v. Shanks

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
October 24, 2019
2019COA160
No. 17CA0495, People v. Shanks — Evidence — Opinions and
Expert Testimony — Testimony by Experts
In this criminal appeal, a division of the court of appeals
considers whether a trial court must conduct a Shreck hearing
before admitting expert witness testimony analyzing historical cell
site data. As an issue of first impression, but consistent with most
federal courts, the division holds that the use of historical cell site
data to determine the general geographic location of a cell phone is
widely accepted as reliable and does not require a Shreck hearing.
In so holding, the division distinguishes historical cell site analysis
from the theory of granulization, which remains a source of
controversy within the scientific and forensic communities.
Because the evidence offered at trial was within the bounds of
reliable historical cell site data analysis, it was properly admitted.
The division also rejects the defendant’s contentions that the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s
out-of-court identification and in admitting the victim’s in-court
identification; that the district court violated his rights to due
process, to present a defense, and to a fair trial by disallowing
certain evidence in support of and not instructing the jury on an
alternate suspect defense; and that the district court erred by
allowing reference to his nickname during trial.
Accordingly, the division affirms the judgment of conviction.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA160
Court of Appeals No. 17CA0495
Jefferson County District Court No. 14CR2888
Honorable Tamara S. Russell, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Charles Jenson Shanks,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Furman and Davidson*, JJ., concur
Announced October 24, 2019
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jillian J. Price, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Lauretta A. Martin Neff, Alternate Defense Counsel, Grand Junction, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2019.
¶1 Defendant Charles Jenson Shanks appeals from his conviction
on two counts of kidnapping, two counts of burglary, and one count
each of robbery, felony menacing, assault, and false imprisonment.
He contends that the district court erred by (1) admitting expert
witness testimony about historical cell site analysis without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing; (2) admitting an impermissibly
suggestive out-of-court identification and an in-court identification
based thereon; (3) excluding his alternate suspect defense; and (4)
allowing the use of his nickname, “Capone,” at trial. He also
contends that the cumulative effect of these errors warrants
reversal. We affirm.
¶2 Addressing an issue of first impression in Colorado, we
conclude that expert testimony explaining how historic cell site data
is used to provide a general geographic location of a cell phone at a
given time may be admitted without first holding an evidentiary
hearing on the reliability of the methodology.
I. Background
¶3 Shanks and his codefendant, William Cody, were charged with
numerous offenses arising from the home invasion and assault of
the victim.
1
¶4 The victim and Cody worked together and occasionally
socialized outside of work. The victim supplied Cody with
marijuana and the two men sometimes smoked marijuana together.
On the night of the charged offenses, Cody called the victim to
purchase some marijuana and arranged for his “sister,”
codefendant Arianna Eastman, to pick it up for him.
¶5 The victim met Eastman outside his house for the transaction.
When he turned to go back inside, a masked man, whom the victim
later identified as Cody, and another unmasked man followed him
and forced their way inside. The two assailants searched the
apartment and beat up the victim before leaving with the victim’s
equipment for growing marijuana.
¶6 A couple of days after this incident, the victim identified
Shanks as the second assailant from a photo array. The victim
identified Shanks again during trial.
¶7 A jury ultimately convicted Shanks as charged. The court
sentenced him to twenty-eight years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections.
2
II. Historical Cell Site Analysis
¶8 Shanks contends that the district court erred by admitting
expert witness testimony analyzing historical cell site data without
first holding a hearing to determine the reliability of the science
behind such analysis. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶9 We review the district court’s admission of expert testimony for
an abuse of discretion and will reverse only when the decision is
manifestly erroneous. See People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200
(Colo. 2011). “This deference reflects the superior opportunity of
the trial judge to assess the competence of the expert and to assess
whether the expert’s opinion will be helpful to the jury.” Id.B. Applicable Law
¶ 10 A trial court determines the admissibility of expert testimony
under CRE 702, which provides as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
3
The inquiry focuses on “the reliability and relevance of the proffered
evidence and requires a determination as to (1) the reliability of the
scientific principles, (2) the qualifications of the witness, and (3) the
usefulness of the testimony to the jury.” People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d
68, 70 (Colo. 2001); accord People v. Campbell, 2018 COA 5, ¶ 40.
The court must also evaluate the evidence under CRE 403,
ensuring that the probative value is not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. See Rector, 248 P.3d at 1200;
Shreck, 22 P.3d at 70.
¶ 11 The court’s inquiry “should be broad in nature and consider
the totality of the circumstances of each specific case.” Shreck, 22
P.3d at 77; accord Rector, 248 P.3d at 1200. Although the factors
set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993), provide helpful guidance, a court need not consider any
specific set of factors when determining the reliability of the
proffered evidence. Shreck, 22 P.3d at 78.
¶ 12 Concerns about conflicting opinions or whether a qualified
expert accurately applied a reliable methodology go to the weight of
the evidence, not its admissibility. See Campbell, ¶ 42. “Such
concerns ‘are adequately addressed by vigorous cross-examination,
4
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof.’” Id. (quoting Estate of Ford v. Eicher, 250 P.3d
262, 269 (Colo. 2011)).
