v. Sharp

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
August 29, 2019
2019COA133
No. 18CA0264, People v. Sharp — Criminal Procedure — New
Trial — Postconviction Remedies — New Trial Based on Newly
Discovered Evidence; Attorneys and Clients — Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
A division of the court of appeals holds that a defendant
asserting a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under Crim. P.
35(c) based on counsel’s failure to file a motion for a new trial must
prove prejudice resulting from the failure. This means the
defendant must prove that the trial court would have granted the
motion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA133
Court of Appeals No. 18CA0264
Adams County District Court No. 11CR1307
Honorable Ted C. Tow, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Harley David Sharp,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Román and Rothenberg*, JJ., concur
Announced August 29, 2019
Dave Young, District Attorney, Michael Whitney, Deputy District Attorney,
Brighton, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Mallika L. Magner, Alternate Defense Counsel, Crested Butte, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2018.
¶1 The People appeal the postconviction court’s order granting
the Crim. P. 35(c)(2) motion of defendant, Harley David Sharp, and
ordering a new trial. We reverse and remand with instructions to
reinstate the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed. We
first conclude that defendant didn’t establish prejudice resulting
from his trial attorney’s failure to investigate. And we conclude that
to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel where counsel
failed to move for a new trial, a defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the court would have granted the
motion. Prejudice can’t be presumed in this situation, and in this
case, defendant didn’t establish a reasonable probability that a
motion for a new trial would have been granted.
I. Background
¶2 The People charged defendant with sexually assaulting his
daughter between 2008 and 2010 when she was between two and
five years old. The victim’s great aunt had reported the assaults to
the department of social services after the victim confided in her
and spontaneously engaged in aggressive sexual behavior in late
2010.
1
¶3 At trial, the victim struggled to remember details. But she
testified that her father had touched her buttocks, touched and
licked her vagina, and had her touch his penis. The victim’s mother
testified that one night she woke up and saw defendant touching
the victim’s vagina while also touching himself. She told defendant
to stop, but she didn’t report the incident. 1 A sexual assault nurse
examiner (SANE) who examined the victim shortly after the victim’s
great aunt reported the assaults testified that she didn’t find any
physical trauma. But according to the SANE, that was a fairly
typical result for the type of contact the victim and her mother
accused defendant of engaging in. (The SANE had been told the
victim hadn’t had any contact with her father for at least two
months.) She also said that only about four percent of the children
she has examined for evidence of sexual assault showed any
physical trauma.
1At the time of trial, the victim’s mother had pleaded guilty to
sexual assault and attempted sexual assault relating to the same
conduct with which defendant was charged, and was serving a
seven-year prison sentence.
2
¶4 A jury found defendant guilty of sexual assault on a child,
sexual assault on a child as a pattern of abuse, and sexual assault
on a child by one in a position of trust.
¶5 At defendant’s sentencing hearing, R.H., a cousin of the
victim’s mother, spoke with defense counsel’s investigator and
made some new allegations. R.H. said that the victim had asked
her “what would happen if I lied?” — a statement R.H. assumed
meant the victim was lying about her father assaulting her. R.H.
also told the investigator that, in 2010, the victim’s grandmother
had offered to pay R.H. to make false allegations of sexual assault
against the grandmother’s husband (or ex-husband) to get “revenge”
against him for refusing to pay rent to her. Defense counsel didn’t
move for a new trial based on R.H.’s allegations.
¶6 A division of this court affirmed defendant’s convictions on
direct appeal. People v. Sharp, (Colo. App. No. 13CA1761, June 11,
2015) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).
¶7 Defendant filed a pro se motion (followed shortly thereafter by
a supplemental motion from newly appointed postconviction
defense counsel) for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c). He
sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence (see Crim. P.
3
35(c)(2)(V)) — specifically, the information R.H. had given the
investigator — and alleged that his trial counsel had been
ineffective in a variety of ways (see Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I)). As now
relevant, defendant alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to investigate potential witnesses (one of whom
was R.H.) and by failing to move for a new trial under Crim. P. 33
after R.H. came forward with new information.
¶8 The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion. Defendant testified that in late 2007 or early 2008, the
grandmother picked up the victim from the babysitter and took her
home to defendant. The grandmother told him that she had seen
inflammation and green discharge on the victim’s vaginal area after
picking her up. He said that he “flipped” and took the victim to the
hospital, where a doctor examined her and didn’t find any
inflammation or green discharge. He said he told trial counsel
about the incident before trial, but counsel failed to investigate
further or to seek information from the hospital where the victim
had been examined. R.H. testified about her conversations with the
victim, the grandmother, and the defense investigator.
