legislature knows the legal import of the words it uses. Guenther,
740 P.2d at 976. At the time this statute was enacted, the term
“dwelling” was defined in the criminal code and had been broadly
interpreted by Colorado courts, including in nonresidential settings
such as hospital rooms. See Jiminez, 651 P.2d at 396; Germany,
41 Colo. App. at 308, 586 P.2d at 1009. The language of section
18-1-704.5 gives no indication that the legislature intended a
different definition of “dwelling” to apply to “make-my-day”
immunity.
¶ 32 Accordingly, we conclude that the definition set forth in
section 18-1-901(3)(g) applies, and Alaniz’s cell was a dwelling for
purposes of “make-my-day” immunity under the plain language of
the statute.
¶ 33 We also reject the People’s assertion that, because burglary is
a property crime, the broad interpretation of “dwelling” developed in
the burglary cases should not apply in the context of “make-my-
day” immunity. Both statutory provisions offer protections against
15
intruders who intend to commit a crime against either persons or
property. See §§ 18-1-704.5(2); 18-4-203, C.R.S. 2015 (second
degree burglary). And as noted, nothing in the text of section
18-1-704.5 suggests that the legislature intended the term
“dwelling” to apply more narrowly in the “make-my-day” context
than in other provisions of the criminal code.
¶ 34 The People rely on United States v. Slocum, a federal case
which held that an entire prison was not a dwelling for purposes of
determining whether a defendant asserting self-defense had a duty
to retreat. 486 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In that
case, however, the defendant left his own cell and attacked the
victim in another part of the prison. Id. at 1107. Thus, Slocum did
not involve a claim of “make-my-day” immunity by an inmate in his
own cell, and it did not address whether an individual prison cell
like the one occupied by Alaniz could constitute a dwelling.
¶ 35 The People also rely on out-of-state cases holding that
affirmative defenses such as self-defense and duress are not
available to prisoners charged with possession of deadly weapons.
See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 149 So. 3d 206, 209 (La. 2014); People v.
Rau, 436 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). But those cases
16
did not involve statutory immunity provisions similar to section
18-1-704.5. And here, Alaniz claimed immunity for charges of
murder and assault, not possession of a weapon. Accordingly,
those cases are also inapposite for that reason.
¶ 36 The People argue that public policy reasons should prevent
incarcerated felons from claiming “make-my-day” immunity.
However, “the wisdom of such legislation is not for us to decide.”
Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980. The General Assembly is free to amend
the statute based on such concerns, and indeed has already done
so, but we must apply the statute in effect at the time of the
charged offense.5 We have concluded that Alaniz’s cell is a dwelling
under the plain language of section 18-1-704.5, and we may not
deny him the protections of the statute on public policy grounds.
¶ 37 Finally, we reject the People’s argument that permitting
inmates to claim “make-my-day” immunity leads to an absurd
result because it sanctions possession of deadly weapons by
incarcerated felons. Section 18-1-704.5 grants immunity from
5 Although the parties do not address the recent amendment in
their briefs, we note that courts presume that the General Assembly
intends to change the law, not clarify it, when it amends a statute.
People v. Randell, 2012 COA 108, ¶ 18.
17
prosecution only for an occupant’s use of force against an intruder.
It does not permit incarcerated felons to possess deadly weapons,
nor does it prevent them from being prosecuted for that offense.
¶ 38 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Alaniz’s cell
was a dwelling for purposes of section 18-1-704.5 and, therefore, he
was entitled to claim immunity under that statute.
IV. Use of Force Against the Victim
¶ 39 The People next contend that the court erred in dismissing the
charges because Alaniz failed to prove that he used physical force
against the victim. We disagree.
¶ 40 We defer to the court’s factual findings unless they are so
clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.
Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1254 (Colo. 2011). We
review de novo whether the court applied the correct legal standard.
See People v. Hughes, 252 P.3d 1118, 1121 (Colo. 2011).
¶ 41 We are not persuaded that Alaniz was required to present
evidence proving his own use of force at the pretrial hearing in
order to receive immunity under section 18-1-704.5. The People
charged Alaniz with murdering and assaulting the victim, and they
never argued that he was barred from immunity because he did not
18
use any physical force against the victim. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that Alaniz was merely required to
establish that circumstances justifying the charged use of force
were present, as set forth in section 18-1-704.5(2)-(3). Nothing in
the language of that statute supports the People’s assertion that he
was required to “explain[] the entirety of [his] actions” at the hearing
in order to obtain immunity.
¶ 42 The People rely on Guenther, which states that a defendant
claiming immunity under section 18-1-704.5 must prove that he
“used force against the person who actually made the unlawful
entry into the dwelling.” 740 P.2d at 981. In that case, however,
the defendant claimed immunity for shooting both an intruder in
his home and other people who remained outside. Id. at 973-74.
The supreme court held that section 18-1-704.5 provides immunity
“only for force used against one who has made an unlawful entry
into the dwelling, and . . . does not extend to force used against
non-entrants.” Id. at 979. Thus, the language relied on by the
People merely requires proof that the force for which the defendant
claims immunity was directed against the intruder and not
someone else. That issue did not arise in Alaniz’s case.
19
¶ 43 The People do not challenge the court’s findings with respect
to the other requirements for immunity under section 18-1-704.5,
namely, that the victim’s entry was unlawful and that Alaniz had a
reasonable belief that the victim intended to commit a crime and
might use force against an occupant. See id.; Guenther, 740 P.2d at
981. We conclude that those findings were sufficient to support the
court’s ruling that Alaniz was entitled to immunity under section
18-1-704.5. Accordingly, the court did not err in granting Alaniz’s
motion to dismiss the charges.
V. Conclusion
¶ 44 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE GRAHAM and JUDGE BOORAS concur.
20