¶ 13 If a party requests that evidence be subjected to a Shreck
analysis, the trial court may, in its discretion, hold an evidentiary
hearing. Id. at ¶ 41. “This discretion comports with the trial court’s
need to ‘avoid unnecessary reliability proceedings in ordinary cases
where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for
granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or
more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert’s
reliability arises.’” Rector, 248 P.3d at 1201 (quoting Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). A hearing is not
required if the court “has before it sufficient information to make
specific findings under CRE 403 and CRE 702 about the reliability
of the scientific principles involved, the expert’s qualification to
testify to such matters, the helpfulness to the jury, and potential
prejudice.” Id.C. Additional Background
¶ 14 Shanks’s defense was that he was not the second assailant
and that he was at a family gathering on the other side of town
5
(about eighteen miles southeast of the victim’s house) at the time of
the offense. The prosecution intended to disprove this defense by
introducing evidence from Shanks’s phone records and cell tower
usage data to show that he was in the general area of the victim’s
home at the time of the offense. To do so, the prosecution disclosed
investigator Kathleen Battan as an expert in “Forensic Analysis of
Cellular Phone Records and Cell Tower Function and Data.”
Defense counsel objected and requested a Shreck hearing.
¶ 15 In its order denying the hearing request, the district court
noted that whether a Shreck hearing is required to determine the
admissibility of historical cell site analysis is a novel issue in
Colorado. It then reviewed federal case law analyzing the issue
under Fed. R. Evid. 702, which is similar to Colorado’s rule for our
purposes, before ruling that
federal courts have generally required a
pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility
of expert testimony purporting to pinpoint the
location of a defendant using cell phone site
data, whereas a pretrial hearing has generally
not been required to determine the
admissibility of testimony merely purporting to
place a defendant within the service radius of a
specific tower at a certain time.
6
Concluding that the prosecution’s proffered evidence fell into the
latter category — identifying Shanks’s general location when the
crime was committed — the district court denied the request for a
hearing.
¶ 16 Shanks renewed his objection and request for hearing multiple
times, arguing that Ms. Battan based her opinion on a theory called
“granulization” and the “scientifically unsupported assumption that
a cell phone connects to the closest cell tower.” Shanks also
challenged Ms. Battan’s use of pie shaped sectors rather than ovals
to demonstrate the cell tower service area. Again, the district court
denied the request for hearing.
¶ 17 At trial, over Shanks’s objection 1, the district court accepted
Ms. Battan as an expert and allowed her to testify “about forensic
analysis of cellphone records . . . and also in a limited fashion about
. . . cell tower function and data.” The court acknowledged that Ms.
Battan did not have a background in science or engineering but
1 Shanks did not object to Ms. Battan’s analysis of cell phone
records or her mapping or identification of the cell towers used to
make particular calls. Instead, Shanks objected to Ms. Battan’s
“analysis of sectors, what sectors mean and general technical
operations of a cellphone tower.”
7
concluded she did not need to “know how to design, operate or
manufacture cell towers” to testify about the cell tower data she
collects and “what that data tells her about cell tower function.”
¶ 18 Ms. Battan testified to the following:
• Typically, a cell tower has three sectors, each covering
approximately 120 degrees of a 360-degree circle around
the tower. The orientation of the sector (the precise
direction the sector points) is called the azimuth.
• Law enforcement has access to a database that includes
the precise physical location of all cell towers and the
azimuth of each sector of each tower.
• Shanks’s cell phone carrier produced records that
included data about when each call was made or
received, how long the call lasted, and what specific
sector of what cell tower was used by the cell phone to
make or receive the call.
• She mapped the physical location of the cell towers used
by Shanks’s carrier using Google Earth; identified the
towers closest to Shanks’s residence, Cody’s residence,
8
and the victim’s residence; and noted that there were
approximately 100 towers in between.
• Using an FBI computer program, she plotted the cell
tower and sector used for each relevant call reflected in
Shanks’s phone records. The sectors associated with
each call were reflected on the exhibits as 120-degree
wedges with green lines as the general boundaries of the
sector and a shaded green area between the lines. The
lines did not depict distance from the cell tower.
2
2For reader clarity, we have included a map that was part of a trial
exhibit reflecting how Battan mapped the sectors.
9
• She cannot state how far away a cell phone is from a
given cell tower during a call or exactly where a cell
phone is when it uses a particular tower.
• Many cell tower coverages overlap and a call typically will
use the cell tower with the clearest and strongest signal
even if that tower is not the closest. Which tower a
phone uses is determined by the carrier based on a
variety of factors.
¶ 19 With this background, Ms. Battan testified about and
presented exhibits showing the cell towers and sectors used by
Shanks’s cell phone to make and receive calls before and after the
attack on the victim. Between 10:36 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., Shanks’s
phone connected with towers near his home in Aurora. Between
4:55 p.m. and 7:39 p.m., Shanks’s phone connected with towers
moving west along the highways between his home and Cody’s
home in Lakewood. Between 9:00 p.m. and 10:08 p.m., Shanks’s
phone made or received six calls by connecting to a west-facing
sector of a tower situated southeast of the victim’s home in
Edgewater. At 10:27 p.m. the victim called 911 to report the attack.