4
¶9 The postconviction court rejected many of defendant’s claims,
but found merit in two. First, it found trial counsel’s failure to
investigate defendant’s assertion that he had taken the victim to a
hospital to be examined during the same period he was allegedly
assaulting her was ineffective assistance that prejudiced defendant.
On this basis, the court vacated defendant’s convictions and
ordered a new trial. Second, it found that trial counsel’s failure to
move for a new trial after R.H. came forward was ineffective
assistance. The court said it did not need to determine whether
such a motion would have been successful, reasoning that the
failure to move for a new trial is like a failure to perfect an appeal, a
circumstance in which the loss of the appellate proceeding
constitutes the required prejudice. So the remedy for a failure to
move for a new trial, the court said, would be to restore defendant’s
opportunity to seek a new trial. 2
2 The court addressed this issue only as a backstop in case this
court disagreed with its conclusion on the prior hospital visit issue.
There would be no point in allowing defendant to move for a new
trial if this court were to affirm the postconviction court’s ruling
granting a new trial.
5
II. Discussion
¶ 10 The People challenge both of the postconviction court’s bases
for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with them as
to both.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 11 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under
Rule 35(c), a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). There is a strong presumption that
counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Id. at 689. To prove prejudice, the defendant must
show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 694; accord Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 76
(Colo. 2003) (“[A] reasonable probability means a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”).
¶ 12 A postconviction court’s ruling on a Rule 35(c) motion presents
a mixed question of fact and law. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054,
1063 (Colo. 2007). We defer to the court’s findings of fact if they
6
have record support, but we review any legal conclusions de novo.
Id. These legal conclusions to which we do not defer include “the
ultimate determinations on Strickland’s performance and prejudice
prongs.” People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M, ¶ 16; see People v.
Newmiller, 2014 COA 84, ¶ 18.
B. Analysis
1. Failure to Investigate
¶ 13 The postconviction court found that trial counsel’s failure to
further investigate the 2007 or 2008 hospital visit met both
Strickland prongs: (1) it fell below the objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) “[t]his information, if true, may very well
have had some impact on the jury’s consideration of the facts.”
This is so, the court said, because this evidence would have shown
“that during the same time period Defendant was alleged to have
been perpetrating upon this child, the child was examined by a
doctor, who had found no signs of physical abuse.” The court
concluded that “while it is entirely possible that a jury will still
convict Defendant, the Court finds that the confidence in the verdict
is sufficiently undermined[.]”
7
¶ 14 We don’t address the postconviction court’s finding of
ineffective assistance because we disagree with its ultimate
determination of prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“[A]
court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant
as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”); People v. Villanueva, 2016
COA 70, ¶ 66 (“If a court determines that a defendant has failed to
prove either prong of the Strickland analysis, it may deny an
ineffective assistance claim without addressing the other prong.”).
¶ 15 To show prejudice, defendant had to show a reasonable
probability that the result of the trial would have been different had
defense counsel investigated the hospital visit and introduced
related evidence at trial. See Villanueva, ¶ 67 (A defendant “must
do more than simply allege that other evidence could have aided his
defense; he must identify the evidence and demonstrate that it
would have advanced his defense.”); People v. Pendleton, 2015 COA
154, ¶ 34 (“[T]he mere possibility that additional investigation
would have revealed useful information does not establish
ineffective assistance.”).
8
¶ 16 We conclude that, for the following reasons, defendant failed to
meet his burden:
• The SANE who examined the victim in early 2011
testified that only four percent of over 600 children
whom she had examined for sexual assault showed
signs of irritation or trauma. She explained that
children heal “really quickly” and often the abuse is
“gentle.” Defense counsel didn’t challenge any of that
testimony (and defendant doesn’t contend he should
have).
• The People didn’t allege that defendant had committed
any acts of penetration or any other forceful acts one
might expect to cause physical trauma.3
• The first examination of the victim allegedly occurred in
late 2007 or early 2008. There was therefore only a
small overlap, if any, between the time of that
examination and the period covering the charges
3 The People argued and presented evidence of only nonforceful
touching and licking. The jury made specific findings as to the
particular acts defendant had committed. All involved “touching” or
“licking” either the victim’s or defendant’s genitals.