10
At 10:39 p.m., Shanks’s phone again connected with the tower
nearest Cody’s home.
¶ 20 Ms. Battan performed a similar analysis of cell phone records
for Cody and Eastman. Collectively, the data revealed several
communications among Shanks, Cody, Eastman, and the victim
from 9:04 p.m. to 9:51 p.m., and further communications between
Shanks’s phone and Eastman’s phone between 10:02 p.m. and
10:08 p.m. Shanks’s, Cody’s, and Eastman’s phones connected to
towers near the victim’s home for these communications.
¶ 21 Notably, Ms. Battan did not opine that Shanks or his phone
was in any specific location at any specific time. Nor did she testify
regarding the overlap in coverage between two cell towers or to the
range of any tower with which Shanks’s phone connected the night
of the incident. She also did not testify to the typical coverage
range of a tower, instead explaining generally that the range of a
tower in an urban area like Denver will be much shorter than in a
rural area like the middle of Kansas because of the concentration
and availability of towers, heavy usage, and physical interference in
urban areas. Ms. Battan did say, on cross-examination, that she
believed it was impossible for Shanks’s phone to be eighteen miles
11
to the southeast of the tower nearest the victim’s home at the time
it connected to the west-facing sector of that tower.
¶ 22 To counteract Ms. Battan’s testimony, Shanks offered a
competing expert, Joseph Kennedy. Over the prosecution’s
objection, the district court accepted Mr. Kennedy as an expert in
“radio frequency, which includes cell phone tower operations and
cell phones.” Mr. Kennedy testified to the following:
• Many cell tower coverages overlap and a call typically will
use the cell tower with the best call quality, even if that
tower is not the closest. Which tower a phone uses is
determined by the carrier based on a variety of factors.
• Typically, a cell tower has three sectors pointing in three
different directions. No sector is precisely 120 degrees.
• One cannot say a cell phone is near a tower simply
because it connects to that tower. A cell phone can be
serviced by and connect with any tower within 21.7
miles.
¶ 23 Accordingly, Mr. Kennedy opined that Shanks’s cell phone
could have connected to any tower within a service area of
approximately twenty-one miles and that Shanks could have been
12
at a family gathering eighteen miles southeast of the tower nearest
the victim’s home when his phone pinged that tower. However, on
cross-examination, Mr. Kennedy conceded the 21.7-mile coverage
area decreases in urban areas and cell towers in the Denver metro
area would have a more limited coverage area, possibly one to one
and a half miles.
¶ 24 Finally, to rebut Mr. Kennedy’s opinions, the prosecution
offered special agent Scott Eicher, who is a founding member of the
FBI’s Cellular Analysis Survey Team, as an expert in “historical cell
site data analysis.” Agent Eicher agreed with Ms. Battan and Mr.
Kennedy that a cell phone generally selects a tower based on signal
strength and signal quality. He further testified that, although the
maximum range of a cell tower may be twenty-one miles, in urban
areas, the cell towers are placed in close proximity and are designed
so that the signal does not go past the next tower. In other words,
even in the Denver suburbs, a cell phone must be within a mile or
mile and a half of a cell tower to use it. According to Agent Eicher,
it was not feasible for Shanks’s phone to be eighteen miles away
from the tower with which it was connecting. Even so, Agent Eicher
13
admitted that only the general location of a phone can be discerned
from the tower and sector data, not the phone’s exact location.
D. Analysis
¶ 25 Shanks argues the district court erred in admitting Ms.
Battan’s and Agent Eicher’s testimony without first holding a
Shreck hearing because their opinions (1) were based on the faulty
assumption that a cell phone always connects to the nearest tower;
and (2) were based on unreliable science and methodology.
1. The Opinions Were Not Based on the Faulty Assumption that
a Cell Phone Always Connects to the Nearest Tower
¶ 26 We reject Shanks’s first argument — that the prosecution’s
experts’ opinions should not have been admitted because they were
based on the faulty premise that a cell phone always connects to
the closest tower — because it is inconsistent with the record.
During pretrial arguments concerning Shanks’s request for a
Shreck hearing, the prosecution represented to the district court
that Ms. Battan would not opine that a cell phone necessarily
connects to the nearest cell tower. Consistent with that
representation, neither Ms. Battan nor Agent Eicher so testified at
trial. Instead, both experts testified that a phone will connect with
14
the tower emitting the strongest, clearest signal. Neither expert’s
opinion was based on the alleged faulty premise Shanks identifies.
2. The Opinions Were Based on Reliable Methodology
¶ 27 According to Shanks, Ms. Battan’s and Agent Eicher’s
opinions were based on unreliable science and methodology
because they relied on a theory called “granulization.” To
understand Shanks’s argument, it is necessary to provide some
background on the use of historical cell site data and its general
acceptance nationwide.
¶ 28 “Historical cell-site analysis uses cell phone records and cell
tower locations to determine, within some range of error, a cell
phone’s location at a particular time.” United States v. Hill, 818
F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Aaron Blank, The Limitations
and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular Site Data to Track the
Location of A Cellular Phone, 18 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 3, 5 (2011)).
Essentially, a cell phone is a two-way radio that uses a cellular
network to communicate. Id. Each cell site or tower has a limited
geographic range, which depends on the number and height of the
antennas on the cell site, topography of the surrounding land, and
natural and manmade obstructions. Id.15
¶ 29 “In urban areas, cell towers may be located every one-half to
one mile, while cell sites in rural areas may be three to five miles
apart.” Id. A cell phone generally connects to the tower with the
strongest signal, although adjoining towers may provide coverage
overlap. Id. There are several factors that determine which tower a
cell phone will connect with, including proximity, geography,
topography, environmental factors, the technical characteristics of
the relevant phone, and the number, height, and angle of antennas
on the tower. See id. at 295-96; State v. Johnson, 797 S.E.2d 557,
561-62 (W. Va. 2017).
¶ 30 “A cellphone generates ‘historical’ cell-site data when it places
a call and connects to a specific cell tower.” United States v.
Reynolds, 626 F. App’x 610, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2015). Phone
companies maintain call detail records, which include data about
the duration of the call and the tower and sector to which the cell
phone connected. See id. at 615; United States v. Jones, 918 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013); United States v. Eady, No. 2:12-CR-
00415-DCN-3, 2013 WL 4680527, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 30, 2013)
(unpublished opinion). In addition, the cell service providers
maintain a list of the precise location of each tower and the
16
specifications for each of the sectors of the tower. See Jones, 918 F.
Supp. 2d at 5.
¶ 31 Typically, in criminal cases, the prosecution offers a witness
who uses these resources to plot on a map the location of the cell
tower used by an individual’s cell phone for a call or series of calls.
See, e.g., United States v. Machado-Erazo, 950 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54
(D.D.C. 2013); Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 4-5; Eady, 2013 WL
4680527, at *3; United States v. Davis, No. 11-60285-CR, 2013 WL
2156659, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2013) (unpublished opinion).
Often, these witnesses also will plot the specific sector to which the
individual’s phone connected by drawing lines coming out from
each tower at a 120-degree angle. See Machado-Erazo, 950 F.
Supp. 2d at 54; Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 3; Eady, 2013 WL
4680527, at *3; Davis, 2013 WL 2156659, at *5. From these maps,
the witness may opine that the individual’s phone was likely within
a general geographic location, see Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 5, or
the coverage area of a particular sector, see Eady, 2013 WL
4680527, at *3, at the time of each call.
¶ 32 Federal courts “that have been called upon to decide whether
to admit historical cell-site analysis have almost universally done
17
so.” Hill, 818 F.3d at 297 (collecting cases); Machado-Erazo, 950 F.
Supp. 2d at 56 (collecting cases). Several state courts have done
the same. See, e.g., People v. Fountain, 62 N.E.3d 1107, 1124-25
(Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (collecting cases). And a number of these courts
have concluded that the methodology described above is widely
accepted as reliable and may be admitted without first holding an
evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Hill, 818 F.3d at 298; Jones, 918 F.
Supp. 2d at 4-5; Fountain, 62 N.E.3d at 1124-25; Commonwealth v.
Nevels, 203 A.3d 229, 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). In so doing,
however, these courts have distinguished the use of historic cell site
data to determine the general location of a phone from the theory of
“granulization,” which purports to identify a caller’s specific
location. See United States v. Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956-57
(N.D. Ill. 2012).
¶ 33 The theory of “granulization” was rejected by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Evans, on
which Shanks heavily relies. Although Evans does not define
“granulization,” the court explained that the theory requires an
expert to identify
18
(1) the physical location of the cell sites used
by the phone during the relevant time period;
(2) the specific antenna used at each cell site;
and (3) the direction of the antenna’s coverage.
He then estimates the range of each antenna’s
coverage based on the proximity of the tower to
other towers in the area. This is the area in
which the cell phone could connect with the
tower given the angle of the antenna and the
strength of its signal. Finally, using his
training and experience, [the expert] predicts
where the coverage area of one tower will
overlap with the coverage area of another.
Id. at 952. Using this theory, the prosecution in Evans sought to
prove that the defendant was in the same building where the
kidnapping victim was held for ransom because the building fell
squarely within the coverage overlap of two towers used by the
defendant’s phone to make calls during a relevant time period. Id.
¶ 34 The court identified two flaws with the theory of granulization:
(1) it assumes that a cell phone uses the tower closest to it at the
time of a call, without accounting for the possibility that the phone
might have connected to other towers based on a variety of factors;
and (2) it remains wholly untested by the scientific community. Id.
at 956. Although the court acknowledged that certain types of
historical cell site analysis are reliable and admissible, it rejected
19
the use of granulization theory to pinpoint the defendant’s location.