9
(January 1, 2008, to December 10, 2010). Indeed, the
evidence strongly points to defendant having committed
the charged acts in 2010, two or more years after the
first examination. The victim testified that she was six
years old when defendant touched her. (She actually
didn’t turn six until July 5, 2011.) Her mother testified
that she saw one of the incidents in the summer of
2010. (She claimed to have seen only that one
incident.) Defendant testified that he was separated
from the victim’s mother from July 2008 to August
2010, he was homeless during much of that time, the
victim lived with her mother during that time, and he
had very little contact with the victim during that time.
And the victim told her great aunt about defendant’s
acts in late 2010, about the same time the great aunt
noticed the victim exhibiting inappropriate sexual
behavior.
• This wasn’t a typical child sex assault case, where the
only evidence is the child victim’s testimony. As noted,
the victim’s mother testified that she once saw
10
defendant touching the victim while the victim’s pants
were down. And the mother had pleaded guilty to a
sexual offense against the victim arising from that
incident.
¶ 17 In light of all this, we conclude that the potential evidence of
the first examination would have had only minimal relevance, and
virtually no exculpatory value. The nature of the charged conduct
(supported by both the victim’s and her mother’s testimony) and the
SANE’s testimony were entirely consistent with any finding of no
physical trauma.
¶ 18 Though defendant argues that taking his daughter to a
hospital for a sexual assault examination isn’t the conduct of one
who has sexually assaulted his daughter, and therefore evidence of
that event would have negatively impacted the victim’s and her
mother’s credibility, he overstates the point. After all, there was a
potential gap of more than two years between the first examination
and the acts with which he was charged.
¶ 19 Defendant’s argument that the evidence would have
undermined the grandmother’s credibility fares no better.
11
¶ 20 According to defendant’s testimony at the postconviction
hearing, it was the grandmother who told defendant the victim may
have been sexually assaulted by a babysitter, which prompted him
to take the victim to the hospital in late 2007 or early 2008. So,
defendant says, had the jury learned that the grandmother had
accused someone else of sexually assaulting the victim, it might
have viewed her less credibly. But the grandmother’s credibility
wasn’t an issue at trial. She didn’t testify, and no one testified that
the grandmother had ever accused defendant of sexually assaulting
the victim.4 The only things mentioned about the grandmother
were that she sometimes babysat the victim and had spoken to the
victim about defendant after the police arrested defendant. 5
¶ 21 In sum, defense counsel’s failure to investigate the 2007 or
2008 examination doesn’t undermine our confidence in the
4 The grandmother didn’t testify because defense counsel
successfully argued she shouldn’t be allowed to do so because her
presence during the victim’s testimony violated the court’s
sequestration order. Defendant has never asserted that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance in making that request.
5 The victim testified that her grandmother talked to her (after she
had come forward) about getting her father help and had told her to
“just say the truth.”
12
outcome of the trial. The postconviction court therefore erred in
setting aside defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial.
2. Failure to Move for a New Trial
¶ 22 Though we reverse the postconviction court’s decision to set
aside defendant’s convictions, we also must address its finding that
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a new
trial. This is so because the postconviction court ordered that
defendant be allowed to file a motion for a new trial in the event we
reversed its decision to vacate the convictions. Such a motion could
conceivably result in a new trial. Functionally, therefore, the
postconviction court’s ruling on the failure to move for a new trial
could have the same effect as a ruling setting aside the convictions.
We conclude that the postconviction court erred in granting
defendant relief on this claim.
¶ 23 The postconviction court concluded that counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to move for a new trial after R.H.
came forward at the sentencing hearing. The court reasoned that
R.H.’s assertion that the grandmother had offered to pay R.H. to
falsely accuse the grandmother’s husband to get revenge against
her husband and R.H.’s assertion that the victim had said “what
13
would happen if I lied?” were “potentially exculpatory.” That
information, the court said, could have affected the jury’s
assessment of the victim’s credibility and supported “the possible
defense that [the grandmother] planted the allegations with the
[victim].” (Emphasis added.) So, the court concluded, trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion for a new
trial based on this “newly discovered” evidence.
¶ 24 But the court didn’t find that this evidence met the test for
granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Indeed,
the court said it didn’t need to “determine whether a new trial
would have been granted.” Instead, citing People v. Long, 126 P.3d
284, 286 (Colo. App. 2005), the court determined that, like the
forfeiture of an appeal, “the loss of the ability to present an
argument for a new trial is sufficient prejudice under Strickland.”