Id. at 953, 955, 957.
¶ 35 Having considered the foregoing cases, we hold that the use of
historical cell site data to determine the general geographic location
of a cell phone is widely accepted as reliable and does not require a
Shreck hearing. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Shanks’s request for a Shreck
hearing.
¶ 36 We further conclude that the evidence presented at trial was
within the bounds of reliable historical cell site analysis. The
prosecution experts generally explained how cell towers work and
identified the variables and limitations incorporated into their
analyses. Ms. Battan mapped the cell towers, identified which of
Shanks’s calls used which towers and sectors, and opined — when
asked on cross-examination — that it was not possible for Shanks’s
phone to be eighteen miles away from a tower to which it
connected.
¶ 37 Agent Eicher testified that he had reviewed Ms. Battan’s
analysis and agreed with it. He further opined, based on the
approximate coverage area of cell towers in the Denver metro area,
20
that it was not feasible for Shanks’s phone to be eighteen miles
away at the time of the offense.
¶ 38 Importantly, neither expert opined about coverage overlap
between towers or that a cell phone necessarily connects to the
closest tower. Neither expert opined as to the precise location of
Shanks’s phone at any specific time.
¶ 39 Shanks takes issue with how Ms. Battan portrayed the cell
tower sectors on her map and how Agent Eicher estimated the
range of cell towers in the Denver metro area. Shanks also argues
that the prosecution experts failed to consider the many variables
affecting how a cell phone and tower connect.
¶ 40 But to the extent either expert’s opinion was based on
assumptions about coverage range or fails to account for certain
variables, any challenges to those assumptions or to the expert’s
application of variables went to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility. See Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (“[T]o the extent that
Agent Eicher’s testimony relies on assumptions about the strength
of the signal from a given cell tower, any challenges to those
assumptions go to the weight of his testimony, not its reliability.”).
Indeed, while assumptions and variables may be tested by vigorous
21
cross-examination, they do “not render the fundamental
methodology of cell site analysis unreliable.” Id.; see also United
States v. Pembrook, 119 F. Supp. 3d 577, 597-98 (E.D. Mich. 2015)
(“[T]o the extent that [the witness] has made assumptions about
signal strength that call into question his estimate of where the
phones were located at particular times, Defendants can test those
assumptions on cross exam.”).
¶ 41 Here, both prosecution experts were subject to thorough
cross-examination. Shanks also offered his own expert to challenge
the accuracy of the prosecution’s evidence. That the experts
disagreed did not undermine the reliability of the evidence or
counsel against its admission in the first place. See Campbell, ¶ 42.
¶ 42 Thus, we also conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting Ms. Battan’s and Agent Eicher’s testimony.
III. Identification Evidence
¶ 43 Shanks contends that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress the victim’s out-of-court identification.
According to Shanks, the court further erred by admitting the
victim’s in-court identification, which was based on the
22
impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification. We disagree
with both contentions.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 44 “The ultimate question as to the constitutionality of pretrial
identification procedures is a mixed question of law and fact.”
Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 190 (Colo. 2002). Thus, “[w]hen
reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we generally
defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but review its legal
conclusions de novo.” People v. Plancarte, 232 P.3d 186, 189 (Colo.
App. 2009). But while the trial court’s findings of historical fact are
entitled to deference, “an appellate court may give different weight
to those facts and may reach a different conclusion in light of the
legal standard.” Bernal, 44 P.3d at 190; see People v. Singley, 2015
COA 78M, ¶ 9.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 45 To determine the admissibility of an out-of-court photographic
identification, the court must engage in a two-step analysis. First,
the defendant must prove that the identification procedure was
impermissibly suggestive. Bernal, 44 P.3d at 191; Singley, ¶ 14. If
the defendant fails to meet this initial burden, no further inquiry is
23
required and the identification is admissible. Bernal, 44 P.3d at
191 (“It is important to note that these two steps must be completed
separately; it is only necessary to reach the second step if the court
first determines that the array was impermissibly suggestive.”);
Singley, ¶ 14.
¶ 46 Second, if the court finds the photo array impermissibly
suggestive, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that the
identification was nonetheless reliable under the totality of the
circumstances. Bernal, 44 P.3d at 192; see also Singley, ¶ 15. “As
long as the totality of the circumstances does not indicate a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, no
constitutional impediment to the admission of the identification
testimony exists.” Bernal, 44 P.3d at 192.
¶ 47 But a “defendant is denied due process when an in-court
identification is based upon an out-of-court identification which is
so suggestive as to render the in-court identification unreliable.”
People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d 93, 103 (Colo. 2003).
¶ 48 In determining whether the pretrial photo identification
procedure is impermissibly suggestive, the court may consider such
relevant factors as “the size of the array, the manner of its
24
presentation by the officers, and the details of the photographs
themselves.” Bernal, 44 P.3d at 191. The size of the array is a
factor affecting the weight a court gives to any irregularities. Id.
Thus, the more pictures used, the less likely it is that a minor
difference will have a prejudicial effect; the fewer pictures used, the
closer the array must be scrutinized. Id.
¶ 49 The crucial question when examining the array itself is
“whether the picture of the accused, which matches descriptions
given by the witness, so stood out from all of the other photographs
as to ‘suggest to an identifying witness that that person was more
likely to be the culprit.’” Id. (quoting Jarerett v. Headley, 802 F.2d
34, 41 (2d Cir. 1986)). “In other words, the array must not be so
limited that the defendant is the only one to match the witness’s
description of the perpetrator.” Id. The array need not include
exact replicas of the defendant or be uniform with respect to a given
characteristic, but they must be “matched by race, approximate
age, facial hair, and a number of other characteristics.” Id. at
191-92 (quoting People v. Webster, 987 P.2d 836, 839 (Colo. App.
1998)). An array that includes a photo “unique in a manner directly
related to an important identification factor” may be impermissibly
25
suggestive. Id. at 192; see also Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483,
1490 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Although a photo-lineup is not necessarily
suggestive merely because the individuals in the lineup differ in
facial characteristics, . . . here the differences were either strikingly
apparent, such as a swollen eye, or they related to an important
component of [the victim’s] description of her assailant, his hair
style.”).
¶ 50 We are in the same position as the district court to review the
details of the photographs and consider their placement in the
array. Thus, we review de novo whether the photographic array
itself was impermissibly suggestive. See People v. Carlos, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 873, 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (reviewing the suggestibility
of a photo array de novo); McCoy v. United States, 781 A.2d 765,
771 (D.C. 2001) (same); Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 581
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on
how the suggestiveness of a pre-trial photo array may have
influenced an in-court identification.”); cf. People v. Ramadon, 2013
CO 68, ¶ 21 (“When the interrogation is audio or video-recorded,
and there are no disputed facts outside the recording pertinent to
the suppression issue, we are in the same position as
26
the trial court in determining whether the statements should or
should not be suppressed under the totality of the circumstances.”).
C. Analysis
¶ 51 The victim described the second assailant as a “black Abe
Lincoln” because he had “an Abe Lincoln style beard on his chin
and high cheek bones.” The photo array presented to him
contained pictures of six men arranged in two rows of three, with
Shanks appearing in the middle of the bottom row. The men all
appear to be African-American, though one man (not Shanks) has
noticeably lighter skin than the other five. They all have similarly
placed cheekbones, close-shaven haircuts, and some facial hair. 3
They all appear to be of similar age. Officers presented the array in
black-and-white, so there is no drastic difference in background
color, lighting, or clothing color. All men appear to be wearing
prison clothing. Each photograph is only of the head and neck and
reveals nothing of the height or weight of the men.
3 None of the men have particularly bushy sideburns or beards,
which typically are associated with Abraham Lincoln. However, at
trial, the victim testified that he used the description “black
Abraham Lincoln” in reference to the $5 bill, which depicts Lincoln
with closely-trimmed facial hair. In any event, Shanks’s facial hair
does not distinguish him from the others in the photo array.
27
¶ 52 Shanks points out that he is the only one with a pointy head,
that he has small ears, and that his nose is broader than the rest.
We agree that none of the other men have heads as pointy as
Shanks’s or a nose that is quite as broad; however, several of the
men do have long, slender faces and small ears, and their noses are
a range of sizes. Further, the victim did not describe his assailant
as having a pointy head, small ears, or a broad nose, so these are
not defining characteristics that create impermissible
suggestiveness. See Borghesi, 66 P.3d at 105; Bernal, 44 P.3d at
192; People v. Owens, 97 P.3d 227, 233 (Colo. App. 2004).
¶ 53 Thus, we conclude that the photo array itself was not
impermissibly suggestive and that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting it. Because we have concluded that the
photo array was not impermissibly suggestive, we need not
determine whether the identification was otherwise reliable under
the totality of the circumstances.
¶ 54 Further, we conclude that the victim’s subsequent in-court
identification of Shanks was not inherently unreliable. As noted,
the in-court identification was not preceded by an impermissibly
suggestive pretrial identification procedure, and there was nothing
28
suggestive about the in-court identification beyond the normal
courtroom setting. See Garner v. People, 2019 CO 19, ¶ 5. Defense
counsel was able to cross-examine the victim about the
identification during the trial and to highlight for the jury any
factors he believed made the in-court identification suggestive. See
id. at ¶ 55. Thus, we also conclude that the district court did not
err by admitting the in-court identification.
IV. Alternate Suspect Defense
¶ 55 Shanks contends that the district court violated his rights to
due process, to present a defense, and to a fair trial by denying his
alternate suspect defense. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 56 We review the trial court’s evidentiary decisions, including
whether to admit alternate suspect evidence, for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Folsom, 2017 COA 146M, ¶ 29. A trial court
abuses its discretion where its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or “is based on an erroneous view of the
law.” People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 20.