¶ 25 The postconviction court erred in relieving defendant of the
obligation to show Strickland prejudice. And because defendant
didn’t establish that the new evidence met the requirements for
granting a new trial, the postconviction court erred in granting
defendant relief on this claim.
14
a. Defendant Was Required to Show Strickland Prejudice
¶ 26 To reiterate, Strickland generally requires a showing that the
defendant was prejudiced — that is, that there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different but for counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687-88, 694. Such proof of actual prejudice is necessary
because of the “strong presumption of reliability” attached to the
judgment. Id. at 696; see Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286
(2000); People v. Valdez, 178 P.3d 1269, 1278 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 27 Only in very limited circumstances is prejudice presumed. A
complete denial of counsel falls in this category, United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984), as does a complete failure to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, id.
at 659, and a situation in which even fully competent counsel
couldn’t provide effective assistance, id. at 659-60.
¶ 28 More specifically relevant to this case, so does counsel’s failure
to perfect a defendant’s desired appeal. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470, 483-84 (2000); Long, 126 P.3d at 286-87. In such a case,
the deficiency “deprive[s] [the defendant] of the appellate proceeding
altogether.” Roe, 528 U.S. at 483; accord Long, 126 P.3d at 286;
15
see also Roe, 528 U.S. at 483 (comparing the complete denial of
counsel, for which prejudice need not be shown, to “[t]he even more
serious denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself, . . . to which
[the defendant] had a right”). The upshot is that unlike a case
where the defendant claims his counsel provided ineffective
assistance during the appeal, for which the defendant must show
that he would have prevailed on appeal but for the deficient
performance, Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285 (unreasonable failure to file
a merits brief on appeal required showing of actual prejudice); Long,
126 P.3d at 286, in the circumstance where counsel fails to appeal
in contravention of a defendant’s wishes, no such showing is
required.
¶ 29 In Valdez, a division of this court extended this principle to a
case in which postconviction counsel failed to timely pursue a
motion under Crim. P. 35(c) as requested by the defendant,
resulting in the postconviction court deeming the motion barred by
the doctrine of laches. 178 P.3d at 1273-75. In reversing, the
division concluded that because counsel’s ineffectiveness had
caused the defendant to be denied “the judicial proceeding he
16
sought” — the Rule 35(c) proceeding — the defendant didn’t have to
show Strickland prejudice. Id. at 1278-80.
¶ 30 Our takeaways from this line of authority are (1) absent one of
the situations identified in Cronic, a defendant must show actual
prejudice unless counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the forfeiture of a
“proceeding” in its entirety; and (2) a “proceeding” in this context
means the whole of a discrete phase of a criminal prosecution. In
Colorado, these discrete phases include (1) a trial proceeding, from
the commencement of the case to the resolution of all allowed post-
judgment, pre-appeal motions in the trial court; (2) an appellate
proceeding, including at least a defendant’s appeal as a matter of
right to this court; 6 and (3) a postconviction proceeding under Rule
35(c).
¶ 31 With these principles in mind, we hold that counsel’s failure in
this case to file a motion for a new trial didn’t result in the forfeiture
of an entire proceeding but was, at most, ineffective assistance in
6 We need not decide whether supreme court review, to which, with
the exception of capital cases, a defendant has no right, constitutes
a separate proceeding. We observe, however, that in People v.
Valdez, 789 P.2d 406, 410-11 (Colo. 1990), the supreme court held
that a defendant who claimed that his counsel should have filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari after an adverse decision by the court
of appeals was required to show prejudice.
17
the course of a trial proceeding. And just as a defendant must
show actual prejudice as a result of deficient performance in the
course of an appellate proceeding, see Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285;
People v. Valdez, 789 P.2d 406, 409-10 (Colo. 1990), or in the
course of a Rule 35(c) proceeding, see People v. Fitzgerald, 973 P.2d
708, 712-13 (Colo. App. 1998) (court properly denied postconviction
relief where the defendant failed to show any prejudice caused by
the previous postconviction counsel’s actions), a defendant is
required to show prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient
performance in the course of a trial proceeding, see Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 695-98 (2002) (where counsel didn’t entirely fail to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,
but merely failed to do so at specific points — by failing to adduce
mitigating evidence and failing to make a closing argument —
prejudice would not be presumed).