29
B. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 57 A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense,
including the right to present evidence that someone other than the
defendant may have committed the crime, because “a criminal
defendant is entitled to all reasonable opportunities to present
evidence that might tend to create doubt as to [his] guilt.” Folsom,
¶ 30 (quoting Elmarr, ¶ 26). To be admissible, however, the
alternate suspect evidence must be relevant and its probative value
must not be substantially outweighed by “the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” CRE 403; see Elmarr, ¶ 27.
Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” CRE 401.
¶ 58 “[T]he admissibility of alternate suspect evidence ultimately
depends on the strength of the connection between
the alternate suspect and the charged crime.” Elmarr, ¶ 22; accord
Folsom, ¶ 31. The “evidence must create more than just an
30
unsupported inference or possible ground for suspicion.” Elmarr,
¶ 32. Instead, the evidence must establish a “non-speculative
connection or nexus between the alternate suspect and the crime
charged.” Id. Whether the requisite connection exists requires a
case-by-case analysis considering all evidence proffered by the
defendant to show that the alternate suspect committed the crime.
Id.¶ 59 The Colorado Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions
that merely showing that an alternate suspect had the motive or the
opportunity to commit the charged offense, without some additional
proof connecting the alternate suspect to the offense, is insufficient
to prove that necessary nexus. E.g., id. at ¶ 34 (“[E]vidence merely
showing that someone else had a motive or opportunity to commit
the charged crime — without other additional evidence
circumstantially or inferentially linking the alternate suspect to the
charged crime — presents too tenuous and speculative a connection
to be relevant because it gives rise to no more than grounds for
possible suspicion.”); People v. Mulligan, 193 Colo. 509, 518, 568
P.2d 449, 456-57 (1977) (same).
31
C. Additional Background
¶ 60 Before trial, Shanks endorsed an alternate suspect defense,
asserting that a man named Andrew Davis was the second
assailant. Shanks’s endorsement stated the following:
• Davis and Eastman were “associated” at the time of the
offense;
• Davis was at liberty and lived in the area of the offense at
the time and therefore had the opportunity to commit it;
• Eastman did not approve of Shanks’s relationship with
her mother and the two had never gotten along;
• Davis was associated with a gray Volkswagon Jetta and a
witness described the car that dropped Cody off just after
the offense as a gray Jetta;
• Davis’s physical appearance more closely resembled the
description given by the victim; and
• Davis had an extensive criminal history involving
menacing, weapons, and home invasions.
¶ 61 The prosecution moved to strike the endorsement and
preclude Shanks from presenting alternate suspect evidence at
32
trial, arguing that the facts alleged were speculative and irrelevant
to the charged offense. The court granted the prosecution’s motion.
¶ 62 At the beginning of trial, after it had become clear that
Eastman would testify, defense counsel again asked for permission
to introduce alternate suspect evidence. Counsel represented to the
district court that Eastman had recently told her mother that Davis
committed the crime with her and Cody, not Shanks.
¶ 63 The district court still found that the proffered evidence was
not alternate suspect evidence and that there was “no actual
connection” between Davis and the charged offense. The court did
conclude, however, that the evidence could be used for
impeachment, depending on Eastman’s testimony at trial. The
court said that defense counsel could question Eastman about her
relationship with Davis, about her covering up for him and lying to
investigators, and about her dislike of Shanks. In addition, counsel
likely would be allowed to introduce the photographs of Davis.
¶ 64 At trial, Eastman denied telling her mother that Davis helped
commit the offense. She also testified that she was not dating Davis
at the time. Her mother testified to the contrary and was shown
pictures of Davis, which she confirmed accurately reflected his
33
appearance at that time. For reasons not pertinent to our analysis,
no photographs of Davis were admitted at trial. Still, the court told
defense counsel that he could argue in closing that Davis was an
alternate suspect. Ultimately, counsel did not do so.
D. Analysis
1. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
¶ 65 The evidence Shanks first presented to the district court in
support of his endorsement of an alternate suspect, even
considered collectively, was speculative and did not provide a direct
nexus between Davis and the offense. Generally, it demonstrated
that Davis lived nearby at the time and was potentially dating one of
the codefendants, thereby providing him the opportunity to commit
the offense. But no one identified Davis as being involved in the
offense, there was no physical evidence linking him to the offense,
there was no evidence of a motive for him to commit the offense,
there was no evidence about factual similarities between this
offense and his previous crimes, and the victim confidently
identified Shanks as the assailant. See Elmarr, ¶ 30 (“A defendant .
. . suggesting that an alternate suspect committed the crime . . .
might seek to show that someone else: had a motive to commit the
34
crime; had an opportunity to commit the crime; confessed to the
crime or otherwise engaged in behavior indicating his involvement;
is linked to physical evidence of the crime; or committed similar
acts or crimes.”); Owens, 97 P.3d at 235 (affirming trial court’s
exclusion of evidence that raised speculation but provided no
“direct connection” between the alternate suspect and the crime);
People v. Perez, 972 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Colo. App. 1998) (rejecting
alternate suspect evidence based on commission of a similar crime
when the evidence did not “indicat[e] any distinctive similarities in
the details of the crimes”); cf. Folsom, ¶¶ 38-40 (reversing trial
court’s exclusion of evidence that an alternate suspect, among other
things, had been convicted of a similar crime in the same
geographic area; had been linked to numerous other incidents in
the area in the same general timeframe, including at least three
incidents at the victim’s house; was identified by the victim as a
person she recognized; and more closely matched the victim’s
description than did the defendant).