¶ 32 Consider the analogous circumstance of counsel failing to
move to suppress evidence. Such a motion, like a motion for a new
trial, is filed within a proceeding. And granting a motion to
suppress may result in the dismissal of charges. Yet, the Supreme
Court has held that a defendant seeking postconviction relief based
18
on counsel’s failure to file such a motion must demonstrate actual
Strickland prejudice by proving that the motion would have been
granted. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (“[T]he
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been different absent the excludable
evidence . . . .”); accord People v. Terry, 2019 COA 9, ¶ 31; People v.
Vicente-Sontay, 2014 COA 175, ¶ 23.
¶ 33 Consider as well the equally analogous circumstance of
counsel failing to move for a judgment of acquittal. In that
circumstance, a defendant must also show Strickland prejudice.
See, e.g., Rivera-Rivera v. United States, 827 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir.
2016) (a defendant must satisfy the prejudice prong when seeking
relief for ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure
to move for acquittal); Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 442-
43 (Pa. 2011) (the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim failed where he
did not demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the trial court
would have granted a motion for judgment on [sic] acquittal”).
¶ 34 We don’t see any principled difference in this context between
failing to file a motion to suppress or failing to move for a judgment
19
of acquittal and failing to file a motion for a new trial. As we see it,
all such failures are failures within a proceeding, not failures that
deprive a defendant of “an entire judicial proceeding.”
¶ 35 Rule 35(c) itself also supports our conclusion. Subsection
(c)(2)(V) says that a defendant may seek postconviction relief if
there exists evidence of material facts, not
theretofore presented and heard, which, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, could not
have been known to or learned by the
defendant or his attorney prior to the
submission of the issues to the court or jury,
and which requires vacation of the conviction
or sentence in the interest of justice.
In other words, a defendant may obtain postconviction relief under
Rule 35(c)(2)(V) based on newly discovered evidence only by making
essentially the same showing required to succeed on a Crim. P. 33
post-trial motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. See People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547, 559-60 (Colo.
1981) (setting forth a defendant’s burden on a Rule 33 motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence); People v. Gee, 2015
COA 151, ¶ 73 (same); People v. Muniz, 928 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Colo.
App. 1996) (holding that the same elements apply to a claim under
Rule 35(c)(2)(V)). A defendant may not avoid that burden simply by
20
repackaging his newly discovered evidence claim as one for
ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 36 As noted, the only case the postconviction court cited in
support of its conclusion was Long. Long, however, involved the
forfeiture of the entire appellate proceeding. Defendant doesn’t cite
any case, and we haven’t found one, in Colorado or elsewhere,
indicating that losing the opportunity to move for a new trial is a
forfeiture of an entire judicial proceeding such that a showing of
Strickland prejudice isn’t required. On the contrary, numerous
cases hold that a showing of Strickland prejudice is required in this
context. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 663 F.3d 726, 742-43
(4th Cir. 2011) (a defendant must show a likelihood of prevailing on
a motion for a new trial to establish prejudice based on counsel’s
failure to file such a motion); Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 991
(9th Cir. 1999) (“[B]ecause the motion [for a new trial] almost
certainly would have failed, [the defendant] has not demonstrated
that he was prejudiced by counsel’s refusal to make it.”); Manley v.
State, 605 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (there is no
per se entitlement to relief when counsel fails to file a timely motion
for a new trial); State v. C.D.L., 250 P.3d 69, 80-81 (Utah Ct. App.
21
2011) (the defendant failed to show prejudice from counsel’s failure
to move for a new trial because he couldn’t show that he was
entitled to a new trial). 7 For the reasons discussed above, we find
these authorities persuasive.
b. Defendant Failed to Show Strickland Prejudice
¶ 37 To show that a motion for a new trial would have succeeded,
defendant had to show at the postconviction hearing that (1) the
evidence — R.H.’s testimony about what the victim and the
7 See also, e.g., Ingram v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 736 F. App’x 798,
801 (11th Cir. 2018) (no deficient performance or prejudice where
the defendant can’t show he would have been entitled to a new trial
if his counsel had filed a motion); Weaver v. United States, 793 F.3d
857, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2015) (the defendant wasn’t prejudiced by
counsel’s failure to move for a new trial when evidence wasn’t newly
discovered); Diaz v. United States, 298 F. App’x 858, 859-61 (11th
Cir. 2008) (newly discovered impeachment evidence was insufficient
to justify a new trial, so the defendant failed to show that there was
a reasonable probability of a different result had her counsel filed a
motion for a new trial); Jewson v. Crosby, No. 3:04CV71/MCR/MD,
2005 WL 1684209, at *7-8 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2005) (unpublished
report and recommendation) (declining the defendant’s request to
presume prejudice where counsel failed to move for a new trial; loss
of an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial is not a
forfeiture of an entire judicial proceeding), adopted as modified,
2005 WL 1692617 (N.D. Fla. June 16, 2005) (unpublished opinion),
aff’d, 174 F. App’x 529 (11th Cir. 2006); State v. Batek, 638 S.W.2d
809, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“The fact of untimely filing [for a
motion for new trial], by itself, does not compel reversal; it is also
essential that the defendant show some error by the trial court
which could have resulted in a successful appeal, had the motion
been filed on time.”).