¶ 66 And although Shanks told the district court on the morning of
trial that Eastman would provide a direct link between Davis and
the crime, Eastman actually testified that Davis was not involved
35
and denied that she had ever told her mother that Davis was
involved. Thus, the evidence created nothing more than “an
unsupported inference or possible ground for suspicion” that Davis
committed the charged crimes. Under these circumstances, the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
2. Any Error by the District Court Was Harmless
¶ 67 Even if we were to assume the district court erred by
precluding certain alternate suspect evidence, we conclude that any
such error was harmless. An evidentiary error precluding a
defendant from presenting evidence may be of constitutional
magnitude “only where the defendant was denied virtually his [or
her] only means of effectively testing significant prosecution
evidence.” People v. Brown, 2014 COA 155M-2, ¶ 6
(quoting Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo. 2009)).
Otherwise, reversal is required only if the error “substantially
influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial.” Brown, ¶
6; see also Elmarr, ¶ 27 (“[T]he right to present a defense is
generally subject to, and constrained by, familiar and well-
established limits on the admissibility of evidence.”).
36
¶ 68 Here, the district court did not preclude defense counsel from
mentioning Davis or arguing his theory of defense that this was a
case of mistaken identity. Defense counsel was still permitted to,
and in fact did, attack Eastman’s credibility by questioning her and
her mother about Davis’s involvement with Eastman and Eastman’s
alleged statements to her mother that Davis was the second
assailant. Thus, despite not receiving a jury instruction on
alternate suspect evidence, the jury had before it sufficient evidence
and argument to understand Shanks’s defense.
¶ 69 Accordingly, even if the district court erred in denying Shanks
his alternate suspect defense, the error was harmless.
V. Use of Nickname
¶ 70 Shanks contends the district court erred by admitting
references to his nickname, “Capone,” which created unfair
prejudice because the name is a “gang name.” We disagree.
A. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 71 The parties disagree as to whether this claim of error was
preserved and what standard of review should apply. Shanks
contends it was preserved by defense counsel’s objection to the
prosecutor’s use of “Capone” as his “moniker” or “alias.” As the
37
transcript reveals, defense counsel suggested that the prosecutor
use the word “nickname” instead of “moniker” or “alias,” the
prosecutor revised his question accordingly, and the district court
never ruled on the objection. Defense counsel did not otherwise
object to the use of the nickname “Capone” throughout the balance
of the trial.
¶ 72 We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an
abuse of discretion. People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44, ¶ 14. If the
alleged evidentiary error is unpreserved, we reverse only if the error
was plain. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. Plain errors are
those that are obvious and substantial and so undermine the
fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on
the judgment of conviction. Id. Because we find the district court
did not abuse its discretion, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute
regarding preservation.
B. Analysis
¶ 73 “[B]ecause ‘gangs are regarded with considerable disfavor by
our society,’ gang-related evidence must be ‘admitted with care.’”
Clark, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Trujillo, 2014 COA 72, ¶ 72). Here,
however, no evidence was presented that Shanks was in a gang,
38
that his nickname was affiliated with a gang, or that this offense
was gang-related. Indeed, the word “gang” was not used once in
front of the jury during trial. The only reason the nickname was
used was because that is the name by which most of the witnesses
knew Shanks. In fact, some of the witnesses did not even know his
real name. And the prosecutor did not use the name as a way of
introducing bad character evidence. It was used merely for
identification, and to argue that the jury should discount good
character testimony from Shanks’s family members because they
did not even know he was nicknamed “Capone.”
¶ 74 Under these circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s decision to allow the use of the nickname.
See People v. Samuels, 228 P.3d 229, 243 (Colo. App. 2009).
VI. Cumulative Error
¶ 75 Lastly, Shanks contends that the cumulative effect of the
errors raised in this appeal warrant reversal. We disagree.
¶ 76 “We will reverse for cumulative error where, although
numerous individual allegations of error may be deemed harmless
and not require reversal, in the aggregate those errors show
prejudice to the defendant’s substantial rights and, thus, the
39
absence of a fair trial.” People v. Stewart, 2017 COA 99, ¶ 39
(quoting People v. Gallegos, 260 P.3d 15, 28-29 (Colo. App. 2010));
see People v. Mendenhall, 2015 COA 107M, ¶ 82. However, for the
doctrine to apply, numerous errors must have been committed, not
merely alleged. People v. Allgier, 2018 COA 122, ¶ 70.
¶ 77 Having found no errors, we reject this contention.
VII. Conclusion
¶ 78 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FURMAN and JUDGE DAVIDSON concur.
40