22
grandmother had said to her — was discovered after trial; (2) he
and his attorney were diligent in attempting to uncover it before
trial; (3) the evidence would have been material and not merely
cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence probably would
have resulted in an acquittal if presented at trial. Gutierrez, 622
P.2d at 559; see Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(V). He failed to meet that burden.
¶ 38 Initially, we reject defendant’s argument that the
postconviction court “implicitly” found all of these factors save
whether he could have discovered the evidence through the exercise
of reasonable diligence before trial. The court specifically said that
it need not determine whether a motion would have been
successful, and its order doesn’t include an express finding on any
of the required elements. Nor, contrary to defendant’s assertion,
does the record of the postconviction hearing establish all of the
required elements.
¶ 39 First of all, defendant knew of R.H. before trial. Though he
testified that he told his attorney about R.H. before trial, the
postconviction court found him not credible on that point.
Defendant’s failure to tell his attorney of a potential defense witness
of which he was aware is, by itself, enough to defeat any newly
23
discovered evidence claim. Cf. People v. Gallegos, 187 Colo. 6, 10,
528 P.2d 229, 231 (1974) (“Clearly, evidence within the defendant’s
knowledge before trial does not constitute newly discovered
evidence.”).
¶ 40 Second, the evidence that the victim asked R.H. “what would
happen if I lied” may have been of some impeachment value, but
not enough to be of “consequence to the outcome.” Farrar v. People,
208 P.3d 702, 707 (Colo. 2009) (The evidence “must be of sufficient
consequence for reasons other than its ability to impeach, or cast
doubt upon, the evidence already presented at trial. It must be
consequential in the sense of being affirmatively probative of the
defendant’s innocence, whether that is accomplished by helping to
demonstrate that someone else probably committed the crime; that
the defendant probably could not have committed the crime; or
even that the crime was probably not committed at all.”) (citations
omitted).
¶ 41 To the contrary, when R.H.’s testimony is read in context, it is
more likely that the victim (if she said this at all) was wondering
whether she should lie by saying defendant hadn’t assaulted her.
On this issue, R.H. testified in full as follows:
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And on the drive home one day we were talking
about her dad. And the conversation got
brought up that he was going to be going away
to get some help. And I asked [the victim] — I
said, well, why do you think your daddy needs
help. And she said well because he did bad
things to me. And I said are you sure. What
kind of things did he do to you. And she said,
well, just bad things, I don’t know, just bad
things. And so then the conversation went on
and at the end of the conversation she said,
well, what would happen if I lied.
R.H. questioned the victim’s stated desire to get “help” for her father
and whether the victim was sure her father had done “bad things”
to her. This could have been perceived by the victim as pressure
not to testify against her father. All in all, the exchange was
ambiguous.
¶ 42 Defendant doesn’t explain how R.H.’s testimony about the
grandmother’s offer to pay R.H. to lie about having been assaulted
by the grandmother’s husband would have been admissible.
Because the grandmother didn’t testify, and because the
grandmother’s statements to R.H. would have been offered for their
truth, R.H.’s statements would have been inadmissible hearsay at
trial. See CRE 801, 802. And because there was no evidence of any
discussion between the victim and her grandmother about
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defendant’s touching of the victim (or anything else) before the
victim’s outcry, any assertion that the grandmother’s effort to enlist
R.H. in a scheme to falsely accuse the grandmother’s husband
raised the possibility that the grandmother had similarly attempted
to influence the victim would have been utter speculation. It
therefore wouldn’t have been relevant even if it wasn’t inadmissible
hearsay. See CRE 401, 402 (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible).
¶ 43 In sum, we conclude that there isn’t a reasonable probability
that defendant would have been granted a new trial had counsel
brought the motion. It follows that defendant isn’t entitled to move
for a new trial.
III. Conclusion
¶ 44 We reverse the order and remand the case to the district court
to reinstate defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE ROTHENBERG concur.
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